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ABSTRACT

Scholarly discourse on socioeconomic development in Africa is replete with suggestions that “disloyalty,” perceived or real, and opposition to the state hamper access to public goods and services for “dissident” communities. However, few studies present empirical evidence to substantiate or refute this widely held assumption. With the objective of bridging this gap, this study examines the Kenyan case, with special reference to the Luo community, which has consistently opposed the country’s post-independence governments. It poses the following question: how have antagonistic relations, between the governments of independent Kenya and the Luo, influenced the socioeconomic development of the country, in general, and that of the Luo community in particular? Based on Michel Foucault’s concept of “archaeology of power,” it derives evidence from Kenya’s budget speeches, statistical abstracts and economic surveys, to establish socioeconomic development outcomes in the country. Concerned with equity, it examines public provision trends regarding the following four indicators of socioeconomic development: education, healthcare, housing, and rural water supplies. It finds that marginalization in the provision of public goods and services is not always factual; accordingly, it partly concludes, to avoid ethnic animosity, bitterness, and anti-state feelings by disenfranchised citizens, African states should ensure inclusivity and representativeness in government.

Keywords: *Socioeconomic development, Africa, Kenya, Ethnicity; Public goods and services, Luo.*

Introduction

Of the numerous devastating legacies bequeathed to independent Africa by European colonizers, perhaps the most prominent and durable one has been the ill-informed, egregious idea that governance and economic development policy and practice should be chauvinistically linked to ethnic and racial identity, the latter of which are more often than not socially constructed, ideologically-ensconced and, therefore, fluid, completely unjustified, ludicrous and most definitely lacking in substance. Indeed, European colonial domination and practice across Africa was characterized by what Nyabira and Ayele (2016, 132) have described as “divide and rule ... policy, [in which the authorities] chose individuals from specific ethnic communities, to the exclusion of others to allow access to the [particular] country’s political and administrative institutions, as a reward for this collaboration.” About Kenya, Shutzer (2012, 348) states that:

[t]o implement their policies, the colonial government appointed ‘chiefs’, whose authority had pseudo-traditional power. With the help of these ‘Loyalists’, a small settler population was able to coerce labour and control the best land in the colony. ... For their services, these chiefs received access to land in the native reserves, and other incentives that would distinguish them from the impoverished majority.

Undoubtedly, discriminatory forms of governance were considerably birthed and nurtured in the colonial era; the painful reality, however, is that it seems that skewed allocation of state resources, now largely conducted along the lines of ethnicity, persists in the cradle of humankind more than half a century after the exit of the colonialist and in a world in which the universally accepted fact, at least on paper, is that all humans are created equal. As argued by Ilorah (2009, 698), “[s]ince the independence of new nation-states, Africans have simply continued with the same politics of extraction and divide-and-rule rather than with good investment and the unification of diverse ethnic groups.” This phenomenon, responsible for “caus[ing] resentment among marginalised ethnic groups, fuell[ing] conflicts and sometimes wars, and discourag[ing] investments, retarding growth and development prospects,” (Ilorah 2009, 696) appears to cut across Africa and prevails in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire (see Achimugu, Ata-Agboni, & Aliyu 2013; Attafuah 2009; Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; Ogwang 2011).

In the case of Kenya, whose independence ushered in an era of resource distribution that was dependent on politics and ethnicity (Throup 1987), recent studies have suggested that, among the Luo, there is a strong feeling that the community has been discriminated against by the country’s central government, with regard to the allocation of the national largesse, owing to consistent opposition politics in the independence era (see Omulo 2018; Omulo & Williams 2018). These findings appear to support the sentiments of Megan Shutzer (2012), above, that there is a direct correlation between “loyalty” to the state in Africa, or lack thereof, and socioeconomic development or well-being.

But are these findings factual or are they mere exaggerations and self-indulgent opinions?

With the objective of certifying the validity of the aforementioned sentiments of the Kenya's Luo community, this study, which is inspired by Foucault's (1972) concept of "archaeology of power,"¹ looks to independent Kenya's historical records—budget speeches, economic surveys and statistical abstracts—to establish the proportions and outcomes of public investment undertaken by the Government of Kenya (GoK) in the country's eight provinces from 1963–2003. The study poses the following research questions: how have antagonistic relations, between the governments of independent Kenya and the Luo, influenced the socioeconomic development of the country, in general, and that of the Luo community in particular? What are the specifics of the negative socioeconomic consequences of political marginalization within the Kenyan context? The analysis presented here is centred on four areas of public provision, as follows: education, healthcare, housing, and rural water supplies. It is divided into four sequentially presented historical phases, namely: i) *1963–1973: The Era of Squatter Settlement and Debt Accumulation in Kenya*; ii) *1973–1983: The Era of the Exposure of the Uncertainties of Capitalism in Kenya*; iii) *1983–1993: The Era of Export-oriented Industrialization and Rationalization of Expenditure in Kenya*; and iv) *1993–2003: The Era of Neoliberalism in Kenya*. The study concerns itself with equity—in terms of equality of access to opportunity, equality of participation in the opportunity, and the outcome of equal participation (see Mészáros 2001a; Mészáros 2001b; Mészáros 2010). It is hoped that the findings of this study will contribute towards the increasingly important discourse on the correlation between identity politics and socioeconomic development in the cradle of humankind.

Contextual Background, Methodology, Research Scope, and Limitations

Kenya consists of over 40 ethnic groups, "of which the Kikuyu are the largest, comprising between 17 and 20 per cent of the population. The Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin and Kamba each represent between 10 and 14 per cent of the population (Burchard 2015)." The country has had four presidents so far, as follows: Jomo Kenyatta a Kikuyu (1963–1978); Daniel arap Moi a Kalenjin (1978–2002); Mwai Kibaki a Kikuyu (2002–2013); and Uhuru Kenyatta a Kikuyu and son of Jomo (2013 to date). According to Burchard (2015, 334), "[i]t has been alleged that Kenyatta demonstrated ethnic favouritism in appointing cabinet members, staffing bureaucracies, allotting desirable plots of land, and in securing business contracts." Moi, "much like his predecessor, favoured his co-ethnics (Burchard 2015, 334)." And, "Mwai Kibaki ... was no exception to this since, having assumed the presidency after Moi, he also

¹In his approach to writing history, Foucault begins by identifying the problem. He then works through historical archives of particular societies to disclose the discursive formations (or events) that have led to the field of inquiry (problem).

increasingly preferred his Kikuyu kinsmen in political appointments (Nyabira & Ayele 2016, 133).” The genesis of the animosity between the Luo and the GoK was as explained below:

Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), Kenya’s founding father, was capitalist-oriented and his leadership style largely favored local and international elites. In contrast, his deputy, Jaramogi (a Luo), was a socialist-leaning, populist politician whose approach and vision prioritized the welfare of the Kenyan masses. Because of their ideological differences and ensuing power struggles, Kenyatta frustrated Odinga politically by masterminding the creation of eight posts of party vice-chairman within the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), in 1966. With his powers clipped, for the position of vice-chair had hitherto been exclusively his, Odinga resigned and ventured into opposition politics. This separation set in motion the fierce Kikuyu-Luo rivalry that characterizes contemporary Kenyan society and politics. During Kenya’s 2017 presidential elections, Jomo’s son, Uhuru Kenyatta, ran as the incumbent and Raila Odinga, Jaramogi’s son, was his main challenger. (Omulo 2018, 301–302)

The country, which is now administratively divided into 47 counties, each under the leadership of a governor, has historically, up to 2013 when Kenya’s new constitution was operationalized, comprised eight provinces, viz.: Central (Kikuyuland), Coast, Eastern, Nairobi, North Eastern, Nyanza (Luoland), Rift Valley (Kalenjinland) and Western. These provinces were essentially the result of European colonial mapping and land policy which “most decidedly intersected with the creation of ‘native reserves’, a concept that embedded ethnic identity in geographical space, assigning specific parts of the country to specific ethnic groups” (Shutzer 2012, 348).

This study analyses the following historical records from independent Kenya: Budget Statements for the fiscal years 1962–1963 to 2001–2002; Statistical Abstracts (Statistical Abstract 1963 to Statistical Abstract 2002) and Economic Surveys (Economic Survey 1963 to Economic Survey 2002); these documents provide public provision statistics, for the aforementioned eight provinces, and, despite a few inconsistencies, they make for a pretty decent source of data, through which narratives as to “how” and “why” economic marginalization of the Luo might have occurred from 1963–2002 can be constructed. The study’s main limitation is the fact that the figures provided for Nyanza Province, in the statistical abstracts and economic surveys, have been taken to wholly represent Luo interests when, in fact, the province is also home to the Kisii and Kuria ethnic groups. The findings, however, can still be largely relied upon for the Luo are overwhelmingly predominant in this province and Luo Nyanza forms a considerable part of it. The research findings should, therefore, proffer crucial erudition with respect to the effects of governance formations on the lives of ordinary citizens at the grassroots level of society in the African country. Furthermore, the research strategy espoused in this study may be employed in other contexts for the purpose of examining socioeconomic development in Africa.

Theoretical Framework

This study is mainly guided by the proposition advanced by Ilorah (2009, 695), who has argued that “[t]he leadership in many African countries, with their ethnic diversities, is characterised by ethnic bias and favouritism, and citizens are thus treated unequally in many respects, particularly when it comes to national resource allocation.” From Ilorah’s premise, we can draw the following inferences about ethnicity and development in Africa: i) that whoever lacks political power cannot chart their own economic destiny and is at the mercy of the custodian of the state; ii) that political power is a vehicle to prosperity in the continent; and iii) that there is a strong link between opposition politics and dwindling socioeconomic fortunes in Africa. However, owing to the fact that there is no agreement regarding how to understand the ethnicized politics in Kenya, various rival explanations of the Kenyan case have emerged to elucidate uneven and/or unequal development in the Kenyan state vis-à-vis its Luo community. This phenomenon can best be explained by the certitude that ethnicity is an emotive issue. Analysts, therefore, sometimes fail the test of neutrality and/or objective description. This study considers the arguments and theoretical propositions of Oloo (2004) and Kuria (2011) equally important in the examination of Kenya’s socioeconomic development because case study research methodology involves identifying rival explanations at the outset of the research process and considering these rival explanations during the interpretation of a study’s findings. Since Oloo’s (2004) arguments are based on the *Theory of Uneven Development*, I’ll introduce this theory first, before examining the analyst’s contentions.

The *Theory of Uneven Development* was first propounded fully by Lenin in 1915; its precepts derive from the works of Marx—Capital and Grundrisse (Bond 1999). It is founded on Marx’s argument that “capitalism ... [leads to] the simultaneous emergence of concentrations of wealth and capital (for capitalists), on the one hand, and poverty and oppression (for workers), on the other (Bond 1999, 1198).” The emergence of the phenomenon (uneven development), which can be associated with “differential growth of sectors, geographical processes, classes and regions at the global, regional, national, sub-national and local level” (Bond 1999, 1198) has been explained in various ways by different scholars: whilst Smith (2010) attributes it to rampant development of division of labor, Mandel (1962, as cited in Bond 1999) perceives it as the result of variation in finesse amongst distinct producers in a given community, prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature.

Basing his arguments on the *Theory of Uneven Development*, Oloo (2004) contends that poverty in Luo Nyanza can be explained by the fact that:

[C]apitalism develops in contradictory ways both within the boundaries of a single country, across regions and a global scale. Well known examples include South Africa under apartheid where you basically had two nations and two economies co-existing within the confines of a single racist state; some have cited

the North/South divide within Nigeria, Uganda, Italy, Sudan and other parts of the world. (para. 1)

According to Oloo (2004), the colonial history of Kenya depicts a situation in which the British pursued a policy of uneven development flagrantly and unashamedly. Infrastructure growth and expansion was carried out in correspondence with colonial economic concerns, pursuits and investments. The reason for “the social and economic disparities between towns and the countryside, various districts and provinces and even within individual towns, districts and provinces (Oloo, 2004, para. 4),” lies in this phenomenon. Therefore, impoverishment in any region of the country can neither be attributed directly to the inhabitants nor to superficial ethnic rivalry amongst various ethnic groups (Oloo, 2004).

Another rival explanation on the economic state of Luo Nyanza is based on the concept of poor leadership. Kuria (2011, para. 2) argues that “since independence, the political leadership of the region has held the people hostage to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except themselves for the region’s woes.” According to him, underdevelopment in the traditional homeland of the Luo community is as a result of the culture of overdependence on the government and lack of personal initiative. He suggests that the region needs to make the fishing industry its focal point and modernize it—proceeds from which would uplift the locals. If deployed for irrigation purposes, he argues, Luo Nyanza’s plentiful water sources could transmute the region into the country’s new bread basket. He also advocates for the resuscitation of industries such as Kisumu Cotton Mills (KICOMI), which slumped in 1999.

Results

1963–1973: The Era of Squatter Settlement and Debt Accumulation in Kenya


The period 1963–1973 was largely one in which the newly independent nation of Kenya accumulated debt for the purposes of resettling its landless squatter population and meeting its usual recurrent and development expenditures. Nevertheless, this historical phase will go down as a glorious decade when compared to others that followed it; the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was both stable and consistent, as depicted in figure 1 and table 1 below.

Table 1. *Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1963–1973*

YEAR	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
GDP GROWTH (%)	6.5	5.3	0.8	10.4	4.7	6.6	5.6	6.3	5.7	6.9	6.5

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1963–1973.

Figure 1. Kenya's GDP Growth Rate, 1963–1973




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya's Economic Surveys, 1963–1973

The highest GDP growth rate was recorded in 1966 and the decade's average GDP growth rate—approximately six percent—was impressive. Although borrowing for purposes of development was intense at this time, the GoK seemingly struck a good balance between proposed development projects and programmes, and its spending capacity. The outcomes of public investment instigated at the national level of government with a focus on four areas of public provision— education, health services, housing, and water supplies—is examined next.

Education Outcomes, 1963–1973

The outcome of GoK public investment in primary school education was as depicted in figure 2 below; the GoK provides figures of enrolment in primary school, from the year 1965, which serves as the beginning point in the analysis of this particular public provision.


Figure 2. *Primary school enrolment by province, 1965–1973*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1965–1973

The outcome of GoK investment in primary education shows that the greatest beneficiary was the president’s backyard—Central Province—which experienced a continuous steady rise in enrolment figures. Eastern was second, followed by Nyanza, the ancestral homeland of the Luo, Rift Valley, and Western, in that order. Coast, Nairobi and North Eastern were sixth, seventh and eighth, respectively. Although Nyanza witnessed a general growth in primary school enrolment over this historical phase, continuous stable progress was not witnessed in the province until after 1970. This is unlike Central and Eastern, whose figures show stable growth throughout this historical phase. A vast majority of the country’s school-going population lives in the rural areas of the country; this largely explains the poor performances of Nairobi and Coast Provinces, which are home to some of the country’s largest metropolitan areas. North Eastern, on the other hand, is a very sparsely populated arid area. The enrolment outcomes at the secondary school level were as shown in figure 3 below.

Figure 3. *Secondary school enrolment by province, 1968–1973*




Source: Constructed from Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968–1973.

In a trend similar to the one depicted in the primary school category, the president’s backyard led in the secondary school enrolment numbers, which were characterized by a steady rise throughout the period 1968–1973. It is striking that the other provinces, especially Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western, which performed well in enrolment at a primary level, did not witness the same success in this category. The fact that Nairobi, which enrolled far fewer pupils at the primary level, consistently recorded greater numbers at the secondary level than the aforementioned four provinces, shows that transition rates to secondary school in the rest of Kenya were very poor. This indicates that the Luo and other non-Kikuyu Kenyan ethnic groups did not have equality of participation in secondary education during the first decade of independence in Kenya. The dismal figures recorded by the North Eastern Province can be explained by the fact that it is a very sparsely populated region because of its unfavourable semi-arid climate. The outcomes of public provision in health services are examined next.

Health Provision Outcomes, 1963–1973

As early as the 1970s, Kenya had established a national family planning programme aimed at providing free services for patients who desired to plan their families. This programme, besides providing family planning services, targeted maternal and child health and was aimed at combating malnutrition. Family planning centers were run, mainly, from provincial and district hospitals. Mobile clinics were also operationalized for this purpose. The figures for attendance at these family planning clinics, which the GoK started to provide from the year 1970, were as depicted in figure 4 below.

Figure 4. Attendance at family planning clinics by province, 1970–1973




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970–1973.

The evidence clearly shows that the greatest beneficiaries of this public provision were the capital, Nairobi, and Central, the president’s turf. They were followed by Eastern, Coast and Rift Valley Provinces, respectively. Perhaps owing to a combination of religious-inspired negative attitudes towards the practice and the nomadic lifestyle of most of its largely Muslim pastoralist inhabitants, this service was not accorded to the North Eastern Province. However, it is important to note that, historically, the region has been at

loggerheads with the Kenyan state and this could also be a factor behind its neglect. The figures for Nyanza Province, wherein lies Luo Nyanza, were dismal; in fact, Nyanza was consistently amongst the two worst performers, alongside Western Province, during this first historical phase, indicating a lack of equality of access to these crucial services. These findings suggest that there was a strong link between a community’s posture, perceived or real, and access to health services during the first decade of independence in Kenya. The figures for hospital beds and cots, by province, during this historical phase of the study, which the GoK also began to provide from 1970, were as depicted in figure 5 below.

Figure 5. Hospital beds and cots by province, 1970–1973



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970–1973.


Again, Nairobi, the capital, was dominant as a beneficiary in this category of public provision. It was closely followed by Rift Valley, Central and Eastern in that order. Coast, Nyanza, Western and North Eastern were fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth, respectively. Based on these figures and patterns, it is difficult to create a case for politically-instigated sabotage in the provision of health services with the number of beds and cots as indicators; however, it is clear from figure 5, above—particularly with reference to Nairobi and North

Eastern Provinces—that capitalism leads to uneven development across regions at the nation-state level. Nairobi, the greatest beneficiary, happens to be the country’s industrial, commercial and political capital; North Eastern, on the other hand, owing to its unfavourable climate and soils, has historically been economically overlooked by Kenyan authorities since the advent of colonialism. The outcome of public provision with regard to housing is examined next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1963–1973

The National Housing Corporation (NHC), a GoK statutory body established in 1953, has continuously been tasked with the provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans. Its figures for houses completed, by province, from 1968 to 1973, were as captured in figure 6 below.

Figure Error! No text of specified style in document.. *No. of houses completed by NHC by province, 1968–1973*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968–1973


NHC figures, as depicted in figure 6 above, show that during the first decade of Kenya’s independence the corporation paid no heed to equity in its attempts to provide low-cost housing to Kenyans. The amalgamated outcome

of the units of houses constructed to accommodate low-income earners during the historical phase 1963–1973 shows that Nairobi got the lion’s share, percentagewise, at 58.72, followed by Coast (12.66), Rift Valley (12.65), Central (6.02), Nyanza (3.75), Western (3.82), Eastern (2.01) and North Eastern (0.36). The major determinant factor behind the provision of affordable housing by the NHC during the period 1963–1973 seems to have been logic, suitability and practicality. Owing to its more sophisticated infrastructure and its choice as a destination for employment seekers, presumably, it made more sense for the GoK to apply this provision to the city’s dwellers, as opposed to the nomads of the North Eastern Province, for instance. Urban areas were, thus, prioritized; this posture can be directly linked to the uneven development that inevitably accompanies capitalism as a mode of production. Water supply outcomes for period 1963–1973 are discussed next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1963–1973

The GoK started providing figures for the amounts spent on rural water schemes, by the Ministry of Agriculture’s Water Development Division, from the year 1971. Results of the GoK’s efforts towards the provision of this essential commodity, during this historical phase of this study, 1963–1973, therefore, begin from 1971 and were as captured in figure 7 below.

Figure 7. *Cost of operational rural water schemes by province, 1971–1973 (K£)*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1971–1973.

As depicted in figure 7 above, the GoK’s effort towards provision of rural water supply during the historical phase 1963–1973 was acutely lopsided, especially in favour of Eastern, Central and Coast Provinces. As of 1973, the percentage proportions of government expenditure towards this cause were as

follows: Eastern (31); Central (23); Coast (21); Western (13); Rift Valley (six); North Eastern (four); and, lastly, Nyanza (two). Nyanza Province got the least amount of government funding with regard to provision of rural water supplies during this historical phase of this study; the Water Development Division did not pay any heed to equality of access to opportunity. There is a very strong possibility that opposition politics played an immense role in the dismal allocations to Nyanza Province, where the Luo reside. The subsequent historical phase of this study, 1973–1983, is examined in detail, next.

1973–1983: The Era of the Exposure of the Uncertainties of Capitalism in Kenya


The period 1973–1983 was a very uncertain one for Kenya, owing to protracted periods of drought, its overdependence on coffee and tea for foreign exchange and the volatility of the prices of its most vital import, oil, in the world market. During this historical phase, which was also characterized by a precarious balance of payments position, the country began to restructure its economy in a bid to lessen its reliance on imports. It is also during this historical phase that Moi ascended to the leadership of the country, following the demise of Jomo Kenyatta. Table 2 and figure 8, below, depict the performance of Kenya’s economy, in terms of GDP growth, during the period 1973–1983.

Table 2. Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1973–1983

YEAR	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
GDP GROWTH (%)	6.5	3.6	1.0	5.0	7.3	5.7	3.1	2.4	4.5	3.3	3.9

Source: Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1973–1983.

Figure 8. Kenya’s GDP growth rate, 1973–1983




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1973–1983

The ups and downs experienced by developing economies, owing partly to external circumstances, are clearly discernable from table 2 and figure 8 above. This particular decade was relatively poor, in terms of economic performance, in comparison to the preceding historical phase. The decade’s average growth rate was lower at slightly above four percent. The highest GDP growth rate was recorded in 1977 when coffee prices in the world market skyrocketed. All the borrowing the GoK engaged in during the preceding historical phase of this study did not translate to the envisaged economic growth. An analysis of the outcomes of public investment in this particular historical phase focusing on the four socioeconomic indicators—education, health, housing, and water supplies—follows.

Education Outcomes, 1973–1983

The outcome of the GoK investment in primary education during the historical phase 1973–1983 was as shown in figure 9 below.


Figure 9. *Primary school enrolment by province, 1973–1983*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983

Several noteworthy trends emerge from the 1973–1983 outcome: first, towards the twilight years of Jomo Kenyatta, enrolment figures in Nyanza and Western Provinces took a dip; secondly, after Moi ascended to power, from 1978, there was a remarkable increase in enrolment numbers at primary school level across Kenya’s eight provinces; third, Rift Valley Province, which became the new turf of the president, Moi, rose dramatically from position four to take the lead, country-wide, in terms of primary school enrolment in Kenya; fourth, Central Province, Kenyatta’s backyard, which was at the helm in 1973, stood at position four in 1983, despite also witnessing a steady increase in enrolment numbers. From these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn: first, in comparison to his successor, Moi, Kenyatta was more unfavourably disposed towards the Luo; second, there is certainly a link between state control and access to education at primary level; third, the Kenyatta Administration policies had favoured the Kikuyu to the point where the advantage they yielded from control of state power vis-à-vis primary education, had reached an optimum point—this explains their dwindling dominance in primary school enrolment despite continual steady growth in Central Province; and, fourthly, Moi made sure, within the first five years of his tenure, that equality of access to the opportunity of primary education translated into equality of participation in primary education for other Kenyans not of Kikuyu descent. The enrolment figures at the secondary school level over the same period were as depicted in figure 10 below.

Figure 10. *Secondary school enrolment by province, 1973–1983*




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983

Throughout the historical phase 1973–1983, Kenya’s home area, Central Province, recorded the highest enrolment numbers at secondary school level. This situation prevailed even after the demise of Kenya’s founding father. Apparently, it would take a relatively longer period of time for Moi to beget a semblance of equality of participation in the opportunity of secondary education for non-Kikuyu Kenyans, compared to primary education. By the end of the historical phase 1973–1983, Nyanza stood second in enrolment at the secondary education level; it was followed by Eastern, Rift Valley, Western, Nairobi, Coast and North Eastern in that order. Notably, whilst Nairobi stood at position two in the previous historical phase of this study, it was ranked sixth by the end of 1983. This means that during the historical phase 1973–1983, parents all over Kenya had realized the importance of secondary education as a precondition for advancement in life and were making greater efforts towards securing it for their children. Nairobi’s stagnation and dwindling fortunes can also be explained by the fact that the city lacks the boarding school facilities that most parents desire at this level of education. The health provision outcomes for historical phase 1973–1983 are examined next.

Health Provision Outcomes, 1973–1983


Figure 11. Attendance at family planning clinics by province, 1973–1983



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983.

The outcome of family planning clinic attendances, depicted in figure 11 above, shows a great lack of adherence to the principle of equality of access to opportunity; there are huge disparities in favour of Nairobi and Central Provinces as opposed to the rest of Kenya. Nairobi’s prominence as the commercial and industrial capital undoubtedly explains its appearance at the top of almost every socioeconomic outcome. If Nairobi is put aside, and North Eastern ignored (owing in part to religious reasons for shunning the practice), the two protagonists in the Kenyan story—Kikuyus (Central) and Luos (Nyanza) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of healthcare provision with regard to family planning services. Central’s prominence in this statistic may well mean that family planning services were readily available to the Kikuyu; on the other hand, Nyanza’s position suggests that access to these services during this historical phase was difficult for the province’s inhabitants due to “half-hearted” commitment by the responsible government department. Again, it would seem, regions that oppose the state are considered last when it comes to the provision of services, whilst those that support it come first. GoK provision of hospital beds and cots, by province, during the period 1973–1983, is as depicted in figure 12 below.

Figure 12. *Hospital beds and cots by province, 1973–1983*




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973–1983

Although Nairobi, Rift Valley and Central, in that order, dominated the scene in terms of the number of beds and cots per province as of 1983, the greatest growth in capacity during this historical phase of this study was exhibited by Nyanza. This could be taken to mean that, at least in terms of providing hospital bed capacity to its citizens, the GoK paid no heed to the political inclination of Kenyans, generally, and to that of the Luo, in particular. Housing provision outcomes are examined next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1973–1983

NHC figures for houses completed, by province, from 1973 to 1983 were as captured in figure 13 below.

Figure 13. *No. of houses completed by NHC by province, 1973–1983*




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1973–1983

Of the total of 20,710 units constructed to provide affordable housing to low-income earners, Nairobi got a significant percentage allocation of 45; it was followed by Rift Valley (19), Western (13), Coast (eight), Central (five), Nyanza (four), Eastern (three), and North Eastern (0.2), respectively. Although equality of access to the opportunity of affordable housing was gravely lacking, it does not seem like politics had anything to do with the apportionment of limited government resources towards the provision of this essential social good—houses appear to have been provided in accordance with relevance and need. Indeed, Nairobi is the greatest employer of Kenyans who would fall under the targeted category of low-income-earning citizens. A look at water supply outcomes, during historical phase 1973–1983, follows next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1973–1983

GoK expenditure on rural water schemes, by province, progressed as depicted in figure 14, below, during the historical phase 1973–1983.

Figure 14. *Cost of operational rural water schemes by province, 1973–1983 (K£)*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys 1973–1983.

Figure 14, above, shows great disparities and lack of equity in the allocation of funding for rural water supply during phase 1973–1983. Central Province, Jomo Kenyatta’s turf, consistently received steady funding, whilst the investments in Rift Valley, Coast and North Eastern virtually stagnated throughout this historical phase. Perhaps a calmatative pointer to the ardent Luo activist, it is noteworthy that the outcomes of rural water supply during the second decade of Kenya’s independence show an overwhelming percentage increase in the GoK investment in Nyanza Province. Indeed, the greatest beneficiary, in terms of growth, was Nyanza: it is safe to say that during the period 1973–1983, when the Water Department made amends for what seemed to be outright discrimination of the Luo in the provision of rural water supply during the first phase of this chapter, 1963–1973. The third historical phase of this study, 1983–1993, follows next.

1983–1993: The Era of Export-oriented Industrialization and Rationalization of Expenditure in Kenya

Owing to the volatility inherent in the global capitalist system witnessed in the preceding historical phase of this study—that featured seasons of boom with inflation succeeded by stabilization and recession—Kenya, during the period 1983–1993, adopted more fundamental structural changes geared towards steadying its economy and positioning it for the desired domestically-driven growth. The objective was to gain control of its destiny by shifting focus from production for import substitution to production for export. Accordingly,


besides loosening the protection accorded to producers, providing credit facilities to exporters, and adjusting its currency's exchange rate, the GoK established Export Processing Zones (EPZs). These measures were supposed to loosen dependence on imports to create more room for the repayment of both domestic and external debts. Noteworthy, as a complementary measure to its export-oriented industrialization programme, the GoK, during the period 1983–1993, embarked on a drive to rationalize its expenditure in order to improve productivity and renew economic growth. Table 3 and figure 15, below, depict Kenya's economic performance from 1983 to 1993.

Table 3. Kenya's economic performance, 1983–1993

YEAR	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
GDP GROWTH (%)	3.9	0.9	4.1	5.7	4.8	5.2	5.0	4.5	2.2	0.4	0.1

Source: Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1983–1993.

Figure 15. Kenya's GDP growth rates, 1983–1993




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1983–1993.

Although 1984 recorded a very poor performance, owing largely to a dismal, drought-related agricultural output, Kenya's strategy appears to have been working from 1985 to 1990, before it was suddenly brought to a halt by global events, beyond its control, such as the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the Gulf War I, which conspired to ripen and arrange the stage for the ushering in of neoliberalism. An examination of the outcome of Moi's efforts, with regard to education, health, housing, and rural water supplies, during the period 1983–1993, follows next.

Education Outcomes, 1983–1993

The outcome of public investment by the GoK with regard to primary school enrolment during period 1983–1993 is captured in figure 16 below, which also compares the situation in 1983 with that in 1993.


Figure 16. *Primary school enrolment by province, 1983–1993*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993

As of 1993, figure 16 above shows, Rift Valley, Nyanza (of which Luo Nyanza is a large component), Eastern and Central Provinces led in terms of primary school enrolment in that order. Regarding the rate of growth of primary school enrolment, which is crucial for this study, North Eastern Province led from the front, whilst Nairobi brought up the rear. Notably, the remaining six provinces do not show any appreciable growth difference; this suggests that there was stability and equity in terms of access to the opportunity of primary education. In this regard, therefore, the Luo are not justified to cry foul—at least not during this particular historical phase. The provincial figures for secondary school enrolment, by province, during the years 1983 and 1993 are given in figure 17, below.

Figure 17. *Secondary school enrolment by province, 1983–1993*




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993

Overall, figure 17, above, shows that there was a minimal increase in enrolments during the decade 1983–1993, indicating that, although the GoK’s efforts to provide its citizens with a better education were bearing fruit, the introduction of neoliberalism was somehow taking its toll on the parents of Kenya. Whilst there were enrolment increases in Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley and Western, the other four provinces, Nairobi, North Eastern, Central and Nyanza recorded declines. The biggest enrolment gain was recorded in Rift Valley (state power) whilst the largest drop was recorded in Nairobi (lack of adequate boarding schools prompting many to study upcountry in other provinces). The greatest transition rate from primary to secondary school was recorded in Central Province (bastion of capitalism from colonial times) whilst the least was in North Eastern (shunned by colonial administrators and successive Kenyan Governments owing partly to its unfavourable climate and soils) underlining Oloo’s (2004) argument that capitalism, by its very nature, has led to unequal development in Kenya. Noteworthy is the fact that the immense advantage held by Central Province in the previous historical phases

of this study—1963 to 1973 and 1973 to 1983—was greatly eroded during Moi’s first fifteen years in power. In this sense, there was greater equity, in terms of participation in the opportunity of secondary education, during the historical phase 1983–1993. Health Provision outcomes during this particular historical phase are discussed next.

Health Provision Outcomes, 1983–1993

Figure 18. Attendance at family planning clinics by province, 1983–1987




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1987.

The health provision outcomes, in terms of family planning services, during this historical phase of this study, were as depicted in figure 18, below. The GoK provides statistics on this socioeconomic indicator only to the year 1987; accordingly, this marks the end of the analysis of family planning as a mechanism of gauging health provision outcomes in this study.

Nevertheless, of the total number of first time visits and revisits recorded (3,395,756) during the period 1983–1987, Central Province was dominant percentagewise at 25.5, followed closely by Rift Valley at 24.0; Nairobi (18.1), Eastern (13.8), Nyanza (6.8), Western (6.0), Coast (5.7) and North Eastern (0.1), followed in that order. Evidently, there was no adherence to equality of access to this important GoK provision—the turfs of communities that have held power in Kenya benefited the most. The statistical progression of hospital

beds and cots by province, during this historical phase of the study, was as given in figure 19 below.

Figure 19. *Hospital beds and cots by province, 1983–1993*




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993.

The country recorded a total growth of 30.2 percent in its number of beds and cots from 1983 to 1993, indicating notable progress on the part of the GoK in its efforts towards providing healthcare services to its citizens. Moi’s health policies, it would seem, were more favourable towards the historically marginalized North Eastern Province, where the greatest growth rate (240.2 percent) in the number of hospital beds and cots was recorded; North Eastern was followed by Western (74.0), Rift Valley (45.6), Eastern (24.9), Coast (19.1), Central (17) and Nyanza (13.6), respectively. Nyanza’s poor performance, in this regard, could partly be explained by the fact that this historical phase succeeded the botched coup attempt of 1982, which was largely a Luo affair. It is possible that the GoK became reluctant to expand socioeconomic services to the Luo in the aftermath of that significant event. A look at housing provision outcomes during this historical phase, 1983–1993, is next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1983–1993

The GoK housing provision outcomes for the period 1983–1993 were as depicted in figure 20 below.

Figure 20. *No. of houses completed by NHC by province, 1983–1993*



Sources: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1983–1993.

Throughout the period 1983–1993, a total of 8,575 housing units were constructed by the NHC. Nyanza Province was the greatest beneficiary, for it got 26.4 percent of this provision. The rest of this housing provision—percentagewise—was apportioned as follows: Nairobi (21.1); Rift Valley (19.6); Central (11.7); Eastern (8.5); Western (7.3); Coast (three); and North Eastern (2.5). If we assume that the NHC housing units apportioned for Nyanza Province were constructed in Luo Nyanza, then political inclination did not play a role in determining access to low-cost housing provision during this historical phase of the study. Water supply outcomes for period 1983–1993 are examined next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1983–1993

From 1985, the GoK stopped issuing statistics on numerical and cost distribution of rural water supply schemes, which have been very crucial thus

far in the comparative analysis of the outcome of public investments, with regard to water, opting instead for an amalgamated form of reporting expenditures and inputs under the title “Development expenditure on water supplies and related services.” In view of that fact, no comparative analysis shall be made of the outcomes of water provision for the period 1983–1993; suffice it to say that “[b]etween 1990/91 and 1994/95, the Ministry [of Water Development] had implemented and/or rehabilitated 1,579 water projects, 11,389 boreholes, 916 dams and 448 pans.”² The succeeding historical phase of this study, 1993–2003, is examined next.

1993–2003: The Era of Neoliberalism in Kenya

During the period 1993–2003, Kenya would be forced to yield to calls for privatization by both bilateral and multilateral donors and replace its homespun export-oriented industrialization blueprint with the complete liberalization of its economy. The fiscal discipline imposed upon Kenya during this particular phase would cause tremendous hurt and pain in the lives of many ordinary Kenyans for it was accompanied by reforms in the civil service, through which many civil servants were retrenched. Table 4 and figure 21, below, depict Kenya’s economic performance from 1993 to 2003.


Table 4. *Kenya’s economic performance, 1993–2003*

YEAR	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
GDP GROWTH (%)	0.1	3.0	4.9	4.6	2.3	1.8	1.4	0.3	1.2	1.1	1.8

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1993–2003.

² Republic of Kenya. *Economic Survey 1995* (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Vice-President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1995), 124.

Figure 21. Kenya’s GDP growth rates, 1993–2003




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya economic surveys, 1993–2003.

Overall, the figures depicted in table 4 and figure 21, above, show no superior performance when compared to those of the preceding historical phases examined in this chapter; in fact, the figures are relatively dismal. Notably, the economy seemingly takes a hit during election time—financial years 1992–1993, 1997–1998 and 2002–2003—lending credence to the thought that multiparty democracy is problematic for Africa. The outcomes of GoK public investment, during this particular historical phase, are examined next.

Education Outcomes, 1993–2003

Enrolment figures and patterns at the primary school level during the period 1993–2003 were as depicted in figure 22 below.


Figure 22. *Primary school enrolment by province, 1993–2003*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.

As shown in figure 22, above, the dominance of Moi’s Rift Valley Province continued in earnest, reinforcing the supposition in the theoretical framework that political power is a vehicle to prosperity in Africa. By the time Moi was abdicating power at the end of 2002, Central Province, which is home to the Kikuyu who, alongside the Luo, were staunch advocates of return to multiparty democracy in 1991, had been overtaken by Western Province and stood at position five, overall, in terms of enrolment. This indicates, as surmised in the theoretical framework, that there is a strong link between opposition politics and dwindling socioeconomic fortunes in Africa. It should be noted, however, that what appears to be inequality in terms of access to the opportunity of primary education, such as the huge disparity between enrolment figures in Rift Valley and North Eastern, has to do with demographics; whilst the former is Kenya’s most populous province, for instance, the latter is the country’s least populated region. Enrolment levels at secondary school level, during period 1993–2003 were as shown in figure 23 below.

Figure 23. Secondary school enrolment by province, 1993–2003




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.

There was a steady rise in enrolment figures over the decade for all provinces except Nairobi, which, as indicated earlier in this article, is often unsuitable for seekers of boarding schools at this level for it largely lacks such facilities. This outcome indicates that there was equality in terms of access to the opportunity of secondary education during this historical phase of this study. It is also noteworthy that by the time Moi was preparing to hand over power to Kibaki, his Kikuyu successor from Central, the enormous advantage that the new president’s province had wielded since independence over the rest of Kenya in terms of secondary school enrolment had been substantially eroded. In fact, there was not much difference between Rift Valley, Central, Eastern and Nyanza—the four leading provinces—as Kibaki took over the reins of power in 2003. Apparently, Moi’s policies of instituting special programmes, especially bursaries for fees in secondary schools for children of poor parents, had succeeded in establishing and ensuring equity. Health provision outcomes are discussed next.

Health Provision Outcomes, 1993–2003

Figure 24. Hospital beds and cots by province, 1993–2003




Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.

Figure 24 above shows that there was an exponential increase in the number of hospital beds and cots in Nyanza Province, where the greatest growth over the period 1993–2003 was witnessed. Moi’s Rift Valley also experienced impressive growth rates, albeit to a lesser extent. Modest growth was witnessed in all the other provinces, an indication that the funding that Moi provided for the enhancement of healthcare service at both local and district levels was meeting its objective in a non-partisan manner. As of 2003, Rift Valley held a narrow edge over Nyanza in terms of this public provision; Central, Nairobi, Eastern, Western, Coast and North Eastern followed in that order. Housing provision outcomes are discussed next.

Housing Provision Outcomes, 1993–2003

The NHC investment in the provision of affordable housing for Kenyans during the period 1993–2003 was as captured in figure 25 below.

Figure 25. *No. of houses completed by NHC by province, 1993–2003*



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya statistical abstracts 1993–2003.


A paltry 1,643 housing units were developed by the state corporation over a period of ten years, indicating that, in addition to the scarce resources available for this venture, neoliberalism had annihilated the GoK’s aspiration to improve its effort in this regard, for external forces had imposed upon Kenya the ideology of profit-oriented real estate development. Eastern, North Eastern and Nyanza got no allocations whatsoever during this particular historical phase of the study: the greatest beneficiary was Nairobi (80 percent of the total housing units provided), followed by Central (8.1), Coast (6.8), Western (3.7) and Rift Valley (1.5). When all factors are considered, however, it is difficult to find evidence of corruption on the basis of political inclination. Water supply outcomes are examined next.

Water Supply Outcomes, 1993–2003

As this particular historical phase of the study came to an end, “about 75.0 per cent of the urban population and nearly 50.0 per cent of rural population

had access to safe drinking water.”³ During the period 1993–2003, in keeping with the tenets of neoliberalism, the GoK began to embrace the commercialization of the delivery of essential services such as clean drinking water. As a result, individuals and companies started to dominate the water sector in the urban areas, as the GoK’s policy regarding this public provision in rural areas “shift[ed] towards low cost community based water projects that w[ould] in future be initiated and managed by local communities.”⁴ Accordingly, the GoK, in collaboration with other stakeholders, turned its water provision efforts to the establishment and maintenance of water purification points (WPPs) and drilling of boreholes across the country. Figure 26, below, gives the provincial breakdown of borehole provisions from 1996 to 2003.

Figure 26. Number of boreholes drilled in rural areas by province, 1996–2003



Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996–2003.

³Republic of Kenya. *Economic Survey 2004* (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development, 2004), 138.

⁴Republic of Kenya. *Economic Survey 1997*. (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Vice-President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1997), 138.

Of the combined total of 1,338 boreholes provided by the GoK from 1996 to 2003, the apportionment, in terms of percentages, from the greatest beneficiary to the least, was as follows: Rift Valley (32.2); Eastern (23); Central (14.9); Nyanza (14.5); Coast (8.2); North Eastern (5.3); and, Western (1.9). Besides being the largest in terms of area, the former Rift Valley was the most populous province in Kenya; it is, therefore, injudicious to reflexively conclude that it was favoured. On the other hand, North Eastern, which is by far the driest area of Kenya, was definitely in need of more boreholes. It is not clear what criterion the GoK and its partners employed in according this provision to rural Kenyans. However, one thing is indisputable: neoliberalism hurt the aspirations of the common citizen in Kenya insofar as the right of access to clean drinking water was concerned, by shifting the responsibility from the GoK to the largely uncontrolled and unaccountable private sector. The conclusion of this article, which comprises a general summary of the findings, on public provision in relation to state power and opposition politics, and vis-à-vis the theoretical framework outlined above, follows next.

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

Pertaining to the outcomes of the GoK's investment in education from 1963–2003, the findings of this study strongly support the theoretical proposition that political power is a vehicle to socioeconomic prosperity in Africa, since whoever controls the state decides how scarce resources will be allocated. This study finds that before the introduction of free primary education by Kibaki in 2003, there were very strong links between state control and access to education at both the primary and secondary levels of education in Kenya. From 1963–1973, when Jomo Kenyatta was in power, his home province, Central, enjoyed a healthy lead over the rest of Kenya in primary school enrolment. Over the same period, Central Province's participation in the opportunity of secondary school education was also overwhelmingly dominant over the rest of Kenya. In the decade that Moi took over the reins of power, 1973–1983, his home province, Rift Valley, rose, appreciably, to top the enrolment rankings. Rift Valley's dominance in primary school enrolment would continue consistently to 2003 and coincided with dwindling fortunes in Central, which no longer wielded state power. The fortunes of Rift Valley Province, vis-à-vis secondary education, also improved significantly when Moi rose to power; during the period 1973–2003, the province would come to achieve parity with Central in this sphere and would finally surpass the latter in 2003. Opposition politics does not appear to have played a significant role in determining education outcomes with regard to the Luo, for Nyanza was consistently in the top half in both categories during the period under study.

With regard to the correlation between healthcare provision, state power and opposition politics, the findings of this study regarding the family planning services component of healthcare are in congruence with the following two propositions, which are outlined in the theoretical framework: first, that

political power is a vehicle to socioeconomic prosperity in Africa; second, that the ethnic groups that control state power, owing to the politicization of ethnicity in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups an equitable share of the national resources. During the historical phase 1963–1973, this study shows, there was a strong link between state control and access to family planning services; President Jomo Kenyatta’s homeland, Central, was the greatest beneficiary of this state provision if Nairobi is not considered. During the same period, Nyanza, home to the Luo “dissenters,” performed dismally, appearing in the bottom two in consistent fashion. In the succeeding historical phase of this study, 1973–1983, the two protagonists, Central (Kikuyu) and Nyanza (Luo) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of this crucial healthcare provision component, underlining the link between political inclination and access to state healthcare services. The findings on the hospital bed and cot component of healthcare provision largely support the *Theory of Uneven Development*, which argues that capitalism leads to simultaneous concentrations of wealth and capital, on the one hand, and poverty and oppression on the other. With particular reference to Nairobi and North Eastern, the period 1963–1973 was one in which the number of hospital beds and cots in the two provinces showcased the fact that capitalism leads to uneven development across regions at the nation-state level. Although, generally, the study shows that there was no strong link between political inclination and the provision of hospital beds and cots, the period 1983–1993 is an exception: in what could be interpreted as a result of the botched coup attempt of 1982, Nyanza witnessed the least growth in this category over the decade, amongst all of Kenya’s provinces, lending credence to the proposition that opposition politics has hampered economic development in Luo Nyanza.

The story of the GoK’s provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans totally supports the *Theory of Uneven Development*, especially as espoused by Mandel (1962, as cited in Bond 1999) who has argued that skewed socioeconomic development associated with capitalism is partly the result of prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature. It is about strategy, logic and suitability, and has nothing to do with state-instigated political machinations and/or opposition politics. Nairobi was absolutely dominant, as a recipient of this awfully scarce GoK provision, not least because it is the nation’s industrial and commercial centre. Logically, a gigantic portion of the country’s low income earners work in the city—these are the ones to whom affordable housing is mostly targeted. There is no way in which a province, like North Eastern, an unattractive region characterized by unfavourable climate and soils, and mostly the abode of nomadic pastoralists, would have been prioritized in the allocation of this GoK provision, amid the reality of scarce state resources. Certainly, throughout the period 1963–2003, political inclination and state power did not determine the allocation of this state provision; apportionment of this woefully limited resource was heavily dependent on relevance and strategy. If anything, Nyanza, an opposition stronghold, was the greatest beneficiary during the historical phase 1983–93 of this study. Noteworthy, after the forceful introduction of neoliberalism, the

GoK seemingly lost its zeal and desire to provide this service: the magnitude of this provision dwindled drastically from 8,575 housing units during 1983–1993 to a paltry 1,673 in phase 1993–2003, Kenya’s first decade under neoliberalism.

The findings of this research also suggest that there was a strong link between politics and access to rural water supply funding, with reference to the Luo, in historical phase 1963–1973. In the period after the Odinga-Kenyatta fallout, Nyanza received the least amount of funding from the GoK’s Department of Water. This supports the proposition that ethnic groups that control state power, in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups—the “rebellious” ones—an equitable share of the national largesse. From this summary of findings, we can draw the conclusion that, even though there is adequate evidence to support the hypothesis that “disloyalty” and opposition to the state in Kenya have translated to poor and inequitable access to public goods and services for the Luo community during the period under study, this situation appears not to be as profound or as dire as the sentiments raised by members of the community in earlier studies. Certainly, members of Kenya’s Luo community, alongside others, should refuse to unquestioningly bow to oppressive socioeconomic-political orders and continue pushing for more reforms geared towards further devolution of state resources. However, whilst they might not want to accede to Kuria’s (2011) posture, which seemingly defines a progressive community as one that “suffers peacefully,” they will remain susceptible to prejudiced labels such as those of “poor leadership” and “aimless whining” fronted by the analyst if they fail to embrace what Atieno-Odhiambo (2002, 241) referred to as “individual enterprise and personal virtue” more profoundly.

So what other key take-away points can we derive from this study? First, from the outcome point of view, marginalization in the provision of public goods and services in Africa is not always factual; sometimes, it is an imagined reality occasioned partly by lack of ethnic and regional balance in public appointments. Accordingly, to avoid “breed[ing] resentment and creat[ing] conditions for an ultimate rejection of the state by the frustrated and politically conscious masses,” (Ilorah 2009, 695) African governments should strive to ensure inclusivity and representativeness in their composition. Second, notwithstanding the politically-instigated ethnic violence that accompanies elections in Africa, regime change, often a result of democracy, can indeed lead to socioeconomic development; in the case of Kenya, it is evident that, in comparison to Jomo Kenyatta, Moi’s government adopted and implemented more inclusive programmes and ideas whose positive effects were enjoyed by a larger portion of the population including communities that were unfavourably disposed before power changed hands. Third, poorly managed democratic processes, especially elections, lead to erosions in economic gains. Resulting conflict hampers economic activity and associated growth. African countries should therefore strive to ensure that elections are fully compliant with the law and are seen to be free, fair and credible by all concerned stakeholders, especially their citizens.

Acknowledgments

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