

ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: MDT2013-0383

Athens Institute for Education and Research

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ATINER's Conference Paper Series

MDT2013-0383

**Deconstructing the Discourse of
Models: The 'Battle of Ideas' over
the Post-Revolutionary Middle
East**

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URL Conference Papers Series: www.atiner.gr/papers.htm

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ISSN 2241-2891
29/04/2013

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This paper should be cited as follows:

Göksel, O. (2013) "Deconstructing the Discourse of Models: The 'Battle of Ideas' over the Post-Revolutionary Middle East" Athens: ATINER'S Conference Paper Series, No: MDT2013-0383

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Abstract

Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the so-called 'Turkish model' has become a key ingredient of the discourse of democratization in the Middle East. The debates over the Turkish model are also related with discussions on the comparison of Turkey's democratic Islamic governance with Iran's radical theocratic Islamic rule in terms of appeal to the post-revolutionary Middle Eastern societies. As the Islamist political movements have gained pluralities in the first post-revolutionary parliamentary elections in Tunisia and Egypt, debates on what kind of state would arise in these countries have become very popular. This study has two objectives. Firstly, the assumption of the necessity of a 'model' for the emerging democracies in the Middle East will be discussed. This will be followed by a comparative analysis of Turkish and Iranian models in terms of their potential to affect the policies of emerging states in the region. The study will acknowledge the fact that the full application of the model may not be possible, however, the paper will conclude that the Turkish model is much more applicable to the emerging democracies in Tunisia and Egypt than Iranian model and it has a lot to offer to those societies in terms of guidance in areas such as the state-religion relations, economic development and democracy building.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Turkish Model, Iranian Model, Economic Development

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Introduction

In recent years, Turkey and Iran, two non-Arab countries emerged as key actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with their rising influence. The Arab Spring has intensified ongoing discussions over the roles of Turkey and Iran within the scholarly literature. Hence, 'neo-Ottomanism' and 'Shi'a Crescent' have become popular concepts associated with pro-active foreign policies of these regional powers¹. Debates over the applicability of 'Turkish model' and 'Iranian model' have evolved in parallel to the aforementioned literature. Especially after Islamist-oriented parties such as Ennahda and Freedom and Justice Party emerged victorious from general elections and formed governments in post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt, the so-called rivalry between two different types of governance based in Turkey and Iran have gained wide attention, sparking the interest of media, academia and policy-makers in the MENA region and beyond. This paper will start its analysis by questioning the necessity of a model for post-revolutionary societies. This is an overlooked but much needed discussion that can contribute to the rapidly expanding literature. Then, the discourse of models will be analyzed by defining what each type of governance refers to, as there seems to be confusion regarding the meaning of these concepts. Lastly, the relevance and applicability of Turkish and Iranian models will be examined by assessing the needs and demands of the Arab public in addition to ideas of policy-makers in the post-revolutionary societies. It will be argued that Turkish model is much more applicable to the emerging democracies in Tunisia and Egypt than Iranian model and it has a lot to offer to those societies in terms of guidance in areas such as the state-religion relations, economic development and democracy building.

The Necessity of Models for Development

Modernisation refers to a model of an evolutionary transition from 'traditional' to a 'modern' society. Over the years, modernity has been measured in terms of various indicators such as industrialisation, education level and urbanisation. Measuring and assessing the concept of modernity remains a controversial issue within the literature of development as different schools of thought such as modernisation theory, world-systems school and dependency theorists have offered various methods and approaches to study this phenomenon. Modernisation entered the domain of policy-makers when technologically advanced European empires such as Britain and France began to encounter non-Western nations during their colonisation efforts. As the non-Western nations lacked the technological tools to counter the claims of Western colonial empires, modernisation or development had eventually become a key objective for these societies that lagged behind the rapidly

¹Ayoob, M. (2011) 'Beyond the Democratic Wave: A Turko-Persian Future?', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XVIII, No.2, p.111.

developing West. For obvious reasons, the quickest way to shorten the development gap for non-Western societies was to learn from the example of European and North American nations.

Within the discourse of modernisation, there are ongoing debates about whether developing countries follow similar paths to modernity in their transition periods. Clearly, conditions of each country differ greatly, therefore not all societies have followed the same trajectory of development, however all developing nations have, at some point, observed the experiences of more developed countries. During the 19th century, non-Western societies such as Japan, Turkey, Iran and Egypt pursued series of reforms based on the scientific and political development of Western nations. The early experiments of these non-Western countries with Western models demonstrated that modernisation process can be controlled, accelerated and shaped by policy-makers. The systematic modernisation process directed by Western-educated reforming bureaucrats in Japan throughout the latter half of the 19th century eventually led to the emergence of a society that stands as one of world's most technologically-advanced countries since the second half of the 20th century, merely a century after Western models were adopted¹. Moreover, adoption of models proved its success over and over again as the Western-inspired reforms propelled Turkey into the position of world's 17th largest economy, a country whose economy was based on agricultural production until a few decades ago². Many other non-Western countries such as South Korea have undergone a similar transformation through the use of models while other developing nations such as China are following suit nowadays.

In the history of revolutionary movements, there have been numerous examples of previous models impacting on new uprisings. Waves of revolutions often follow each other in close succession as demonstrated with the way American, French and Haitian revolutions in late 18th century influenced South American revolutions of early 19th century, 1848 revolutions in European countries which facilitated one another throughout most of the continent and the early 20th century revolutionary movements in China, Ottoman Empire and Iran that occurred one after the other within three years³. This role played by models on other movements is called 'demonstrative effect' by Huntington⁴. Building upon Huntington's concept, Kirişçi⁵ points to the importance of regional models which are shown to be the most influential ones in shaping the direction of revolutions.

¹Ward, R. and Rustow, D. (eds.) (1964) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²Kirişçi, K. (2011) 'Turkey's "Demonstrative Effect" and the Transformation of the Middle East', *Insight Turkey*, Vol.13, No.2.

³Keddie, N. (2012) 'Arab and Iranian Revolts 1979-2011: Influences or Similar Causes', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 44, p.150.

⁴Huntington, S. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

⁵Kirişçi (2011), p.35.

As societies clearly lagging behind¹ their counterparts in other developing parts of the world such as East Asia and South America, post-revolutionary countries in the MENA can benefit from the experiences of more developed nations in terms of socio-economic and political development. In fact, the adoption of models is essential if the policy-makers desire to create their own independent modernisation models and success stories. All countries such as Japan, South Korea and Turkey which are now being portrayed as 'models', had initially learned from other countries and experienced an accelerated modernisation process intensified by Western-inspired reforms. Following the Arab Spring, countries such as Tunisia and Egypt desperately need to reformulate their political structures and increase the pace of economic growth in order to meet the ever-intensifying demands of their largely young and more educated citizens.

A combination of various factors has resulted in the rise of Turkey and Iran as potential models for the region. Economically, both countries possess key advantages, Turkey is a highly industrialized country in the region and currently stands as the 17th largest economy in the world while Iran is the world's fourth-largest producer of oil and second-largest producer of natural gas². An even more influential factor has been the largely positive images of both countries among MENA societies. Numerous opinion polls in Arab countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, UAE and Saudi Arabia have produced strikingly similar results, placing Turkey and Iran to top and second positions in terms of public affection. For example, a 2010 University of Maryland and Zogby International poll demonstrates that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan is the most popular leader in the region by a substantial margin, while Iranian President Ahmedinejad took the second position³. A Qatar Foundation poll shows that 72 percent of respondents in the aforementioned Arab countries see Turkey as 'suitable role model' for the direction of their respective societies⁴. So, what do these two models refer to in terms of governance?

It must be noted that due to the highly subjective usage of the concept by observers, the meaning and scope of Turkish model have become vague and abstract. A working definition of the model is required but there is great variety in the way the model has been conceptualized in the discourse. Due to the limits of space within this article, it is not possible to point to every understanding⁵ of the model. For the purposes of this study, Turkish model will be defined as Turkey's modernization experience in terms of economic development, democracy-building and state-religion relations. Over time, Turkey's modernization process has evolved from a state-led model based on,

¹Kirişçi (2011).

²Ayoob (2011), p.113.

³Ayoob (2011), p.113.

⁴Bozkurt, A. (2012) 'Engagement of the Changing Governments in the Middle East into the Current World Order: Turkey as a Role Model', *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 4, No. 41, p.72.

⁵For a detailed examination of the literature on the model, see Göksel, O. (2012) 'Assessing the Turkish Model as a Guide to the Emerging Democracies in the Middle East', *Ortadoğu Etutleri*, Vol. 4, No. 1.

the founder of the republic, Kemal Ataturk's ideas of modernity in terms of cultural Westernisation and radical secularism to a democratic governance model that managed to come to terms with political Islam. The ever-intensifying democratisation process that begun in 1980s has been accompanied by two parallel developments, namely rapid economic development and the transformation of the Islamic movement as Turkish Islamists had managed to develop a new Islamic paradigm that recognizes the democratic and secular system while emphasizing mutual tolerance. Iranian model, on the other hand, refers to the radical theocratic state structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran formed after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In contrast with the pluralistic nature of Turkish Islamism, Iranian model is based on the revolutionary takeover of the state by Islamists and the subsequent authoritarian implementation of Islamic rules and law onto the population from above. In light of the brief definitions given above, the study will now focus on assessing the applicability of Turkish and Iranian models for the post-revolutionary MENA societies.

The Applicability of Turkish and Iranian Models for Post-Revolutionary MENA

Debates around the Turkish and Iranian models do not solely occur within the realms of media and academia. Public statements given by Iranian officials provide hints about the Iranian perception of the ideological clash between two models. Speeches of Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi and President Ahmedinejad indicated the popular Iranian belief that the Turkish model is backed by the Western powers to weaken the appeal of Iranian Islam¹. From the beginning, the Arab uprisings have been interpreted by Iranian policy-makers as a 'continuation of the 1979 Revolution', a process that would result in the establishment of Iran-like theocratic governments². As such, Supreme Leader Khamenei called for the establishment of regimes based on the 'Iranian way' when he publicly encouraged Egyptian clerics to preach an 'Islamic Revolution' in Friday prayers³. However, these calls seem to have not found a response as major Islamic parties in post-revolutionary countries emphasize the notion of 'civil state' as the direction for their countries, not the Iranian model.

The civil state can be defined as a mix of pluralism, respect to democratic principles and the recognition of all citizens' right to practise their religious beliefs⁴. The calls for a civil state reflects the desire of Islamist movements such as the *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood) and its political affiliates to form a

¹Akyol, M. (2012) 'Turkey vs. Iran: The Regional Battle for Hearts and Minds', *Foreign Affairs*, 21 March [Online] Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137343/musta-fa-akyol/turkey-vs-iran> (Accessed: 10 January 2013).

²Hilal, F. A. (2011) *Iran and the Arab Revolutions: Positions and Repercussions*, Doha Institute, p.1.

³Hilal (2012), p.2.

⁴Ramadan, T. (2012) *The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East*, London: Allen Lane & Penguin.

state structure inspired by Islamic values but based on mutual tolerance and minority rights, rather than dictatorial implementation of the 'majority will' as in the Iranian model¹. It seems that the emerging regimes in Tunisia and Egypt signal the rise of moderate Islamism which have been adopted by Ennahda leader Ghannouchi in Tunisia and Freedom and Justice Party leaders such as Saad el-Katatni as both politicians make constant references to civil state in their speeches².

Even though many policy-makers in Iran seem convinced that the 2011 Arab Spring has similarities with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, there are many reasons to believe otherwise. Firstly, the uprisings that had occurred Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have different characteristics from each other, even though all movements resulted in the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. Thus, it would be an over-simplification to argue that all uprisings were inspired by Islamic values akin to the 1979 Revolution. Furthermore, there is an obvious difference between the nature of social life in Iran and the MENA countries that had experienced the Arab Spring. All these Arab countries (except Bahrain which had an unsuccessful revolution attempt) have predominantly Sunni populations unlike Iran and its predominantly Shi'a citizens whose religious belief is rooted in a completely different theological and socio-political background.

Another key difference between the 2011 uprisings and the 1979 Revolution, most emphasized in the literature³ is the absence of 'charismatic leadership' among the revolutionary countries. Unlike the Arab Spring, the 1979 Iranian Revolution gradually came under the control of the clergy which, under the 'messianic' leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, had a clearly-defined, radical agenda to transform the state in the aftermath of the revolution. The only exception of the Arab Spring could be Rachid Ghannouchi in Tunisia who initially seemed to fill the role of charismatic leader, but ultimately did not emerge as the sole leader of a new authoritarian regime. In addition to the absence of a 'leader cult' during the Arab Spring, there were no references to totalitarian concepts such as the 'Rule of the Jurist' formulated by Khomeini which had formed the basis of the new authoritarian regime in post-1979 Iran⁴. As mentioned above, the only noteworthy concept that emerged with the Arab Spring is the 'civil state' which stands in stark contrast to the authoritarian 'Rule of the Jurist' with its messages of tolerance and civil liberties. The concept of civil state is line with the Turkish model. The Turkish model and the civil state acknowledge the rights of both the believers and non-believers in the society as the state strictly abstains from attempting to regulate personal liberties. Akin to

¹Hilal (2012), p.3.

²Dalacoura, K. (2012) 'The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications', *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1, p.77.

³Dalacoura (2012) and Amanat, A. (2012) 'The Spring of Hope and Winter of Despair', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 44, p.147.

⁴Nabavi, N. (2012) 'The Arab Spring as Seen through the Prism of the 1979 Iranian Revolution', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 44, p.153-154.

Turkish model, the civil state implies that moderate political Islam, which is respectful of democracy, can exist in a pluralistic and open society.

The uprisings in MENA countries had not only been devoid of any charismatic leader with widespread recognition, but the revolutionary movements were also characterized by the absence of any uniting ideology. The movements consisted of ideologically diverse groups, only united in their common struggle against authoritarian regimes. Moreover, unlike the 1979 Revolution which had a variety of radical movements such as the Marxist-Leninist *Tudeh Party* and urban guerrilla group *Fada'iyān-i Khalq*, militancy was absent during the Arab Spring¹. All these factors lead us to define the Arab Spring movements as a 'post-ideological phenomenon'² that has more in common with 'Orange movements' that had spread to a number of post-Soviet states such as Ukraine and Georgia in 2004 and 2005, not with an old-style ideological revolution such as the 1979 Revolution which had happened within the ideological environment of the Cold War.

As it should still be considered a recent event, we should not assume to fully know the reasons behind the Arab Spring, yet the current literature sheds some light over this complex phenomenon. Coll³ emphasizes liberal values such as freedom of speech and equality of opportunity as objectives espoused by the revolutionary youth that led the movements in 2011. Even though there appears to be a consensus within the discourse about the essential role played by the demand for political freedom, there are still scholars such as Bozkurt⁴ who argues that this emphasis on political factors may be overstated as economics might have played a bigger role. Malik and Awadallah⁵ point that the 2011 uprisings were, to a large extent, caused by economic problems such as poverty, unemployment, lack of social mobility and insufficient economic opportunities. Saif and Rumman⁶ also focus on economic factors such as low productivity and low-level integration with the global economy as they argue that these ongoing deficiencies had prevented the authoritarian regimes from increasing the living standards of their citizens. Dalacoura⁷ analyzes a broader set of issues and argues that a combination of socio-economic and political demands had been driving the revolutionary movements, pointing that poverty alone cannot explain the rationale behind the uprisings as average living standards in Tunisia and Libya were quite high compared to some other Arab countries that had not experienced any dissent so far. In its analysis of the

¹Amanat (2012), p.147.

²Many scholars identified the Arab Spring as 'post-ideological'. See, for example, Amanat (2012) and Dalacoura (2012), p.75.

³Coll, S. (2011) 'The Second Tunisian Revolution: A New Model for Change for a New Generation', *US/ME Policy Brief*.

⁴Bozkurt (2012), p.68.

⁵Malik, A. and Awadallah, B. (2011) 'The Economics of the Arab Spring', *Middle East Insight*, No. 46, p.1.

⁶Saif, I. and Rumman M.A. (2012) 'The Economic Agenda of the Islamist Parties', *Carnegie Papers*.

⁷Dalacoura, K. (2011) 'Democratisation: Uprising, Violence and Reform', *The Arab Spring: Implications for British Policy*, Conservative Middle East Council, p. 54.

needs and demands of the public in post-revolutionary countries, this study utilizes this last argument as political demands such as accountable governance and open society should be accompanied by economic factors such as high unemployment rates (particularly among the more educated youth) and corruption in order to better reflect the reasons behind the recent events in MENA.

In terms of economic structures and conditions, post-revolutionary societies Tunisia and Egypt are quite different from Iran. While Iran has an economy based on one of the world's richest natural reserves in terms of oil and natural gas which generate enough revenues to sustain itself even under the Western-imposed trade embargo and sanctions, Tunisia and Egypt lack such a unique ability to survive autonomously from the global economy. Tourism is a key sector for Tunisian economy, one that requires a positive image and a relatively open society to attract foreign tourists, whereas Egypt is largely dependent on financial aid and Suez Channel revenues, two factors making up two-thirds of all its foreign exchange revenues¹. Furthermore, 80 percent of Tunisia's trade is conducted with the European Union countries while most tourists it receives are also from Europe². Thus, policy-makers in Tunisia and Egypt cannot hope to antagonize the developed countries and the new governments in Tunis and Cairo seem to be aware of this situation. The pragmatism of the Islamist-led governments is apparent as one of Ennahda leaders Hamadi Jebali (who had also been the prime minister of Tunisia between December 2011-February 2013) had indicated that Ennahda has no intention to ban 'bikinis and wine'³. Ennahda leaders have repeatedly stated their support for free-market principles and emphasized the importance of their economic ties with Europe on Tunisian economy. Akin to Jebali, another key Ennahda leader and party chairman, Ghannouchi has also indicated that Ennahda would not force women to wear headscarves, implement Shari'a law and ban alcohol⁴. Same level of pragmatism can be seen in the economic policies formulated by Ennahda in Tunisia and Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt. Rather than dismantling the system to develop an ideological 'Islamic economy', the policies offered by the two parties focus on improving the management of economy through a series of measures such as cooperation with private sector, ensuring good governance, fighting corruption and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises⁵. Moreover, the party policies state that Islamic finance will not be imposed, it will merely continue alongside the conventional finance sector while much emphasis is put on reassuring the Western tourists about their security and freedom⁶. Demands such as political

¹Malik and Awadallah (2011), p.3.

²Hammond, A. (2011) 'Tunisia's Ennahda likely to back an open economy', *Reuters*, 26 October [Online] Available at: <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-tunisia-ennahda-likely-to-back-an-open-economy/> (Accessed 12 February 2013).

³Hammond (2011).

⁴Yakış, Y. (2012) 'The Role of Political Islam and Expectations for the Future', *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 4, No. 39, p.65.

⁵Saif and Rumman (2012), p.1.

⁶Saif and Rumman (2012), p.2.

freedom, increased living standards and ending the corruption have been at the foreground of discussions since the Arab Spring and the political Islamists have, so far, displayed a high level of awareness and responsiveness towards the needs of the public in these matters.

The actions of major Islamist parties in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt clearly point to the importance given to the Turkish model in the minds of these policy-makers¹: Leader of Ennahda, Ghannouchi has repeatedly emphasized the similarity between the ruling conservative AKP (Justice and Development Party) government in Turkey and Ennahda in Tunisia by stating that both movements represent a 'new brand of political Islam', one that synthesizes Islam and modernity at the same time. Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt has explicitly refused to form a coalition government with radical Islamist *Al-Nour* Party, preferring to keep an open door policy towards cooperation with liberal and centrist parties instead. The local *Ikhwan* branch in Libya founded its political party with the exact same name of the Turkish AKP, 'Justice and Development Party' declaring that the party is 'inspired by principles of Islam' but it would lead the re-construction of Libya on the basis of a democratic system. Since the Arab Spring, the popularity and appeal of the Turkish model has rapidly increased while the Iranian model seems to be losing ground. The decreasing appeal of Iranian model vis-à-vis Turkish model should be attributed to the perceptions and policies of new governments in post-revolutionary countries, led by moderate Islamist parties. Leaders of these movements have voiced their support for the Turkish model and this tendency is not only limited to politicians as the public opinion is also leaning towards Turkish model. For example, the TESEV survey conducted in post-revolutionary MENA countries shows that 61 percent of respondents see Turkey as a model because "it is at once Muslim, democratic, open and prosperous"².

The applicability of the Turkish model for post-revolutionary MENA is most apparent in the field of economic development whereas this is the area the Iranian model fails to provide solutions for the problems of these societies. It has been argued that the Islamist parties won elections not due to a widespread public demand for a theocratic regime but because of their aforementioned party programs based on social welfare, fighting corruption and increasing economic prosperity, all pointing to socio-economic issues³. Compared to the Iranian model, Turkish model is better suited to provide solutions for new governments to meet these public demands. Despite its vast natural reserves, Iranian economy has serious problems such as high unemployment and inflation levels, constituting a failure in economic development⁴. In terms of

¹Bozkurt (2012), p.72.

² Akyol (2012).

³von Rohr, M. (2011) 'Victory for Ennahda: Why Tunisians Voted for the Islamists', *Spiegel*, 26 October [Online] Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/victory-for-ennahda-why-tunisians-voted-for-the-islamists-a-794133.html> (Accessed: 15 February 2013).

⁴Öztürkler, H. (2012) 'General Characteristics of Iranian Economy', *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 4, No. 40, p.86.

delivering a better life and increasing living standards, the Iranian regime is seen as a failure as the radical theocratic regime has caused the greatest brain drain in history in addition to a severe capital flight since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran ranks first in terms of the displacement of citizens with advanced education and technical know-how¹. Furthermore, the same analysis shows that the total wealth of the Iranian diaspora is estimated to be around 400 billion USD, assets that could have been invested in Iranian economy if not for the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In developed economies, the percentage of agricultural sector within the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stands around 5 percent while it is still more than 10 percent in Iranian economy today and another key indicator of development, the portion of services sector within Iran's GDP is 46.8 percent while it more than 60 percent in Turkey, clearly demonstrating that the latter is in a much more developed state, closer to Western economies in its economic indicators². In addition, it is important to note that Turkey's per capita income rose from 1.300 USD in 1985 to more than 11.000 USD in 2008³ while in Iran's per capita income remains around 4.500 USD as of 2009⁴.

A distinguished expert of the region, Fawaz Gerges indicates that Iran is a 'failed model' due to the inability of its regime to build a functioning, prosperous economy while Turkey has been fairly successful in that field⁵. Another factor that reduces the applicability of Iranian model for the MENA is regarding the international position and state structure of Iran as it is a highly isolated state under heavy economic sanctions and its policy-making mechanisms are extremely complex, based on the particular historical evolution of Shi'a religious thought and political institutions, entirely unique to Iran. All these factors bring us to the conclusion that Iran's economic development is not relevant for the post-revolutionary MENA countries Tunisia and Egypt.

In contrast, the Turkish model offers some helpful insights in terms of economic development that can be utilized by the post-revolutionary to develop solutions for their economic problems. A key problem that the Turkish model can help to solve is in regards to the ongoing crony capitalism and inefficient public sector in Tunisia and Egypt. The state remains as the most important economic actor in Egypt and Tunisia but due to rampant corruption and *clientelist* networks, it is a sector that works for the benefit of a very small elite, not the majority of citizens⁶. So far, the neoliberal reforms that were

¹Kamal, R. (2009) 'Iran's Islamic regime is no model to follow', *Ikhwan Web*, 17 November [Online] Available at: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=21708> (Accessed 12 January 2013).

²Öztürkler (2012), p.87-88.

³Kirişçi (2011), p.37.

⁴Öztürkler (2012), p. 89.

⁵Quoted in Donat, G. N. (2012) 'Turkey sole example for region, Iran a failed model says expert', *Today's Zaman*, 19 March [Online] Available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-274788-turkey-sole-example-for-region-iran-a-failed-model-says-expert.html> (Accessed: 17 February 2013).

⁶Malik and Awadallah (2011), p.3.

initiated in 1970s and 1980s had not been successful in reducing these problems. Malik and Awadallah¹ explains the current state of economy in post-revolutionary MENA: "Recent events in the region provide an apt reminder that the prevailing development model has outlives its usefulness...The region needs a new social and economic paradigm that is based on a competitive, entrepreneurial, and inclusive private sector".

These issues lay at the very heart of the success of the Turkish model. Turkey's own neoliberal experiment launched in early 1980s produced the rapid economic development that now constitutes a key pillar of the Turkish model. The export drive, waves of privatization and Turkey's integration with the global production and market network led to the emergence of an expanding middle class and new entrepreneurs even in formerly-rural areas of Central Turkey as the country had gone through rapid urbanization and industrialization. Turkey is the only Muslim country in the region that has managed to create a self-sustainable and free-market economy that is not based on natural reserves as in economies such as Saudi Arabia and Iran but on modern production sectors such as automotive, textiles and white goods. The Turkish model offers valuable lessons in terms of transition to market economy, integration into the global market, rapid economic growth to overtake the population growth, reduce unemployment and ensure efficient governance.

Conclusion

This study has argued that the post-revolutionary countries in the MENA such as Tunisia and Egypt need to learn from the experience of other countries through analyzing their modernization models, so that the policy-makers can develop policies that can respond to the socio-economic and political demands of their citizens in the era following the Arab Spring. Throughout this study, the emerging concept of the civil state, ideas of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt, and the demands of the public have been analyzed in order to assess the applicability of two models of governance for post-revolutionary MENA. In conclusion, compared with the Iranian model, the Turkish model is much more applicable for these societies as the particular experience of Turkey in terms of economic development and the nature of its Islamist movements is more relevant for the current circumstances of post-revolutionary societies. Yet, it is important to note that this work does not attempt to suggest that through completely following the example of Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt can achieve success in all fields related to modernization. Turkish model is merely one model among many development strategies that can be utilized to solve problems. In addition to Turkish model, it might be useful for policy-makers in MENA to look at other examples such as the Malaysian model. Turkish model should not be referred as 'a perfect formula' for development as no model can

¹Malik and Awadallah (2011), p.5.

be fully applicable for a different setting, however the Turkish model is certainly more useful than the experience of Iran, a country that had a very different social, political and economic trajectory compared to MENA societies Tunisia and Egypt and one that is yet to demonstrate considerable success in development.