Athens Institute for Education and Research
ATINER

ATINER's Conference Paper Series
SOC2012-0369

Modern Military Identity

Dr. Dini Dewi Heniarti
Lecturer
Faculty of Law and Faculty of Comunication
Bandung Islamic University
Indonesia

An Introduction to
ATINER's Conference Paper Series

ATINER started to publish this conference papers series in 2012. It includes only the papers submitted for publication after they were presented at one of the conferences organized by our Institute every year. The papers published in the series have not been refereed and are published as they were submitted by the author. The series serves two purposes. First, we want to disseminate the information as fast as possible. Second, by doing so, the authors can receive comments useful to revise their papers before they are considered for publication in one of ATINER's books, following our standard procedures of a blind review.

Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos
President
Athens Institute for Education and Research

Modern Military Identity

Dr. Dini Dewi Heniarti
Lecturer
Faculty of Law and Faculty of Comunication
Bandung Islamic University
Indonesia

Abstract

As a matter of sociological fact, most civilians are probably less distinct from the military than many of them think. After all, the military is a social construction, as is the role of soldier. Militaries across the world have adopted generally similar means to transform civilians into soldiers with remarkable efficiency. Many military organizations have evolved descriptions of the sort of person they wish their members to be. Many military members view their uniformed predecessors as a long line of tradition and identity. Indeed, some service members reported that gaining a specific identity was one of the elements that attracted them to the military in the first place. There are well established cultural themes in military life for any initiate to discover and emulate. A large part of military indoctrination is devoted to just such a process, and those who have been through it often do think of it as a meaningful and positive shift in self-concept. A serious ethical question looms, however, in light of the ever-changing world that modern military members face. Just what sort of identity is appropriate for the military or for individual components of the military? This paper will demonstrate that the problem is best approached through an examination of a few dimensions of identity that exhibit tensions. The first tension has to do with the role of military tradition as a constituent of identity. The second tension has to do with obedience to military hierarchy. The third tension is similar, but on a larger scale; it lies in military subordination to civil control, including the jurisdiction of military justice system. The fourth tension for military identity involves how professionalism is to be understood.

Keywords: modern;military;identity.

Contact Information of Corresponding author: bunda_difa@yahoo.com

Intruduction

Many civilians seem to regard the military community as akin to exotic folk living in a distant and isolated land. This sense of distance is created in part by geography. Most of the military community in many countries is centered on self-contained bases that are sometimes remote and often secure. Many military members not only work but also reside on the base, especially when deployed. Moreover, the military wears special dress and practices special customs. These include the willing surrender of certain freedoms, submission to a strict hierarchy, and, of course, engaging in deliberate acts of both killing others and risking violent death. Depending on the era, this social distance may magnify the general public's admiration for the military or diminish it.[1]

A serious ethical question looms, however, in light of the ever-changing world that modern military members face. Just what sort of identity is appropriate for the military or for individual components of the military. The problem is best approached through an examination of a few dimensions of identity that exhibit tensions. Although it is impossible to provide an in-depth examination of all of these tensions, this chapter surveys a few of the most obvious. The first tension has to do with the huge role of military tradition as a constituent of identity. Buildings and streets are named for iconic figures, and reverence for tradition is common in most military communities. But not all traditions are equally relevant for the present world. The second tension has to do with obedience to military hierarchy. Although military effectiveness demands obedience, there are cases in which it is functionally inappropriate. This is especially so in cases where a superior may be unaware of crucial facts; in such cases it seems likely that disobedience would be excused. But the issue also crops up where adhering to guidance or orders would be ethically problematic, and doing so would cause people to be harmed or killed unnecessarily. The third tension is similar, but on a larger scale; it lies in military subordination to civil control. This subordination helps ground a sense of service in the military community and a sense of respect, during at least some historical periods, for the military itself. But does subordination require silent compliance with decisions that rub against firmly held professional military opinion? The relationship between professional dissent and subordination can pose tough ethical issues. The fourth tension for military identity involves how professionalism is to be understood. Much has been written about the military's identity as a professional identity. This is unsurprising, as many military training environments emphasize "professionalism" and typically convey the message that "being professional" is an ethical obligation. But these terms are used to mean different things in varying military contexts. The question is not whether a military member ought to "be professional," but rather just what professionalism means.

---

[1] Bill Rhodes, *An Introduction to Military Ethics,* A Reference Handbook*,* Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues,Praeger Security International*An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLCp.* p.50.

Analysis

1. The Role of Military Tradition as a Constituent of Identity

Traditions serve an important and ethically salient sociological purpose; they help to provide a self-concept for the members, both individually and collectively. Military members understand themselves as situated in a particular societal niche, and this in turn helps in framing the ethical dimensions of any given situation.

A sense of tradition also aids in the functional imperatives of unit cohesion and devotion to the group. But there is more to tradition's role in the military. It provides a sense of connection to military members who have served in the past, especially to those who suffered greatly or died in the military. Here, a sense of obligation may be engendered that helps members both to understand the natureof the military and to motivate faithful service.[1]

Sociologists have long been interested in studying military effectiveness. The sociological research has addressed questions vital to the study of military effectiveness, but its analyses tend to be concerned with a relatively discrete set of questions concerning individual and small-unit behavior in tactical operations. It does not explore a broad variety of factors beyond individual motivation and small-unit social dynamics that affect military effectiveness, such as an organization's strength in strategic and operational planning, training, military education, or doctrinal development. In addition, this scholarship tends not to link these phenomena systematically to an explicit definition of military effectiveness.[2] Culture represents a first category of potential causes of military effectiveness that warrant investigation. Specifically, by culture we are interested in how shared worldviews or beliefs within a state or society shape how a military organization prepares for and executes war. Culture may be expressed in both evaluative standards (values and beliefs about appropriate action) and cognitive standards (such as rules and methods for undertaking action) that both define the actors in a given society and shape their behavior.[3] Culture shapes behavior by defining possible alternative course of action and helping them to solve problems, not by defining people's goals or the values they place on different ends.[4]

A second category of potential causes is social structure. At its most basic, social structure refers to the way a society divides itself and distributes resources to different groups; it captures the underlying distribution of power among groups with different characteristics. As such, societies can be divided

---

[1]Risa A. Brooks, *Society, Institutions, and International Power Effectiveness*, (California : University Press Stanford, 2007), p.5.
[2]*Ibid*.
[3]Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 6. Note that this definition accords with fairly traditional usages of the concept of culture in political science.
[4]Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (April 1986): 273– 86. Quotation appears on p. 273

along any number of axes: ethnicity (including race and religion), familial or tribal ties, gender, and economic means or class are commonly cited social structures. Some cleavages may be more pronounced than others in different states and societies, and the nature and intensity of divisions may evolve over time.[1] When do states civil-military relations create the most effective militaries on the battle field? There is no consensus among scholars about the answer to this question. Some suggest that the best civil-military relations are found where there is a clear division of labor, and that militaries left to their own devices perform best in organizing for war. Hence Huntington lauds the imperial German Army as exemplary of an effective military, arguing that its proficiency was facilitated by its freedom from civilian intervention. Others suggest that firm civilian direction is essential to producing effective militaries. Cohen, for example, argues that active engagement of civilians in military affairs is essential to wartime effectiveness.[2]

The military's seemingly strange ways reflect an important and ethically salient fact about military members. Military people occupy a special place in society; in some ways their place is perhaps better described as being along society's borders. They enjoy privileges and bear burdens that, taken together, form a unique sociological landscape accompanied by equally unique ethical issues. Two special qualities of military service are particularly relevant for military ethics. First, militaries act as agencies of their states or communities. Second, this agency includes the functions of dispensing and absorbing violence. These two aspects of military service are at the core of many of the seemingly odd aspects of the military community. Most military customs and policies are, at least in theory, functionally linked to them. Two special qualities of military service are particularly relevant for military ethics. First, militaries act as agencies of their states or communities. Second, this agency includes the functions of dispensing and absorbing violence. These two aspects of military service are at the core of many of the seemingly odd aspects of the military community. Most military customs and policies are, at least in theory, functionally linked to them. The first special quality has to do with the military's acting on behalf of a political community. Entry into the military renders an individual distinct from most others in that it constitutes entry into public office. When a person is acting as a military member, at least in a liberal democracy, she is acting as a representative of her state. Her actions are taken in the name of the community that she defends. Ordinary language, for example, referring to the military as *the service,* reflects this relationship performing military functions is a service to the community. That service is performed on the community's authority and with the community's funding. Consequently, the moral quality of the service reflects on the community served. Many militaries are intensely image-conscious as a result. This consciousness is driven in part by the same sorts of public-relations needs that are common to many organizations, but it is also driven by special ethical

---

[1] Risa A Brooks, *Op. Cit.*,p.16-17.
[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 106.

concerns. The military is entrusted with violent power by the community it defends. The community, therefore, must be able to trust its military with its security. As the military acts on the authority of its community, the community's image also depends on the military's international reputation. Second, the military member's activities on behalf of the state are ethically remarkable. He is permitted, even required, to kill other human beings deliberately, perhaps many of them. He can do this without being considered guilty of murder if the appropriate conditions are met. Even if he never performs violent acts, it is ethically significant, particularly to deontological thinkers that he must *intend* to do so. Indeed, much of a military member's time is spent in perfecting the expertise to harm others efficiently, or at least to facilitate that very end. He is expected to become the sort of person who willfully destroys others, often much like him, under certain circumstances.[1]

Many military members view their uniformed predecessors as a long line of tradition and identity. Indeed, some service members report that gaining a specific identity was one f the elements that attracted them to the military in the first place. There are well- established cultural themes in military life for any initiate to discover and emulate. A large part of military indoctrination is devoted to just such a process, and those who have even through it often do think of it as a meaningful and positive shift in self-concept.[2]

A serious ethical question looms, however, in light of the ever-changing world that modern military members face. Just what sort of identity is appropriate for the military or for individual components of the military? The problem is best approached through an examination of a few dimensions of identity that exhibit tensions. Although it is impossible to provide an in-depth examination of all of these tensions, this chapter surveys a few of the most obvious. The first tension has to do with the huge role of military tradition as a constituent of identity. Buildings and streets are named for iconic figures, and reverence for tradition is common in most military communities. But not all traditions are equally relevant for the present world. The second tension has to do with obedience to military hierarchy. Although military effectiveness demands obedience; there are cases in which it is functionally inappropriate. This is especially so in cases where a superior may be unaware of crucial facts; in such cases it seems likely that disobedience would be excused. But the issue also crops up where adhering to guidance or orders would be ethically problematic, and doing so would cause people to be harmed or killed unnecessarily. The third tension is similar, but on a larger scale; it lies in military subordination to civil control. This subordination helps ground a sense of service in the military community and a sense of respect, during at least some historical periods, for the military itself. But does subordination require silent compliance with decisions that rub against firmly held professional military opinion? The relationship between professional dissent and subordination can pose tough ethical issues. A fourth tension for military

---

[1]*Ibid*.

[2] Bill Rhodes,*An Introduction to Military Ethics,* A Reference Handbook, Contemporary Military, *Op. Cit.,*p. 147.

identity involves how professionalism is to be understood. Much has been written about the military's identity as a professional identity. This is unsurprising, as many military training environments emphasize "professionalism" and typically convey the message that "being professional" is an ethical obligation. But these terms are used to mean different things in varying military contexts. The question is not whether a military member ought to "be professional," but rather just what professionalism means.[1]

Traditions serve an important and ethically salient sociological purpose; they help to provide a self-concept for the members, both individually and collectively. Military members understand themselves as situated in a particular societal niche, and this in turn helps in framing the ethical dimensions of any given situation. A sense of tradition also aids in the functional imperatives of unit cohesion and devotion to the group. But there is more to tradition's role in the military. It provides a sense of connection to military members who have served in the past, especially to those who suffered greatly or died in the military. Here, a sense of obligation may be engendered that helps members both to understand the nature of the military and to motivate faithful service. This tradition-minded and obedient self-concept, however, can be a double edged sword. Times change and successful militaries must adapt to them. A reverence for the past can result in inadequate relevance to the present. The conservative-minded nature of some military practices may impede functionality in a world that does not adhere to tradition, or when an adversary exploits a reverence for military tradition. It is commonplace to hear that a given military is fighting "the last war." Examples abound. The widespread slaughter of the First World War was in large measure due to the advent of the machine gun's effectiveness against the sorts of massed infantry assaults that had characterized earlier wars. The Nazi assault into Poland was mechanized, but some of the defenders were on horseback. It may be impossible to know with certainty just what innovations the future will hold, but an uncritical reliance on "the way we've always done things" obviously courts peril.

2. Obedience to Military Hierarchy and Civil-Military Relations

This long-standing debate about the division of labor is primarily a debate about how and to what extent civilians should delegate decisions to military leaders while keeping them firmly under control. But what happens when civilians lose control of their militaries altogether? How does this affect a state's military effectiveness? Studies like those by Sagan, Van Evera, and Posen suggest that the absence of civilian direction could be extremely dangerous; beyond that, however, we have little understanding of how the breakdown of civilian control could affect a military's preparation for war.[2] Concerns emerge, however, in the practical implementation of this hierarchical

---

[1]*Idem.*, p. 148

[2]Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons *"*? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, No. 3 (1996– 97), p. 54– 86

relationship. Two are mentioned here. First, there is the question of the military's commonality with and regard for the society it protects. Second is the matter of military subordination in the face of what it considers ill-informed direction. Conflictual civil-military relations could interfere with battlefield effectiveness in a variety of ways. At the highest levels, civil-military conflict can interfere with the smooth functioning of senior policy-making councils and thereby undermine national strategy. Sound grand strategy requires that military considerations be integrated with nonmilitary concerns involving diplomacy, economic policy, and domestic politics.[1]

To bring such disparate elements together requires close collaboration and frank, honest exchanges between civilian and military leaders. Friction, distrust, dislike, or simply unfamiliarity between the civil leadership and senior officers can impede such collaboration and result in poorly formulated strategy and military policy.[2]

Civil-military conflict can also interfere with the officer corps military proficiency per se. In states where the military poses a threat of political violence against the regime, for example, civilian leaders often adopt self-defensive measures that interfere with the effective conduct of war. Such interventions can include frequent rotation of commanders and purges of the officer corps, restriction of enlisted service time, suppression of horizontal communications within the military hierarchy, divided lines of command, isolation from foreign sources of expertise or training, exploitation of ethnic divisions in officer selection or combat unit organization, surveillance of military personnel, promotion based on political loyalty rather than military ability, or execution of suspected dissident officers.[3] Some say that the military is a microcosm of society at large, and this is likely true if universal military conscription is in place. But in an all-volunteer military, the assertion can come into serious doubt. At least in the case of the United States, in some ways the military does not reflect the population it protects. Both demographically and culturally, there is a palpable distance. And far from considering this a problem, as some might in a democracy, many military members seem to exude a sense of moral superiority over the citizenry.[4] General Sir John Winthrop Hackett famously remarked that "A man can be self she, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. . . . What the bad man cannot be is a

---

[1]Kennedy, Paul , *Grand Strategy in War and Peace*: Toward a broader definition. In Grand strategies in war and peace, ed. Paul Kennedy, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1991),p. 1-10.
[2]Kennedy, Paul , *Britain in the First World War*. In Military effectiveness, vol. 1, ed. Allan Millett and Williamson Murray,. (Boston: Allen &Unwin, 1988), 31-79.
[3]Huntington, Samuel, *The Soldier and the State*: The theory and politics of civil-military relations.(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1957).
[4] Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," *The Atlantic Monthly* 280, no. 1 (1997): 66–78.

good sailor, or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource that should always be a source of strength within the state.[1]

In the case of civilian control over the military, however, the client's decisions are binding. This places special ethical burdens on the military professional, as professional expertise may render a judgment that is at odds with obedience to the client's commands. The best known case of this sort of conflict culminated in the July 1944 assassination attempt against Adolf Hitler. In that case, a plot was hatched among senior military officers to kill Hitler and take the political reins of Germany before it was destroyed by the encroaching Allied armies. Few crises in military ethics make it to this point, but the tension is nonetheless a relevant one today. In the United States, the phenomenon is most usually made manifest to the civilian populace by retired military officers criticizing civil authority's policies or decisions. But within the military, it is no secret that professional conscience may urge what obedience forbids. Numerous options emerge in the face of such a tension. One is simply to resign from office, allowing the supposedly misguided policy to remain in effect but not participating in it oneself. This option may offer some sort of relief to conscience, but it is less than ideal for two reasons. First, from an ethical point of view, the sort of person who is bothered enough to contemplate resignation on grounds of professional conscience is probably just the sort of person who should stay in the military. Second, the resignation does nothing to ameliorate the problematic order or policy.[2]

Civil-military relation include jurisdiction of military justice. They [courts-martial] have always been subject to varying degrees of "command influence." In essence, these tribunals are simply executive tribunals whose personnel are in the executive chain of command. Military law is, in many respects, harsh law which is frequently cast in very sweeping and vague terms. It emphasizes the iron hand of discipline more than it does the even scales of justice." In view of these misgivings about military law and the court-martial system, it is not surprising that Justice Black and his colleagues could find no way to permit the court-martial of civilian dependents.[3]

As the civil judiciary is free from the control of the executive, so the military judiciary must be untrammeled and uncontrolled in the exercise of its functions by the power of military commanders. The decision of questions of law and legal rights is not an attribute of military command.[4]

Military justice civilian authorities, although possessing power to try servicemen, are reluctant to use it. They generally prefer to return military culprits to military control. Usually local working arrangements are developed

---

[1] Sir John Winthrop Hackett, "*The Military in the Service of the State,*" in *War, Morality and the Military Profession,* ed. Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 119.
[2]*Ibid*, Handbook .p.150.
[3] John C. Ries and Owen S. Nibley,*Justice, Juries, and Military Dependents Author(s)*: Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sep., 1962), pp. 438-448 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/445034 Accessed: 12/11/2011, 18:24,) p.440
[4] Major Joshua M. Toman, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.Pamphlet No. 27-100-195, Spring 2008, Military Law Review-Volume 195,p.1.

between military and civilian authorities along this line. During World War II, the standard practice, so far as the Army was concerned at least, was for military courts to handle all cases involving servicemen, murder and rape included. As to crimes committed by servicemen outside of the United States, the military authorities have exclusive jurisdiction. By the rules of international law, American servicemen in hostile territory are not subject to trial by the local civilian courts, but only to trial by American military courts. The same is true when American forces are in friendly territory. In fact, during World War II, England codified this rule of international law into a statute. Thus, whether considered from the point of view of subject matter or geography, military jurisdiction is adequate to deal with all crimes committed by men in the armed forces.[1]

As a consequence, for the bulk of academics and civilian practitioners military law was terra incognita, an autonomous realm vis-a-vis the civilian legal system. Indeed there are grounds for suggesting that military law exemplified what Arthurs has referred to as nineteenth-century legal pluralism, embracing those 'legal systems' in the United Kingdom which remained outside the orbit of control of the judiciary at Westminster Hall. In regard to military law, whether theoretically the latter did constitute a wholly separate 'legal system' may be to over-state the case (but only marginally) given the occasional judicial utterance in the nineteenth century suggesting that the civil courts might be prepared to accept jurisdiction over military questions in 'exceptional' circumstances. But somehow exceptional circumstances never seemed to arise and therefore for a period of perhaps a hundred years, from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the civil courts adopted a 'hands-off' approach to military disputes, with the result that military law remained effectively autonomous of and immune to civilian judicial oversight.

The well known phrase," where there is an army, there is military justice" [2], which sought to claim that military courts existed as a natural consequence of the existence of the military apparatus and where therefore a matter of indisputable historical fact, has been widely discredited. Historically, the fact that armies existed did not always mean that they were accompanied by organ of military justice, an example being Imperial China. At the present time, several countries with armies do not have a system of military justice operating in peacetime. In those countries, responsibility for punishing any wrongdoing within the ranks of the military falls to the ordinary courts and/or discipline bodies.

There is difficulty in classifying military courts. While there are number of common denominators within national legal systems as far as ordinary jurisdiction is concerned, this is not the case for military jurisdiction.

---

[1] Delmar Karlen and Louis H. Pepper ,*The Scope of Military Justice Author(s)*: Source: The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep. - Oct., 1992), p. 285-298 Published by: Northwestern University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 1139145 Accessed: 12/11/2011, 19:13), p. 291-193

[2]*Ibid.*,p.39.

Need to be legally different? In support of a claim for military law autonomy is the strong argument that the ethos, tasks and obligations of the armed forces are unique and that the legal system should therefore reflect this. Whether the core values identified by the services, which include moral integrity, loyalty, honesty, mutual support, self-discipline and group identification (which are contrasted with the pursuit of individual advantage), are the sole preserve of members of the armed forces may be debatable.[1]

3. How Professionalism is to be Understood.

As Martin Cook has noted, in the military use, the term *professionalism* can take on many meanings, from denoting good moral character to evaluating how neatly an officer's desk is arranged. Capturing the essence of what constitutes a profession, as opposed to an occupation or job, is surprisingly difficult. From the point of view of professional ethics, two lines of attack seem promising. The first conceives of a profession as defined by the peculiar expertise it exercises. This approach understands a profession as a specialized occupational jurisdiction requiring extensive formal education. Licensing is often in place to recognize the expertise and to preclude laymen from encroaching on the professional domain of practice. The second approach emphasizes the societal function the profession provides. Here, the profession is characterized by its service to an enduring societal need. On this model, although the techniques may vary over time, and with them the education and expertise required, the function does not.[2]

Professional identity may be understood in terms of a delineated jurisdiction in which a specialized expertise is applied.[3]

Like the medical community, the military possesses a specific sort of expertise
and enjoys a jurisdiction spelled out in part by JWT. Samuel Huntington's classic book, *The Soldier and the State,* took the military officer's specific expertise to be the "management of violence." Some military members stand by that definition; it does provide a fairly stark jurisdictional boundary.[4]

On this avenue of approach, understanding professionalism relies on understanding the enduring societal needs professionals are to meet. Air forces came into being with the airplane, and much of their identity remains tied to

---

[1] G. R. Rubin ,*United Kingdom Military Law Autonomy, Civilianization, Juridification* Author(s): Source: The Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan., 2002) Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Modern Law Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor. org/stable/1097516 Accessed: 26/11/2011, 23:26 .

[2] Martin Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military* (Albany: State University of New York, 2004), 56.

[3] Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 1988

[4] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) p. 11..

that technology. The advent of unmanned cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles, as well as evolutions in satellite technology, all in the past 50 years, offer challenges to an airplane-centric identity. Meeting an enduring need effectively depends on a subset of a community devoting itself to mastering the best techniques for doing so. Should that subset be successful, it may well come to occupy a particular jurisdiction, but the boundaries of that jurisdiction will likely vary even as the need for professional commitment and expertise endure. The very word "profess" may be understood as signifying an individual's identifying himself as devoted to serving an enduring need. On this understanding of professionalism, then, purpose is much more fundamental than jurisdiction. A profession is weakened less by admitting that there is ambiguity attendant to its identity than it is by asserting a professional identity that is not borne out by reality. Military justice civilian authorities, although possessing power to try servicemen, are reluctant to use it. They generally prefer to return military culprits to military control. Usually local working arrangements are developed between military and civilian authorities along this line.

Conclusion

It may also be that some cultural traits affect military performance. Many have argued for example, encourage rigidly hierarchical organizational structures and extreme deference to authority. Status is associated with distance from one's subordinates, and hands-on mastery of technical detail by superior officers is discouraged. This tends to interfere with honest assessment of problems and promotes artificiality in training, because mistakes are too rarely acknowledged and thus too rarely rectified.

Similarly, military identity is connected in strong ways to the notions of obedience and subordination of self. The obligation to obey lawful orders makes sense in a context where accomplishing a task requires the interlocked coordination individual efforts, especially when time is short. In some cases, the very survival of others depends on this obedient coordination. But in other cases, obedience can result in tragedy. Military members are expected to face dangerous situations on behalf of noncombatants. This relationship is well established. Ethical issues arise when military judgments about which dangers to face conflict with those of the civilian leadership.

Civil-military relation include jurisdiction of military justice. Traditionally, military justice has been a rough form of justice emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties with a view to maintaining obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks.

Career military members often describe themselves as professionals. But what military professionalism amounts to is controversial, as is the question of what constitutes a profession in the first place. Professional identity may be understood in terms of a delineated jurisdiction in which a specialized

expertise is applied. Understanding professionalism relies on understanding the enduring societal needs professionals are to meet.

Career military members often describe themselves as professionals. But what military professionalism amounts to is controversial, as is the question of what constitutes a profession in the first place.

Bibliography

Book :

Andrew Abbott (1998), *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bill Rhodes, *An Introduction to Military Ethics,* A Reference Handbook, Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues,Praeger Security International*An Imprint of ABC-CLIO.*
Huntington, Samuel. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kennedy, Paul **.** (1991) *Grand Strategy in War and Peace*: Toward a broader definition. In Grand strategies in war and peace, ed. Paul Kennedy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Martin Cook. (2004) *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military* ,Albany: State University of New York.
Peter Katzenstein, ed. (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.* New York: Columbia University Press.
Risa A. Brooks, *Society, Institutions, and International Power Effectiveness***,** Stanford University Press.
Samuel. P. Huntington. (1957). *The Soldier and the State.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sir John Winthrop Hackett. (1986) 'The Military in the Service of the State'. In: *War, Morality and the Military Profession,* ed. Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Journal Article :

Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 5 1 April 1986.
Delmar Karlen and Louis H. Pepper ,*The Scope of Military Justice Author(s)*: Source: The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep. - Oct., 1992), p. 285-298 Published by: Northwestern University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1139145 Accessed: 12/11/2011, 19:13.
G. R. Rubin ,*United Kingdom Military Law Autonomy, Civilianization, Juridification* Author(s): Source: The Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan., 2002) Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Modern Law Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1097516 Accessed: 26/11/2011, 23:26 .
John C. Ries and Owen S. Nibley, *Justice, Juries, and Military Dependents Author(s)*: Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sep., 1962), Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/445034 Accessed: 12/11/2011, 18:24.

Kennedy, Paul, (1988), Britain in the First World War. In Military effectiveness, vol. 1, ed. Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, 31-79. Boston: Allen &Unwin

Major Joshua M. Toman, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.Pamphlet No. 27-100-195, Spring 2008, Military Law Review-Volume 195.

Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, No. 3 (1996– 97)

Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," *The Atlantic Monthly* 280, No. 1, 1997.