


**Athens Institute for Education and Research**  
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**ATINER's Conference Paper Series**  
**SPO2012-0037**

**If you host it, will they come?**  
**Mega-Events and Tourism in South Africa**

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**If you host it, will they come? Mega-Events and Tourism in South Africa**

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Abstract

Mega-sporting events such as football's World Cup are expensive affairs. Host countries often justify the spending required to put on these events by predicting that mega-events will draw large numbers of tourists. This paper analyzes monthly tourist arrivals into South Africa between 2000 and 2010, a period that includes the country hosting the Cricket and FIFA World Cups, and finds that mega-events draw fewer fans than the boosters claim. While economic consultants predicted between 373,000 and 483,000 visitors for the FIFA World Cup, and estimated after the fact that just under 310,000 came for the tournament, statistical analysis of tourist arrivals estimates that foreign arrivals into South Africa during the months of the World Cup were only 121,000 to 202,000 higher than would have otherwise been predicted.

**JEL Classification Codes:** L83, F14

**Keywords:** World Cup, sports, tourism, South Africa

## **Introduction**

Major international sporting events such as the various World Cups in a variety of sports or the Summer and Winter Olympic Games are considered by many countries to be valuable prizes to be won, and like the athletes on the field of play, nations compete against one another for the right to host these spectacles with often reckless abandon. Many reasons are put forward to explain cities' and countries' willingness to expend large sums of money to attract and host these events, but among the most common justifications is that it is claimed that these events can serve to attract huge numbers of foreign visitors with thick wallets and favorable spending habits. This paper examines the past 10 years of foreign tourist arrivals in South Africa, the host of several major recent international sporting events to determine the effect of these mega-events on the number of international visitors to the country.

South Africa has a particularly interesting sports history related directly to its prior practice of institutionalized discrimination known as apartheid. Beginning in the 1960s, predicated by changing social norms worldwide and specific events such as the Sharpeville Massacre and British Prime Minister Harold McMillan's "Winds of Change" speech condemning South Africa's discriminatory government policies, numerous international sporting organizations began to speak out against South Africa's white-led government and its practice of fielding segregated sports teams for international events. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1761 was passed in 1962 and called upon member nations to break diplomatic ties with South Africa and cease economic activities with the country. The International Olympic Committee was the first major sports organization to follow the United Nation's request by banning South Africa's participation in the Summer and Winter Olympic Games starting in 1964. Other organizations quickly followed. FIFA expelled South Africa in 1963 and prohibited its participation in the 1966 World Cup. South Africa offered a compromise whereby the country would field a segregated all white team for the 1966 World Cup and a segregated all black team for the 1970 World Cup, but this offer was rejected.

The International Cricket Council suspended South African in 1970. Cricket is among the most popular sports in South Africa among English-speaking whites and those of South Asian descent. Perhaps most famously, tennis legend Arthur Ashe followed his win in the 1968 U.S. Open by applying to play in the South African Open. When South Africa denied his visa application, Ashe successfully campaigned to have the country removed from Davis Cup play in 1970. South Africa returned to Davis Cup play in 1974, winning the title by default when India, their opponent in the final, refused to travel to South Africa to play the matches in protest of apartheid. After 1974, South Africa was denied participation in future Davis Cups although individual South African players were permitted to play in most events.

Rugby, or more precisely, Rugby Union, has historically been the sport most closely identified with South Africa and is the sport in which South Africa has had the most international success. The national team, known as the Springboks, began play in 1891, and since that time has regularly played matches (or tests) against the teams from the other leading rugby nations including New Zealand, Australia, England, Wales, and France. Prior to 1960, teams, particularly New Zealand which often fields players of Maori descent, often felt compelled to present all white teams when playing test matches against the Springboks, but the stakes grew higher starting in 1960. A trip to South Africa by New Zealand in 1960 went ahead despite petition signed by 150,000 New Zealanders stating "No Maoris, No Tour." For the rest of the 1960s and 1970s, further tours by or to South Africa were subject to increasing criticism and

protests or were cancelled entirely. In 1976, New Zealand went ahead, under heavy domestic and international protest, with a planned tour of South Africa despite the recent Soweto uprising that left many black youths in the Johannesburg suburb of Soweto dead. In response, several protesting nations petitioned the IOC to block New Zealand's participation in the Summer Olympics. When the IOC refused to ban New Zealand, 28 African nations boycotted the 1976 Games. The 1976 events led to the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977 that urged Commonwealth nations to refrain from sporting contacts with South Africa. Tensions surrounding unofficial and unofficial visits by rugby clubs to and from South Africa only intensified in the 1980s.

In 1990, South Africa began to dismantle its apartheid laws, and the country was quickly welcomed back into the international sporting community. The ICC reinstated South Africa in 1991, South African teams were invited to participate in the 1992 Summer Olympics, and the country returned to international rugby union play in 1992. Of particular interest to this paper is the fact that South Africa was also quickly invited to host several major sports tournaments. The Country was selected to host the Rugby World Cup in 1995 followed by co-hosting the Cricket World Cup in 2003 with Zimbabwe and Kenya. The country was awarded the 2010 FIFA World Cup, and also held the Confederations Cup in 2009, a pared down version of the big tournament. The question for the remainder of the paper is whether these events had a significant impact on tourism in the country.

### **Impact Analysis**

Sports organizers routinely claim that mega-events have a large impact on host economies. For example, the consulting firm Grant Thornton South Africa initially predicted 483,000 international visitors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. The firm revised their figures downward multiple times, once to "a gross economic impact of \$12 billion to the country's economy" with 373,000 international visitors (Voigt, 2011), and then subsequently placing the economic impact at \$7.5 billion along with 198,400 annual jobs (Rihlamvu, 2011). Following the event, a report suggested "309,554 foreign tourists arrived in South Africa for the primary purpose of attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup" and that they spent 3.64 billion rand during their stay (FIFA, 2010). Other mega-events also garner rosy economic forecasts. According to the consulting firm Deloitte, the 2007 Rugby World Cup attracted over 350,000 overseas visitors to France, and the event "can deliver between £260m and £1.1 billion of Gross Value Added to a Host Nation, depending on location (Deloitte, 2008).

Of course, the expenses associated with hosting an event like the World Cup are also quite large, and the majority of the costs are typically borne by the host country. Just considering the sporting infrastructure, FIFA requires host countries to have at least 12 modern stadiums capable of seating at least 40,000 spectators with one of the stadiums being able to seat at least 80,000 for the opener and the final. Operating costs can also be quite expensive due to the extreme security measures that must be put in place. The 2010 FIFA World Cup entailed \$3.9 billion in expenses borne by South Africa, including at least \$1.3 billion in stadium construction costs (Voigt, 2010; Baade and Matheson, 2011).

Academic economists have generally been quite critical of the economic impact estimates of mega-events that have been published by event organizers. From an ethical point of view, there is a clear conflict of interest for a sporting organization to publish an economic impact study when that organization will be using any estimated economic gains as bargaining chip for the host government to supply large

taxpayer subsidies for the event. Can one trust the economic impact estimates published by an organization that has a strong vested interest in the size of those very same estimates?

Even aside from the obvious incentive problems, there are numerous theoretical reasons why standard economic impact methodology exaggerates the true economic effect of mega-events on host economies. First, money spent by local residents on the sporting event may not generate new economic activity but rather simply reallocates existing spending throughout the economy. Of course, one important feature of hallmark events is that they attract audiences from outside the local economy, so some level of new spending is generated. Even here, however, two common mistakes can be made. The crowds and congestion associated with a mega-event can dissuade other visitors from coming to a host economy during a mega-event. If the country is already a popular tourist destination, this displacement effect can be quite large. In addition, while money may be spent within a local economy during an event, to the extent that expenditures are made on goods and services provided by multinational corporations, that spending may not stick in the local economy. Every economic impact study implicitly accounts for these leakages through the use of multipliers. The economic multipliers used, however, are typically based on spending patterns during the normal state of an economy while the economy during a mega-event may be anything but normal, and there is significant reason to believe that mega-events significantly increase leakages of consumer spending (Matheson, 2009).

Ex post studies of economies that have hosted mega-events have typically shown that mega-events have economic impacts that are a fraction those claimed by event organizers. Using national data, Syzmanski (2002), for example, finds that among the world's largest economies, countries hosting the World Cup over the past 30 years experienced lower economic growth during World Cup years. Baade and Matheson (2004) use economic data from host cities (as opposed to country-wide data) and examine personal income growth in 13 metropolitan areas that either hosted World Cup games in the United States in 1994 or were directly adjacent to a host site. Their findings suggest that rather than a \$4 billion windfall, host cities experienced personal income growth that was below that which normally would have been predicted by a total sum of \$5.5 to \$9.3 billion. Other mega-event analyses such as Coates and Humphreys (2002), Porter (1999), and Crompton (1995) reach similar conclusions regarding the magnitude of predicted versus realized economic gains.

Most ex post economic studies rely on economic data such as tax receipts, personal income, or employment. Fewer focus specifically on tourism data. Allmers and Maennig (2009) examine specific sectors of host economies for potential effects of the FIFA World Cup. They find no identifiable impact on overnight hotel stays, national tourism income, or retail sales in France during the World Cup in 1998, while in Germany in 2006 they find approximately 700,000 additional hotel nights sold to foreigners and an additional 600 to 700 million euros (US\$ 830 to 970 million) in net national tourism income. While these figures are substantial, they are again a fraction of those claimed by event boosters. Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi examine visitor arrival data in Hawaii (2009) and conclude that while substantial number of out-of-state visitors participate in major sporting events such as the Pro-Bowl and Honolulu Marathon, the net increase in the number of visitors to the state was in each case less than half of the number of visiting spectators/participants at the event suggesting a considerable amount of displacement of other visitors by sports tourists. Tourism data for South Africa will be examined with a similar question in mind.



## Data and Model

The data for this project is monthly visitor arrival data for South Africa from January 2001 through December 2010 for roughly 230 counties, territories, or political units. Additional monthly arrival data is available back to 1980 but for a more limited number of countries (roughly 30). Of the roughly 230 areas for which tourist arrival data is available, 177 have corresponding IMF economic data that is relatively complete from 2001-2010. Future work will utilize this time series panel data to determine the factors that drive tourism to South Africa from individual countries. For the purposes of this paper, however, only overall tourism and tourist arrivals from nations participating in the events will be considered.

At first glance, tourism for the FIFA World Cup, at least, appears to have boosted employment. Total tourist arrivals in June 2010 were 215,880 above the same month the year before, and the second month of the tournament recorded 57,000 more tourists than the year before for a total increase in arrivals of roughly 273,000. However, 2009 was a particular poor year for tourism to South Africa, due presumably to the worldwide economic crisis. A more sophisticated approach is warranted.

The *ex post* approach used in this paper to estimate the impact on tourism from hosting a major event uses the following linear model

$$vis_{it} = \beta_0 + \theta event_{it} + y_t + m_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where  $vis_{it}$  is the number of tourist arrivals from country  $i$  in time  $t$ . The dummy variables  $y_t$  and  $m_t$  are yearly- and monthly-specific controls, which account for seasonal variation in tourism to South Africa and trends in international tourism due to worldwide economic conditions or other factors. Finally,  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is the overall error term.

The variables of interest for this paper,  $event_{it}$ , is a vector of five sports related dummy variables equal one during the months South Africa hosted the Cricket World Cup in February and March 2003, the Confederations Cup in July 2009, and FIFA World Cup in June and July 2010. It is plausible that the employment response is more complicated than a simple dichotomous control (see Box and Tiao, 1975), but we begin here on the assumption that if the World Cup influenced tourism, it is most likely to have an impact during the event. The cricket and soccer World Cups each took place over two months and a separate dummy variable is included for each month on the assumption that tourism may be different earlier in the tournament when more teams are still active than later in the tournament when many countries have been eliminated.

As noted previously, this paper will not take a panel data approach and will simply examine overall tourism individually and tourism by countries participating in the event in total. Because of issues related to unit roots, this paper examines several specifications. In a second model, the dependent variable has been changed from tourist arrivals to the change in tourist arrivals between period  $t$  and period  $t-2$ . A 2-period lag is used to avoid comparing arrivals between the second month of a two month tournament and the first month of the tournament. A third specification uses a 12-month lag to both eliminate potential unit roots as well as seasonality. Tables 1 through 3 show OLS results for the 3 specifications.

In each case, only the first month of the FIFA World Cup shows overall arrivals coming in at a level significantly above expectations, although the other mega-events do, more often than not, exhibit positive coefficients even if these

coefficients are not statistically significant. Depending on the specification, the number of additional arrivals in June 2010 ranges from 162K (data in levels) to 187K (data lagged 2 periods) to 137K (data lagged 1 year). While one should take caution in interpreting non-statistically significant parameters, if one adds the coefficients from June 2010 and July 2010, the number of additional arrivals during the FIFA World Cup ranges from 184K (data in levels) to 212K (data lagged 2 periods) to 115K (data lagged 1 year).

In all cases, these estimates of net increases in arrivals are far below the promoter's estimates of the number of tourists that the event would attract. If one accepts the FIFA estimate of 310K World Cup tourists to be true, that figure itself is 17-36% below the estimates made by Grant Thornton SA. In addition, the 310K figure does account for any tourists displaced by the crowds, congestion, and high prices prevailing during the World Cup. The figures provided in this analysis show that net tourism arrivals increased by only between 115K and 212K visitors, suggesting between 100K and 200K regular tourists were crowded out by World Cup fans. In fact, the net increase in tourism as a result of the World Cup is between 56% and 76% below the original high estimate made by Grant Thornton and between 32% and 63% below the lower arrival numbers provided by FIFA.

While a full time-series panel data analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth examining whether some countries experience a larger increasing in South African tourism than others. A second set of scenarios examines the combined visitor arrivals by 30 of the 32 FIFA World Cup participants. (South Africa and North Korea are excluded from the analysis.) The time series data is shown in Figure 1 for World Cup participants. Again, OLS regressions are run under the three previous dependent variable scenarios: levels, lagged 2 periods, and lagged 1 year. The results are presented in Tables 4 through 6.

Depending on the specification, the number of additional arrivals in June 2010 ranges from 144K (data in levels) to 178K (data lagged 2 periods) to 121K (data lagged 1 year). While one should take caution in interpreting non-statistically significant parameters, if one adds the coefficients from June 2010 and July 2010, the number of additional arrivals during the FIFA World Cup ranges from 159K (data in levels) to 202K (data lagged 2 periods) to 123K (data lagged 1 year). It should be noted that these numbers are remarkably close to those presented earlier suggesting essentially all of the increased tourism comes from participating nations.


## **Conclusions**

Mega-events clearly offer host areas the opportunity to at least temporarily expand tourism, but one should be quite wary of arrival numbers touted by organizers. In the case of South Africa, the 2010 FIFA World Cup clearly increased tourism during the event but at a fraction of the level claimed ahead of the tournament by FIFA, the organizing committee, and consulting firms (which may be closely affiliated with the event.) The observed net increases in foreign arrivals into South Africa during the tournament were at best less than half that of the original estimates and at worst less than a quarter of expectations. The most likely explanations for these errors are simply overly optimistic boosterism as well as a failure to account for crowding out of non-sports fans. Governments looking to bid to host these events should take care to account for these biases.

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**Figure 1: Arrivals from participating World Cup nations**



**Table 1: Arrivals by levels**

<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>					
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
FIFA1	161855.962	28982.873	.129	5.585	.000
FIFA2	22245.458	29162.850	.018	.763	.447
Confed Cup	41866.461	29042.856	.033	1.442	.153
Cricket1	42962.479	28985.092	.034	1.482	.142
Cricket2	25199.924	28985.092	.020	.869	.387
Jun	-129086.296	12075.542	-.313	-10.690	.000
2008	318403.000	10701.193	.837	29.754	.000
2009	88497.878	10971.467	.233	8.066	.000
2010	165118.882	11283.563	.434	14.634	.000

**Table 2: Arrivals lagged 2 months**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	8532.421	26288.508		.325	.746
	FIFA1	186926.525	61578.569	.195	3.036	.003
	FIFA2	24781.118	61963.029	.026	.400	.690
	Confed Cup	80735.343	61706.395	.084	1.308	.194
	Cricket1	40490.844	61957.572	.042	.654	.515
	Cricket2	28052.905	61577.655	.029	.456	.650

**Table 3: Arrivals lagged 12 months**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	5795.100	11930.040		.486	.628
	FIFA1	136999.300	39567.468	.134	3.462	.001
	FIFA2	-21880.700	39567.468	-.021	-.553	.582
	Confed Cup	14483.182	39403.627	.014	.368	.714
	Cricket1	28361.900	39567.468	.028	.717	.475
	Cricket2	-7724.100	39567.468	-.008	-.195	.846
	2002	47695.900	16153.351	.153	2.953	.004
	2004	8797.067	16153.351	.028	.545	.587
	2005	52798.150	16153.351	.169	3.269	.002
	2006	76745.400	16153.351	.245	4.751	.000
	2007	52445.817	16153.351	.168	3.247	.002
	2008	37635.150	16153.351	.120	2.330	.022
	2009	-233418.282	16483.720	-.747	-14.161	.000
	2010	73085.600	16871.625	.234	4.332	.000

**Table 4: Participant Arrivals in levels**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	105282.685	3278.459		32.113	.000
	FIFA1	144290.356	8707.611	.486	16.571	.000
	FIFA2	14949.361	8653.873	.050	1.727	.087
	Confed Cup	22110.960	8671.783	.075	2.550	.012
	Cricket1	4030.381	8654.535	.014	.466	.643
	Cricket2	-1876.841	8654.535	-.006	-.217	.829
	Feb	10627.562	3605.600	.109	2.948	.004
	Mar	9561.784	3605.600	.098	2.652	.009
	Apr	-14877.300	3500.192	-.152	-4.250	.000
	May	-35420.700	3500.192	-.363	-10.120	.000
	Jun	-44277.732	3732.170	-.454	-11.864	.000
	Jul	-10553.736	3605.585	-.108	-2.927	.004
	Aug	-1049.300	3500.192	-.011	-.300	.765
	Sep	-10269.800	3500.192	-.105	-2.934	.004
	Oct	26811.200	3500.192	.275	7.660	.000
	Nov	21621.900	3500.192	.222	6.177	.000
	Dec	22531.900	3500.192	.231	6.437	.000
	2002	19482.583	3195.224	.217	6.097	.000
	2003	24228.372	3368.192	.269	7.193	.000
	2004	24780.583	3195.224	.276	7.756	.000
	2005	29575.500	3195.224	.329	9.256	.000
	2006	38679.250	3195.224	.430	12.105	.000
	2007	44333.667	3195.224	.493	13.875	.000
	2008	45172.417	3195.224	.502	14.137	.000
	2009	19912.087	3275.924	.221	6.078	.000
	2010	28788.690	3369.111	.320	8.545	.000



**Table 5: Participant Arrivals lagged 2 months**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-18059.084	7266.408		-2.485	.015
FIFA1	178948.532	17127.203	.529	10.448	.000
FIFA2	22696.569	17020.935	.067	1.333	.186
Confed Cup	21105.662	17056.267	.062	1.237	.219
Cricket1	-3849.390	17125.695	-.011	-.225	.823
Cricket2	-9746.321	17020.682	-.029	-.573	.568
Feb	12339.710	7501.064	.106	1.645	.103
Mar	29411.640	7296.343	.264	4.031	.000
Apr	-6844.992	7090.672	-.061	-.965	.337
May	-25731.892	7090.672	-.231	-3.629	.000
Jun	-13702.811	7544.441	-.123	-1.816	.073
Jul	43155.151	7296.868	.388	5.914	.000
Aug	45651.208	7090.672	.410	6.438	.000
Sep	17851.908	7090.672	.160	2.518	.014
Oct	46923.408	7090.672	.421	6.618	.000
Nov	50954.608	7090.672	.458	7.186	.000
Dec	14783.608	7090.672	.133	2.085	.040
2002	6310.955	6625.700	.061	.952	.343
2003	1081.764	6921.918	.011	.156	.876
2004	198.621	6625.700	.002	.030	.976
2005	385.955	6625.700	.004	.058	.954
2006	2945.371	6625.700	.029	.445	.658
2007	383.621	6625.700	.004	.058	.954
2008	-2247.129	6625.700	-.022	-.339	.735
2009	-3377.767	6784.180	-.033	-.498	.620
2010	-15719.637	6966.627	-.153	-2.256	.026

**Table 6: Participant Arrivals lagged 12 months**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	19482.583	2861.313		6.809	.000
	FIFA1	120972.300	10395.666	.612	11.637	.000
	FIFA2	1671.300	10395.666	.008	.161	.873
	Confed Cup	17919.000	10352.620	.091	1.731	.087
	Cricket1	9354.000	10395.666	.047	.900	.371
	Cricket2	-4815.000	10395.666	-.024	-.463	.644
	2003	-14935.583	4244.013	-.248	-3.519	.001
	2004	-19109.833	4046.508	-.317	-4.723	.000
	2005	-14687.667	4046.508	-.244	-3.630	.000
	2006	-10378.833	4046.508	-.172	-2.565	.012
	2007	-13828.167	4046.508	-.230	-3.417	.001
	2008	-18643.833	4046.508	-.310	-4.607	.000
	2009	-44393.583	4137.452	-.737	-10.730	.000
	2010	-9398.883	4244.013	-.156	-2.215	.029