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**Philosophy as Science and Art:  
A Study on the Objectivity of Knowledge in Schopenhauer**

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**ABSTRACT**

*The current article presents an investigation, centered in the volume I of *The World as Will and Representation*, on a central and underexplored issue of the Schopenhauerian philosophy: if the knowledge subject to the principle of reason is necessarily clouded by the individual will, whose more immediate manifestation is the body, how does one achieve a clear knowledge of the world, without the interference of the individualizations of the will? According to Schopenhauer, the subject who achieves this knowledge, named reflective consciousness (*Besonnenheit*), must be purified from the disturbances of the individual will and be able to mirror the world in its most perfect unity. This mirroring is only achieved by the philosopher, whose knowledge reflects and communicates the perfect objectivity of the world.*

**Keywords:** *objectivity, philosophy, idea, consciousness, reflection*

## **Introduction: On the Clear Knowledge of the Objectivity of the World**

In the first book of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer exposes his theory of knowledge, whose core can be described in the subtitle of the book: “Representation subject to the principle of sufficient reason: the object of experience and science” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 9). The philosopher numbers four forms of the principle of sufficient reason, each of them applied to a determined modality of representation. They are: *becoming*, to which the representations of the possible experience are subject as the law of causality; *being*, which subsume intuitions of space and time, a formal part of the representations; *cognition*, to which the abstract representations given by reason are subject; and *action*, which is the law of causality internally considered (as law of motivation), which subsumes the subject of willing. Every object, synonym of representation, is dependent on the principle of reason. The latter place the objects in a relation of mutual determination, and any changes that may happen to them must be anticipated and guided by the referred principle.

Besides the connections that the objects have with each other, the representation is in relation with the subject who knows. The different forms of the principle of reason are “the expression of everything that exists *a priori* in the subject in relation to the knowledge of the object” (Cacciola, 1981, p. 22, our translation). The subject applies the principle of reason to mere sensation, derived from the body, from which the representations result. It is, thus, bearer of the world (*Träger der Welt* [Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 391]), without which no representation would be possible. However, the forms of the principle of reason do not apply to the subject: they presuppose the subject who knows everything without ever been known. According to the author’s words in the first paragraph of his main work, we can affirm that “the world is *my* representation” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 3, our emphasis).

By using the possessive pronouns in the first-person singular, in order to refer to the phenomenal world, Schopenhauer remits the reader, right at the beginning of the work, to the issue of the objectivity of the world we know. This objectivity is, such as the author thus far presents it, indissolubly connected to the subject, their faculties, and to the principle of reason. Schopenhauer refers to two possibilities of representations: the intuitive and the abstract ones. Regarding the first ones, they are products of the understanding, which come from vague and confusing sensations, purely subjective, provided by the body, and they build the world in its actuality and signification. In other words: the understanding takes as ground something completely diverse from representation and builds the whole intuited world from this first matter. How does it do it? It connects a cause to the modifications each body feels, and insofar as this effect is referred back to its cause, the intuition arises from this cause as an *object*” (Schopenhauer, 2012, p. 13). Thus, a causal connection between the subject’s own body (their immediate object, from which the sensations arise) and other bodies is established<sup>1</sup>. The relation between the body (immediate object) and the other

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<sup>1</sup>In this article we will not discuss the relevant issue of the body in the Schopenhauerian philosophy and its implications for the anti-dogmatic reading of the author because this would

bodies has as fundamental point the action (*Wirken*): the action of a body on another body is known only insofar as there is a starting point, that is, the effect of an action on an immediate object (the body). It is from this connection between effect and cause, established by the understanding, that the world gains materiality, that is, perceptibility; its actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) is the law of causality itself. For Schopenhauer, the whole intuitive world is nothing more than an intellectual construct from a subject who knows, and the understanding, the subjective correlate of the actuality of the world.

Cause and effect are always related to space and time simultaneously, and they are constituted by the combination of these formal aspects of the representation. Whereas causality is the material part of the representations, through which the world gains perceptibility, space and time provide, as we have stated above, the formal part<sup>2</sup>. Time is the elusive and continuous flow: “there would be no persistence, no coexistence, thus, no simultaneity, consequently no duration” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p 12); space is the rigid, immutable permanence “of reciprocal determination of its parts, that is, *position*” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p 9). It is in the mutual limitation of space and time that the law of causality finds its necessity and signification. In this way, the world becomes materially rich: from the unification of space and time in causality, operated by the understanding immediately and necessarily from the sensations, results every particularity and multiplicity of the actual world: the change of states, even of substances remain the same, the coexistence in a determinate space, the duration in an also determinate time<sup>3</sup>. The author writes:

But, just as the visible world is there as soon as the sun rises, so too the understanding with its one simple function transforms dull, meaningless sensation into intuition in one fell swoop. What the eye, the ear, the hand senses is not an intuition: it is merely data. Only when the understanding proceeds from the effect back to the cause is the world present in intuition, spread out in space, its form capable of change, its matter persisting throughout all time (because the

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extrapolate the purpose of the current study. We only affirm that the mere sensations are not *caused* by an object that affects our body or our faculties, a problem that would lead us to Jacobi’s reading of Kant, and its developments in Reinhold’s, Schulze’s, Maimon’s, and Fichte’s thought. Schopenhauer’s thing-in-itself is out of the principle of reason and, therefore, of the causal successions. On this matter, see: Cacciola, 1994, p. 47 ff. and 2007, p. 138; Lebrun, 2001, p. 51 ff.; Torres Filho, 1975; Hartmann, 1976; Brandão, 2015, p. 213 ff.; Soares, 2009, p. 14 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Schopenhauer analyzes space and time from two approaches: they can be purely intuited, without matter, as forms of the exterior and internal objects, composing what Schopenhauer calls the principle of reason of being; or they can be united in the perceptibility of the content of the representations (matter), which is the causality, principle of reason of becoming, which rules the effective representations of the world.

<sup>3</sup>Schopenhauer writes: “But the law of causality gets its meaning and necessity from this alone: that the essence of alteration is not mere change of state itself, but rather lies in the fact that *one and the same* position in space contains now *this* state of affairs, but then later *another*; and the fact that at *one* and the same particular time there is one state *here* but another state *over there*”. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p 11).

understanding unites space and time in the representation of *matter*, i.e. activity). (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 14).

The apprehension of the actual world is achieved only to and by the understanding, and reason does not take part in this construction. This faculty plays a very limited role in the Schopenhauerian theory of knowledge: it fixes the intuitive representations in abstract concepts and put them in the condition of being communicated. Reason is, thus, a faculty exclusive of the human beings. If the understanding has its ground of knowledge in the immediate sensations of the body, or rather, in something that is not representation, the substrate of reason is in the very representational field. Its objects are reflexes or abstract copies of the intuited objects.

An important remark to the development of our issue is made by Matthias Kossler (2015, p. 26). According to him, the formulation of concepts by the Schopenhauerian theory of knowledge is due to a new level of consciousness, higher than the animal consciousness, capable of representing what *is not immediately given in intuition*. In other words, different from the rest of animality, human beings are capable of detaching from the intuition of things in particular, given in this place and in this time, and of building objects that are not attached to impressions and determinations of the present. In the abstract representations, the heterogeneity of the intuited object is not taken into account by reason. On the contrary, reason only works with the homogeneous; its objects can, thus, be determinate and reach, therefore, the status of *universals*. Language is the first product of reason and the instrument with which it works. According to Schopenhauer, heterogeneity has signification only to the understanding because it derives from space and time simultaneously in the apprehension of matter. Reason raises these heterogeneous relations to the homogeneity of the universal, or rather, it fixes “the immediate cognition of the understanding [...] by setting it down in abstract concepts”, “putting it into a state to be interpreted for others, to make it meaningful” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 25). The capacity of detaching from the immediately given, of producing concepts, and of communicating them is inseparable from what Schopenhauer calls *Besonnenheit*<sup>4</sup> (*reflective*

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<sup>4</sup>A term of difficult translation, according to the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (entry *Besonnenheit*), it dates back to the Greek *Sophrosyne* and to the scholastics’ *temperantia*. In this dictionary, we read: Schopenhauer “describes it as the capacity of gaining distance from the moment and calls it ‘non-immanent consciousness’ (*nicht-immanentes Bewußtsein*); animals also have a consciousness in which they perceive their ‘well-being and suffering’ and themselves, but they do not have the *Besonnenheit*. Thus, the capacity of the intellect of, ‘through its preponderance, disentangle from the will, to which it is originally subservient’, must be called *Besonnenheit*. It is, therefore, the root of philosophy, of art, and of poetry, and it constitutes the ‘degrees of the reality of being (*Dasein*)’, ‘for the immediate reality is conditioned by its own consciousness’ ” (our translation). Jair Barbosa, in his Portuguese version of *The World* (2005), translates the term as “clareza de consciência” (clarity of consciousness), “clara consciência” (clear consciousness) or “clarividência” (clairvoyance); Flamarion Ramos, in the translation of Matthias Kossler’s article, called *On the Role of Discernment [Besonnenheit] in Arthur Schopenhauer’s Aesthetics* (2015), chooses the term “discernimento” (discernment). In the English translation of volume I of *The World as Will and Representation*, Janaway chooses “circumspection”, “sound”, “soundness of mind”, “clear-headedness”, “clarity of mind”, “mental clarity”, “thoughtfulness”, “reflectiveness”.

*consciousness*). In addition to the knowledge of causality, this new capacity emerges in men, about which the philosopher states:

[...] this is very fittingly and correctly known as reflection. [...] This new, more highly potentialized consciousness, this abstract reflection of everything intuitive in the non-intuitive concepts of reason is the only thing that gives people the circumspection [*Besonnenheit*] that so completely distinguishes their consciousness from that of animals and which makes their stay on earth turn out so differently from that of their irrational brothers. [...] Animals live only in the present; humans, meanwhile, live simultaneously in the future and the past. Animals satisfy their momentary needs; people use ingenious arrangements to provide for the future, even for times they will never experience. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 43).

Now, would these objects built by reflection be the assurance of the objectivity of the world? Does the homogeneity proper to concepts, their universality, rid knowledge of its subjective roots? In a study on this issue, Janaway states that the object of Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge is that one that always presents itself somehow related to us, and that the genuine objectivity is that one in which we purely perceive what is in front of us, that is, what is "undistorted by desires of our own or by any thought of the thing's relation to our will." (Janaway, 1996, p. 49). Put differently, insofar as the understanding cannot offer us the pure objectivity of the world, for its objects are always in relation to what exists in the subject (space, time, and causality), neither can the concepts provide the setting for such apprehension. In both cases, the subject who knows is rooted in the subject of willing, that is, in their own body, whose individual will disturbs the clear knowledge of the objectivity of the world. The universality of abstract representations is not the expression of the world purified from subjective determinations. Through reason, objects can be thought under the same concept, but this unity of the objects intuited in the abstract representation does not result from the apprehension of the essence (*Wesen*) of the objects. How does one achieve a clear knowledge of this essence, without the latter being disturbed by the individual will?

### **Real and Illusory Knowledge of the World**

Now, if we consider only what is exposed in the first book of *The World as Will and Representation*, we cannot know anything more than the mere phantasms: "Now we are confronted at close quarters with the intimate

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We provisionally translated it as "reflective consciousness" because, besides the fact that *reflective* refers to prudence, to the moderation of desires, to weighting, present in the meaning of the German term, it allows us to also think reason as the faculty of *reflection* (*Reflexion*), the concept as abstract *reflex* (*Reflex*) of the sensitive intuition (Schopenhauer, 2010, p 43), and philosophy as *mirroring* (*Abspiegelung*) of all diversity of the world in a single appropriate concept (*in einen Begriff*) (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 77). The association of these three last terms and the issues that derive from it to the Schopenhauerian philosophy will be presented further. However, we are aware of the possibility of translating the German term for different words and expressions, depending on its use in the theory of knowledge, in aesthetics, and in philosophy. (Cf. Kossler, 2002).

relationship between living and dreaming” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p 20). For Schopenhauer, it is a matter of questioning the following: “we have dreams; is the whole of life not in some way a dream? – Or more specifically: is there a definitive criterion to distinguish between dream and reality? Between phantasms and real objects?” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p 19). The question on the reality of the world cannot be answered through its remission to an object that serves as ground for knowledge. Every intuited or conceptualized object is subjected to the principle of reason, and the latter is related to the subject who knows. On the other hand, the question cannot be answered by tracing back the cause of the representation to the subject because the separation of the subject from the object is prior to the principle of reason and, thus, the application of the law of causality to the subject who knows is forbidden. If, in the first contact with Schopenhauer’s work, the reader would interpret the body sensations as a kind of return to the realist dogmatism, it may now seem to them that Schopenhauer is trapped in the impossibility of any secure knowledge of the world and his philosophy would be, then, tied to skepticism. The author writes:

We want to know the meaning [*Bedeutung*] of those representations: we ask if this world is nothing more than representation; in which case it would have to pass over us like an insubstantial dream or a ghostly phantasm [*Luftgebilde*], not worth our notice; or in fact whether it is something else, something more, and if so, what this could be. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p 118)

If the world were nothing more than a pile of phantasms without any substance, not only its intuition, but also the very abstract and discursive knowledge would lose signification, for it would no longer reflect the reality that comes from intuition. According to Schopenhauer, the field of representation does not offer any way to answer this question. The solution to the riddle (*Räthsel*) of the world is found in something completely different from representation, that is: the Will. It is independent from the forms and laws that rule the phenomena, that link objects, without ever penetrating the essence (*Wesen*) of things. However, the individual will in which the subject who knows is rooted (and whose action is immediately translated in acts of their own body) distorts the clear knowledge of this essence. We then ask: how is it possible to know anything outside representation, so that the subjective disturbances do not corrupt the genuinely objective? How can one abstractly build this knowledge and communicate it to other individuals and at the same time remain faithful to the being and meaning of the world? And how can one refer to a true objectivity, known outside the subject-object relation, once any object is only possible in relation to a subject? Schopenhauer refers, as we have seen, to a new form of consciousness. A theme still very poorly explored by the secondary literature<sup>5</sup>, the

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<sup>5</sup>We mention the two main authors who engaged in the study of the *Besonnenheit* in Schopenhauer’s philosophy: Alessandro Novembre (2012), who analyzes the influence of Fichte’s *absoluten Besonnenheit* on Schopenhauer’s early thought, and exposes some aspects of the Schopenhauerian thought that refer to the author’s early texts, that is, which extrapolate the limit of investigation of this article; and Matthias Kossler (2002; 2006), who explores some conceptual developments of the term in Schopenhauer’s aesthetics and in his early texts. For the purpose of

reflective consciousness (*Besonnenheit*), by allowing the distancing from the immediately given, allows the intellect to detach from the individual will – objectified in the body – and reaches a clearer degree of vision of the world. However, the subject who knows will no longer be that one to which we have referred so far, linked to the individual willing: it will be the pure subject of cognition, free from the particularities of the will. Among the highest degrees of the vision of the world enabled by this distancing, there is the *philosophical knowledge*.

A difficulty must be mentioned before we continue our argument. We refer to the paradox that marks the point of view of representation in the knowledge of the world, that is: the fact that the representation is a product of the brain, and the brain, a product of the representation (Cf. Cacciola, p. 78). Or, put differently: we refer to the fact that the intellect has its ground in the brain, and the latter, as part of the body, is the objectification of the individual will. Consequently, how can one conceive the separation between the intellect and the will in the pure subject of cognition?

In order to solve this impasse, we must analyze the movement of intuition, of reflection, and of communication of the riddle of the world, bearing as reference the single subject matter capable of conceptually exposing the complementary side of the phenomenon, which is: *Philosophy*. To this end, an investigation on the nature of the philosophical knowledge and on the way which, from the willing subject's apprehension, whose actions are expressed immediately in acts of the body, the philosopher reaches the knowledge of the very character of the world, expressed in the actions of the other bodies that compose it, is necessary.

### **Philosophy and the Mirroring of the World in Abstract Concepts**

*Will*. This is the name given by Schopenhauer to the concept that expresses the organic unity of all heterogeneity of the phenomenal world. In contrast to Kant, who did not denominate the thing-in-itself but negatively, referring to it as an unknowable X, Schopenhauer will name it and attribute a function to it in his philosophy: it allows him to stitch together the particularities of the phenomena in a whole that does not subject to the principle of reason. The knowledge of the riddle of the world, initially reached by the action of the single object that is immediately given to us, that is: our own body enables Schopenhauer to transit from the analogy of the duplicity of this object to the duplicity of the other ones. Just as our own body is will and representation, so are the other bodies. The acts of will are translated to acts in the phenomenal world, subject to the principle of reason, since the fall of a stone to the human action. However, these acts of willing, because they are out of the principle of reason, cannot be said to be the cause of the modifications of objects, and

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this study, it is important to stress the fundamental relevance of the *Zur Rolle der Besonnenheit in der Ästhetik Arthur Schopenhauers* (Kossler, 2002), for it emphasizes the centrality of the term in the volume I of *The World as Will and Representation*, such as we will investigate further.



among them there cannot be any temporal separation. The willing manifests itself immediately as body act. That which in the world as will is in the most perfect unity, in the world as representation is translated, concomitantly, in all diversity and modification of the phenomena. What we mean is that the will and the phenomenon, or rather, the unity and the multiplicity, are inseparable. In addition: by being out of the representation, the unity of the will is indivisible, that is, its wholeness does not concede the division of parts. Even though Schopenhauer refers to the individualized willing, each phenomenon completely embodies the will – it is its core, its essence. The whole is inseparably in the parts, without, however, being possible to affirm which of them has the primacy. Schopenhauer calls *organic* this relation of reciprocity between the whole and the parts, which give life to the world.

And what does the philosopher do? In the preface to the first edition of *The World*, Schopenhauer states that his philosophy takes shape in his text, and that the latter must communicate a single thought (*ein einziger Gedanke*). According to the author, this thought, by preserving the most perfect unity (*die vollkommenste Einheit*), embodies the very organicity of the will and, consequently, gives life to the work. And if his thought must be divided into parts in his book, this division takes place due to the communication of the work. These parts, which are the theory of knowledge, metaphysics of nature, aesthetics, and ethics compose the four books of *The World as Will and Representation*, and they interpenetrate in such a way that “each part containing the whole just as much as it is contained by the whole, with no part first and no part last, the whole thought rendered more distinct through each part, and even the smallest part incapable of being fully understood without a prior understanding of the whole.” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p VIII). The unity expressed in the work can only be communicated when separated in parts, but the philosophical discourse must be such that the parts are contained in the whole and the latter in the former, without one being able to ascertain the primacy of one over the others. Thus, according to Schopenhauer, his thought distances from the architectonic cohesion, proper to thought systems that take a part as sustainer of the others and that do not achieve the perfect unity and reciprocal relation among the parts.

But how can the philosopher communicate this organic cohesion and vivacity of the will if the principle of reason imposes, even for the intuitive cognition, a causal sequence in the parts, and, for the conceptualization, the universality without particularities? If Schopenhauer limits reason to a mere faculty that fixes the immediate knowing in concepts and that communicates it, on the other hand, in the preface to the first edition of his capital work he affirms that the construction of his discourse cannot be a mere articulation among intuitive representations. On the contrary, it must be able to communicate the *Will*, without any disturbances of its meaning. We do not refer to the will that manifests itself to the subject as individual willing, but to the will that is key to the riddle of the whole world. The difficulty in understanding the organic nature of the work is related to the difficulty in understanding the perfect unity that gives reality to the world, which is, in turn, fixed in concepts and communicated by the philosopher. The understanding and reason, as presented in his theory of knowledge (first book of

*The World*), do not help us much understand the apprehension of this true objectivity that, as we have seen, is beyond any representation.

However, the conversion of what is represented to the subject into something that becomes public or communicable has necessarily to go through reason and language. But by translating the organicity of the world in concepts, what the latter essentially has is lost, that is, its vivacity. In Cacciola's words:

The life filtered by the concepts is established in another domain and, after conceptualized, does not allow the return to the experience anymore. The nuances and differences are lost and, although still in the subjective field, what one has is a schematic image of what is real. (Cacciola, 2003, p. 13, our translation)

The cohesion of the philosophical discourse must translate the concepts without, however, corrupting its nature. Now, by defining his philosophy as the expression of a single thought, Schopenhauer imposes us the need to think of another use of reason – and, consequently, its disposition to work organically – that allows us to conceptually conciliate the heterogeneous with the homogeneity. This other use of reason must enable a mutual support among theory of knowledge, metaphysics of nature, aesthetics, and ethics, and to manifest the *Will* as vivifying element of the philosopher's work. Cacciola shows us the heart of the problem:

But if philosophy is the immediate knowing of that which presents itself to the subject as their essence, the will-to-live, it is also inevitably language, and its instrument is the concept. However, if its task of explaining the world is successful, its concepts or names must ultimately refer to something immediately given in the experience of everyone. This criterium is what enables the accuracy of this knowing as science, but it is not the only one and it is sustained by another: the mode that this knowing is constituted as language. The art – closely connected to philosophy – is the instance of evaluation that detects the genius's *logos*, their capacity to translate the truth of the world; it is the clarity and conciseness of their discourse [...] that enables one to judge the correction of their philosophy. It is, therefore, the text body that reveals the thought of its author and its adequacy to decipher the riddle of the world. (Cacciola, 2003, p. 14, our translation).

More than a mere scientific knowledge that, constituted by conceptual representations, elaborates a rational discourse, philosophy must also have the bias of art. The “genius's *logos*”, to which Cacciola refers, allows us to think that there is a special use of reason, higher than the ordinary, and, consequently, also of the philosophical discourse, which allows us to arrange the whole and the parts organically. Thus, what we wish to defend is that this *logos* is inseparable from a high degree of reflective consciousness, which allows us to make use of reason in a way that surpasses, in clarity and objectivity, the vision of the world given by the knowledge subject to the principle of reason. Let us now focus on a more complete exposition of this idea.

## **Art, Genius, and the Perfect Objectivity of the World**

We stated above that the scientific approach reaches its limits when trying to translate the truth of the world and the latter must be considered from a perspective that overcomes this limit. Here, Schopenhauer's philosophy reaches the point where the distinction between being and appearance becomes completely inadequate and the scientific knowledge must be complemented by another aspect: art.

In an important contribution to this issue, Kossler (2016, p. 237 ff.) states that the apprehension of the will and the world as a whole and the formal analogy between both do not take place in the subject who knows, but in pure cognition, that is, in the artistic contemplation and production. This is because the subject of cognition is correlate of the principle of reason and this one is the expression of willing. More precisely: in common knowledge, including the scientific knowledge, the intellect relates all objects (representations) to the interest of the *individual* will, being always at its service. Regarding this point, Schopenhauer writes:

Since it is the principle of sufficient reason that places the objects in this relationship to the body and thus to the will, the cognition that serves this principle will similarly only aim to come to know of objects just those connections posited by the principle of sufficient reason, and thus pursue their various relationships in time, space and causality. This is because it is only through these that the object is of *interest* to the individual, i.e., that it has a connection to will. (Schopenhauer, 2012, p. 208)

In the knowledge subject to the principle of reason, the apprehension of the perfect objectivity of the world is irremediably blurred by our willing. The intellect is limited to knowing what the human being wants here and now, not to [knowing] the willing in general. The scientific knowledge lacks a degree of clarity in the apprehension of the will, which only a higher reflective consciousness, manifested in the genius, can provide. Limited to the forms of space, time, and causality, the knowledge of objects can be said according to the relations of cause and effect, individuality, etc. In this case, the subject only knows parts, never the totality of the representations. The transition from the willing that manifests in the body acts to the will, that is, the essence of the phenomena, is blocked by this path.

In the same text, Kossler affirms that by being free from the principle of reason, the pure subject's intuition can only take place all at once, in a new consciousness, [that is, in] the *Besonnenheit*, in which the subject becomes mirror (*Spiegel*) to the object, [and] which expresses itself outside the relations of space, time, and causality. This object, called *Idea*, is not the same of science, and its objectivity is not subjectively conditioned. The intuition of the idea requests the erasure of the subject as individual in its connection to the willing individualized in them, so that the thing shows itself. Just as we have spoken of a pure subject, the object, to a certain extent, is also contemplated purely, detached from its relation to other objects. The *Idea* is not the immediate intuition of the will as thing in itself, that is, it remains representation, but independent from the principle of

reason; thus, it is not representative of a singular aspect of the thing given in this time and in this space, but of all the singular appearances of a species.

With regards to this mirroring, Kossler makes an important remark:

The mirroring must not be understood in this metaphor as an object made of glass or metal or as the surface of water, which bear several qualities and among them also of being able to reflect something; but here it is considered from the determination of being something in which all things show themselves as they are. The mirror must be distinguished from the image – as a painting or a photograph – in which the thing is reproduced through a painter or a photographer and can replace the thing regardless of its existence. In the mirror, conversely, the things themselves become visible in their existence in the world of an image. They are presented, so to speak, in the form of objectivity, and the mirror itself is only the *medium* of this event. Transmitted by the artist, it means that they, by contemplating the idea, are not an individual who has a personality and then, *also* an artistic talent; but by intuiting and producing art, the subject is pure *medium* of things, through which is shown what they are – but objectively – in themselves. (Kossler, 2015, p. 30, our translation).

Let us go back once more to the issue of intuition, conceptualization, and communication of the genuine objectivity of the world. However, it will be added [to the issue] the problem of the self-exposition of the object. In the artist, the state of mirroring is momentary. Subsequently, the subject returns to their ordinary state and the object is again interesting for the subject. If philosophy also has a bias for art, the conservation of this intuition can only take place when using reason in the fixation of abstract concepts. The purified subject is the thing's means to see itself. What is this thing but the will itself? In the contemplation of the idea, the subject, purified of the influences of their individual willing, apprehends the very nature of the thing and the complete expression of the essence of what is given in the intuition as object. In this case, stripped of their individuality in the mirroring of the object, the subject is united with; and the contemplated idea is the essence that expresses itself in a disinterested phenomenon to the subject. The philosopher's reflective consciousness, which reached this high degree of contemplation, is put in the state of being, not this individual, but all things, so they remit, in themselves, to a vision of the unity of the world, as "fundamental type" (Cacciola, 1994, p. 56) of the indivisible character of the will, whose objectivity must be understood separately from the subjective dispositions. Hence, if we are able to speak of parts, it is possible only insofar they entirely represent the idea and are in intrinsic unity with it. Thus, only when the bias for science and art is combined, philosophy reaches a higher degree of apprehension of the world. In this regard, Kossler says:

Insofar as every science is built from the principle of reason, the scientific objectivity [*Objektivität*] is subjective, in the sense that it derives from the individual will-to-live, proceeding in a purely methodical manner and, despite all objectivity [*Sachlichkeit*], remains subject to the pragmatic demands. Therefore, science does not look, as philosophy does, for the "what" of the world, but for the "from, where to, and why" (W I 346 (§53)). Thus, whereas the reputedly objective science is, in the end, subjective, for Schopenhauer, the aesthetic sensation, which is used to be seen as subjective, shows itself as genuinely objective. (Kossler, 2002, p. 126, n. 25)

### **Conclusion: The Pure Cognition of the World and its Communication**

If the philosopher follows the model of the aesthetic sensation in order to apprehend the Idea, what he knows, in contrast with the artist, is not only *one* idea, but the totality of them, to which he offers an adequate concept. This high degree of consciousness enables the philosopher to ask himself for the essence of the world (for the *what*), not for the relations that the objects have with each other (for the *from, where to, why*). How can one communicate the *what* intuited by the pure subject, now under another perspective? The new consciousness, clear and more elevated, does not remove the difficulties of this enterprise: just to name a few examples, Schopenhauer affirms that the will is an object that cannot be entirely converted into an object, once it is not given in the subject-object relation and, thus, he forges the term *objecthood* (*Objektivität*), applied to the body, which is immediate visibility of the individual will and of the *idea*, which, because it is a phenomenon independent from the principle of reason, is the most adequate *objecthood of the will*. Or rather, Schopenhauer refers to the separation between will and intellect. The body, nonetheless, which is immediate objectivation of the individual will, produces the brain, ground of the intellect.

The difficulty is also found in the exposition of the organic articulation of his single thought, for in the text, linearly expressed, its form is in contradiction with the organic form, and, consequently, with the perfect unity that it seeks to communicate. Hence the recommendation to the reader: “the only way to completely fathom the thought presented here is to *read the book twice*, and in fact with considerable patience the first time, the sort of patience that only comes from a voluntary conviction that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end presupposes the beginning, and similarly that all the earlier parts presuppose the later ones almost as much as the later ones presuppose the earlier.” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. VIII). Philosophy and the pure cognition of the objectivity of the world, this one fixed and expressed in abstract concepts, are not completed without the presence of the one who contemplates the work presented by the philosopher. It is in the reader’s consciousness where the totality of the ideas, expressed through an adequate concept by Schopenhauer, gains life and where the organic unity of the work becomes alive. The text itself, without the one who contemplates it, is something dead because it formally contradicts what gives life to the world. Therefore, Schopenhauer does not address to an ordinary reader. This one must be, such as the author, also a philosopher and capable of reviving, in their consciousness, the clear objectivity of the world. In the preface to the first edition of his work, we read: “This, like the demands to follow, is absolutely essential for the hostile reader (hostile, that is, to the philosopher, because he is one himself).” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p IX).

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