17th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
23-26 May 2022, Athens, Greece

Edited by William O’Meara & Olga Gkounta
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Preface

This book includes the abstracts of all the papers presented at the 17th Annual International Conference on Philosophy (23-26 May 2022), organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER).

A full conference program can be found before the relevant abstracts. In accordance with ATINER’s Publication Policy, the papers presented during this conference will be considered for inclusion in one of ATINER’s many publications only after a blind peer review process.

The purpose of this abstract book is to provide members of ATINER and other academics around the world with a resource through which they can discover colleagues and additional research relevant to their own work. This purpose is in congruence with the overall mission of the association. ATINER was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world can meet to exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study.

To facilitate the communication, a new references section includes all the abstract books published as part of this conference (Table 1). I invite the readers to access these abstract books –these are available for free– and compare how the themes of the conference have evolved over the years. According to ATINER’s mission, the presenters in these conferences are coming from many different countries, presenting various topics.

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>2021</td>
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<td>Papanikos (2021)</td>
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It is our hope that through ATINER’s conferences and publications, Athens will become a place where academics and researchers from all over the world can regularly meet to discuss the developments of their disciplines and present their work. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 400 international conferences and has published over 200 books. Academically, the institute is organized into 6 divisions and 37 units. Each unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

For each of these events, the involvement of multiple parties is crucial. I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committees, and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference and its subsequent publications together. Specific individuals are listed after the Editors’ Note.

**Gregory T. Papanikos**  
President
Editors’ Note

These abstracts provide a vital means to the dissemination of scholarly inquiry in the field of Philosophy. The breadth and depth of research approaches and topics in this book underscores the diversity of the conference.

ATINER’s mission is to bring together academics from all corners of the world in order to engage with each other, brainstorm, exchange ideas, be inspired by one another, and once they are back in their institutions and countries to implement what they have acquired. The 17th Annual International Conference on Philosophy accomplished this goal by bringing together academics and scholars from 18 different countries (Austria, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, UK, and USA), which brought in the conference the perspectives of many different country approaches and realities in the field.

Publishing this book can help that spirit of engaged scholarship continue into the future. With our joint efforts, the next editions of this conference will be even better. We hope that this abstract book as a whole will be both of interest and of value to the reading audience.

William O’Meara & Olga Gkounta
Editors
17th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 23-26 May 2022, Athens, Greece

Organizing & Scientific Committee

All ATINER’s conferences are organized by the Academic Council. This conference has been organized with the assistance of the following academic members of ATINER, who contributed by reviewing the submitted abstracts and papers.

1. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER & Honorary Professor, University of Stirling, U.K.
2. William O’Meara, Head, Philosophy Unit, ATINER & Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University, USA.
3. Patricia Hanna, Vice President of Academic Affairs, ATINER, ex-Dean & Professor Emerita, University of Utah, USA.
# FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM

17th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 23-26 May 2022, Athens, Greece

## PROGRAM

### Monday 23 May 2022

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<td>09:30-10:00</td>
<td>Opening and Welcoming Remarks:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER</td>
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<td>- William O’Meara, Head, Philosophy Unit, ATINER &amp; Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University, USA.</td>
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### 10:00-11:30 TIME SLOT 1 – MORNING PRESENTATIONS

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<th>Time Slot 1a Coordinator: Konstantinos Manolidis.</th>
<th>Time Slot 1b Coordinator: David Philip Wick, Director, Arts, Humanities and Education Division, ATINER &amp; Retired Professor of History, Gordon College, USA.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Lars Samuelsson, Associate Professor, Umeå University, Sweden.</td>
<td>1. Barbara Pemberton, Professor, Ouachita Baptist University, USA.</td>
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<td>Title: Internal vs External Impartiality and the Requirement of Universalizability.</td>
<td>Title: Job: Servant of Yahweh – Prophet of Allah.</td>
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<td>2. Niclas Lindstrom, Associate Professor, Umeå University, Sweden.</td>
<td>2. Alice Reininger, Freelance Scientist, Austria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title: Can Attempts to Make Schools more Reliable Render Them Less Trustworthy?</td>
<td>Title: William Blake: Mental Slavery and his Visions of mental Freedom.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Atli Hardarson, Professor, University of Iceland, Iceland.</td>
<td>4. Gregory Morgan, Associate Professor, Stevens Institute of Technology, USA.</td>
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<td>Title:</td>
<td>Title: Prospects for Philosophy of Virology.</td>
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### 11:30-13:00 TIME SLOT 2 – MORNING PRESENTATIONS

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<th>Time Slot 2b Coordinator: David Philip Wick, Director, Arts, Humanities and Education Division, ATINER &amp; Retired Professor of History, Gordon College, USA.</th>
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17th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 23-26 May 2022, Athens, Greece:
Abstract Book

| 1. Ivana Batarelo Kokić, Professor, University of Split, Croatia.  
Tonići Kokić, Associate Professor, University of Split, Croatia.  
Title: Teaching Philosophy of Science: The Opabin Hypothesis as Outdated Scientific Theory. |
|---|
| 2. Dylan Skurka, PhD Student, York University, Canada.  
Title: Seeking Oneness: Zhuangzi and Psychedelics. |
| 3. Lisa Yount, Associate Professor, Savannah State University, USA.  
Murray Skees, Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina Beaufort, USA.  
Title: Epistemic Closure’ in Contemporary Politics: Extreme Confirmation Bias as Epistemic Injustice. |
| 1. Zoltán Gyenge, Professor, University of Szeged, Hungary.  
Title: The Debate as Mono-Discourse – Comments on the Question of Philosophical Discourse. |
| 2. Claudia Simone Dorchain, Researcher, Profiler’s Academy, Germany.  
Title: Crime is a Language II: Hyperviolence and Georges Bataille’s Concept of the Souverain. |

**13:00-14:30 TIME SLOT 3 – NOON PRESENTATIONS**

Coordinator: Konstantinos Manolidis.

1. Maria Lucia Mello de Oliveira Cacciola, Senior Professor, University of São Paulo, Brazil.  
Title: Atypical idealism of Schopenhauer. |

2. Ana Carolina Soilva Soria, Associate Professor, Federal University of São Carlos, Brazil.  

14:30-15:30

Lunch

**15:30-17:30 TIME SLOT 4 – AFTERNOON PRESENTATIONS**

Coordinator: Konstantinos Manolidis.

1. Ettore Barbagallo, Research Fellow, Technical University of Kaiserslautern, Germany.  
Title: Is Reality Constructed Or Constituted? From Constructivism to Phenomenology. |

2. Ivanilde Aparecida Vieira Cardoso Fracalossi, Postdoctoral Student, Federal University of São Carlos, Brazil.  
Title: Philosophical Reason and Common Understanding in the Justification of Freedom. |

3. Gustavo Araújo Batista, Professor, University of Uberaba, Brazil.  
Title: Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Principles of Philosophy of Religion According to the Profession of Faith of the Savonian Vicar. |

4. Nydia Lara Zavala, Professor, National University of Mexico, Mexico.  
Title: Thales of Miletus: Thinking About Nature as an Engineer. |

**17:30-19:30 TIME SLOT 5 – AFTERNOON PRESENTATIONS**

Coordinator: Konstantinos Manolidis.

1. Lex Newman, Associate Professor, The University of Utah, USA.  
Title: Lessons from Descartes on the Role of Free Will in Belief Formation. |

2. Mark Rozabegy, Researcher, Concordia University, Canada.  
Title: Reading the Opening Lines of the Metaphysics through the Lens of Cultural Genocide. |

3. Stephen Sullivan, Associate Professor, Edinboro University, USA.  
Title: Abrahamic Theism, Free Will, and Eternal Torment. |

4. Pavel Stankov, Graduate Assistant, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, USA. |
Title: The AIR Theory of Consciousness and Working Memory: A Suggestion for Revision.

21:00-23:00
Greek Night

Tuesday 24 May 2022

08:00-11:00 TIME SLOT 6 – MORNING PRESENTATIONS

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<td><strong>Coordinator:</strong> Konstantinos Manolidis.</td>
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</table>
| 1. Aya Kitago, Researcher, Hokkaido University, Japan.  
*Title:* Aristotle’s Categories and Substance in Posterior Analytics A.22. |
| 2. Masahiro Matsuo, Professor, Hokkaido University, Japan.  
*Title:* New Phuse of Philosophical Value Judgment Argument Found in the L’Aquila Trial. |
| 3. António dos Santos Queirós, Professor, Lisbon University, Portugal.  
*Title:* One Country, Two Systems. Understand the Paradox of the Last Hong Kong Crisis. |
| 4. Yashar Jeirani, Lecturer, Islamic Azad University, Iran.  
*Title:* The Cold King: Eros and Politics in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. |
| 5. Dorota Tymura, Assistant Professor, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland.  
*Title:* Antisthenes of Athens as ἱστός πάθος. |
| 6. Daniel Hill, Senior Lecturer, University of Liverpool, UK.  
*Title:* The Ethics of Entrapment: A Dirty Hands Problem? |
| **Old and New-An Educational Urban Walk** |

The urban walk ticket is not included as part of your registration fee. It includes transportation costs and the cost to enter the Parthenon and the other monuments on the Acropolis Hill. The urban walk tour includes the broader area of Athens. Among other sites, it includes: Zappion, Syntagma Square, Temple of Olympian Zeus, Ancient Roman Agora and on Acropolis Hill: the Propylaea, the Temple of Athena Nike, the Erechtheion, and the Parthenon. The program of the tour may be adjusted, if there is a need beyond our control. This is a private event organized by ATINER exclusively for the conference participants. Some participants have videotaped the event. [Click here](#) for an example.

11:00-12:30 TIME SLOT 7 – MORNING PRESENTATIONS

| Coordinator: David Philip Wick, Director, Arts, Humanities and Education Division, ATINER & Retired Professor of History, Gordon College, USA. |
*Title:* In Defense of Doubt: A New Paradigm (in the study) of Skepticism. |
| 2. Iris Vidmar Jovanović, Assistant Professor, University of Rijeka, Croatia.  
*Title:* Echoes of Plato’s Concerns in Contemporary Ethical Criticism of Art. |
| 3. Stephen Milford, Researcher, Basel University, Switzerland & PhD Candidate, North-West University, South Africa.  
*Title:* Potential Persons: The Absurdity of the Potential-Actual Divide in Abortion Debates. |
| 4. Lipaz Shamoa-Nir, Senior Lecturer, Zefat Academic College, Israel.  
*Title:* ‘Under the Radar’: How is the Jewish-Arab Conflict Reflected in Internal Religious Jewish Dialogue? |
12:30-14:00 TIME SLOT 8 – NOON PRESENTATIONS

**Coordinator:** David Philip Wick, Director, Arts, Humanities and Education Division, ATINER & Retired Professor of History, Gordon College, USA.

1. **Gary Percesepe**, Adjunct Professor, Fordham University, USA.
   **Title:** “Tweaking the Spectacle: Détournement from Debord to Bansky”.
2. **Rick Jarow**, Professor, Vassar College, USA.
   **Title:** Nostos: Visions of “Home” in the Indian and Greek Epic Literatures.

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14:00-16:00
Lunch

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16:00-18:00 TIME SLOT 9 – AFTERNOON PRESENTATIONS

**Coordinator:** Konstantinos Manolidis.

1. **Elisa Ravasio**, Independent Researcher, Italy.
   **Title:** A Stinging Citizen: Socrates “The Gadfly” as a Political Model.
2. **Janine Jones**, Associate Professor, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, USA.
   **Title:** Ruchell Magee: A Political Prisoner of the United States.
3. **James Downey**, Associate Professor, Hollins University, USA.
   **Title:** On Souls and Forms.
4. **Marc Kaufman**, PhD Candidate, Florida State University, USA.
   **Title:** Stoic Virtue and the Pursuit of a Meaningful Meaning in Life.

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18:00-20:00 TIME SLOT 10 – AFTERNOON PRESENTATIONS

**Coordinator:** Konstantinos Manolidis.

1. **Alexandre Campaneli Aguiar Maia**, Professor, Integrated Faculties of Vitoria, Brazil.
   **Title:** Human Rights and Brazilian Folklore: Understanding and Social Tolerance through Narratives.
2. **Ivonne Pallares Vega**, Professor, Autonomous University of the State of Morelos, Mexico.
   **Title:** Properties, Subsets and Truth Values.
3. **Taylor Terzek**, Doctor of Ministry Student, Northern Seminary, USA.
   **Title:** Gospel Language in NT Context: Perfecting the Concept.
4. **Chin-Tai Kim**, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA.
   **Title:** A Critique of Kant’s Ethics and Philosophy of Religion.
5. **Chrysoula Gitsoulis**, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Baruch College, City University of New York, USA.
   **Title:** What Do Hippocrates’ Doctor and Aristotle’s Poet Share in Common?

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20:00-21:30
Greek Home-Made Dinner (includes the traditional Greek household hospitality and quality)

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**Wednesday 25 May 2022**
Educational Islands Cruise
Mycenae Visit

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**Thursday 26 May 2022**
Delphi Tour
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Principles of Philosophy of Religion According to the Profession of Faith of the Savoian Vicar

This is one of the results of a theoretical research about the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Swiss philosopher whose thought about philosophy of religion is found in his pamphlet entitled *Profession of faith of the savoian vicar*, inserted in his work entitled *Emily, or On Education*. According to that pamphlet, there are principles of philosophy of religion shown by Rousseau to reasonably think about the nature of God, as well as the religious feeling. Furthermore, Rousseau discusses about the relation between God and His creatures and the connection between belief and morality. There is also a criticism concerning miracles and revelation in religion, as well as intolerance among the several religious sects. The aim of this text is to show what Rousseau still might teach us about the relation among education, philosophy and religion. The need of this research is based on discussion around religious toleration under philosophical perspective, because, in a world where there is religious diversity, there is demand for a dialogue culture among the several beliefs rather than violent practices that intend to impose beliefs by terror. Thus, the way to peace among religions requires an education for religious toleration and an education for religious toleration requires a philosophical approach about the several systems of beliefs.
Ettore Barbagallo  
Research Fellow, Technical University of Kaiserslautern, Germany  

**Is Reality Constructed or Constituted?**  
**From Constructivism to Phenomenology**

Modern neuroscience inherited its hermeneutical paradigm for the understanding of mind and brain activity from the Experimental Psychology of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and his teacher Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894). With a rather contemporary language, we can define this paradigm as the *constructivist* paradigm of the mind and the brain. A developed version of Constructivism can already be found in the so called *Principle of creative synthesis* that Wundt formulated in the 1860s. According to this principle, perceptions not only consist of elemental impressions that we receive from the outside world, but also need a linkage—a synthesis—that is created by the brain and does not originate in the sensory impressions themselves. As several neuroscientists would put it today, our brain *constructs* the reality we perceive and live in. This does not mean that Constructivism denies the existence of reality in itself, but that it differentiates between the reality that we know and experience in our daily life on the one side, and the reality as it is in itself on the other side. For many exponents of Constructivism, the reality in itself—the non-constructed reality—either is unknowable or is accessible and comprehensible only through the instruments and techniques of natural science. In my talk, I first want to show the intrinsic inconsistency and contradictoriness of the constructivist paradigm, especially when it is applied to the mind and the brain in their most elementary dimension. Then, I want to propose an alternative point of view on the basis of a phenomenological approach to perception and knowledge in general. This phenomenological approach, not founded on the notion of *construction* but on that of *constitution*, does not want to lower and diminish the explanation power of neuroscience, but, on the contrary, aims at offering a new hermeneutical paradigm that can promote and stimulate neuroscience’s further development.
Ivana Batarelo Kokić  
Professor, University of Split, Croatia  
&  
Tonči Kokić  
Associate Professor, University of Split, Croatia

Teaching Philosophy of Science:  
The Oparin Hypothesis as Outdated Scientific Theory

One of the basics of philosophy of science education is teaching that scientific theories are subject to change. When theory is not following the facts described by the best current scientific knowledge, it has to be reconsidered. Sometimes theory is still considered valid in certain countries but loses relevance in describing the phenomena in the other parts of the world, or needs auxiliary hypotheses to be repaired and improved according to new scientific insight. The chosen example is the Oparin hypothesis, the most famous hypothesis on the origin of first life. This hypothesis changed the course of life studies from a long tradition of metaphysics to a scientific domain of investigation, made a milestone in the further origin of life research. The cornerstone of this hypothesis is the idea of the stepwise prebiotic synthesis of macromolecules as a fundamental step in the transition from the inorganic to the organic world. Today, some premises of this hypothesis are considered unconfirmed, uncertain, or even rejected. Although it has a high value in its metatheoretical reach and giant scientific impact on prebiotic chemistry, the Oparin’s hypothesis as a specific scientific theory is no anymore considered important and relevant in describing the hypothesized steps from inorganic to organic world.
Vincent Bozzino  
Researcher, University of London, University of Oxford/Cambridge, UK  

In Defense of Doubt:  
A New Paradigm (in the Study) of Skepticism

This study is a cutting-edge analysis of epistemological skepticism, twisted as a centuries-spanning upshot of the polarization of the Cartesian doubt.

Providing a full overview of classic and current research, controversies and responses from Infallibilism and Closure, Semantic and Inferential Contextualism, Neo-Moorean Responses to the New skeptics, I challenge the skeptical paradox in contemporary debate and proceed to illustrate an original account to the epistemological distrust, replying to historical and contemporary objections with a new paradigm.

Descartes was a “scientific philosopher”, I argue, who turned philosophy into a recognized - as in unanimously valid - scientific study of the general matters of human existence from a mere entertainment and leisure-led activity of the Ancient world. 

There is not ever empirical certainty in sciences or in the study of philosophy but the fact that we may refer to a method to confute any argument and compare our viewpoints, it is surely a milestone for a subject widely often viewed as “impractical”.

Thus, what influenced the history of philosophy following Descartes, I infer, be it Existentialism, Phenomenology or Nihilism, Structuralism and Critical Theory - to name but a few - is just a series of philosophical extensions revolving around this concept taken to different extremes, the same Cartesian Method polarized over and over again.

Whilst granting Descartes a strong legacy of philosophical disbelief with his putative doubt and method, I answer the first objection to skepticism, by disrupting the self-defeating argument with an elementary concept.

We are able to say one exist, without proving it – at the same time, that we possess beliefs - and say that we cannot know anything, for the lack of knowledge stands for a “personal belief” assertion of not possessing knowledge and therefore does not amount to knowledge, too, in particular “knowledge of my non-knowledge”, thus the self-defeating argument is not sufficient to reject a priori skepticism, sensu lato for being counterintuitive as usually claimed.

Rethinking doubt and being skeptical in another key, I also reply with the doctrine of fundamental necessity.
Videlicet, a logical finding raises skepticism to a leading role in the theory of knowledge, id est inherently pivotal to fuel and achieve any “pure” knowledge when questioning a domain beyond the personal - irrational – beliefs we possess.

Numquam, we shall consider skepticism as sine qua non in order to ignite philosophy and motivate further inquiry in research so as to better ascertain truth. Potential knowledge requires exploration.

Doubt fuels knowledge, for without it there would not exist any. Furthermore, I establish a scale of skepticism: we could not function properly in life if we doubted everything all the time, hence there shall exist certain degrees of skepticism on a scale to moderate and challenges the incessant process of skeptical hypotheses, in reverse whilst they challenge and fact-check any truth-claiming proposition.

Lastly, I infer the final response to the epistemic paradoxes and skeptical threat through the lens of eristic, applying a new binary principle.
Claudia Simone Dorchain  
Researcher, Profiler’s Academy, Germany

Crime is a Language II: Hyperviolence and Georges Bataille’s Concept of the Souveign

In political philosophy, trust, legality and violence are interdependent, with different weights, connecting and excluding. Enlightened democracies have needed contractual relations to protect against violence since their existence, because trust structures historically and systematically suffer most from an anticipation of violence or violence itself. Against this background, sociological research on violence becomes relevant together with philosophical typology of perpetrators as protection of democratic conditions. Violence as an escalation of transgressive acts structurally takes place in three iterative phenomenological stages (Jan-Philipp Reemtsma): explosive, abusive, and murderous, all of which have their distinct and recurrent verbal and nonverbal counterparts. In addition to these three stages, there is also the cultural phenomenon of hyperviolence, which goes beyond them and even mutilates the dead body, whether actually physically or through massive propaganda that declares the enemy a killable nonhuman. The goal of hyperviolence as maximum violence is the demonstration of absolute power over victims and spectators through a traumatizing violation of trust, reason, and individuality. At the same time, hyperviolence is an atavism of modernity, a historical regression, in that achievements of modernity such as the reduction of violence (Sigmund Freud), secularization (Hans Blumenberg), and the identity of reason and rule (Gerhard Gamm) are nullified. The practitioner of hyperviolence is the anti-modern type par excellence and in this respect stands in a living contrast to the citizen of enlightened democracies. Georges Bataille, in his research on the interdependence of violence and history, introduces here the concept of "sovereignty" and the "sovereign" who can be identified with the perpetrator of hyperviolence. The sovereignty of the sovereign is the immediate experience of the moment, free of any responsibility, with a rhetoric of bogus justification of each of the three types of violence, including hyperviolence. Moreover, through this presumption of total power as "blood power over life" (Walter Benjamin), the trust structure of modernity and the contract system of democracy itself is also endangered. So the question is, how does one unmask the "sovereign" on his way to undermine legal relations already in his linguistic
patterns and codes, how can an escalation be prevented by early detection?
António dos Santos Queirós  
Professor, Lisbon University, Portugal

One Country, Two Systems: Understand the Paradox of the Last Hong Kong Crisis

This essay, in the field of the new political philosophy of China, is focused on the concept of “one country, two systems”, and the case-study of HKSAR. The essay analyses the Historical Evolution of Hong Kong, from the colonial period to the return to China sovereignty in 1997, according to the political philosophy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and the principle “one country, two systems”, what means that Hong Kong is part of China and enjoys a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense policy, as stipulated by the Basic Law of The Hong Kong Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. HKSAR.

The political system implemented in HKSAR corresponds to the matrix of the People’s Republic of China, but its economic base and legal system remained untouched in essence; an extreme model of liberal capitalism, deregulated and functioning on the margins of international law, with deep social inequalities, millions of new poor (workers and students in a situation of necessity) and a serious problem of access to housing.

This essay analyses the political nature of the conflict around the extraction laws, distinguishing internal causes, and external interferences. In the context of demonstrations against the extradition laws, that mobilized hundred thousand youth, analyse what the West media and the West political propaganda called movement pro-democracy, querying if we are face to an organic movement with a common programme, or not and if the political focus in direct elections silenced other claims of young peoples: low salaries, short students’ subventions, right to housing, the survival of small and medium enterprises...and their connection with the colonial heritage.

This text quote the agreement made with Portugal, that represents the model of extradition laws, to understand if the new legal amendments would allow the PRC to persecute political dissidents. Characterize the political geography of HKSAR. And analyses the elections of November 24 (2019), the political meaning of its results, querying if they represent the win of the opposition democratic liberal or the pluralism, diversity, and independence of HKSAR political tendencies and citizens groups, and the political weight of youth in this process.
Al last, this essay analyses the system of political representation of HKSAR, the government program to overcome crisis and the new legislation after crisis.
James Downey  
Associate Professor, Hollins University, USA

On Souls and Forms

I pursue the logical implications of a core ontological view of souls, which I believe and which I find in Socrates, Plato and Descartes, and a core ontological view of Socratic/Platonic Forms which I also believe. Students often ask whether Socratic considered souls to be Forms. I pursue what he should have believed. I investigate whether Socratic/Platonic/Cartesian souls could possibly be Socratic/Platonic Forms. I argue that the alleged distinction between attributes/properties and their instances is not a good reason to distinguish universals from individuals, nor thereby to distinguish Forms from souls. I distinguish between Forms which can have multiple instances and Forms which can only possibly have one instance. I note that some Forms are instances of Themselves. I consider the idea that a Form as a soul have only one possible instance which is Itself, which would be a soul’s status if it were a Form. I consider the ontological relationships between souls and Forms and time. I also comment on famous objections to Leibniz’s attempt to define individuals in terms of qualitative difference based on point of view. I reach a conclusion about whether souls can possibly be Forms.
Chrysoula Gitsoulis  
Adjunct Assistant Professor, Baruch College, City University of New York, USA

What Do Hippocrates’ Doctor and Aristotle’s Poet Share in Common?

Hippocrates believed that disease resulted from an imbalance of the four “bodily humors” (blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile). Being too hot, cold, dry or wet disturbed the balance between the humors. The person would then become sick and remain that way until balance was restored. In the Hippocratic Corpus, the term “catharsis” was used to mean the removal or purging (cleansing, discharging) of the disease-causing elements, through, e.g., sweating, vomiting, diarrhea, or blood-letting, so as to restore balance between the humors. “Catharsis” was applied by the Greeks not only to physical states but to emotional states. Aristotle, for example, uses it to describe the effects of music and drama on the emotions. Music and drama can be used to “purge” mental disturbances by artificially stimulating the passions of an audience, leading them to an emotional climax, which would be followed by relief and calm pleasure. Just as the art of the doctor is directed toward healing the body (by restoring balance in our physical constitution), the art of the poet can be viewed, and arguably was viewed by Aristotle, as directed toward healing the soul (by restoring balance in our emotional constitution), and in this respect, the poet serves as a useful ally to the philosopher, whose art, for the Greeks, was also directed at healing the soul. In the paper, I develop the analogy between the poet and the doctor by exploring the texts of Aristotle and Hippocrates in greater depth.
Zoltán Gyenge  
Professor, University of Szeged, Hungary

The Debate as Mono-Discourse - Comments on the Question of Philosophical Discourse

It is almost a trite to say that in philosophy, questions matter most of all. Every question begets another question. “Its questions are more essential than its answers.” (Karl Jaspers) Plato writes about a very important principle in his famous Seventh Letter, namely, the purpose of a debate. The idea of unwritten doctrine has been meaningful for centuries:

“There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden,1 as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself.”

The ceaseless work referred to here is nothing other than ceaseless discourse, or ceaseless debate. This debate has been interpreted in many ways in philosophy. This lecture analyses the forms of indirect and direct communication (based on the Sophists) and the essence of revelation (Schelling), and concludes that a new form of communication, which we might call mono-dialogue, emerged in the 19th century. Primarily found in the works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, it was not called this way by these authors.
Can Attempts to Make Schools More Reliable Render them Less Trustworthy?

This paper draws upon recent work within the fields of ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of education to understand what makes schools trustworthy. What gives us reasons to believe that they are fair and serve their purposes?

The concepts of institutional trust and ethical trust are used to explain why measures to make schools more reliable in the institutional sense, through regulation, accountability, supervision, and economic incentives, need to be applied with caution.

Sometimes we are confident that teachers and other professionals do their duty because it is in their own interest. Such reliance can be described as institutional trust because it typically depends on law enforcement and incentives that are effective through social institutions. Ethical trust is different because it rests on warranted beliefs about others’ ethical virtues.

Ideas about a social order based primarily on institutional trust have haunted political thought since the time of Thomas Hobbes. Such ideas may seem realistic if we focus on business relations, where conformity to rules or contractual terms suffices to meet the needs of all concerned. Teachers’ interactions with students are more intimate, and ethical trust is thus indispensable for school education.

Institutional measures to make schools more reliable can undermine ethical trust because they, at least implicitly, question the moral integrity of teachers and school-heads.
Daniel Hill  
Senior Lecturer, University of Liverpool, UK

**The Ethics of Entrapment: A Dirty Hands Problem?**

Under the ‘dirty hands’ model of political power, exercising it inevitably involves situations when whatever the politician does is wrongful. Some authors suggest that certain law-enforcement practices involve dirty hands. Christopher Nathan has considered, but rejected, this suggestion in relation to undercover policing. He argues that on the dirty-hands model:

1) The public would correctly feel that morally wrongful acts were at the centre of police practice.
2) Despite the justification of these acts, public unease would remain.
3) The police would probably become, via internalization of the dirty-hands ethic, even more secretive.
4) Public justification of undercover policing would be harder than if the police were to hold that it need not involve wrongful acts.

We focus on 1). (In the full paper, we also address 2) and 3).) Our main interest is in whether the dirty-hands model applies specifically to legal entrapment.

We argue that 1) relies on a controversial dilemmatic understanding of the dirty hands model that does not readily apply to legal entrapment. Following work by János Kis, we explain three dilemmatic accounts of the dirty-hands model:

**TRAGIC.** The agent, S, is bound by two moral requirements that cannot simultaneously be satisfied. Whichever requirement S disregards, S violates a valid, in-force requirement. The dilemmatic situation is inescapable in that S becomes involved in it innocently but once in it cannot come out of it innocently. However S acts, it will be appropriate for S to feel guilty.

**RESIDUE.** S is bound by two moral requirements, a and b, that cannot simultaneously be satisfied. One of the requirements, say a, overrides the other, but the normative force of b does not evaporate: rather, it gives rise to a derivative requirement that the target of S’s act must receive redress.
Problem: if S observes a and then suitably compensates the target for not having observed b, no moral residue remains.

Solution: RESIDUE applies in situations in which there is ineliminable residue because redress is impossible: that is, whenever a residue would necessarily remain when S acts on the overriding requirement.

DIRTY. S is bound by two moral requirements, a and b, that cannot simultaneously be satisfied. Violating one of the requirements, say a, is morally reprehensible (but not wrong); the other, b, is such that its violation is morally reprehensible (but not wrong) or else it is not a morally overriding requirement.

We argue that TRAGIC does not generally apply to law-enforcement agents in entrapment scenarios because, among other reasons, inescapability does not apply. RESIDUE does not generally apply because, among other reasons, legal entrapment typically does not render redress impossible.

DIRTY is incompatible with Nathan’s criticism of the dirty hands model because DIRTY leaves no room for morally wrong acts as part of the picture.

In conclusion, the TRAGIC and RESIDUE versions of the dirty hands model are inapplicable to legal entrapment. The DIRTY version has better prospects of being applicable and is immune to Nathan’s criticism of the dirty hands model of undercover policing.
Nostos: Visions of “Home” in the Indian and Greek Epic Literatures

This paper explores the concept of “home” and homecoming in the Greek epics (the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer) and the Indian epics (the Rāmāyāna of Vālmiki and Mahābhārata of Vyāsa) with a glance at Virgil’s Aeneid. In all cases, the question explored, “Where is home?”, highlights contrasting visions of home and homeland.

In the Greek epics (see Nagy) Kleos or glory is a compensation for death. Fame and remembrance come conflated with immortality. Both a specific homeland, and nature herself, are secondary to this, typified by Achilles choice of “immortality” if being remembered against a comfortable mortal life and death.

The Odyssey, however, features a search for nostos (homecoming) imagined as the city of Ithaca, even though the death of the hero in the Odyssey belies other concerns that will be fleshed out. Virgil’s Aeneid also details an epic search for a new home after the destruction of Troy, and envisions the founding of Rome as a dynasty of homecoming.

The Indian Epics, on the other hand, are skeptical about any ultimate value of kingdoms, as their heroes exit from the stage of the world in the knowledge that their “play” (līla) is done.

The return home, in such cases, is not to a nation or a people, but to a heavenly abode (svarga).

Quite interesting and pertinent here is the conception of a hero as partially human and partially divine. It may very well be that in their earliest forms, the epic heroes from both Greece and India were all too human. However, in the same way that the zodiac of Ptolemy split into a sidereal one in India and a tropical, moving, one in Greece, concepts of the heroic went the way of their respective cultures.

In India, the epic hero Rāma is elevated to the status of a full-fledged God, an incarnation of Vishnu. No such evolution occurs in the Greek epics. This suggests that different concepts of home and homecoming are related to specific world-views and cosmologies. In the West, the polis and its history become the principal are of cultural focus, whereas in India, what is known as “the world” is relegated to the province of māyā, an illusory apparition. The great heroes of Indian culture, therefore, are more often than not, beings who have lifted themselves above the fray of history. In Greece and Rome, on the other hand, history becomes the locus of activity and contemplation, with the
great heroes being those who demonstrate leadership, or influence over the courses of events.

This paper takes specific examples from Greece and India as a springboard to consider what “Nostos” may actually be, how its main images are reappearing in contemporary cultures, and what the consequences of these visions of the heroic may be in our current time.
The Cold King: Eros and Politics in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*

Surprisingly, eros or love is one of the recurring themes in *Cyropaedia*: Artabazus’s love of Cyrus (1.4.27-28, 4.1.22-24, 8.4.27), Sambaulas’s love for the “hairy and ugly” youth (2.2.28-31), Tigranes’s love for his wife (3.1.35-43), Cyaxares’s love of women (4.5.51-52), Araspas’s love for Panthea (5.1.2-18, 6.1.32-44), Panthea-Abradatas love (6.1.45-7, 7.3.3-16), and last but not least, Cyrus professing and practicing the “art of marriage” (8.4.18-26). In other words, eros is omnipresent in *Cyropaedia*. This thematic omnipresence directs the reader to the assumption that *Cyropaedia*’s author wants to say something regarding the relation between eros and politics. Accordingly, by examining all these instances of love in *Cyropaedia*, this paper will argue that, regarding eros as a theme, the plan or plot of *Cyropaedia* is a movement from comedy or ridicule (Artabazus’s love of Cyrus, Sambaulas’s love for the “hairy and ugly” youth, Tigranes’s love for his wife, and Cyaxares’s love of women), to political abuse (Araspas’s love for Panthea), and finally to tragedy or death (Panthea-Abradatas love). This paper will conclude that since *Cyropaedia* is Xenophon’s political work *par excellence* devoted to outlining the ideal political order, the movement culminating in tragedy and death of eros reveals Xenophon’s conviction regarding the essential conflict between eros and politics; in the sense that an ideal or stable regime requires the banishment of erotic longings from public or political life. Therefore, Xenophon’s political hero, unlike his philosophical hero, whom in *Symposium* characterized as an eros incarnate, appears as “the cold king.” Thus, the tension between eros and politics anticipates the well-known tension between philosophy (as an erotic activity) and politics.
Janine Jones  
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Ruchell Magee:  
A Political Prisoner of the United States

“Slavery 400 years ago, slavery today. It’s the same but with a new name.”  
Ruchell Magee

In mid-February, 2022, WNBA player, Brittney Griner was detained at the Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow, Russia, after a customs canine dog detected the possible presence of narcotic substances in her luggage. Sports media in the U.S. has been silent about the case. Sports editor of The Nation, Dave Zirin, believes that the silence has to do with racism (Griner is black), with sexism (Griner is a woman), and with homophobia (Griner is a lesbian). Zirin argues that “we can raise up Brittney Griner’s name and turn her into a headache for Vladimir Putin at a moment where he has many headaches...if we raise hell, then we can actually embarrass, humiliate Putin at a moment where his situation is very delicate...” Hillary Clinton has called for her release on Twitter. Iranian journalist, Jason Rezaian, detained in Tehran in 2014, who spent 544 in Iran’s Evin Prison, told CNN news that Griner’s detention is “the most audacious hostage taking by a state imaginable.” Zirin’s strategy, Clinton’s Twitter expression, and Rezaian’s statement give me pause collectively, while each, in its own right, is cause for reflection.

Why should the holding of a U.S. political prisoner be an embarrassment for Putin but not for the United States? Ruchell Cinque Magee, captured in 1963, has he been a political prison for 59 years. Could the most audacious capture imaginable be that of Griner by Russia because people around the world do not know about the political prisoners captured by the United States, some of whom have been held for decades in solitary confinement? Albert Woodfox spent 43 years in solitary confinement, despite the fact the practice is considered torture by the UN and is against international law. Is the United States too exceptional to be politically embarrassed when it commits or underwrites acts deemed criminal when carried out by other nation-states?

In this paper, I seek to make clear that the United States holds political prisoners. Second, I consider the case of Magee, who adopted
his second name, “Cinque,” from the African resistance-freedom fighter, Cinqué, who led a rebellion on the slave ship The Amistad. In this afterlife of slavery, like Cinqué and his fellow companions, R. Cinque Magee argues for right to rebel against slavery. He maintains that those on the outside must bring his case to the Supreme Court. Using arguments from Cinqué’s court case and Magee’s, I seek to support Magee, as well as his captured comrades. That their names be lifted on Twitter until they are free!
Marc Kaufman  
PhD Candidate, Florida State University, USA  

Stoic Supervenience and a Meaningful Meaning in Life  

Is there room for meaningfulness in a philosophy that holds the only good to be virtue? The literature that attempts to answer this question is still rather undeveloped. Those who are writing on this intersection have, unsurprisingly, converged on the view that virtue and *eudaimonia* — respectively the highest good and our final end — are solely meaningful in a Stoic life. While plausible, cashing it out like this does little more than to reiterate that the Stoics value virtue and *eudaimonia*. It doesn’t help to understand what is distinctly meaningful about them, and I believe there are other potential sources of meaning that are both compelling and compatible with their ethical views. I take the concept of meaningfulness to be a multifaceted value distinct from others like happiness and morality. In some cases, it is as simple as “mattering” or “significance”; in other cases, it pertains to personal transcendence, making a lasting impact on the world, or one’s life making sense in a certain context. In this paper, I will explain the limitations of equating meaningfulness solely with virtue and *eudaimonia*. I will then argue that if there are multiple ways to conceive of the concept, and if some of these are not mutually exclusive, there will be other ways that a Stoic might derive meaning in life. I conclude that finding it not in virtue itself but in what *supervenes* on virtue will be particularly compelling.
A Critique of Kant’s Ethics and Philosophy of Religion

While Kant with seeming humility acknowledges that he was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume by his destruction of many metaphysical fictions, some of which even Kant did not mind seeing destroyed, Kant responds to Hume’s moral epistemological and psychological slogan, “Reason is, and ought always to be, the slave of passions,” with rationalist indignation. For Kant, a moral law, to have authority as such, must be universal for all rational agents, hence must be established a priori, and the conception of the duty to act in conformity to the moral law must be sufficient to motivate action in conformity with the moral law and such motivational purity should not be marred by any inclinations (passions, in Hume’s language). The following critical point is made in this presentation: both Kant’s ethics and philosophy of religion fail to satisfy the conditions for legitimate use of concepts (or significant use of language expressing them) elaborately constituted in The First Critique. The stipulation of the primacy of practical reason over the theoretical begs the question. A possible redirection of Kantian thinking toward an ontology of epistemic and moral subject is considered.
Aristotle’s Categories and Substance in Posterior Analytics A.22

Aristotle’s concept of Categories, along with its first item called Substance, has long been an inspiration for philosophers for centuries describing what kinds of entity there exist, and how they should be classified. A difficult question among others about the Categories is whether they are linguistic terms or ontological items in their origin, and if they developed to eventually have both aspects, --- as they seem to in most of his arguments about Categories in Metaphysics --- how they did. In other words, is it language or existence that Aristotle aims to analyse using the Categories where anything that exists will be classified into the ten items? How are language and existence in Aristotle’s ontological study related to each other?

In this presentation, I will first suggest an interpretation of Topics A.9, where the two statuses of the Categories, as a classification of predications and of entities, can be observed. After this, I will argue that the description of Categories in Posterior Analytics A.22 provides with the clues that explain the crucial phrases “[predicated] about itself” (peri hautou) and “[predicated] about another” (peri heterou) seen in Topics A.9. By doing so, I will show that what we could understand about Categories and the concept of Substance in Posterior Analytics A.22 would support our interpretation of Topics A.9. As a result, I will try to dig in some facts about the connection between these two works to reveal that the concept of “the underlying thing” (hypokeimenon) might be a theoretical basis in the origin of the concept of Categories.

In Topics A.9, Aristotle introduces the ten components (“what it is”, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, posture, possession, doing, undergoing) (103b22-23) of the list of Categories as the kinds of predication, the elements of which the propositions consist. The second list of ten items, on the other hand, is the kinds of “what the expression that signifies “what it is” signifies” (103b27-29), i.e., the kinds of entity, based on the items previously enumerated, with the first item of the first list, “what it is” (103b22), now replaced with “Substance” (103b28).

Aristotle’s account of Categories and Substance (cf. 83a1-83b24) in Posterior Analytics A.22 on the other hand, is much more in detail and complementary as he explains how the formation of a proposition should accord with the ontological structure of the things mentioned. While the notablly ontological expressions such as “the underlying
things” (83a6-7) and “became” (egeneto) (83a8, a13) are used, the passages about proposition-forming that follow refer back to the ideas that Aristotle posed in the ontological context, e.g., “the very thing it is” (hoper) (83a13, a24, a27) and “in virtue of being something different” (ouch heteron ti on) (83a13, a32, 83b23). These references of the words suggest that Aristotle’s analysis of the proposition structure here has the ideas of “the underlying thing” and its attributions as its basis.
Nydia Lara Zavala  
Professor, National University of Mexico, Mexico

**Thales of Miletus:**  
**Thinking About Nature as an Engineer**

The aim of my talk is to show that the cradle of scientific-philosophical thought responds to the strategy of Thales of Miletus to know how to use the techniques and reasoning typically employed in technological creations, to theorize about the dynamics, processes and developments of natural events in terms of physical arrangements and components. This approach, combined with a commercial background, such as Thales inherited both from his Phoenician parents and from his life in Miletus, were part of the circumstances that strongly contributed to shape the intellectual turn that culminated in natural philosophy, antecedent of both science and philosophy.

The interest of this work is to rescue a very important part of the tradition and formation that propitiates the original thought of Thales of Miletus that practically nobody knows or recognizes. Among them we have: his engineering training, his commercial skills, his skillful handling of mathematics and something that generally goes unnoticed by many scholars of the pre-Socratics: his deep knowledge of astrology, learned from the Mesopotamian and Egyptian cultures.
Alexandre Campaneli Aguiar Maia  
Professor, Integrated Faculties of Vitoria, Brazil  
&  
Daury Cesar Fabriz  
Professor, Integrated Faculties of Vitoria, Brazil  

**Human Rights and Brazilian Folklore: Understanding and Social Tolerance through Narratives**

This research project aims to promote understanding and social tolerance, as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articulating the critique of post-positivism to legal positivism, under the bias of the Law and Literature movement. Specifically, studying Brazilian folklore as a form of cultural understanding and affirmation of rights, it intends to demonstrate two fundamental concepts of the theory of literature: description and narration, and how they can relate to the realization of Human Rights, according to Philosophy of Law.

There is a difference between Legal Positivism and Post-positivism, based on the composition of the texts produced, a starting point for evaluating the best way to understand Law from the perspective of inclusion and social visibility. The scientific pretension of Positivism, more precisely Logical Neopositivism, brings consequences and demands in textual production. It is characteristic of the positivist text that there is a greater incidence of descriptive composition, in its search for objectivity, dissociation from morality and justice, and the interpreter’s neutrality. Post-positivism, on the other hand, adding the legal principles on Law’s concept, uniting Law and morality, validity, and efficacy, brings a predominantly narrative, participatory composition. It aims to show that only within the narrative conception is there the possibility, through traditions and a communitarian conception, to seek an understanding of Justice, in a discourse that does not depend on formal logic.

From this perspective, understood as a narrative, the Law must pay attention to all the elements that are dear to it: the characters, the setting and time. Consequently, human lives regulated by Law must be understood in their narratives, in their cultures that guarantee their identity, access to traditions and respect for the different cultural matrices present in society. Narrative is a practice that we engage as soon as we begin to tell our first story, intrinsically linked to our memories and desire for communication. Next to language itself,
narrative is one of the characteristics that define the human being. It is part of our identity, our existence.

The research is justified by the need to recognize the importance of narrative in understanding the Law, as well as valuing the rich Brazilian folklore beyond stereotypes that do not contribute to recognition and dignity. The chosen method is the rhetoric philosophical, aiming to propose a reasonable and convincing speech. It is concluded that the narrative understanding of law is adequate for recognizing cultural narratives, contributing to their visibility and recognition. It is essential that local narratives have a greater reach, bringing out the richness and complexity of different cultures, in addition to caricatured clippings. Such recognition is an embodiment of the dignity guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promoting understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all racial and religious groups.
Masahiro Matsuo  
Professor, Hokkaido University, Japan  

New Phase of Philosophical Value Judgment Argument  
Found in the L'Aquila Trial  

It has been long debated in philosophy of science whether value judgments in scientific process should be (or can be appropriately) made by scientists ever since controversy between Richard Rudner and Richard Jeffery in 1950s. As is well known, Rudner (1953) endorsed the view that scientists qua scientists make value judgment in scientific research process in accepting/rejecting a targeted hypothesis, which includes consideration about the effects of the research result on society. On the other hand, Jefferey (1956) stressed that scientists should devote themselves to calculating a probability about the hypothesis, leaving value judgment to policy makers. What they mostly focused on was along a traditional philosophical inquiry, how the indeterminacy of scientific research from ‘inductive risk’ can be coped with: whether scientists need value judgment or not for this. With this background of debates, the original argument of Rudner’s was a simple, straightforward view that scientists make value judgments comprehensively on social effects, irrespective of the kind of science.  

‘Value-laden’ theorists have succeeded to Rudner’s basic idea on value-ladenness of science, and indeed this idea is attracting a lot of attention in society nowadays, but many of Rudner’s successors try to weaken the original view, since it seems too demanding. Notable among these is Katie Steele’s (2012). Her argument focuses on climate change science, particularly on decision making about IPCC reports, and concludes that the role of scientists should be limited to ‘standardization of data’ to policy makers. She says scientists need value judgments in that they have to consider options of policies but that they don’t have to promote a specific policy in terms of their value judgment. Although this weak version seems very popular, whether this can be applied to any socially related science is yet to be known.  

In my paper, I pick up seismology as one of very socially important sciences, which has been scarcely focused upon in philosophy of science. Particularly I focus on the L’Aquila earthquake trial. In the first trial, 7 people including 5 scientists were sentenced to 6 years in prison for manslaughter (309 deaths) and injuries in the L’Aquila earthquake 2009. This decision triggered a staunch criticism among communities of scientists. Though finally the Supreme Court judged all the scientists are not guilty, I think in the accusation by the prosecutor in the first
trial we find some crucial point to discuss. Scientists were accused of not with poor prediction of the large earthquake, but with lack of consideration of what would happen to the citizens in case of the earthquake. What they were required of is a comprehensive value judgment! The old Rudner’s view has now revived as a very important point at issue of court battle. This apparently opens a new phase of value judgment argument in philosophy of science and shows what could be the subject for it to tackle now. And also important is, it’s high time for society to discuss value judgment made by scientists seriously, hopefully with the aid of philosophical argument.
Maria Lucia Mello de Oliveira Cacciola  
Senior Professor, University of São Paulo, Brazil  

**Atypical Idealism of Schopenhauer**

My proposal for the presentation at this Congress refers to Schopenhauer and his relation with other German “idealists” of his period, especially Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Such approach intends to show Schopenhauer’s philosophy as an “atypical idealism”.

On the one hand, we put in question his idealism as a pure one, since he dismisses the idealist position of his epistemology by introducing the will as the foundation of knowledge and representation. This becomes more evident in the second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, where Schopenhauer also claims that “matter is the objectivity of the Will”. In this sense, he defines his philosophy as immanent, moving away from the path of transcendental proposals, including Kant’s Ideas, even as regulative principles, which source is reason. This interpretation has its main source in Max Horkheimer’s philosophy and in his followers, Alfred Schmidt and Ludger Lütkehaus.

On the other hand, we aim to focus the peculiarity of Schopenhauer compared to other post-Kantians, due to the role that reason occupies in his philosophy and what follows from this. In Schopenhauer’s point of view, reason deals only with abstraction and language, as propitiating a reflection of “real World”. This world, as intuition and empirical representation, has nevertheless its source not only in a poor sensation, but also in understanding, which gives the possibility of cognition. Reason comes in second place, in the sense that it provides abstraction, making the communication of knowledge possible. According to Schopenhauer, reason is simply a way of calculation and organisation of intuitive cognition and cannot go farther than that. We can therefore stress his position in face of the power of reason in Kant’s philosophy and of his criticism against him. The critique of reason is for Schopenhauer unnecessary and arises from the huge importance Kant attributes to reason. Schopenhauer thinks the Kantian critique of reason would be superfluous if we kept abstract knowledge always attached to intuitive knowledge. His criticism against Kant focuses on a “love of abstraction” that would have caused the loss of the “real world” content.

I intend to develop both these arguments in order to show the difficulty there is in classifying Schopenhauer as an “idealist” in strict
sense, since he proposes an art of overcoming the classical division between idealism and realism.
Stephen Milford  
Researcher, Basel University, Switzerland & PhD Candidate, North-West University, South Africa  

Potential Persons:  
The Absurdity of the Potential-Actual Divide in Abortion Debates  

“What God creates in creating humankind is actual living human bodies.” These words from the Yale professor David Kelsey, in his critically acclaimed theological anthropology *Eccentric Existence* (2009), epitomise the perennial debate surrounding abortion. What are pre-birth entities? Actual human persons, or merely the potential thereof? The distinction has far reaching consequences for the value and moral status of the foetus.  

Yet this distinction is difficult to defend either philosophically or theologically. Philosophically, potentiality and actuality do not represent two mutually exclusive features of existence, but inter-connected ways of being. Counter to our intuition, a potentiality is not always actualised in the same being. For example, the foetus represents the actuality of a prior being (its parents), as well as the potentiality of a future being (its own off-spring). At the same time, it is the amalgamation of both potentiality and actuality as it continues to actualise its potential through a dynamic state of “being-at-work-staying-itself” (Kosman, 1969).  

Theologically, recent shifts toward relationality (Shultz, Grenz, McFarland, Kelsey etc.) argue for the importance of a relationally conceived personhood (social trinitarianism). In this construction, one actualises one’s potential through relationship, an actualisation whose potentiality exists ‘eccentrically’ (i.e., outside of the being in question). Such eccentric constructions emphasize the dynamic nature of human potentiality as it relates to the *imago Dei*.  

This paper will explore the dynamic nature of actuality and potentiality in abortion debates, challenging our dichotomisations and drawing attention to the overlooked nature of religious relational ontology for human personhood in debates around foetal value. It will raise challenges to our natural intuitions about the nature of pre-birth entities and point us toward the lived experience of pregnant persons who do not easily fit into either one camp or the other.
Prospects for Philosophy of Virology

This paper will consider a range of topics that could constitute a future philosophy of virology, conceived of as a subfield of philosophy of biology. I will suggest that philosophical analysis drawing on recent discoveries about viruses provide insight into the nature of life, species, and the tree of life. Relatedly, I suggest that an increased understanding of the ecology, diversity, and evolution of viruses has the potential to transform our understanding of many of central concepts of biology, notably, our conceptions of biological species, the tree of life, biodiversity, disease, evolution, and even life itself. Life is found to be a more complex concept than traditionally thought and the sharp distinction between living and nonliving less important to the development of biology as a discipline. Species are not required for, nor a necessary consequence of, viral evolution. Furthermore, the genetic and phenotypic mosaicism found in viruses and their hosts, a consequence of viral evolution, demonstrates how traditional species concepts are simplifications and can obscure important parts of the history of life. The germ theory of disease, as an account of external microbes that cause disease, also requires updating as endogenous viruses fuse with their hosts, can offer protection from other infections, and accelerate evolution. Roughly 8% of the “human” genome is viral genomes and some of these “viral” genes play vital roles in human development. The traditional tree of life, a structured series of bifurcations, has to be augmented with, or replaced by, a more complicated structure that contains reticulations caused by the virus-driven horizontal transfer of genes among distant branches.
Lessons from Descartes on the Role of Free Will in Belief Formation

Descartes scholarship is split concerning his views of free will, in the context of belief formation. Some of his writings strongly suggest a compatibilist view – i.e., a theory whereby we bear responsibility for our beliefs, even if those beliefs are predetermined. Yet other writings strongly suggest an incompatibilist view – i.e., a theory whereby we bear responsibility for our beliefs only if those beliefs are not predetermined. This paper proposes a resolution of the interpretive puzzle, attributing to Descartes an incompatibilist account. Primarily, this is a history of philosophy paper focusing on problems in Descartes scholarship. Secondarily, it raises issues of ongoing philosophical interest.

At the heart of the interpretive resolution is an indirect version belief voluntarism – the view that our beliefs are, at least in part, under our voluntary control. The account incorporates dual volitional contributions: one volitional contribution (itself causally prior to the other) stems from attentional control, i.e., our ability to direct our cognitive attention; the other contribution involves the actual forming of occurrent beliefs. Only the causally prior contribution involves "incompatibilist" voluntary input; the causally down stream contribution accords with typical "compatibilist" constraints. The apparent textual puzzle thus resolves, in that the two kinds of texts refer to different volitional contributions. Cognitive attention emerges as fundamental driver of free will.

The account that emerges offers a plausible understanding of belief formation, while offering a number of insights relevant to ongoing philosophical debates: e.g., concerning the value of inquiry; debates about belief-voluntarism; the importance of cognitive attention; and the interpretation of Libet experiments in cognitive science.
Ivonne Pallares Vega
Professor, Autonomous University of the State of Morelos, Mexico

Properties, Subsets and Truth Values

Category theory is nowadays at the forefront of developments in the foundations of mathematics. It is a highly abstract theory and most likely because of this, philosophy students interested in this area of philosophy tend to find it difficult to learn. In this talk we propose, as one first approximation to the theory, a comparison between the axiom of separation of set theory (also known as the subset axiom) and the sub-object classifier axiom of the category of sets.
Barbara Pemberton
Professor, Ouachita Baptist University, USA

Job: Servant of Yahweh - Prophet of Allah

In a time when religious differences help fuel conflict worldwide, shared narratives often provide common ground in which true understanding may take root. This paper will consider the all too common problem of suffering and address how adherents of the three great monotheistic religions seek understanding and the appropriate believer’s response from the same story found within their respective sacred texts. Most scholars from each of these three traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—consider the writings of the Tanakh/Old Testament to at least contain divine revelation. While they may not agree on the extent of the revelation or the method of its delivery, they do share stories as well as a common desire to glean God’s message for God’s people from the pages of the text. One such shared story is that of Job, the servant of Yahweh—called Ayyub, prophet of Allah, in the Qur’an. Job is described as a pious, righteous man who loses everything—family, possessions, and health—when his faith is tested. Three friends come to console him. Through it all Job remains faithful to his God who rewards him by restoring all that was lost. All three hermeneutic communities consider Job to be an archetype of human response to suffering, regarding Job’s response to his situation as exemplary. The story of Job addresses more than the distribution of evil problem. At stake in the story is Job’s very relationship to his God. Some exegetes believe that Job was adapted into the Jewish milieu by a gifted redactor who used the original ancient tale as the “frame” for the biblical account (chapters 1, 2 and 4:7-17) and then enlarged the story with the complex center section of poetic dialogues creating a complex work with numerous possible interpretations. Within the poetic center Job goes so far as to question God, a response to which contemporary Jews relate, finding strength in dialogue—even in wrestling with God. Muslims only embrace the Job of the biblical narrative frame, as further identified through the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions, considering the center section an errant human addition not representative of a true prophet of Islam. The Qur’anic injunction against questioning God also renders the center section theologically suspect. Christians also draw various responses from the story of Job. While many believers may agree with the Islamic perspective of God’s ultimate sovereignty, others would join their Jewish neighbors in questioning God, not anticipating answers but rather an awareness of his presence—peace and hope.
becoming a reality experienced through the indwelling presence of God’s Holy Spirit. Related questions are as endless as the possible responses. This paper will consider a few of the many Jewish, Christian, and Islamic insights from the ancient story, in hopes adherents within each tradition may use it to better understand the other faiths’ approach to suffering.
Gary Percesepe  
Adjunct Professor, Fordham University, USA

Tweaking the Spectacle:  
*Détournement* from Debord to Bansky

Like Guy Debord, the founder and leading theorist of the Situationist International (SI), Bansky is a shadowy figure who plays with questions of identity and aesthetic choice in a digital age. Unlike Debord, Bansky has never revealed his biographical identity. Yet, fifty-three years after *les evenements de soixante huit*—the birthplace of modern stencil art—the anonymous street artist Bansky continues the SI project of *détournement*, disrupting the cultural logic of late capitalism with his guerilla art.

While many have noted the influence of Situationist thought and praxis in Bansky’s work, pointing to the mixing of high and low culture, the sagacious use of graffiti, and cartoons with balloons subverting political messaging, *détournement* itself remains under-theorized, and few have explicitly taken note of Debord’s importance in tracing its historical development.

The closest English translation of *détournement* lies somewhere between diversion and subversion, the act whereby the unifying force of play “retrieves beings” and melts frozen hierarchies of domination which begin in childhood. This paper explores Debord’s development of *détournement* beginning in 1955, when Debord first sought to deploy Lautréamont’s systematic use of *détournement*, and explores Bansky’s reliance on *détournement* in his aesthetic work. The paper analyzes selected creations by Bansky that steer us away from ready-made images and unmask the contradictions of late capitalism, even while Bansky himself maneuvers to avoid being absorbed by the same capitalist and consumerist system he criticizes.
Elisa Ravasio  
Independent Researcher, Italy

A Stinging Citizen:  
Socrates “The Gadfly” as a Political Model

Arendt’s analysis starts with the description of a negative example of how she conceives the political thinking. In her proposal, Eichmann is the perfect performer: he does not think of the consequences of his actions and obeys orders without questioning the correctness of the values on which they are based on. Conversely, a correct thinking, she conceives, is the only way which can help valuing contemporary politics and prevent from falling back into totalitarianism. An inconclusive thinking can criticize events and people, so that citizens can achieve together a common and public good.

According to Arendt, Eichmann and Socrates are perfect opposites. The latter is depicted as a model not only for the ancient but also for the contemporary political life too: unlike Plato’s philosopher who focuses only on speculation, Socrates succeeds in harmonizing the two conflicting passions of thinking and acting.

According to Arendt, inaugurating political philosophy, Plato exiled thinking out of the political realm. As it is in the Republic, “thinking” stands for “knowing how to achieve citizens’ good” and only (those who possess this kind of knowledge can claim the right to govern the city: conversely, she maintains that only the activity of thinking based on the two principles of the Gorgias, living without contradicting oneself (482b-c) and “doing wrong is fouler than suffering it” (e.g., 475b and 508c) could prevent people from obeying impositions without questioning rulers’ proposals.

Consequently, Socrates is the perfect thinker and –in Arendt’s view–the perfect politician and citizen. He examines his fellow citizens’ opinions in order to rebuke them for scorning what is worthless and to exhort them to look after what is of most importance (justice and values useful for the civil life). His technê maieutichê is political, since it destroys prejudices and criticizes events and values as the thinking activity proposed by Arendt should do.

Especially during the totalitarianism, people entirely obeyed orders and did not think of the correctness of the values proposed by the ruling class. On the contrary, politicians and citizens have to critically weigh up events and facts: their thinking activity has to be based on the principle of the Gorgias and they must live, think and judge in...
coherence with them, as well as the philosopher and people who oppose to the totalitarianism did during their entire lives.

In Arendt proposal, those who live dialoguing with their consciousness, to suffer injustices rather than to damage their fellows, or to not obey Nazi’s orders are the only people able to share the political realm with others: as a result of these considerations, Eichmann is the perfect a-political person, since he only executes orders without inquiring the correctness of the values which found them. On the contrary, Socrates does not want to damage his fellow citizens and tries to improve their points of view and values in order to achieve the common good.
Alice Reininger  
Freelance Scientist, Austria

William Blake: Mental Slavery and his Visions of Mental Freedom

William Blake belongs to one of those visionary artists who, during his lifetime, did not receive much recognition from society, was not understood and therefore even marked as “crazy”, his artworks “odd”. Nevertheless, a small circle of sensitive connoisseurs favored and supported him. But, fortunately, his work was not completely forgotten. It seems that today William Blake is being highly valued. An extensive exhibition of his fine, masterful artworks is shown at Tate Britain in London till February 2020. His pictorial, sensitive works are of inestimable value to us today as they address areas that are so important for the further development of mankind nowadays.

For William Blake, imprisonment of a human being does not mean only the physical, as a slave, but above all the spiritual, the mental. Unfortunately mental slavery is not being recognized by mankind, as Blake let us know, this is influence of sly forces. From early childhood he had visions of God and angels. For him it was clear and undoubted that man should be innocent as a small child and therefore is under God’s protection. However, according circumstances emanating from negative forces, man is enthralled and drowned in it.

Religion is a prison for Blake. Religions, of whatever kind, are signs of falsehood. However, the Christian idea, in his eyes, is different from the Christian religion because, religion is man-made and barely has anything, or very little, to do with the divine words from the mouth of the Most Highest, the all pervading energy of the universe. Even the representatives of religion are also prisoners in this system who act blindly in it. Priests or those who call themselves that are the ones who extend their tentacles and hinder others from their spiritual development. Even Homer, Ovid, Plato, and Cicero – so Blake – had written “perverted” writings and did nothing to help humanity rise spiritually. Mankind’s innocence was lost.

However, there is hope in a new age that this negativity will be eradicated, for a new generation of young innocent-born, who have regained their innocence through divine grace, will lead mankind on the right path to God and establish the New Jerusalem and the Golden Age again. This hope he expresses f. e. in “Preface” to Milton’s “A Poem”.

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Blake’s spiritual world is clarity, purity, and light. To gain this state men must throw of the chains and, as it is written in the Bible, must be born again through the spirit.
Mark Rozahegy  
Researcher, Concordia University, Canada

Reading the Opening Lines of the Metaphysics Thought  the Lens of Cultural Genocide

This paper uses the definition of cultural genocide as articulated by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in Canada and the work of Mi’kmaq artist Ursula Johnson to put forward an alternative reading of the opening lines (980a21 - 981a2) of the Metaphysics. Aristotle begins his investigations of being with a generalization about the nature of humans - that all humans by nature desire or stretch themselves out towards knowing - and then goes on to demonstrate how sensory perception and memory, together with the desire for knowledge, result in the formation of experiences and a teachable practical knowledge or know-how. In the last line, Aristotle asserts that the human race - or γένος - needs art and reason to live. It is this last claim that opens the key questions that will guide our inquiry. What does it mean to live humanly by way of art and reason? How are art and reason connected to living in a human manner?

To be clear, it is important here to acknowledge that I am a CIS-gendered, white, male colonizer, so I am not speaking in any capacity for or as a representative of Canadian Indigenous peoples. This reading of the opening lines of the Metaphysics emerges out of my own research into the Residential School genocide perpetrated by the Canadian Government on my country’s Indigenous populations and out of my own engagement with works by various Indigenous authors and artists.

As a first step, we need to spend some time developing a clear understanding of the overall process being described in the opening lines of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. One way to read these lines would be as a generalized biological account of what the human race as a species needs to survive beyond the simple mechanisms of reproduction. From an evolutionary perspective, this type of interpretation could claim that civilization, developed using tools and higher-level reasoning, is our human advantage in the biological struggle for survival that governs all living things. Cultural production supplements our biological living and ensures the survival of our species.

In this paper, I will argue instead that Aristotle can be read as providing an account of how indigenous cultures - understood as originating or happening ‘naturally’ in a particular place - establish and maintain themselves. According to this alternative reading, human
living grows into itself through the development of practices and institutions - what one could refer to as *cultures* - that, through practical knowledges and discursive practices, create bonds of belonging amongst its members and ensure the continuance of the group *as a group*.
Lars Samuelsson  
Associate Professor, Umeå University, Sweden  
&  
Niclas Lindstrom  
Associate Professor, Umeå University, Sweden  

Internal vs External Impartiality and the Requirement of Universalizability

In a seminal paper from 1998, Helga Kuhse, Peter Singer, and Maurice Rickard (hereafter referred to as KSR) defend impartial over partial moral reasoning, outlining these two kinds of moral reasoning, or perspectives, as follows:

“Partial moral reasoning... involves judgments that emphasize personal relationships and attachments. These sorts of judgments and dispositions differ from impartialist judgments in that they favour people with whom we are personally connected over people with whom we are not. Impartialist reasoning, by contrast, ... involves judgments and dispositions that are detached and do not favour personal attachments.” (H. Kuhse, P. Singer & M. Rickard, 1998, “Reconciling Impartial Morality and a Feminist Ethic of Care”, The Journal of Value Inquiry 32, p. 453.)

In short and simplified, KSR’s argument for impartial morality looks as follows: (1) Either (a) morality is fundamentally divided into a partial type of morality and an impartial type of morality with no common ground, or (b) one of these two perspectives must be the most fundamental one, in terms of which the other one should be understood. (2) Option (a) would involve “a fairly radical and unsettling conclusion about morality” and should therefore be rejected. (3) The perspective we have reason to believe to be the most fundamental one is the perspective with the best explanatory power. (4) The impartial perspective is the perspective with the best explanatory power, since it best explains our widely held pre-theoretic moral intuitions and our empirically observed dispositions to approach moral problems. (5) Consequently, we have reason to believe the impartial perspective to be the most fundamental one, in terms of which the partial perspective should be understood. (pp. 457ff.)

In this talk, we problematize this argument and distinguish between two different ways in which impartial moral reasoning can be understood. We refer to these as internal and external impartiality, respectively. Internal impartiality concerns the judgements and dispositions of the acting agent, while external impartiality concerns the judgements and dispositions of someone other than the acting agent,
for instance an idealized hypothetical agent judging or responding to the judgements and dispositions of the acting agent. While KSR seem to be concerned with internal impartiality, we argue that external impartiality can do a better job with regards to both explanatory power and reconciling the partialist and the impartialist perspectives.

First, we note that KSR’s argument rests on a false dichotomy. Besides the two alternatives in option (b) above, a third possibility is that the partial as well as the (internally) impartial perspective can be explained in terms of some other, even more fundamental component of sound moral reasoning. Second, we argue that there is indeed such a more fundamental component of sound moral reasoning, namely the widely accepted requirement of universalizability (see T. Jollimore, 2014, “Impartiality”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta.). Third, we explain how we take external impartiality to be related to the requirement of universalizability.
Lipaz Shamoa-Nir  
Senior Lecturer, Zefat Academic College, Israel

“Under the Radar”: How is the Jewish-Arab Conflict Reflected in Internal Religious Jewish Dialogue?

This study explores the role of intergroup conflict in the religious identity exploration process among 83 Jewish participants in a dialogue in a multicultural college in Israel. Thematic analysis has shown that the behavior of most of the participants has been affected by the Jewish–Arab conflict as follows: they centered on internal commonalities among Jewish subgroups; they neither engaged in conflict among Jewish subgroups nor explored their Jewish identities, and they expressed confusion regarding who the out-group was: the Jewish subgroups’ members or the Arab students in the college. These findings expand the knowledge about the religious identity exploration process in a social context of religious-ethnic conflict and may pose a practical contribution to the field of intergroup dialogues and conflict resolution in divided societies.
Dylan Skurka  
PhD Student, York University, Canada  

Seeking Oneness:  
Zhuangzi and Psychedelics

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that there is a connection between the Ancient Chinese philosophical text the Zhuangzi and psychedelic-assisted therapy — particularly in their shared capacity to promote the realization of oneness. After explaining what I mean by “oneness,” I will then propose an interpretation of the Zhuangzi — one that is in line with the views of David Loy and Mark Berkson — which asserts that the text not only advocates for the existence of oneness, but also skillfully uses language to jolt readers into experiencing it. In the third section of this paper, I will turn to a series of studies conducted at NYU and Johns Hopkins University that demonstrated that psychedelic-assisted therapy is extremely effective in treating a number of psychological disorders and argue that this effectiveness directly correlated with the patients experiencing the same oneness that the Zhuangzi embraces. Finally, I will briefly note some interesting implications of the connection between psychedelic-assisted therapy and the Zhuangzi I draw, including how their shared therapeutic qualities might imply that the two seemingly disparate mediums can one day be used in conjunction with one another.
Ana Carolina Soliva Soria  
Associate Professor, Federal University of São Carlos, Brazil

The World Reflected in Abstract Concepts:  
The Problem of Philosophical Discourse in Arthur Schopenhauer

In his major work "The World as Will and Representation", Schopenhauer says that his philosophy must be a reflection of the world or a means by which the world as a whole presents itself, just as it is. Moreover, philosophy must fix this reflection in abstract concepts as a permanent knowledge. It is well known that the will gives the world its unity, i.e., it organizes and makes the dispersal of representations meaningful. Without the will, the world would be nothing but an aggregate or a mere senseless construction. The task of philosophy is to know and present unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity. Since it is a reflection of the world, it can therefore neither present only unity nor the opposite, namely, multiplicity. For if one tries to present just one side, the other is necessarily lost. As far as I understand it, the problem is the following: how could the two halves of the world be reflected at the same time by using a tool of reason, i.e., what is appropriate for only one of these halves (i.e., for the representation)? Whenever speech tries to discursively present the one and the many, it gets into contradictions. So, Schopenhauer claims that the will is such an object that can never fully become an object, hence he coined the term "objectity" [Objektität] of will, a good example of how problematic many of his designations are. Is it possible to avoid these contradictions? Perhaps not. Perhaps it is neither possible nor desirable, because such tensions describe the world in its entirety from the point of view of representation. My hypothesis is that if a philosophical discourse aims at dissolving the world's contradictions, it simultaneously dissolves its organic quality, or rather, it forms a senseless world that is nothing but an aggregate. Therefore, philosophy does not have to fill the gaps in the world.
Pavel Stankov  
Graduate Assistant, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, USA  

The AIR Theory of Consciousness and Working Memory:  
A Suggestion for Revision  

The Attended Intermediate-level Representation (AIR) theory of consciousness, as put forward by Jesse Prinz (2010, 2012), is a powerful account with much explanatory power. The current paper argues that although the AIR model is mostly correct, it contains two mistakes which are fortunately repairable. Firstly, AIR downplays the role of working memory and its contribution to the globality of consciousness, and secondly it insists with insufficient justification that consciousness results only from attended intermediate-level representations. In response, this paper boldens Prinz’s hypothesis about the role of working memory but weakens it as far as the level of consciousness is concerned. After arguing why the AIR model meets the requirements for a satisfactory theory of consciousness, the paper revises Prinz’s thesis that consciousness arises when representations merely “become available to working memory” and thereby offers an account closer to Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace model. Prinz’s arguments against the necessity of encoding of attended representations seem to rely on a presupposition that working memory has a location associated with particular neural circuits and that working memory encodes high-level representations. The first presupposition is not suggested by the literature, and the second one is defeated by the nature of working memory as a robust, multisensory system capable of encoding information in various modalities including the binary presence/absence of a stimulus. In addition, the cases Prinz suggests as disproving the necessity of working memory could be accounted for with an extra chunk of information encoded from sensory memory. Thus, the multifaceted and multisensory nature of working memory along with its collaboration with sensory memory allows a response not only to Prinz, but also to Ned Block’s conception of phenomenal consciousness “overflowing” access consciousness. The second criticism is considerably milder and derived in part from Susanna Siegel’s arguments for high-level representations in the consciousness of experts. The representation of culturally encoded stimuli such as written words with a message meaningful to the reader is perceived directly and in parallel with intermediate-level representations. These considerations allow speculation about the biological function of consciousness as a requirement for the encoding of representations in
long-term memory. Finally, the paper briefly considers and responds to three reasonable objections: (1) that the current revised account invites infinite regress of memory systems, (2) that consciousness may arise from sensory memory even without working memory, and (3) that the existence of blindsight may suggest consciousness without working memory.
Stephen Sullivan
Associate Professor, Edinboro University, USA

Abrahamic Theism, Free Will, and Eternal Torment

Atheist philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Kurt Baier, though from different philosophical traditions, shared a common concern about the traditional Judeo-Christian-Muslim doctrine that human beings are the creations of a Supreme Being. For Sartre, in “Existentialism is a Humanism” (1946), a God who designed us would thereby detract from our freedom and dignity. For Baier, in “The Meaning of Life” (1957), the idea that God designs us to serve his own purposes was deeply offensive in treating us as artifacts, domestic animals, or slaves. Indeed, Baier said explicitly what was implicit in Sartre: that the divine creation of humans as would violate Immanuel Kant’s respect for persons principle. But this Kantian objection is badly flawed in ignoring the crucial role of human free will in traditional Abrahamic theism. Still, if we focus not on the divine-creation doctrine but on the doctrine of eternal damnation for non-worshippers of God, then—I will argue this kind of theism does indeed undermine human freedom and dignity.
Taylor Terzek
PhD Student, Northern Seminary, USA

**Gospel Language in NT Context: Perfecting the Concept**

Looking at the gospel word group in scripture, the singular form of the noun ‘gospel’ is surprisingly scarce until the time of Paul. Even looking at the Old Testament occurrences of the gospel word group, the noun בְּשָׁרָה is not as prominent as we might tend to assume. Further, there is not a single occurrence of the neuter singular noun in the LXX. Therefore the use of ‘gospel’ in the New Testament is distinctive. What can account for its originality with Paul and the early church?

There are possible fragments of authentic usage by the historical Jesus preserved in the synoptic gospels, but this does not adequately account for the explosion of the word in its singular, definitive form with Paul and the early church. As G. H. Stanton has noted, we must consider the extrabiblical usage of the gospel-language. In the first century of the Greco-Roman world, we find gospel-language is political language that is used to conceptualize soteriological and eschatological claims. For example, the Calendar Inscription of Priene describes Emperor Augustus as a savior who is launching a new era of peace, and this event is labeled as ‘good news’ or a gospel. Focusing on Paul’s writings, Paul could then be intentionally juxtaposing the gospel of Jesus the Christ with gospels of the imperial cult; and this could account for the origination of the NT’s distinct use of gospel-language.

Paul is juxtaposing the gospel of Christ and gospels of Rome, but rather than intentionally opposing Rome (e.g., Deissmann, Horsley, Elliot, Wright, etc.), Paul is perfecting the concept (Galinsky) for which gospel-language was employed. The soteriological and eschatological conceptualization of the Roman gospels has been perfected in the gospel of Christ. The singular definitive usage points us to the intention of Paul’s juxtaposition. Jesus the Christ is Lord, and it is through his redemptive rule and reign that a new era of salvation has dawned; and this is the gospel. The gospel of Jesus Christ is the gospel par excellence, the epitomized gospel, or the perfected gospel.
Dorota Tymura  
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Antisthenes of Athens as ιατρὸς ψυχῆς  

The aim of this article is to present the philosophy of Antisthenes of Athens as a specific type of philosophical therapy closely connected with the Socrates' model. According to ancient tradition, Antisthenes himself was considered the most faithful disciple of Socrates, not only in terms of his lifestyle, but also in terms of philosophical considerations. Nevertheless, historians of philosophy still do not pay sufficient attention and interest to reflect such honorable opinion of the ancients. The few modern works devoted to the philosophy of Antisthenes interpret his fragmentarily preserved ethical thought only from the Cynic perspective, that he initiated, without even referring to the Socrates' ethics of which, in the opinion of the ancients themselves, he was the only true heir and continuator. Like his master, Antisthenes deepened ethical issues, abandoning his previous research in the field of rhetoric, logic, language or knowledge.

The inspiration of Socrates' life mode and his skilful implementation in it of the fundamental understanding of virtue as a unity of knowledge and action contributed to the gradual formation of theoretical assumptions of the Cynic movement, the author of which was Antisthenes himself. This philosopher took over from the ethics of Socrates the basic concepts, such as arete, enkrateia, eleutheria and, above all, autarkia, giving them a specific radical Cynic dimension. This decisive radicalization of some of Socrates' views, such as the transformation of autarkia into the concept of not-needing-anything (τὸ μηδὲνός προσδείσθαι) was Antisthenes's reaction to the then deep moral crisis which, like his master, he tried to remedy by offering the only proper medicine - philosophy. It was, above all, a practical philosophy that showed a man how to live in order to be able to call his existence, following Socrates, "a life worth living". The Socratic dimension of this philosophy is perfectly illustrated by Xenophon's Socratic writings, which are also one of the most important sources of understanding Antisthenes' ethical thoughts, thus showing the essential relationship between them. The Cynic philosophical thought of Antisthenes appears in them, especially in the Symposium, as a peculiar therapy of human souls, and the philosopher himself can therefore be described as a "physician of the mind" (ιατρὸς ψυχῆς). He perfectly recognized the state of a special kind of intoxication deeply embedded in society and its addiction to inborn impulses and instincts as well as
attachment to irrational traditions and customs. And his treatment with the help of philosophy boiled down to a thorough return to rationality, rejection of excessive bodily desires and continuous shaping of one's own personality through work on oneself and practicing virtue, which would become not only the basis of cynic, but also stoic mode of life.
Philosophical Reason and Common Understanding in the Justification of Freedom

In the first edition of the Letters on Kantian Philosophy (1785-6), Reinhold already demonstrates his concern with the needs of common sense, an expression used there as sane human understanding. His appreciation for this topic suggests that what is actually being inquired is the role of reason in our conviction of the existence of God. That is, for Reinhold, this question must be unfolded into two others, namely: (1) does reason bring apodictic proofs for the existence of God? (2) can there be a faith in the existence of God without the request of reason as a foundation?

In the 1792 edition of these Letters, Reinhold seeks to prove the non-impossibility of freedom on the basis of sane understanding, and proposes the concept of freedom of the will as the foundation of moral law. But the question remains: How is freedom possible? Philosophical reason is not content with the sayings of common understanding and investigates them. According to Reinhold, there is no contradiction that can undermine the conviction of the common and sane understanding before the judgment of philosophical reason. Both are precisely linked to the same fundamental faculties of the human spirit, and announce themselves in the common understanding by irresistible and infallible feelings (Gefühle) and, through them, provoke convictions on which the philosophical reason, which seeks the foundations of these feelings, must remain at odds with itself until it can establish distinct and determined concepts of fundamental faculties. Precisely because it cannot provide any justification for the possibility of freedom, philosophical reason should be satisfied with the results of the common and sane understanding in relation to reality and the possibility of freedom of the will. The starting point of such a “justification” would be the self-consciousness of freedom itself, assumed to be infallible and absolutely certain, which, by itself, excludes the possibility of a refutation of the convictions of sane understanding by philosophical reason. This, through its concepts, brings only the insight of sane understanding to the concepts and, together, it brings the justification of freedom. By bringing together sane understanding and philosophical reason, Reinhold attributes to the freedom of the will, which inhabits the faculty of the mind, a double perspective, making it both a feeling and a determined and distinct concept. In reading these Letters of 1792,
one can see that Reinhold is satisfied with the result achieved in relation to a complete foundation for moral philosophy. However, two years later he returned to analyze the relationship between common understanding and philosophical reason, perhaps because he realized that this relationship was not yet exhausted, or sufficiently clear in the Letters. This is the essay: “On the difference between sane understanding and philosophical reason in relation to the foundation of knowledge made possible by both”. Thus, the purpose of this speech is to inquire why the key concepts that guide the Letters on Kantian philosophy of 1792, such as personality, philosophical reason and sane human understanding, required a review by the author just two years later.
Echoes of Plato’s Concerns in Contemporary Ethical Criticism of Art

Over the last few years, several prominent philosophers of art have written extensively on the ethics of engagement with art. Some consider the possibility of sanctioning the artists for the (im)moral dimension of their works or of their deeds in creating the works, while others defend art’s autonomy and insist on separating it from their creators. All the while, the artists themselves keep inspiring new challenges regarding the ethical evaluation and criticism of their creations. Whether it is their character or that of their work that is morally contentious, or both, it seems that Plato’s worries regarding the capacity of art to morally corrupt us have never been more pressing. And given the omnipresence of art, both high and low, in our society, culture and education, we have to wonder: was Plato right? Should we expel the arts from our society, and/or subject them to some form of censorship?

My aim in this talk is to address these questions from the point of view of contemporary theories dominant in moral psychology and in philosophy of art. In the first part, I offer an analysis of Plato’s Republic, in order to show how many of his concerns are particularly prominent in contemporary artistic practices. I then move on to examining some of the current proposals regarding the ethical criticism of art, and I show how their underlying rationale relate to Plato’s views. In particular, I stress some of the current psychological research which suggest that younger audience is particularly prone to some forms of corruption in engagements with violent forms of art, thus supporting Plato’s calls for censorship. As a counterargument to such censorship, I analyze factors which determine the process of moral reasoning, in order to show that the ethical character of artworks is not the sole factor that has an impact on the moral beliefs and actions of the spectators. Consequently, as I argue in my conclusion, in order to face Plato’s concerns, we need to not only look at the artworks themselves, but also to understand better the imaginative, affective and cognitive dimension of our art experience. My proposal is to approach this problem from a more inclusive perspective, which takes into consideration the context of art-creation and its ethical character on the one hand, and is considering what exactly goes on in our minds and bodies when we engage with an artwork on the other.
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“Epistemic Closure” in Contemporary Politics: Extreme Confirmation Bias as Epistemic Injustice

The study of political epistemology is focused on two questions. One question is concerned with whether individuals – in principle – can be expected to know what needs to be known in order to make sensible public policy decisions. The other question is concerned with how, in fact, individuals get that information – namely what are the sources and what is the content of a person’s knowledge regarding public policy. Crucial to answering the second questions is the need to pay attention to the presuppositions, the ideas, and the values that people hold when considering deliberative choices. The conditions for the possibility of any possible democratic deliberation lie in these presuppositions.

“Epistemic closure,” though, refers to the apparent inability for a person to see political views that run counter to her own as even intelligible. It is an extreme form of confirmation bias. Epistemic closure is not about a group of like-minded individuals agreeing on everything. It is about what can possibly count as information. It is also not about disagreeing over the interpretation of facts; it is about what claims can even count as facts. Epistemic closure is about what we know and what we don’t know. But, in the context of contemporary politics, “epistemic closure” is not being used in the traditional sense that it is used in philosophical epistemology. Furthermore, epistemic closure is the result of recent developments in our technologies of communication that allow for always-on, personalized news feeds as well as closed social media feedback loops. The results are self-imposed media and information bubbles, so that we get our information from the like-minded – and, at times, the equally ill-informed. It is exactly the type of epistemic attitude that would motivate the ‘gadflying’ of Socrates.

We contend that this phenomenon should be further examined through the concept of “epistemic injustice,” and that the phenomenon is a result of contemporary “epistemologies of ignorance.” Political identity – when ‘tribal’ – constitutes a group whose political norms preclude them from seeing issues in certain ways. Group identity – even if that identity is constituted in part through one’s digital footprint as opposed to one’s race or sex or ethnicity (though those group
identities are salient as well) - is epistemically relevant because different groups begin from different beliefs that subsequently inform their judgments. Thus, even political identity bears on epistemic factors such as relevance, plausibility, coherence, consistency, and credibility. Social media, furthermore, exacerbate the effects of the isolated experiences and motivations of particular groups. Social media make it very easy, for instance, for one to pursue a distorted account of reality; it insulates the person from the countervailing evidence and also ‘justifies’ the acts of testimonial injustice that would occur against anyone who would put fort such countervailing evidence. Political epistemologists need to direct their attention to the mediation of information in contemporary public discourse that allows for these instances of epistemic injustice, where countervailing evidence can be routinely dismissed in public policy debates.
References


