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**From St. Germain to Sèvres - The Collapsing of the  
Habsburg and Ottoman Empires and the Paris Peace  
Treaties**

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**ABSTRACT**

*The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded on August 10, 1920 between the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, can undoubtedly be described as one of the most significant international treaties of the previous century, even though it never entered into force. Aiming at reshaping the Middle East, it laid the foundation for the British Empire to reach the peak of its territorial expansion shortly after it was signed. Also, it sought to ensure that the Ottoman Empire as the rival of Britain and France, would not get in the way of the major European powers on a geopolitical level any time soon. Almost a year earlier the peace treaty with Austria had been signed on September 10, 1919 in St. Germain-en-Laye, near Paris. Although parts of the Treaty of St. Germain are still in force (and in constitutional rank) in Austria today it is by far not as important as the Treaty of Sèvres for the international legal order. The paper aims to shed light on the initial situation of both Empires after the end of the First World War and discusses the development of the Treaties of Sèvres and St. Germain. It presents, analyses and compares the individual provisions of both treaties and puts them in context with the other Paris Peace Treaties.*

## Introduction

As one of the in total twenty-one treaties concluded in the suburbs of Paris in 1919/1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was intended to end the First World War for Turkey. That Turkey would enter the First World War alongside Austria, Hungary and Germany had by no means been clear from the beginning: Only when the negotiations about a possible neutrality of Turkey finally failed because of the Turkish counter-demands (abolition of the capitulations<sup>1</sup>, the delivery of the already paid warships ordered in Great Britain), the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War at the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary on 24 October 1914.<sup>2</sup> In the fourth year of the war, the British troops advanced into large parts of Mesopotamia and Palestine, capturing Baghdad and Jerusalem in 1917. The Ottoman Empire, whose army had already shrunk to one-fifth of its original strength, finally had no choice but to sign an armistice agreement<sup>3</sup> in Moudros Bay (Lemnos) on October 30, 1918. Peace negotiations were held bilateral between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain; the other Allies<sup>4</sup> were not involved.<sup>5</sup> With the Moudros Armistice Agreement, the Ottoman Empire was effectively reduced to Asia Minor, especially since the Hejaz<sup>6</sup>, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia - as well as the countries of Tripolitania, Cyrene (Libya) and Egypt, which at that time only formally still belonged to the Ottoman Empire - were finally lost. Other than in the armistice negotiations with Austria-Hungary, there was no reference to the Fourteen Points proclaimed by President Wilson in the case of Turkey. The Allies were therefore free of any obligation.<sup>7</sup>

The situation of the Habsburg Monarchy was slightly different when it signed the Armistice Treaty on November 3, 1918 in the Villa Guisti near Padua, Italy: Austria-Hungary had triggered the First World War on July 28, 1914 with its

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<sup>1</sup>The so-called capitulations resulted from a special form of treaty concluded between the Ottoman Empire and most of the Christian states of Europe since the early modern period. They created a system of extraterritorial privileges in favor of many European states in the Ottoman Empire. The United States was also granted such extraterritorial rights in Article IV of the 1830 American-Turkish Treaty. (see also: Leland J. Gordon, Turkish-American Treaty Relations. In: *The American Political Science Review*, 22, No.3 (Aug.1918) 711-721 (714.); Roland Banken, Die Verträge von Sèvres 1920 und Lausanne 1923 (Berlin Münster: LIT 2014) 118-120.

<sup>2</sup>Philipp Marshall Brown, From Sèvres to Lausanne In: *The American Journal of International Law*, 18, no.1 (Jan.1924) 113-116 (114); Klaus Kreiser, *Der Osmanische Staat 1300-1922*, 2. ed. (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag 2008) 51.

<sup>3</sup>Printed in: Paul C. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres* (Ohio State University Press 1974) APPENDIX A. 341; see also: Harold Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol.1 (London: Frowde 1920) 495-497.

<sup>4</sup>In the Treaty of Sèvres the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan are referred to as the Principal Allied Powers. Together with Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the State of Slovenes Croats and Serbs and Czechoslovakia, they formed the Allied Powers.

<sup>5</sup>J.E. Zürcher, The Ottoman Empire and the Armistice of Moudros. In: Cecil/Liddle (eds.), *At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War 1918* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper 1998) 266-275.

<sup>6</sup>Hejaz was originally an Ottoman province and included the two holy sites of Islam, Mecca and Medina.

<sup>7</sup>Bernadotte E.Schmitt, The Peace Treaties of 1919-1920. In: *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 104 no.1 (Feb.15 1960) 101-110 (101).

declaration of war on Serbia on the occasion of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist. During the First World War, Austria-Hungary not only suffered bitter defeats at the side of the German and Ottoman Empires, but was also weakened internally by the unresolved nationality conflicts. At the end of October 1918, the Austro-Hungarian army was in such a bad shape that the army command felt obliged to seek an armistice.<sup>8</sup>

When the Armistice Treaty was concluded on November 3, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had already fallen apart. Inspired by Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed on October 28, 1918, and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was founded the following day. On October 31, 1918, Hungary denounced the Real Union, which meant that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had disintegrated. In view of the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, the German-speaking members of the Austrian Imperial Council formed a Provisional National Assembly in October 1918 and decided to found the Republic of German-Austria, which was proclaimed on October 30, 1918.<sup>9</sup> The name German-Austria (*Deutschösterreich*) was intended on the one hand to signal a certain distance from the Habsburg Monarchy, and on the other hand to demonstrate a commitment to the German nation. The (legal) opinion<sup>10</sup> that German-Austria was a newly founded state and therefore could not be considered the legal successor of the Habsburg Monarchy was predominant in the Austria of the years that followed World War I. The discontinuity thesis met with acceptance only in Great Britain,<sup>11</sup> but was rejected by the other Allied and Associated Powers - first and foremost by France, which regarded Austria alongside with Hungary, as the clear legal successor to the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>12</sup> Unlike in the armistice negotiations with the Ottoman Empire, Italy set the tone in the armistice negotiations with Austria: In contrast to the other Entente Powers, which regarded Germany as the main adversary and dismissed the Habsburg Monarchy as a “trivial enemy,”<sup>13</sup> Italy referred to Austria as its “main enemy in the war” and asserted territorial claims against Austria.<sup>14</sup>

During the First World War, in November 1916, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph died after having ruled the Austrian Hungarian Monarchy for over 68

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<sup>8</sup>Andreas Raffener, Der Staatsvertrag von St. Germain- “Der Rest ist Österreich”. In: Raffener (ed.) *100 Jahre Staatsvertrag von St. Germain* (Wien: Facultas 2020) 156.

<sup>9</sup>Thomas Olechowski, Introduction to Austrian and European Legal History (Vienna 2021) 92; John W. Boyer, The Foundation of the Republic (1918). In: Heinz Fischer (ed.) *The Republic of Austria 1918-2018* (Wien Czernin Verlag 2018) 16-26 (16).

<sup>10</sup>See also the legal opinion by Hans Kelsen from Nov. 29, 1918, printed in: Matthias Jestaedt (ed) *Hans Kelsen Werke* vol.5 (Tübingen Mohr Siebeck 2011) 61-64.

<sup>11</sup>James W. Headlam-Morley, *A memoir of the Peace Conference 1919* (London: Methuen 1972) 126-130.

<sup>12</sup>Manfred Rauchensteiner, St. Germain – Das Ende einer Illusion Tirol In: Raffener (ed) *100 Jahre Staatsvertrag von St. Germain* (Wien Facultas 2020) 170.

<sup>13</sup>Anton Pelinka, Intention und Konsequenzen der Zerschlagung Österreich-Ungarns. In: Gerd Kumreich (ed) *Versailles 1919. Ziele- Wirkung – Wahrnehmung* (= Schriften der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte Vol.14) (Essen Klartext 2001) 203.

<sup>14</sup>Marion Dotter, Der Vertrag von St. Germain und Tirol. In: In: Raffener (ed.) *100 Jahre Staatsvertrag von St. Germain* (Wien Facultas 2020) 77.

years. He was succeeded by his grand-nephew Emperor Charles I. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet V. Reşad outlived his Austrian ally by a little more than two years. After his death in July 1918 he was succeeded by his brother Mehmet VI Vahidettin. Like Charles I, Mehmet VI was handed over a multi-ethnic state that was literally swamped by the rising wave of nationalism. Both monarchs focused exclusively on ensuring the continuity of their empires and dynasties and therefore tried to cooperate with the Allies as far as possible.<sup>15</sup> However, in the case of Austria, the times of the Monarchy had come to an end: Shortly after the Armistice was signed, Emperor Charles I in a half-hearted declaration of November 11, 1918, renounced “his share in the affairs of state”, thus reconfirming the republican form of government of the new state.<sup>16</sup> He therefore no longer signed the peace treaty with the Allies - whereas the Turkish Sultan was not formally deposed until after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres.

### **The Intentions of the Great Powers**

As it became already apparent during the armistice negotiations, the Allied and Associated Powers attached little importance to Austria, especially since the greater part of the newly formed successor states of the former Habsburg Empire had changed sides and become Allies.<sup>17</sup> The main question discussed by the Allies with regard to Austria was therefore to what extent Austria-Hungary could be called upon to pay reparations. The British appeared sympathetic to Austria, so did the Americans, neither of whom had - apart from reparations payments - any economic or other interests with regard to Austria.<sup>18</sup> In reality, even France's interest in Austria was limited: It directed all its energies toward defeating its German archrival and, in this respect, also had an interest in Austria only insofar as it served to weaken Germany. This was expressed in particular with regard to Austria's desire to join its German neighbor: The so-called “*Anschluss*” was by no means a product of the First World War, but it acquired new relevance as a result of the disintegration of the monarchy, especially since German-Austria was not considered economically viable on its own.<sup>19</sup> In the Treaty of St. Germain, France finally enforced the prohibition of the annexation. In this context also the name of the new state had to be changed from German-Austria to Austria. For France the support of Czechoslovakia was of high importance, given the fact that

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<sup>15</sup>Cengiz Günay, *Geschichte der Türkei. Von den Anfängen der Moderne bis heute* (Wien/Köln Weimar 2012) 118; Raffreiner, *Der Staatsvertrag von St. Germain*. In: *Raffreiner (ed) 100 Jahre Staatsvertrag* 157.

<sup>16</sup>However, Emperor Charles' declaration did not constitute a formal renunciation of the throne, which is why the so-called Habsburg Act concerning the expulsion of the Habsburgs and the takeover of the assets of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine were passed in April 1919.

<sup>17</sup>Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: six months that changed the world* (New York, NY, Random House 2002) German Version: Margaret MacMillan *Die Friedensmacher: wie der Versailler Vertrag die Welt veränderte* 2. ed. (Berlin: Propyläen 2015) 330.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup>Thomas Olechowski, *Das “Anschlussverbot” im Vertrag von St. Germain*. In: *zeitgeschichte*, 46, no.3 (2019) 61-75 (64).

Czechoslovakia on the one hand provided a good buffer with regard to the approaching Bolshevism and on the other hand also weakened Germany with its territorial claims. For this reason, France also supported all the territorial demands that Czechoslovakia made with regard to Austria.<sup>20</sup> Among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, only Italy had its own genuine interest in Austria, namely territorial claims and in the absence of conflicting interests on the part of the other Allied Powers also successfully enforced them.

While the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers in Austria were limited, the interests of the Allied Powers in the Ottoman Empire were too diverse to handle.<sup>21</sup> Because of the conflicting interests of the Allies the road to the Treaty of Sèvres was a long one. In contrast to Austria, where the Peace Treaty was concluded within ten months of the signing of the Armistice Treaty, it took almost two years for the Turkish Peace Treaty to be signed.

From the conclusion of the Armistice of Moudros onwards, British and French interests in relation to the Ottoman Empire openly clashed. As far as the interests of Great Britain were concerned, it should be recalled that at that time Great Britain had a Colonial Empire on the Indian subcontinent that included not only the territory of the present-day Republic of India, but also the territories of other present-day states such as Pakistan and Bangladesh - and thus several million Muslims. In addition to the demand for free, secure and permanent access to the Indian subcontinent, which Great Britain hoped to achieve by creating an independent Armenia - also as a buffer to Russia<sup>22</sup> - Great Britain was trying not to endanger the stability within its Empire. Therefore, Muslim interests had to be taken into account. In the conflict between the Sharif of Mecca and the Sultan, the "Indian Muslims" had sided with the latter which did not exactly simplify Britain's position, especially since it had entered into an alliance with the anti-Ottoman Sharif of Mecca.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, since the First World War, the Great Powers had become increasingly aware of the importance of oil, which prompted Great Britain to demand the establishment of British rule on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and to expand its sphere of influence in Baghdad and Basra.<sup>24</sup> For this reason a contiguous chain of territory from the Mediterranean to the Indus was to be placed under British control. Since the opening of a British consulate in Palestine in 1838, Great Britain acted as the protecting power of the Jews (and Protestants) in the Holy Land, positioning itself there as a counterweight to France, which traditionally saw itself as the protecting power of the Catholic Christians in the Middle East. With Lloyd George's accession to power in December 1916, exclusive British control over Palestine became one of Britain's most important political goals, since Palestine was to provide a (secure) land link between British

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<sup>20</sup>MacMillan, *Paris 1919* German version: Die Friedensmacher 312.

<sup>21</sup>A.E.Montgomery, The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920. In: *The Historical Journal* 15, no.4, Dec. 1972, 775-787.

<sup>22</sup>James Renton, Changing languages of empire and the orient: Britain and the invention of the middle east 1917-1918. In: *The Historical Journal* 50 no.3 (2007) 645-667 (647).

<sup>23</sup>Eugene Roth, *Der Untergang des Osmanischen Reiches* (Darmstadt wbg 2021) 391.

<sup>24</sup>Atarodi Habibollah, *Great Powers, Oil and the Kurds in Mosul: (Southern Kurdistan/ Northern Iraq)*, 1910-1925 (Lanham Western Illinois University Press 2003) 60.

Egypt and a future British Mesopotamia.<sup>25</sup> In order to be able to realize the project of a safe land connection between British Egypt and Mesopotamia, the Sykes-Picot-Agreement<sup>26</sup>, that had already come up with a solution in 1916, had to be eliminated in first place. Moreover France had to be stopped in Palestine, which was to be done with the help of the Jews living in Palestine and the Balfour Declaration.<sup>27</sup> Finally, it should not be forgotten that British Prime Minister David Lloyd George had great personal sympathies for Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios.<sup>28</sup> This also coincided with the public opinion of the British population: Since the Armenian genocide<sup>29</sup> during the First World War, an extreme anti-Turkish (and pro-Armenian) sentiment spread among the British public, which should by no means be underestimated.<sup>30</sup>

Unlike Britain, France had long enjoyed good economic relations with the Ottoman Empire. For example, about 60 % of the *Dette publique ottoman*, the pre-war Ottoman public debt, was in the hands of French private creditors.<sup>31</sup> Thus,

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<sup>25</sup>Alexander Macfie, *The Straits question 1908-36* (Thessaloniki Inst. For Balkan Studies 1993) 93.

<sup>26</sup>The secret agreement concluded between Great Britain and France on May 16, 1916, was named after the British and French diplomats, Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot. It defined the colonial spheres of influence of the two states in the Middle East in the event of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Later, Russia and Italy also joined this agreement. Britain was granted dominion over an area roughly equivalent in total to present-day Jordan, Iraq, and an enclave around the ports of Haifa and Akka. France was to assume dominion over southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The “rump Palestine” with Jerusalem and Jaffa was to be placed under international administration. Each country was free to determine the state borders within its zone of influence. Later, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was expanded to include Italy and Russia. Russia was to receive the city of Constantinople and the western shore of the straits, as well as northern Armenia and parts of Kurdistan; Italy was to receive some Aegean islands (Dodecanese) and a sphere of influence around Smyrna (Izmir) in southwestern Anatolia. The entire Sykes-Picot Agreement can be found in: J.A.S Grenville, *The major international treaties of the twentieth century* (London Routledge 1974) 30.

<sup>27</sup>In the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, Britain told the Zionist movement to support the establishment of a “national home” for the Jewish people in Palestine. For the Balfour Declaration see also: Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration* (New York Magnes Press 1983); Ian S. Lustick, *The Balfour Declaration a Century Later: Accidentally Relevant*. In: *Middle East Policy* 24 no.4 (2017) 166-176; William M. Mathew, *The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives*. In: *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 40 no.3 (2013) 231-250.

<sup>28</sup>A.E.Montgomery, “Lloyd George and the Greek Question 1918-1922”: In: J.P. Taylor (ed), *Lloyd George: Twelves Essays* (London Hamilton 1971) 283; Daniel-Joseph Macathur-Seal, *Intelligence and Lloyd Georges’s secret diplomacy in the Near East 1920-1922*. In: *The Historical Journal* 56 no.3 (2013) 707-728 (710).

<sup>29</sup>To this day, the Turkish government denies that it was a genocide. For the genocide see also: Michelle Tusan, “Crimes against Humanity”: Human Rights, the British Empire and the Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide. In: *The American Historical Review* 119, no.1 (Feb.2014) 47-77; Akçam, Taner, *A shameful act: the Armenian genocide and the question of Turkish responsibility* (New York Holt 2006); Donald Bloxham, *The great game of genocide: imperialism, nationalism, and the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (New York, NY Oxford University Press 2009).

<sup>30</sup>Renton, *Changing languages*. In: *The Historical Journal* 50 no.3 (2007) 645-667 (649); Benes, Adam, *British national dailies and the Outbreak of War*. In: *The international history review* vol.36/1 (2014).

<sup>31</sup>Banken, *Die Verträge von Sèvres 1920 und Lausannes 1923* 317.

already for economic reasons France advocated the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. Since Catholic France had established itself over the centuries as the protective power of Christianity in the Middle East, it claimed territories with relatively significant Christian minorities, such as Syria or Lebanon, for itself.<sup>32</sup> However, for France weakening its German archrival was its top priority, so it had to back down behind Britain's demands on the Ottoman question and thus ultimately concentrated its forces on preventing British control of the straits.

Italy's main goal with regard to the Ottoman Empire was to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean region and to expand its colonial empire in East and North Africa, where it had *de facto* colonies in Italian Somaliland and in Italian Libya. However, it soon had to realize that some of its territorial claims, such as those regarding Antalya were not compatible with Wilson's Fourteen points and thus were hardly enforceable due to the lack of an Italian population.<sup>33</sup>

The only two issues on which France and Britain seemed to agree in principle were Thrace and Armenia. Both France and Britain supported Greece's demands regarding Thrace, and both powers were in favor of an independent Armenia.<sup>34</sup> The problem with Armenia was that the country itself was so divided that even the two Armenian delegates at the Paris Peace Conference were not able to agree on what they wanted.<sup>35</sup>

The U.S. itself seemed to have no real interest in the Middle East and thus essentially limited its demands regarding the Ottoman Empire to the creation of an international zone for the straits under the supervision of the League of Nations.<sup>36</sup>

Although Greece was not one of the Great Powers, its claims to Turkish territory carried special weight at the Paris Peace Conference, because of the large Greek minority in the Ottoman Empire. When Greece entered the war in 1917 on the side of the Allied Powers, it had not received any territorial promises.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos vigorously pursued his *Megali Idea* at the Paris Peace Conference.<sup>38</sup>

A similar - though not comparable - role to that played by Greece with regard to the Ottoman Empire was played by Czechoslovakia with regard to Austria: Although the Czech foreign minister Edvard Beneš was nowhere near as charismatic as the Greek Venizelos, he was similarly proactive with regard to Czechoslovak interests at the Paris Peace Conference. Similar to Greece's occupation of Smyrna, the Czech Republic with the approval of the Allies

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<sup>32</sup>William Shorrock, *French Imperialism in the Middle East: The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon, 1900-1914* (Wisconsin 1976) 13; Alexander Schölch, *Europa und Palästina 1838-1917*. In: Helmut Mejer, Helmut (ed) *Die Palästina-Frage 1917-1948*, 2. ed. (Paderborn 1993) 17.

<sup>33</sup>Richard Bosworth, *Italy and the end of the Ottoman Empire*. In: Marian Kent (ed), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London Portland Frank Cass 1996) 55.

<sup>34</sup>Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Allies and Armenia 1915-18*. In: *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1968) 145-168.

<sup>35</sup>MacMillan, *Die Friedensmacher* 500.

<sup>36</sup>Heinz A. Richter, *Der griechisch-türkische Krieg 1919-1922* (= Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns Vol. 72) (Wiesbaden Peleus 2016) 21ff.

<sup>37</sup>C.M. Woodhouse, *Modern Greece, A short History* (Kent 1977) 197.

<sup>38</sup>Renée Hirschon. *Crossing the Aegean, An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*. (New York, NY Berghahn 2004).; Finefrock, *Atatürk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea* In: *The Journal of Modern History* 52, no.1 D1047-D1066 (D1051).

occupied Hungarian territory shortly after the Communist revolution in Hungary.<sup>39</sup> Thus, Czechoslovakia became one of those states that profited considerably from the consequences of the First World War.

### **The Paris Peace Conference**

On January 18, 1919, after the arrival of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson at the French Foreign Ministry on the Quai d' Orsay, the Paris Peace Conference, or more precisely the Pre-Peace Conference<sup>40</sup>, was opened. All states that had been at war with the German Empire or at least had broken off its diplomatic relations were admitted to the Peace Conference. The Ottoman Empire and Austria were not. For all matters concerning the former Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire the *Supreme Council*, also known as the "Council of Ten", which consisted of the respective heads of government and foreign ministers of the Allied and Associated Principal Powers, was initially responsible.<sup>41</sup> The first half of the year 1919 was dominated by the drafting of the Peace Treaty with Germany. The German delegation was summoned to Paris in May 1919, and on June 8, 1919, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, it signed the Peace Treaty under protest. The Treaty of Versailles served as a construction pause for the other four Peace Treaties, including the one with Austria and the one with the Ottoman Empire.

#### *Austria at the Paris Peace Conference*

The Austrian delegation, led by the Social Democratic State Chancellor Karl Renner, had actually expected to be invited to France at the beginning of 1919. However the Austrian delegation was only summoned in May 1919, when the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Germany became apparent. Thus, on May 12, 1919, the seven-member Austrian delegation traveled to Paris, where it was accommodated in a separate area, which it was only allowed to leave in the company of an officer.<sup>42</sup> On June 2, 1919, a first, still incomplete draft was submitted to the Austria delegation, which underwent fundamental revisions in a second phase. For example, in the first draft the financial and military provisions and the reparation provisions were still missing. Also the political provisions were incomplete, especially in regard to Italy.<sup>43</sup> The Austrian delegation was given fourteen days to comment on the first draft of the Peace Treaty, which it did in the form of memoranda containing counterproposals. In order to strengthen Austria's

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<sup>39</sup>MacMillan, Paris 1919/German Version: Die Friedensmacher 322.

<sup>40</sup>The actual Peace Conference began with the handing over of the peace terms to the German delegation in May 1919 (Laura Rathmanner, Die Pariser Friedensverhandlungen und die deutschösterreichische Friedensdelegation. In: *zeitgeschichte* 46 no.3 (2019) 14.)

<sup>41</sup>Stefan Wedrac, Historische Einleitung. In: Kalb/Olechowski/Ziegerhofer(ed.), *Der Vertrag von St. Germain* (Wien Manz 2021) 13.

<sup>42</sup>Rathmanner, Die Pariser Friedensverhandlungen In: *zeitgeschichte* 46 no. 3 (2019) 26.

<sup>43</sup>Fritz Fellner (ed.) *Saint-Germain im Sommer 1919: Die Briefe Franz Kleins aus der Zeit seiner Mitwirkung in der österreichischen Friedensdelegation Mai- August 1919* (Salzburg Neugebauer 1977) 95.

negotiating position, even the Austrian Foreign Minister Otto Bauer, one of the most colorful figures of the Austro-Marxism movement, who was strongly supporting the *Anschluss* and sympathized with the Hungarian council system, resigned.<sup>44</sup> On August 6, 1919, the Austrian delegation received a detailed reply from the Allies, in which it was already clear that the Austrian delegation had succeeded in achieving selective improvements. In the new draft, Austria was still considered responsible for the war (Art.177), but the financial provisions now took into account the dissolution of the Monarchy. Also, the confiscation of the property of German-Austrian citizens in the territories of the Monarchy was abandoned. With regard to the nationality issue, unlike in the other Peace Treaties, the point of reference was not the habitual residence but the so called *Heimatrecht*.<sup>45</sup>

On a territorial level, it can be stated that in general Austria was to be reduced to the territory from which it had emerged in the Middle Ages. In August 1919, it was already clear, that South Tyrol was to be annexed to Italy. Surprisingly, Austria was able to gain a new territory: Although not foreseen in the first draft, western Hungarian territories (today's Burgenland) were to be annexed to Austria. This can be interpreted as a generous act of the Allies, who hoped that Austria would support them in containing communism in Hungary. As a result, Austria ended up being the only state losing the First World War, which achieved a territorial gain.

On September 2, the final draft was handed over to the Austrian delegation, and on September 10 it was signed by Karl Renner on behalf of the Republic of Austria.<sup>46</sup>

### *The Ottoman Empire at the Paris Peace Conference*

Only a few weeks after the opening of the Peace Conference, Greece and its territorial claims was the subject of negotiations for the first time.<sup>47</sup> In March 1919, shortly after the establishment of the *Greek Affair Committee*, Italy sent troops to Antalya and Marmaris without even consulting Great Britain or France to "peace and order" there.<sup>48</sup> At the same time, it also claimed the formerly Hungarian city of Fiume, which was supposed to be incorporated into the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The Italian actions stated a clear violation of the Fiume agreement and so the Allies authorized Greece, to intervene and also send troops to Smyrna.<sup>49</sup>

On June 17, 1919, a few weeks after the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops, a four-member Ottoman delegation led by the Sultan's brother-in-law and

<sup>44</sup>Rathmanner, Die Pariser Friedensverhandlungen. In: zeitgeschichte 46. No.3 (2019) 28.

<sup>45</sup>The so-called *Heimatrecht* describes a belonging of a certain person to a certain municipality. It was determined by descent, was inherited and could therefore differ from the actual residence. The *Heimatrecht* was introduced in Austria in 1849 and was only abolished in 1939; Kalb/Olechowski /Ziegerhofer. (ed.) Der Vertrag von St. Germain 252.

<sup>46</sup>Staatsvertrag von Saint-Germain-en-Laye vom 10.9.1919, StGBI. 1920/303.

<sup>47</sup>Nicholas Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (Thessaloniki: Inst. for Balkan Studies 1978) 200.

<sup>48</sup>Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres 94.

<sup>49</sup>Finefrock, Ataturk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea. D1051.

Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, Damad Ferit Pasha, arrived in Paris.<sup>50</sup> On the same day, the Turkish delegation was allowed to appear before the “Council of Ten”. The Turkish delegation appeared self-secure, its main concern was to avert the “dismemberment” of the former Ottoman Empire; only on the Egyptian and Cyprus issues it showed willingness to negotiate.<sup>51</sup> It argued that the Ottoman Empire had been a guarantor of security and prosperity on the European, African and Asian continents for many centuries. The borders of the Muslim Empire, according to Ferit Pasha, should run according to the borders of 1878, the region of Mosul and other parts of Iranian and Russian territory should be returned to the Sultanate in Istanbul.<sup>52</sup>

Great Britain and France were stunned by the uncompromising, almost arrogant Turkish demands. Only a few days later, the conference decided that negotiations on the peace treaty with Turkey should be suspended until the U.S. had made a decision on whether it wanted to take over part of Turkey as a mandated territory.<sup>53</sup> Thus, the peace negotiations were put on hold between July and November 1919. Only the Thrace issue, which was necessary for the demarcation of the borders in southern Bulgaria, could not be postponed, especially since the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria was still to be signed in the fall of 1919.

It was not until December 1919, that Great Britain and France - with Italy's tacit disapproval - began to draft the Peace Treaty with Turkey.<sup>54</sup> However, by that time, things in Turkey had already changed significantly: In those areas of Turkey that were at risk of being taken over by Armenians or Greeks, especially in Cilicia, local resistance groups had formed.<sup>55</sup> Mustafa Kemal, the future Atatürk, who had already become known to the public in the successful defense of the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915, had risen rapidly within this newly established resistance movement. When he was transferred to Anatolia in May 1919 to disarm the remaining military units in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, he defied the sultan's order and resigned from military service. With him, considerable parts of the soldiers stationed in Anatolia also left the army. In the summer of 1919, the Erzurum Congress was held. Mustafa Kemal called the government in Istanbul “a hostage of the occupying powers” and declared the centrally located provincial city of Ankara the “center of resistance”.<sup>56</sup>

In the late autumn of 1919, the French government under Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau already regretted that it had supported the Greek expedition in Asia Minor.<sup>57</sup> When Clemenceau traveled to London on December 2, 1919, he urged British Prime Minister Lloyd George to preserve Turkish integrity. The de facto assumption of power by Mustafa Kemal, who had exercised effective control

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<sup>50</sup>MacMillan, Paris 1919/ Die Friedensmacher 575.

<sup>51</sup>Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres 110.

<sup>52</sup>Hüseyin I.Cicek, Der Friedensvertrag von Sevres und die osmanische Haltung. In: *BRGÖ* 9 no.2 (Wien 2019) 447.

<sup>53</sup>Richter, Der griechisch-türkische Krieg 1919-1922 68.

<sup>54</sup>Montgomery, The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres 775.

<sup>55</sup>Günay, Geschichte der Türkei 125.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid. 127.

<sup>57</sup>Montgomery, The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres 776.

over Anatolia since the fall of 1919, would necessitate a “change of plan” on the part of the Allies, he argued, but this was vehemently opposed by Lloyd George.<sup>58</sup>

The “Council of Ten” met again in London on February 12, 1920, with the aim of reaching a fundamental agreement among the Great Powers. However, already a couple of days later the Council decided to transfer the preparation of the pending Peace Treaty to a Committee of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors.<sup>59</sup> At the London Conference, which lasted until April 10, 1920, the project of a neutralized “Straits Free State” based on the model of Danzig was discarded.<sup>60</sup> However, all participants agreed that the straits had to be brought under some form of international control. Thus, at the London Conference, the much milder option of placing the demilitarized straits under the supervision of an international commission finally prevailed.<sup>61</sup> Concerning the French request to bring Turkey under French financial control, an agreement was obtained, when the British proposal regarding a formal waiver of the reparation claims was accepted. Great Britain and France finally agreed on the establishment of an (interallied) Financial Commission for the economic and fiscal supervision of Turkey.<sup>62</sup>

The reports from Cilicia, where the Kemalists were making great territorial gains, significantly accelerated negotiations on the Constantinople issue: On March 5, 1920, the Allies decided to occupy Constantinople. Constantinople was to be formally left with Turkey for the time being, but it was to be used as a kind of “hostage” for good behavior on the part of Turkey: Should uprisings or massacres occur (again), the Principal Allied Powers would reconsider their decision.<sup>63</sup>

As for the Smyrna question, the Principal Allied Powers had begun to distance themselves more and more from Greece, but Kemalist gains in Asia Minor now left them in serious doubt as to whether a harsh Peace Treaty could actually be implemented domestically in Turkey. A report by Marshal Foch, speaking for the Inter-Allied Command, stated that the Peace Treaty would not be enforceable unless some 325,000 men were sent into the field, which neither Britain nor France were prepared to do.<sup>64</sup> Here, Greece once again appeared as the “savior”: It declared that, if necessary, it could defeat the Turkish nationalists in the capital also by itself. Thus, in June 1920, Greece was authorized to occupy Eastern Thrace. Venizelos’ *Megali Idea* thus for a moment seemed to have come true.

With regard to the former Turkish territories in North Africa, it was agreed that Turkey had to give up all its rights with regard to Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan. Egypt was to become a British protectorate.

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres* 242.

<sup>60</sup>Raimund Beck, *Die Internationalisierung von Territorien: Darstellung und rechtliche Analyse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1962). 60-65

<sup>61</sup>Alexander Macfie, The British Decision regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 1918-January 1920. In: *Historical Journal* 18, no. 2 (1975) 391.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid 243.

<sup>64</sup>Banken, *Die Verträge von Sèvres 1920 und Lausannes 1923* 164.

In the Syria question, the demarcation of the borders had long been a matter of dispute, but finally a solution emerged at the London Conference, whereby France was to receive a mandate for Syria and Great Britain a mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia. The oil of Mosul, should be more or less shared between these two states. In the Kurdish question<sup>65</sup>, a turnaround in Great Britain's attitude became apparent at the London Conference: Lloyd George no longer advocated a Kurdish state of its own.<sup>66</sup>

The Kurdish question, like the Armenian question, remained unresolved at the London Conference: Thus, it was agreed that the the Principal Allied Powers would meet again in April in San Remo to finalize the peace treaty.

The San Remo Conference began on April 18, 1920, in San Remo, Italy. On April 22, 1920 Sultan Mehmed VI was personally invited to attend the final negotiations.<sup>67</sup> On the Kurdish question, Great Britain and France jointly decided to create a Kurdish autonomous region; like this, the Kurds thus became a mere subject of the treaty. The Kurdish dream of a state of their own was not realized.<sup>68</sup> Armenia was also led down by the Principal Allied Powers, as it was decided to leave the young Armenian state more or less to itself.

Behind the scenes, the San Remo Oil Agreement was negotiated between France and Great Britain without taking the USA into account: It was agreed that France would relinquish Mosul. Mosul, together with the provinces (*"vilayets"*) of Baghdad and Basra, was to be provisionally integrated into the British mandated territory of Mesopotamia.<sup>69</sup> In return, France was to share in the oil exploitation in Mosul.<sup>70</sup>

After the negotiations in San Remo, a Turkish delegation from Constantinople led by Grand Vizier Ahmet Tevik Pasha was invited to Paris. On May 11, 1920 the delegation received a draft of the Peace Treaty.<sup>71</sup> The head of the Turkish delegation was replaced by Damad Ferit Pasha after only a few days. After several unsuccessful attempts to make their demands heard, the Ottoman delegation finally left Sèvres.<sup>72</sup> The Allies ignored the domestic events in Turkey, such as the fact that Mustafa Kemal had convened a National Assembly in Ankara on April 23, 1920, which made him its chairman or that Mustafa Kemal had declared the Sultanate abolished, and appointed a government opposed to the Sultan and the

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<sup>65</sup>Terry Galvin, No friends but the mountains: The fate of the Kurds. In: *World Affairs* 177 no.6 (March/April 2015) 57-66.

<sup>66</sup>Loqman Radpey, Kurdistan on the Sèvres Centenary. How a Distinct People Became the World's Largest Stateless Nation. In: *Nationalities papers* (2021) 1-30 (8); Kartal, Celalettin, *Der Rechtsstatus der Kurden im Osmanischen Reich und in der modernen Türkei – Der Kurdenkonflikt, seine Entstehung und völkerrechtliche Lösung* (Bremen 2001).

<sup>67</sup>Ziegerhofer, Historische Einleitung. In: Kalb/Olechowski/Ziegerhofer. (ed.), *Der Vertrag von St. Germain* 34.

<sup>68</sup>Celalettin Kartal, *Der Rechtsstatus der Kurden im Osmanischen Reich* 64.

<sup>69</sup>After bloody uprisings of the population, the Kingdom of Iraq was to be proclaimed in this area in 1921.

<sup>70</sup>Atarodi Habibollah, *Great Powers, Oil and the Kurds in Mosul; Banken, Die Verträge von Sèvres 1920 und Lausannes 1923* 241.

<sup>71</sup>Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres* 309.

<sup>72</sup>Cisek, *Der Friedensvertrag von Sevres und die osmanische Haltung in: BRGÖ* 9/2 450.

Allies.<sup>73</sup> On August 10, 1920, in one of the exhibition rooms of the famous porcelain factory of Sèvres, a Peace Treaty was signed with a contracting party that in reality no longer existed. The historian Philip Marshall Brown wrote about the Treaty of Sèvres: “*The Treaty of Sèvres was fragile as the porcelain of that name, though lacking its charm.*”<sup>74</sup>

*The Treaty of Sèvres in the Light of the Paris Peace Treaties*

Like the Treaty of St. Germain and all the other Paris Peace Treaties, the Treaty of Sèvres lists at the beginning the contracting parties and the names of their respective representatives. In each of the treaties, different countries appeared on the side of the “Allies”.<sup>75</sup> The Treaty of Sèvres differed from the other Paris Peace Treaties by the fact, that the United States were not a party in the treaty. In the other Paris Peace Treaties, the USA had insisted on being referred to merely as an “associated” (principal) power, which is why those treaties regularly refer to the “Allied and Associated (Principal) Powers”.<sup>76</sup> All states that signed the Treaty of Sèvres, also signed the other four Paris Peace Treaties as well. The only exception was Armenia. However, some other states, notably China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, and Siam, had signed all or almost all of the other four treaties, but not the Treaty of Sèvres. Of particular interest is Hijaz, which, although located within the territory of the former Ottoman Empire, was a signatory state only to the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon, but not to the Treaty of Sèvres.

The fact that neither the Treaty of Sèvres nor the Treaty of St. Germain were concluded between two equal parties becomes already clear when reading the preamble: After listing the contracting parties, in the case of the Treaty of Sèvres it is stated that on the request of the Imperial Ottoman Government, Turkey was *granted an armistice by the Allies on October 30, 1918*, with which *the hostilities begun by Turkey against the Allies on October 29, 1914* were replaced by a firm and durable peace. The term Peace Treaty is not mentioned in the original version of the Treaty of Sèvres. Unlike the other Paris Peace Treaties, which speak of a

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<sup>73</sup>Günay, Cengiz, *Geschichte der Türkei* 129; see also: Kreiser, Klaus, *Geschichte der Türkei*.

<sup>74</sup>Brown, From Sèvres to Lausanne In: *The American Journal of International Law*, 1871 (Jan. 1924) 113-116 (113).

<sup>75</sup>In the Treaty of Sèvres the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan are referred to as the “*principales puissance alliées*”, the Principal Allied Powers. Together with Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the State of Slovenes Croats and Serbs and Czechoslovakia, they formed the “*puissance alliées*”, the Allied Powers. In its preamble, the Treaty of Sèvres also mentions Hejaz in the course of listing the Allied Powers, but curiously the Treaty of Sèvres has never been signed by Hejaz. Due to the fact that the US had never been in a state of war with the Ottoman Empire, it was neither mentioned in the preamble of the Treaty of Sèvres nor did it sign it. This is also the reason, why the Allied Powers are not referred to as Allied and Associated Powers or Allied and Associated Principal Powers in the Treaty of Sèvres as they were referred to in the Treaty of Versailles or the Treaty of St. Germain.

<sup>76</sup>See also: Olechowski/Rathmanner, *Kommentar zur Präambel*. In: Kalb/Olechowski/ Ziegerhofer, *Der Vertrag von St.Germain* 71

*firm, just and lasting peace*, in the French version - and thus in the decisive version of the Treaty of Sèvres - the word *just* is missing.<sup>77</sup>

In all five Peace Treaties, the first part of the treaty (Art. 1-26) consists of the Covenant of the League of Nations and its annexes.<sup>78</sup> Since President Wilson had demanded that the Covenant of the League of Nations was linked to the Treaty of Versailles, which served as the basis for all further peace treaties. The provisions on the demarcation of the new borders form the second part of all Paris Peace Treaties (Treaty of Sèvres: Art. 27-35 and Treaty of St. Germain: Art. 27-35). The Treaty of Sèvres as well as the Treaty of St. Germain provide for the establishment of Boundary Commissions.

The political clauses make up the the third part in all Paris eace Treaties. While the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of St. Germain and the Treaty of Trianon deal with the provisions on Europe and non-European interests (especially colonies) separately, the Treaty of Sèvres does not make such a division. In addition to the fate of Constantinople<sup>79</sup>, the Straits<sup>80</sup> and the other Ottoman territories<sup>81</sup>, Moreover, the third part in the Treaty of Sèvres also dealt with the question of nationality.

Similar to Articles 64, 65, 70-82, 90-92 and 230 of the Treaty of St. Germain with regard to the inhabitants of the former Habsburg Monarchy, Articles 123 to

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<sup>77</sup>The French version of the Treaty of Sèvres is printed in: Deutsches Außwärtiges Amt, *Die acht Verträge von Sèvres* (Berlin Außenamt 1921) 14-152.

<sup>78</sup>For the Covenant of the League of Nations see: Anita Ziegerhofer, League of Nations [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/league\_of\_nations] (6.4.2022); Clive Parry, League of Nations, In: Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, vol.3 (Amsterdam Elsevier North-Holland 1981).

<sup>79</sup>Article 36 stipulated that Constantinople was to remain with Turkey until further notice and could therefore remain the seat of the Sultan and the Caliphate. The provision in the second paragraph of Art. 36 of the Treaty of Sèvres can be seen as a counterpart to Art. 428 of the Treaty of Versailles for the German Rhineland, with the difference that the Rhineland was kept occupied as security for the implementation, while Turkey got back its capital “until further notice”.

<sup>80</sup>According to Art.37-61, the Turkish Straits were placed under international administration by the Straits Commission, the waters were neutralized and the shores demilitarized.

<sup>81</sup>With regard to Kurdistan (Art. 62-64), the realization of a Kurdish autonomous area with local self-government was not decided in the Treaty of Sèvres itself, but was left to the decisions of a British-French-Italian commission. Similar to Kurdistan, a provisional autonomy statute was envisaged for the Smyrna zone, although Greece was to be granted comprehensive administrative rights. The city of Smyrna itself was to remain formally part of Turkey, but Greece was allowed to maintain troops in Smyrna. (Art.71) With respect to Greece, Articles 84-87 regulated the territorial transfers of some Aegean islands and the former Ottoman territories in Eastern Thrace (the up to that point Bulgarian Western Thrace was to be transferred to Greece in a separate treaty). Art. 88-93 stipulated with regard to Armenia and Art. 98-100 with regard to the Hedjaz, that Turkey had to recognize both as free and independent states. The exact boundary between Armenia and Turkey was to be determined by an arbitration award by the U.S. President. With regard to Syria and Mesopotamia, it was stipulated that, in accordance with Article 22 of the League of Nations Statute, both were to be provisionally recognized as independent states but would be subject to the administrative advice and assistance of a mandate holder “...until they were able to stand alone.” (Art.94) Palestine was also to be placed under a mandate power (Art. 95). With regard to Egypt, the British protectorate already established in 1914 was recognized retroactively (Art.101), and the anexion of Cyprus by Great Britain was declared legal. (Art.115) For both Libya and the Dodecanese, Turkey renounced all rights in favor of Italy. (Art.121)

131 of the Treaty of Sèvres contained provisions regarding the citizenship of the inhabitants of the former Ottoman Empire: While the Treaty of St. Germain was based on the *Heimatrecht*, all former Ottoman citizens who now resided in a new state founded on the territory of the former Ottoman Empire were automatically to receive the citizenship of this new state. (Art.123) Art. 125 stipulated that every person whose race differed from the majority of the population in that territory had the right, to opt for Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Greek, Mesopotamian, Syrian, Bulgarian, Turkish citizenship - or the citizenship of Hijaz - provided that the majority of the population of the chosen state, belonged to the same race as the person exercising the right of option. Article 126 was also of particular importance in this context: people who exercised the aforementioned option had to transfer their residence to the state for whose citizenship they had opted within the following 12 months. In the course of the “transfer of domicile” they had the right to keep their immovable property in the state from which they de facto had to emigrate. With regard to Jews living within the borders of Palestine, Art.129 stipulated that they should ipso facto become Palestinian citizens and as such were excluded from other citizenships. The entire provisions of Art. 123 to 131 are of particular importance, since they are based on migration and thus have no equivalent in either the Treaty of Versailles or the Treaty of St. Germain. They focus on the “ethnic disentanglement” of the former Ottoman population and can thus be seen as the first harbingers of the population exchange that was actually implemented after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Unlike Articles 136-140 of the Treaty of Sèvres, which dismembered the Ottoman Empire, Articles 36-62 of the Treaty of St. Germain essentially regulated mainly border issues and relations with Austria’s neighboring countries. In this context, a referendum had to take place with regard to Klagenfurt, by means of which it was to be decided to which state the area in question was to be annexed (Arts. 49-51). The Treaty of Sèvres does not foresee such a referendum or anything alike. The “heart” of the political provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain was Article 88 on the “unalterable independence of Austria” (“*Anschlussverbot*”).

The fourth part of the Treaty of St. Germain, in particular the provisions concerning Morocco, Egypt, Siam and China, were for the most part copied from the Treaty of Versailles and, since Austria had no colonies, were meaningless.<sup>82</sup>

While the provisions on the protection of minorities are integrated into the third part (Art. 62- 82 of the Treaty of St. Germain), in the Treaty of Sèvres they form a separate fourth part (Art. 140-151). In the Treaty of Versailles, there is no comparable part.

For what concerns the protection of minorities, the relevant provisions in Articles 140-151 of the Treaty of Sèvres - as well as those in the Treaty of St. Germain - were based on the minority protection provisions of the “small Versailles Treaty” with Poland concluded on June 28, 1919.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, most provisions also correspond to each other. In the case of Turkey, the minority

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<sup>82</sup>OlechowskiI, Kommentar zu Art.95-117 In: Kalb/Olechowski/Ziegerhofer, *Der Vertrag von St.Germain*, 283.

<sup>83</sup>See also: Kalb, Kommentar zu Art.42-82 (Minderheitenschutz) In: Kalb/Olechowski/Ziegerhofer, *Der Vertrag von St. Germain* 240.

protection provisions were intended to regulate the rights of people living in the territory left to Turkey, who were ethnically and/or religiously different from the Turkish Muslim majority. First and foremost, the minority protection provisions were aimed at protecting the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities. Minority protection was tripartite with respect to the former Ottoman Empire: Apart from the minority protection provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres, a twenty-article long minority protection treaty for the protection of former Ottoman citizens in the parts of the Ottoman Empire assigned to Greece was also signed between the Principal Allied Powers and Greece on August 10, 1920. Furthermore a corresponding treaty between the Principal Allied Powers and Armenia was concluded. With regard to the individual minority protection provisions, Art.144 of the Treaty of Sèvres is particularly worth mentioning: According to this, so-called “*Emval-i-Metroukeh*” houses or businesses of Ottoman nationals of non-Turkish race, who had been forcibly expelled from their homes or had left them for fear of massacre, had to be returned to the victims of Turkish aggression free of charge. Also, in the chapter on the protection of minorities, there is again a precursor of the later population exchange: Article 143 obliged Greece and Turkey to conclude a special agreement regarding the mutual and voluntary emigration of the Turkish and Greek populations in those areas that were either transferred to Greece or remained Turkish. Generally, the protection of minorities in the Treaty of Sèvres itself, did not go beyond that in the other Paris Peace Treaties.

In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of St. Germain and the Treaty of Trianon, the fifth part of the Treaty of Sèvres contained military provisions concerning the Turkish military forces. Articles 152-207 of the Treaty of Sèvres stipulated the demobilization of the existing Ottoman military forces, the limitation of the military apparatus (e.g., the total land forces were to be limited to 50,000 men) and the absolute prohibition of an air force (Article 191). As far as the reduction of land forces is concerned, this was limited to 100,000 men in the Treaty of Versailles and to a maximum of 30,000 men in the Treaty of St.Germain. Thus, in terms of the territorial size of the three countries, Turkey's restrictions were the most severe. In general, it can be said that the military provisions in the Paris Peace Treaties correspond to each other over long distances.

The sixth part (Art. 208-225 in the Treaty of Sèvres) in all Paris Peace Treaties regulated the fate of the prisoners of war and the gravesites: With regard to the repatriation of prisoners of war, the provisions of Art. 208-217 of the Treaty of Sèvres largely correspond to those of Art. 215 onwards of the Treaty of Versailles and Art.160-172 of the Treaty of St.Germain. However, the provisions concerning graves in the Treaty of Sèvres differ significantly from those in the other Paris Peace Treaties: Article 218 stipulated that the Turkish government had to transfer to the British, French and Italian governments the full and exclusive rights of ownership over the land within the boundaries of Turkey in which the graves of their soldiers who fell in the war were situated. However, in reality this only affected the Gallipoli peninsula, where more than 40,000 allied soldiers, mainly from Australia and New Zealand, had died when trying to conquer the peninsula.

The seventh part (Art. 226-230 in the Treaty of Sèvres) is entitled “Penalties” and is dedicated to the punishment of war crimes, whereby the provisions of Art. 226-229 Treaty of Sèvres, but Art. 230, which referred to the genocide of the Armenian minority, are almost identical to those in the other Paris Peace Treaties.<sup>84</sup>

The financial provisions formed the eighth part of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Neuilly, and the ninth part of the other Paris Peace Treaties. Articles 231 to 260 of the Treaty of Sèvres dealt with the reimbursement of occupation costs (Art. 236), compensation for private individuals (Art. 235) and the establishment of an inter-allied *Financial Commission* to reform and monitor the Turkish state budget (Art. 232). A novelty in the history of international law was the formulation of the so-called “*war guilt articles*” in the Paris Peace Treaties (Treaty of St.Germain: Art. 177, Treaty of Versailles: Art. 231, Treaty of Neuilly: Art. 121), which formed the basis for a far-reaching - until then unprecedented – aggressor’s liability. In those *war guilt articles*, the respective country was held responsible as the author (or contributor) of the losses and damage suffered by the Allies. Although the Treaty of Sèvres also contains a “*war guilt article*” (Art. 231, first paragraph) the Ottoman Empire was only accorded reduced responsibility especially since it had acted as mere assistants of the German Empire. The reparation provisions contained in the eighth part of the other Paris Peace Treaties had only an indirect counterpart in the Treaty of Sèvres: Unlike the Treaty of Versailles or the Treaty of St. Germain, Art. 231, second paragraph formally waived reparation claims. Art.231, paragraph 2 however stands in sharp contrast to Art. 235, which obliged the Turkish government to pay for all losses or damages suffered by civilian citizens of the Allies during the war.

The ninth part of the Treaty of Sèvres was dedicated to the economic provisions (Art. 261-317). It contained a wide variety of provisions concerning economic relations, taxes and customs duties. Thus, in the Treaty of Sèvres, the system of capitulations was renewed and extended to all allied powers in accordance with the most-favored-nation principle (Art. 261). The economic provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres can be seen as the reverse of those contained in Art. 155 onwards of the Treaty of Versailles.

The economic provisions were followed by regulations concerning aviation (Part Ten), which, with a few exceptions, corresponded to the regulations in the other Paris Peace Treaties: Aircraft of the Allied powers were granted full freedom of flight and landing within the territory of the respective state. Of particular interest with regard to the eleventh part of the Treaty of Sèvres (“Ports, Waterways and Railways”) are Articles 335 to 345, which provided for the establishment of “ports of international concern”. These ports included Constantinople and Haidar-Pasha, the Mediterranean ports of Smyrna, Alexandretta and Haifa, as well as Basra on the Persian Gulf and Trabzon and Batumi on the Black Sea. Within the territory of the ports *free zones* were to be established, in which no customs duties or other import and export restrictions were to be imposed.

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<sup>84</sup>In this context see also: Sevane Garibian, From the 1915 allied joint declaration to the 1920 treaty of Sèvres. Back to an international criminal law in progress. In: *The Armenian review* 52/1-2 (2010), 87-102.

Finally, as in all Paris Peace Treaties, Part twelve contains the Statute of the International Labor Organization (ILO).

## Conclusion

The Treaties of St. Germain and Sèvres both stand in the shadow of the Treaty of Versailles and yet are essential components of the Paris Peace Order of 1919/20. Both treaties mark the end of multinational empires whose political significance was far behind their territorial expansion even before 1914. The disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy took place as early as October 1918 and was sealed only legally in the Treaty of St. Germain, while in the case of Turkey it was the Treaty of Sèvres itself that brought about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire – this, despite the fact that the Treaty of Sèvres never formally entered into force.

Due to the fact that the Treaty of Versailles served as the textual basis of all Paris Peace Treaties, there are considerable parallels in the structure of both treaties. However, of all five Paris Peace Treaties, it is the Treaty of Sèvres that differs the most.

At first glance, the peace terms concerning the Ottoman Empire are not quite as harsh as those in the Treaty of Versailles, but at second glance it becomes clear that here, too, the Allies were aiming at the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Symbolic of this is the occupation of Constantinople, which - unlike Vienna or Berlin - was taken by the Allies.<sup>85</sup>

Post-imperial Austria, Hungary and Turkey witnessed the emergence of sizeable paramilitary subcultures shaped by the successive traumatising experience of war, defeat and territorial disintegration. Although the levels of violence in the former imperial territories differed significantly, the logic underpinning violent action did not.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup>Michael M.Finefrock, Atattürk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea (D1049).

<sup>86</sup>Robert Gerwarth/Ugur Ümit Üngör, The Collapse of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires and the Brutalisation of the Successor States. In: *Journal of Modern European History* 13 No.2 [The crisis of Empire after 1918 2015] 226-248 (246).

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