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**The Transylvanian Relations with the  
Cossacks During the Second  
Northern War (1655-1660)**

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Second Northern War (1655-1660)**

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**Abstract**

The uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648) had virtually eradicated the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth authority in Ukraine and has severely shaken the very foundations of the Republic of Nobles. Khmelnytsky was quick to realize, as he learned from past unsuccessful uprising campaigns, that unless he gathered support from external forces, as he had hoped this time around, following a great plan, to create a coalition of orthodox and protestant powers, to force Poland-Lithuania to admit Ruthenians as their equals and be granted full Commonwealth rights and to replace the King Jan II Cazimierz with the prince of Transylvania, his plan was doomed. György II Rákóczy, the prince of Transylvania from 1648, hoped, as had his precedesors after Stefan Báthory, to ascend to Polish crown. The difficulties Poland was going through during that period of time gave him hope to believe that his dream to becoming King might become reality. As Khmelnytsky had proceded, the Prince of Transylvania wanted to sign treaties not only with Commonwealth countries but more so with non-Commonwealth countries. The signed treaties between Transylvania, the Cossacks and Sweden, the latter having already allied with Brandenburg, would have led to the partition of Commonwealth and reconfiguration of this part of Europe. The correspondence between the Prince of Transylvania and Cossacks Hetman pin points their mutual ideals (the drive towards achieving independence) and their rather peculiar war embarkment with stronger forces than their own.

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The uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648) had virtually eradicated the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth authority in Ukraine and has severely shaken the very foundations of the Republic of Nobles. The direct or indirect involvement of the neighbouring countries: Crimeea, Russia, Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania and Austria, in the conflict between the Cossacks and the Republic, would turn the conflict from an internal one, within the Commonwealth, into a large scale war whereby the balance of powers and the status quo of European countries will undergo significant changes. Khmelnytsky was aware that the former campaigns failed because of the lack of international support, and hoped that after a carefully conceived plan to create a coalition of orthodox and protestant powers to force Poland and Lithuania into admitting Ruthenians as their equals.

Transylvania, „the creation of Suleiman Magnificent and the property of the sultan” became during 1568 and 1660 a great power in Oriental Europe. György II Rákóczi, the prince of Transylvania from 1648, hoped, as had his predecessors after Stephen Báthory, to ascend to Polish crown. The difficulties Poland was confronted with during this period gave him hope to believe that his dream to becoming King might come true, forgetting his commitment he had towards the Ottoman Porte and lacking full sovereign powers with regards to external politics.<sup>1</sup>

The first encounters between György Rákóczi II and Bohdan Khmelnytsky date from 1648. In a letter from 17 November, Bohdan Khmelnytsky addressed the prince of Transylvania reminding him “about Stephen Báthory and his privileges and liberties” and proposing him an alliance between Transylvania and the Cossacks.<sup>2</sup> An emissary was sent to Alba Iulia by the Polish nobles who were discontent with John Casimir’s election to ascend to the Polish throne. Ivan Vyhovsky, one of Khmelnytsky’s closest advisors, arrived shortly after to Alba Iulia, promising the prince the Polish crown.<sup>3</sup> In return, after the prince would have ascended to the Polish throne, Rákóczi would restore and respect the rights of the Cossacks.<sup>4</sup> In the years that followed, messengers were sent on both sides to form an alliance against Poland.

György Rákóczi could do little to prevent the electors to choose Ivan Vyhovsky as the King of Poland, nevertheless he tried his hardest. In this regard, he turned to the hetman of the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky, who supported György Rákóczi I<sup>5</sup> nomination to Polish crown, and proposed him a convention that would make Khmelnytsky liable, together with the Tatars, for intervening

<sup>1</sup> Bérenger, J. (2000). *The History of Habsburgs Empire (1273-1918)*. Bucharest: Teora. p. 252. [In Romanian]

<sup>2</sup> Szilágyi, S. (1890). *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale acta et documenta (Erdély éz az északkeleti háború levelek és okiratok)*. Budapest. p. 6. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>3</sup> Iorga, N. (1901). *Studies and documents concerning the Romanian history*. Bucharest. p. CCXXX. [In Romanian]

<sup>4</sup> Göllner, C. (1977). *Gheorghe Rákóczi II (1648-1660)*, Bucharest: Military Press. p. 38. [In Romanian]

<sup>5</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 3. [In Latin and Hungarian]

as to prevent the crowning of the King in Poland and called for a new Diet that would call off the Polish throne election process on the grounds that it was made „during the war”. Should he or his brother become King of Poland, he promised the Cossacks that he would restore their rights and liberties.<sup>1</sup> Rákóczi’s proposal remained inconclusive as Khmelnytsky had hoped to obtain them from the King himself, Ivan Vyhovsky.<sup>2</sup> After Zborov’s peace treaty, signed between the Poles and the Cossacks (18 august 1649), Rákóczi maintained relations with his Polish family friends as well as with the Cossacks, while at the same time pretending to be friends with the King, Ivan Vyhovsky.<sup>3</sup> The support Sigismund Rákóczi received for his candidacy to aspire to Polish crown is one the characteristics that defined the Transylvanian-Cossacks relations during the first year of György Rákóczi II as ruler. On 20 February 1649, Khmelnytsky wrote a letter to Rákóczi expressing his support towards Sigismund, his brother, to ascend to Polish crown.<sup>4</sup> Half a year later, on 25 september 1649, Khmelnytsky writes to Sigismund Rákóczi assuring him of his support and protection.<sup>5</sup>

In 1650, Rákóczi sent Francisc Sebesi to Khmelnytsky to negotiate an alliance that not only sought to turn against Poland but also to contribute towards his aspiration of becoming King of Poland, an alliance in which the hetman would not be allowed to attack Moldavia and Wallachia, so long as the rulers of these regions were in good relations with the prince.<sup>6</sup> On September 1650, Khmelnytsky wrote to Rákóczi to assure him of his friendship.<sup>7</sup> In the following year (19 April, 1651), the prince sent Paul Göcs to the Cossacks. Following these diplomatic representations a Tatar-Cossack delegation arrived in Alba Iulia in 1651 to reassure Rákóczi that Bohdan Khmelnytsky supported him fully<sup>8</sup> in his struggle to obtain the Polish crown.<sup>9</sup> In that same year, at Khmelnytsky’s request, the Ottoman Porte ordered the Tatars, the prince of Transylvania and the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia to give him assistance

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<sup>1</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 33-34. [In French]

<sup>2</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 34. [In French]

<sup>3</sup> Sârbu, I. (1992). *The external relations of Matei Vodă Basarab (1632-1654)*. Timișoara: West Press p. 138-139. [In Romanian]

<sup>4</sup> Szilágyi, S. (1890). *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale acta et documenta (Erdély éz az északkeleti háború levelek és okiratok)*. Budapest. p. 33. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>5</sup> Szilágyi, S. (1890). *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale acta et documenta (Erdély éz az északkeleti háború levelek és okiratok)*. Budapest. p. 55. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>6</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 41. [In French]

<sup>7</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 38. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>8</sup> Göllner, C. (1977). *Gheorghe Rákóczy II (1648-1660)*, Bucharest: Military Press. p. 41. [In Romanian]

<sup>9</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 74. [In Latin and Hungarian]

in the struggle against the Poles. Only the Tatars responded to his request,<sup>1</sup> however they suffered a major defeat at Berestechko (27–30 June 1651).<sup>2</sup> After Khmelnytsky's defeat, György Rákóczi wanted to intervene in Poland in order to help the Cossacks, however Constantinopol did not authorise such action.<sup>3</sup>

During 1652-1653 the relations between Rákóczi and Khmelnytsky became fairly tensed because of the conflicts caused between the Transylvanian prince and the ruler of Moldavia, Vasile Lupu (1634-1653), who was supported by his son-in-law, Timus Khmelnytsky. Rákóczi and Matei Basarab's (1632-1654) acts of war, sustained by the Poles, determined Khmelnytsky, in the opinion of some historians, to use the alliance with Moscow,<sup>4</sup> achieved in 18 January 1654 (the Treaty of Pereiaslav). Cossacks' obedience towards Moscow has slightly changed Rákóczi's approach, whose main concern then was to reestablish good relations with the Cossacks while at the same time isolate Poland as much as possible.<sup>5</sup>

Nonetheless, restoring good relations between these sides proved to be difficult, all the more so because Khmelnytsky held Rákóczi most responsible for the tragic death of his son, Timus. The chronicler Georg Kraus tells us that: „on the eve of Christmas (1654) there came the messengers ... the Cossacks ... who negotiated the release of Cossacks' elite who were taken prisoners of war ... during the battles for Wallachia and the battle for Suceava”.<sup>6</sup> „Cossacks' elite” (numbering 28) held captive in Transylvania would be released, thus giving rise to a secret alliance between the prince and Khmelnytsky.<sup>7</sup>

In a letter, from 20 February 1654, Bohdan Khmelnytsky made an effort to justify Timus' actions in Moldavia and showed willingness to restore their old friendship. At the same time, Rákóczi expressed his regret claiming that he was forced to fight the Cossacks and that he was prepared to sign an agreement with Khmelnytsky.<sup>8</sup>

At the start of 1655, Poland and Transylvania still maintained their old friendly relations. These relations had proven to be effective in the battles

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<sup>1</sup> Hurmuzaki, E. (1897). *Documents concerning the history of Romanians*. vol. IX. p. 1, 5. and Iorga N. (1895). *Documents and fragments from Romanian history*. vol. I. Bucharest. p. 203. [In Romanian, Latin etc.]

<sup>2</sup> Göllner, C. (1977). *Gheorghe Rákóczi II (1648-1660)*, Bucharest: Military Press. p. 41. [In Romanian]

<sup>3</sup> Hurmuzaki, E. (1900). *Fragments from Romanian history*. vol. II. p. 209. [In Romanian, Latin etc.]

<sup>4</sup> Göllner, C. (1977). *Gheorghe Rákóczi II (1648-1660)*, Bucharest: Military Press. p. 46-47. [In Romanian]

<sup>5</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 133-134. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>6</sup> Kraus, G. (1965). *Transylvanian Chronicles 1608-1665*. Bucharest: Academy Press. p. 176. [In Romanian]

<sup>7</sup> Kraus, G. (1965). *Transylvanian Chronicles 1608-1665*. Bucharest: Academy Press. p. 176. [In Romanian]

<sup>8</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1875). vol. XXIII. p. . [In Latin and Hungarian]



against Vasile Vodă in Moldavia and against the Cossacks,<sup>1</sup> as revealed from a letter sent on 8 January 1655 by the King Ivan Vyhovsky, wherein he wrote to prince of Transylvania about his vainly efforts, together with Tatar Khan, to sign a peace treaty with the Cossacks and to separate them from the Muscovites.<sup>2</sup> A number of treaties were not signed partly because the King, using his messengers to the Porte,<sup>3</sup> expected to obtain the involvement of Transylvania and Romanian lands through an order by the Sultan, thus avoiding the responsibility of signing a separate treaty with Romanian lands. In 1655, Rákóczi continued to gain support among Polish sympathizers not only from the Protestants but also from those who were discontent with policies of the Polish monarchy. His sympathizers facilitated the Prince correspondence and provided safe passage of the envoys through Polish territories and on to the Cossacks and others.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, on 31 March 1655, Rákóczi intended to buy, for his son, real estates from Georgius Litonieiski so that his rights (of Litonieiski) returned to Francisc Rákóczi.<sup>5</sup>

When the Swedes invaded Prussia to attack the Poles, both the Swedes and the Poles asked Rákóczi's brothers for their military support.<sup>6</sup> Alongside the Swedes and the Cossacks, the Aryan nobles asked Rákóczi to take a chance in Poland.

In the meantime, Rákóczi had started negotiations with the Cossacks. On 28 August 1655, his ambassador, Ștefan Lutsch, went to see Khmelnytsky to reach an agreement,<sup>7</sup> all the more so as the relations between Moscow and Sweden were slowly breaking down because of Lithuania. Moreover, the Tsar fearing the growing Swedish power sought to find good terms with Poland to form an alliance against the Swedes.<sup>8</sup> Under such circumstances, Khmelnytsky was pleased to receive Rákóczi's new proposals and responded to him through Ioan Wyhowski that the Cossacks' subjects are prepared to act "and just await a sign from your Majesty"<sup>9</sup>. Greater unrest

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<sup>1</sup> Iorga, N. (1901). *Studies and documents concerning the Romanian history*. Bucharest. p. CCLXXVI. [In Romanian, Latin etc.]

<sup>2</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 161. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>3</sup> Szilágyi, S. (1886). *Monumenta Comitalia Regni Transsylvaniae*. vol. XI. Budapest. p. 218. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>4</sup> Szilágyi, S. (1890). *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale acta et documenta (Erdély éz az északkeleti háború levelek és okiratok)*. Budapest. p. 383. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>5</sup> Szilágyi, S. (1890). *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale acta et documenta (Erdély éz az északkeleti háború levelek és okiratok)*. Budapest. p. 382. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>6</sup> Kraus, G. (1965). *Transylvanian Chronicles 1608-1665*. Bucharest: Academy Press. p. 184. [In Romanian]

<sup>7</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 75. [In French]

<sup>8</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 75. [In French]

<sup>9</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1874). vol. XXI. p. 234. [In Latin and Hungarian]

came from the relations with the Tatars, who assured Ivan Vyhovsky that they will not only attack the Swedes but their allies as well.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this, in Târgoviște, Ioan Boros advised György Rákóczi II not to trust the Cossacks because they are „very upset on your Majesty and the country of your Majesty”.<sup>2</sup> In another letter from 30 August 1655, he reiterates the forewarnings addressing to the Transylvanian prince that „they (the Cossacks), alike dogs, ought not to be trusted, as I have learned with certainty that they will never forget about the death of Timus and the slaughtering of the Cossacks in Suceava and on the bridge near Soroca, they will always keep this in mind; Khmelnytsky will see to this, have trust in me your Majesty”.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately for Transylvania, György Rákóczi did not take in account any of these warnings and continued his negotiations with the Cossacks.

In 9 February 1656, Khmelnytsky tells to Rákóczi that: „we are ready to serve our Christian friendship, according to the customs of true Christians and to follow and respect your Highness with duty and honor”,<sup>4</sup> and should there be matters of discussions, other than those already debated with Stefan Lutsch, it could be arranged through our messengers.<sup>5</sup> Bohdan Khmelnytsky was also doubtful of Rákóczi's sincere promises. Thus, on April 4th, 1656 Khmelnytsky wrote to Moldavian ruler about the Cossacks' decision to hold off the Poles should there be no favorable conditions to negotiate peace terms, concerning the former conflict and to ensure that the prince of Transylvania would not make a move against the Cossacks.<sup>6</sup> In that same year, the messengers came to Rákóczi „calling on him to start war with Poland”. Rákóczi was constrained to accept, after various pressures, „to march for Poland this year”, but needed a reconfirmed written agreement with the Cossacks. On 3 June 1656, Francisc Sebesi was sent to the Cossacks to renew their old friendship, which was suspended in 1653. The rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia should have been included in this new friendship.<sup>7</sup> On July, Francisc Sebesi received, on behalf of his master, the oath of loyalty from Bohdan Khmelnytsky, declaring solemnly to never become an enemy of the prince of Transylvania nor to the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Göllner, C. (1977). *Gheorghe Rákóczi II (1648-1660)*, Bucharest: Military Press. p. 65. [In Romanian]

<sup>2</sup> *Foreign travelers on the Romanian Lands*. (1973) vol. V. Bucharest. p. 536. [In Romanian]

<sup>3</sup> *Foreign travelers on the Romanian Lands*. (1973) vol. V. Bucharest. p. 539. [In Romanian]

<sup>4</sup> *Documenti Bogdani Chmielnicki*. (1961). Kiev. p. 473 or *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1874). vol. XXI. p. 313. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>5</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1874). vol. XXI. p. 313. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>6</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1874). vol. XXI. p. 355. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>7</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 80 [In French]

<sup>8</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria*. (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 416. [In Latin and Hungarian]

In addition to the convention signed with the Swedes on 7 September, an „eternal peace” treaty with the Cossacks<sup>1</sup> was signed in Alba Iulia, whereby the treaty’s final amendments were drawn on 18 October, date in which László Ujlaki, a delegate of Rákóczi, swore to Khmelnytsky confirming their Treaty.<sup>2</sup> One of the amendments in the new treaty refers to the obligation of the Cossacks not to attack Moldavia and Wallachia.<sup>3</sup> Following the accomplishment of this treaty, the interests of the Swedes to draw Transylvania closer to their side became gradually more evident.

Under these circumstances, because the King of Poland lost all hope to draw Transylvania to his side, he sent a delegation to Vienna to plead the Emperor to exercise his full authority to deter Rákóczi from materializing his intentions. For the same reasons, other delegations were sent to Constantinopol and to Crimeea.<sup>4</sup> Only when Mehmed Köprülü was appointed the Grand Vizier Vizier the Poles raised their hopes, as the Porte supported them fully. When György Rákóczi II war intentions against Poland became reality on November-October 1656, Mehmed Köprülü Pasha asked the Voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia to refrain from taking any military action, while at the same time he ordered Melek Ahmed Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman forces from the Danube, and the Khan of Crimeea, to intervene in full force in the Polish favour.<sup>5</sup>

On December, the Prince György Rákóczi II declared that he was not hostile against the Poles.<sup>6</sup> In spite of this, on 3 December 1656, Rákóczi sent Stefan Horvát to Khmelnytsky to prepare the promised 40000 Cossacks to march to Poland and arrive with them at Hust fortress on January 24th, same date set by Rákóczi to arrive by with his own troops.<sup>7</sup>

To guarantee success, Rákóczi signed on 6 December, at Iernut (Radnót) a convention with the Swedes to start an offensive against Poland.<sup>8</sup> One would find it hard to explain the nonchalance in which Rákóczi embarked in this war, neglecting the Ottoman Porte, who did not authorise, once again, Rákóczi to give any support to the Cossacks.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Frost, R. I. (2003). *After the Deluge: Poland- Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655-1666*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 85.

<sup>2</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 82. [In French]

<sup>3</sup> Andea, S. (1996). *Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia. Political connections (1656-1688)*. Cluj-Napoca: Risoprint Press. p. 90. [In Romanian]

<sup>4</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 82-83. [In French]

<sup>5</sup> Gemil, T. (1979). *Romanian lands in the context of international politics (1621-1672)*. Bucharest: Academy Press. p.165. [In Romanian]

<sup>6</sup> Szilágyi, S. (1886). *Monumenta Comititalia Regni Transsylvaniae*. vol. XI. Budapest. p. 242. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>7</sup> Kraus G. (1965). *Transylvanian Chronicles 1608-1665*. Bucharest: Academy Press. p. 187. [In Romanian]

<sup>8</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 83. [In French]

<sup>9</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660)*. Iassi. p. 84. [In French]

Moreover, the prince of Transylvania was warned that the Porte will not tolerate any military aggression against Poland. If Rákóczi still aspired for the Polish Crown he would have had to send a special envoy, accompanied by a Polish emissary, holding a substantial request from the Senate of the Kingdom, as Stephen Báthori had proceeded before.<sup>1</sup> The public opinion in Transylvania did not share the same views with regards to the campaign in Poland.<sup>2</sup> The mother of the prince, Susanna Lorantffy and György Rákóczi I wife, Zsófia (Sofia) Báthori, the latter having Polish roots from her mother side, along with a few of his counsellors, disapproved the military action in Poland.<sup>3</sup> „Having already decided to go to war against Poland, György Rákóczi II completely forgot that he was subject to the Porte”<sup>4</sup> and it had not occurred to him that he practiced a different religion than the one received from the Kingdom of Poland.<sup>5</sup>

On 22 January 1657, Rákóczi entered Poland. „On the brick of New Year (1657) our lord hasted all his troops and entered Poland, commanding the troops himself. Cossacks arrived at once...thirty thousand men, with hetman ...”<sup>6</sup>. Their leader was Anton Zdanovics. However, the disputes between Ioan Kemény and the Cossacks which provoked chaos among the two armies weakened the alliance.<sup>7</sup>

On 21 July at Miedzibos, all the Cossacks and Romanians abandoned Rákóczi.<sup>8</sup> Abandoned by his own allies on 22 July 1657, near the town Czarni Ostrov, the prince of Transylvania was forced to lay down his arms and ask for peace. According to Georg Kraus, he believes that Marshal Lubomirski was fairly lenient towards Rákóczi when peace terms were established.<sup>9</sup> Only a few of them and the prince managed to return to Transylvania. Most of the troops, led by Kemény, were attacked by the Tatars and the Poles. Many were taken prisoners, including general Ioan Kemény.<sup>10</sup>

Meanwhile, the posing Tatar threat along with Lubomirski's move to enter Transylvania from north gave Rákóczi good reasons to request military assistance from Khmelnytsky. However his request was not accepted as the Cossacks commanders from Poland complained to Khmelnytsky that the prince

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<sup>1</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria.* (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 470. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>2</sup> Makkai, L. (1946). *The History of Trasylyvania.* Paris. p. 241. [In French]

<sup>3</sup> Köpeczi, B. (1989). *The History of Transylvania.* Budapest. p. 342. . [In French]

<sup>4</sup> Bérenger, J. (2000). *The History of Habsburgs Empire (1273-1918).* Bucharest: Teora. p. 252. [In Romanian]

<sup>5</sup> Swart, J. (1784). *Historical Memoris of Count Bethlen- Nikols.* I. Amsterdam. p. 8. [In French]

<sup>6</sup> *The Memorial of Nagy Szabo-Ferencz from Târgu-Mureş (1580-1658).* (1993). Bucharest:. p. 214. [In Romanian]

<sup>7</sup> Andea, S. (1996). *Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia. Political connections (1656-1688).* Cluj-Napoca: Risoprint Press. p. 93. [In Romanian]

<sup>8</sup> Motogna V., „The era of Matei Basarab and Vasile Lupu”, în *Historical researches*, An. XIII-XVI, Nr. 1-2, Iași, 1940, p. 536

<sup>9</sup> Kraus G. (1965). *Transylvanian Chronicles 1608-1665.* Bucharest: Academy Press. p. 219-220. [In Romanian]

<sup>10</sup> Makkai, L. (1946). *The History of Trasylyvania.* Paris. p. 242. [In French]

was not interested at all in fighting the Poles, in contrary they claimed that Cossacks soldiers were been slaughtered by the prince. Khmelnytsky accused the prince for treason, threatening to send 50000 Cossacks to wipe out the Transylvanians in one day.<sup>1</sup> When reports came out about the defeat of Rákóczi, according to Miron Costin, Khmelnytsky would have said the following: „O, if God handed this dog over to me”.<sup>2</sup>

After Khmelnytsky's death (1657), the military Council did not take into account Khmelnytsky wish for his son Yurii to become his successor and appointed instead Ivan Vyhovsky as leader.<sup>3</sup> On 12 November 1657, an important Cossack delegation arrived in Transylvania asking him to step down and hand over the princship to Francisc Rhédey so that the country will not face more hardships than they were already facing.<sup>4</sup> On 4 February 1658 the new hetman Vyhovsky, writes to Rákóczi, that during the peace negotiations with the Khan of the Tatars, his attempts to negotiate good terms for his Majesty were unsuccessful.<sup>5</sup> Rákóczi sent Paul Göcz to obtain Cossacks' support against the Porte, who did not want him prince of Transylvania any longer. In another letter from July 1658, Vyhovsky refers to the renewal of friendly relations between Transylvania and the Cossacks. Nonetheless, 12000 Cossacks joined the great army, under the command of Pasha from Silistra, and crossed the Carpathians, forcing Rákóczi to renounce the throne.<sup>6</sup> Between 1659-1660, the relations between Transylvania and the Cossacks were affected by political crises and internal conflicts from these two regions. In spite of this, the Cossacks continued to give military support to Transylvania as it happened in 1660 when the Tatars prepared to invade Transylvania.<sup>7</sup>

The correspondence between the prince of Transylvania and Cossacks Hetman pin points their mutual ideals (the drive towards achieving independance) and their rather unconcious war embarkment with stronger forces than their own. Their alliances as well as the involvement of Transylvania in the Northern War were disapproved by the greater powers of the region who monitored with uneasiness the unfolding events in the Commonwealth and were not inclined to accept the emergence of new powers that would have led to instability to the existing regional players. Moreover, neither Transylvania nor the Cossacks were ready to play a greater role than

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<sup>1</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria.* (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 531. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>2</sup> Miron, C. (1883). *Chronicle of Moldavia.* Bucharest. p. 354. [In Romanian]

<sup>3</sup> Stone, D. (2001). *The Polish Lituianian State, 1386-1795.* Seattle and Londra: University of Washington Press. p. 170.

<sup>4</sup> Kraus, G. (1965). *Transylvanian Chronicles 1608-1665.* Bucharest: Academy Press. p. 249. [In Romanian]

<sup>5</sup> *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria.* (1875). vol. XXIII. p. 598. [In Latin and Hungarian]

<sup>6</sup> Pavlesco, E. (1924). *Georges II Rákóczy prince of Transylvania (1648-1660).* Iassi. p. 117. [In French]

<sup>7</sup> Kraus, G. (1965). *Transylvanian Chronicles 1608-1665.* Bucharest: Academy Press. p. 331-332. [In Romanian]

the one they already had up until that time. (Translated by Linelia Petruța Vasiliu)