Abstract Book
14th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
27-30 May 2019, Athens, Greece
Edited by
Gregory T. Papanikos

2019
Abstracts
14th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
27-30 May 2019, Athens, Greece

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Preface

This book includes the abstracts of all the papers presented at the 14th Annual International Conference on Philosophy (27-30 May 2019), organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER).

In total 74 papers were submitted by 74 presenters, coming from 27 different countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and Vietnam). The conference was organized into 28 sessions that included a variety of topic areas. A full conference program can be found before the relevant abstracts. In accordance with ATINER’s Publication Policy, the papers presented during this conference will be considered for inclusion in one of ATINER’s many publications.

The purpose of this abstract book is to provide members of ATINER and other academics around the world with a resource through which to discover colleagues and additional research relevant to their own work. This purpose is in congruence with the overall mission of the association. ATINER was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet to exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study.

It is our hope that through ATINER’s conferences and publications, Athens will become a place where academics and researchers from all over the world regularly meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 400 international conferences and has published nearly 200 books. Academically, the institute is organized into 6 divisions and 37 units. Each unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

For each of these events, the involvement of multiple parties is crucial. I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committees, and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference and its subsequent publications together. Specific individuals are listed on the following page.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
Scientific Committee

All ATINER’s conferences are organized by the Academic Council. This conference has been organized with the assistance of the following academics, who contributed by a) setting up the program b) chairing the conference sessions, and/or c) reviewing the submitted abstracts and papers:

1. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER & Honorary Professor, University of Stirling, UK.
2. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.
3. William O’Meara, Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University, USA.
4. Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Burman University, Canada.
5. Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA.
6. Roderick Long, Professor, Auburn University, USA.
7. Michael Strawser, Professor & Chair of Philosophy Department, University of Central Florida, USA.
8. Gary Bartlett, Professor, Central Washington University, USA.
9. Verena Gottschling, Professor, York University, Canada.
10. William Stephens, Professor, Creighton University, USA.
11. Johan Buitendag, Professor, University of Pretoria, South Africa.
12. Elelwani Farisani, Chair of Department, Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.
13. Gerardo de la Fuente Lora, Professor, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.
14. Alan Hueth, Professor, Point Loma Nazarene University, USA.
15. Meredith Drees, Chair, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Kansas Wesleyan University, USA.
16. Nikolay Milkov, Professor, University of Paderborn, Germany.
17. Maria Adamos, Academic Member, ATINER & Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.
18. Scott Rubarth, Associate Professor, Rollins College, USA.
19. Atli Hardarson, Associate Professor, University of Iceland, Iceland.
20. Dylan Futter, Associate Professor, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.
21. Susan Castro, Associate Professor, Wichita State University, USA.
22. Piers Stephens, Associate Professor, University of Georgia, USA.
23. Giuseppe Naimo, Academic Member, ATINER & Senior Lecturer, University of Notre Dame Australia, Australia.
24. Danielle Wylie, Assistant Professor, Mississippi State University, USA.
25. Natalia Smirnova, Professor & Head, “Philosophical Problems of Creativity” Department, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Russia.
26. Sandra Plastina, Associate professor in History of Modern Philosophy, Department of Humanities, University of Calabria, Italy.
27. Paul Helfritzsch, Temporary Lecturer, Die Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany.
29. Susanne Kathrin Beiweis, Research Associate, Sun Yat-sen University, China.
30. Bjorn Freter, Independent Researcher, Germany.
31. Tiago de Lima Castro, PhD Student, UNESP, Brazil.
### FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM

**14th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 27-30 May 2019, Athens, Greece**  

**Conference Venue:** Titania Hotel, 52 Panepistimiou Street, 10678 Athens, Greece

**Monday 27 May 2019**

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<td>09:30-11:00</td>
<td>Room A - 10th Floor: Chair: Patricia Hanna, Professor, University of Utah, USA. 1. Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA. Being and Beings: Ontological Explication and Systematic Comprehension. 2. Joel Wilcox, Professor, Barry University, USA. Four Objections to Essentialism, and Why They Matter. 3. Maja Schepelmann, Scientific Assistant, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Germany. Kant’s System of Metaphysics from a New Point of View.</td>
<td>Room B - 10th Floor: Chair: Gary Bartlett, Professor, Central Washington University, USA. 1. William Stephens, Professor, Creighton University, USA. The Evils of Oysters and the Virtues of Vegetables: The Roman Stoics on Food. 2. Dylan Futter, Associate Professor, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. Socratic Method and the “What is x” Question.</td>
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<td>11:00-12:30</td>
<td>Chair: Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA.</td>
<td>Chair: Yi Wu, Independent Researcher, The New School for Social Research, New York, USA.</td>
<td>Chair: Giuseppe Naimo, Senior Lecturer, University of Notre Dame Australia, Australia.</td>
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<td>1. Sandra Fairbanks, Professor, Barry University, USA. Cultural Challenges to Environmental Ethics.</td>
<td>1. Luyan Xie, Professor, Harbin Engineering University, China. The Course and Enlightenment of Ecological Civilization Construction since the Reform and Opening-up in China.</td>
<td>1. Stephen Boyd, John Allen Easley Professor of Religion, Wake Forest University, USA. Collaborating to Defend Native American Human Rights and the Earth: Theological Resources.</td>
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<td>Chair: Danielle Wylie, Assistant Professor, Mississippi State University, USA.</td>
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<td>2. Ana Maria Vicuna, Adjunct Associate Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile. Philosophical Dialogue</td>
<td>2. Atli Hardarson,</td>
<td>2. Elelwani Farisani, Chair of Department, Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.</td>
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3. Miloud Belkoniene, Researcher, University College London, UK. What Should We Believe about the Future?

Associate Professor, University of Iceland, Iceland. The Paradox of Moral Education and Locke’s Second Perfection.
Africa. The Conflict between the Poor and the Wicked in Psalm(s) 9 and 10 and its Significance for the South African Context.

14:00-15:00 Lunch

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<tr>
<th>Session XII (Room A - 10th Floor)</th>
<th>Session XIII (Room B - 10th Floor)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chair: Roderick Long, Professor, Auburn University, USA.</td>
<td>Chair: Atli Hardarson, Associate Professor, University of Iceland, Iceland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Francisco David Corrales Cordon, Associate Professor, University of Girona, Spain. Anaxagorean Traces in Plato’s Menexenus: The Case of the Myth of Autochthony.</td>
<td>2. Shogo Hashimoto, PhD Student, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany. Correspondence Theory of Truth in Wittgenstein’s on Certainty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tonci Kokic, Associate Professor, University of Split, Croatia. Metempsychōsis as Common Idea in Ancient Greek and India.</td>
<td>3. Jonathan Egeland, PhD Student, Stockholm University, Sweden. The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended.</td>
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18:00-19:30

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<tr>
<th>Session XIV (Room A - 10th Floor)</th>
<th>Session XV (Room B - 10th Floor)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chair: Michael Strawser, Professor &amp; Chair of Philosophy Department, University of Central Florida, USA.</td>
<td>Chair: Alan Hueth, Professor, Point Loma Nazarene University, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Burman University, Canada. The Concept of Multiple Realization and Phenomena of Emergence: The Possibility of Conscious Life beyond this Planet.</td>
<td>1. Keiichi Iwata, Professor, Waseda University, Japan. Subjecthood and Definability in Aristotle's Investigation of Substance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pawel Sajdek, Professor, Pedagogical University in Cracow, Poland. Ontological Foundation of the Liberation Doctrine in Bhramasiddhi of Manđana Mišra.</td>
<td>2. Jaroslav Danes, Associate Professor, University of Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. Aristotle on War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Susanne Kathrin Beiweis, Research Associate, Sun Yat-sen University, China. Proteus. Or: Magic or the Change in Naturein Ficino and Bruno.</td>
<td>3. Pavel Hobza, Assistant Professor, Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic. Induction and Aristotelian Epagoge.</td>
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19:30-20:30

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<tr>
<th>Session XVI (Room B - 10th Floor)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chair: Susanne Kathrin Beiweis, Research Associate, Sun Yat-sen University, China.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Danielle Wylie, Assistant Professor, Mississippi State University, USA. You Knew the Risks: A Puzzle for Moral Responsibility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Laszlo Komorjai, Research Fellow, Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary. The Phenomenon of Following Rules and Some of its Problems.</td>
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21:30-23:30 Greek Night and Dinner

Tuesday 28 May 2019

07:30-10:15 Session XVII: An Educational Urban Walk in Modern and Ancient Athens

Group Discussion on Ancient and Modern Athens.
Visit to the Most Important Historical and Cultural Monuments of the City (be prepared to walk and talk as in the ancient peripatetic school of Aristotle)

10:30-12:30

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<th>Session XVIII (Room A - 10th Floor)</th>
<th>Session XIX (Room B - 10th Floor)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chair: Dylan Futter, Associate Professor, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.</td>
<td>Chair: Elelwani Farisani, Chair of Department, Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Roderick Long, Professor, Auburn University, USA. Labour Exploitation: A Left-Libertarian Analysis.</td>
<td>1. Michel Tombroff, Artist, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA. Kronecker, Einstein and the Cross.</td>
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| 3. Elisabetta Di Castro, Professor, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico. The Justice in
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<td>4. Justyna Miklaszewska, Professor, Jagiellonian University, Poland. Liberal Justice.</td>
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<th>12:30-14:00</th>
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<tr>
<td>Session XX (Room A - 10th Floor)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Gerardo de la Fuente Lora, Professor, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Maria Adamos, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA. <em>Eudaimonia</em> and the Choice-Worthiness Condition in the <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Scott Rubarth, Associate Professor, Rollins College, USA. Visual Perception in Ancient Stoic Philosophy.</td>
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<td>3. Ryan Quandt, Graduate Instructor, University of South Florida, USA. Aristotle’s Appraisal of Epicharmus.</td>
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<th>14:00-15:00 Lunch</th>
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<td>15:00-16:30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Session XXII (Room A - 10th Floor)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Maria Adamos, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Wieslawa Sajdek, Professor, Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa, Poland. What Is ‘Knowledge’? Dialogic Quest for the Answer in Plato’s <em>Theaetetus</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Andrej Kalas, Associate Professor, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia &amp; Zuzana Zelinova, Independent Researcher, Slovakia. Xenophon’s Socrates and Archaia Paideia.</td>
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### 16:30-18:00

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<tr>
<th>Session XXIV (Room A - 10th Floor)</th>
<th>Session XXV (Room B - 10th Floor)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair</strong>: Nikolay Milkov, Professor, University of Paderborn, Germany.</td>
<td><strong>Chair</strong>: Verena Gottschling, Professor, York University, Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Michael Strawser, Professor &amp; Chair of Philosophy Department, University of Central Florida, USA. Levinas and the Spinoza Question.</td>
<td>1. Susan Castro, Associate Professor, Wichita State University, USA. On the Natural and Cultural Logic of <em>Renga</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jan Juhani Steinmann, PhD Candidate, University of Vienna, Austria. Hardship as Constitutive Principle of Subjectivity in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard.</td>
<td>2. Paul Helfritzsch, Temporary Lecturer, Die Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany. A Sensibility for Opacity, or <em>how it is to Feel Tarrying</em>.</td>
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### 18:00-19:00

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<tr>
<th>Session XXVI (Room A - 10th Floor): Decolonisation &amp; Desuperiorisation: On the Dangers of Western Thought</th>
<th>Session XXVII (Room B - 10th Floor)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chairs</strong>: Bjorn Freter, Independent Researcher, Germany &amp; Patricia Hanna, Professor, University of Utah, USA.</td>
<td><strong>Chair</strong>: Susan Castro, Associate Professor, Wichita State University, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Maria Lopez Rios, PhD Student, University of Bristol, UK. Apologia of Kant.</td>
<td>1. Beishi (Sabrina) Hao, PhD Student, University of Pittsburgh, USA. Does Special Theory of Relativity Contradict with Theories of Time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yvette Franklin, Instructor, The University of Tennessee, USA. Desuperiorization in Educative Contexts.</td>
<td>2. Jerzy Golosz, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Philosophy of Natural Sciences, Director of the Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Poland. In Defence of a Dynamic View of Reality.</td>
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### 19:00-21:00

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<tr>
<th>Session XXVIII (Room B - 10th Floor)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair</strong>: Paul Helfritzsch, Temporary Lecturer, Die Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Verena Gottschling, Professor, York University, Canada. Getting Delusions Right.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Nikolay Milkov, Professor, University of Paderborn, Germany. Russell’s Theory of Proposition (1900–1919) in Relation to Pragmatism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Marnie Binder, Lecturer, California State University, Sacramento and Cosumnes River College, USA. Pragmatism for History and History for Pragmatism: An Indispensable Dialogue for the Humanities.</td>
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### 21:00-22:30 Dinner
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday 29 May 2019</td>
<td>Mycenae and Island of Poros Visit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Educational Island Tour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday 30 May 2019</td>
<td>Delphi Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday 31 May 2019</td>
<td>Ancient Corinth and Cape Sounion</td>
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**Eudaimonia and the Choice-Worthiness Condition in the Nicomachean Ethics**

The aim of this paper is to show that Aristotle advocates a consistent notion of *eudaimonia* throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*. First, I suggest that Aristotle’s account of the choice-worthiness condition in Book I indicates an inclusive account of *eudaimonia*; that is to say, a *eudaimonia* which includes all other intrinsic goods. Next, I discuss Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtues in Book VI and I show that there, too, he advocates an inclusive account of *eudaimonia*. Finally, I argue that in Book X Aristotle continues to defend the definition of *eudaimonia* given in Book I despite of his saying that theoretical activity is coextensive with *eudaimonia*. Hence, if I am right, Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia* in Books I, VI and X is not contradictory. The life of theoretical activity in Book X is perfect (*teleia*) *eudaimonia* which includes all other intrinsic human goods and practical virtues. And although such life includes the activity which more than any other contributes to *eudaimonia*, theoretical activity, it also needs other goods such as the practical virtues which are the subject of political science.
Mohamed Almisbkawy  
Assistant Professor, The British University in Egypt, Egypt

Western Metaphysics of Exclusion and its Impact upon Interpretation of Buddhist Logic

The most fundamental and influential concept of Buddhist logic is catuṣkoṭi. This principle postulates that there are four possibilities regarding any statement: it might be true (and true only), false (and false only), both true and false, or neither true nor false. Graham Priest the famous Australian logician argues that such principle could represent the contemporary developed of western logic namely many valued logic as such principle renders four values and A paraconsistent logic as its third value renders a contradiction. Whatever we argue in this paper that all such interpretations are merely western interpretation of such principle. As the many valued logics and A paraconsistent logic emerged within the domain of major western exclusionary ontological theory which in turn is founded upon non-contradiction and excluded middle principles, thus such kind of developed logics surpass the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle in some level while adopted some version of such laws in higher language level, whereas principle of catuṣkoṭi relies upon ultimately non-exclusionary ontological theory.
Are Children Subject to Epistemic Injustice?

Some recent authors have argued that children are subject to epistemic injustice, in much the same way that women and black people are. Here I argue that this is correct, but not in the way that those authors have so far described. In particular, while testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice are the focus of attention following Miranda Fricker’s 2007 book, I do not think that either of these kinds of epistemic injustice are a serious concern in the case of children. What is a serious concern, I suggest, are some other varieties of epistemic injustice, which involve children being regarded as incapable of participating in any kind of epistemic practice— even those which have nothing to do with assertion. To see these other forms of injustice, and why they are likely to be commonly committed against children, we need to think about a broader variety of speech acts than just the acts of assertion that are the focus in cases of testimonial injustice. Even if we do not have the same obligation to believe a child’s assertions (i.e. ‘testimony’) that we have to believe an adult’s assertions, I argue that we still have an obligation to take the child’s utterances seriously. In this paper I begin to try to say what this “taking seriously” involves.
Proteus. Or: Magic or the Change in Nature in Ficino and Bruno

Proteus is not simply a character in Greek mythology, he is the water deity whom Homer called “the old man of the sea”. He often appears in works of art, literature, poetry, and philosophy. Proteus’s shape-shifting qualities and his prophetic power to tell the past, present, and future, became, in particular, highly intriguing to Renaissance intellectuals. Proteus’s capacity to form and to create within the world, and to reveal knowledge also have much in common with the discourse on magic, which formed the practical part of natural philosophy (or science) during the European Renaissance and Early Modern period. Magic is unavoidably linked to Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) and his De vita libri tres (“Three Books of Life”), published in 1489. A ‘bestseller’ in its time, it influenced a variety of thinkers, including Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), one of the ‘new natural philosophers’ of the late sixteenth century and a representative of the Copernican system. Bruno also dedicated a series of writings to magic. These included Demagia (“On magic”) and De vinculis in genere (“A general account of bonding”). Bruno took several ideas from Ficino concerning the mutual relations of the cosmos, nature, and humankind, giving them a new context and meaning. In this paper, I will identify the similarities and differences between Ficino’s and Bruno’s concepts of magic. And I will argue that the figure of Proteus – adopted by both Ficino and Bruno – may be considered representative, not only of their different perspectives on the relationship between nature and humankind, but also for the shift in philosophical discussion from a theoretical to a more active and practical view of the natural and empirical world.
What should we believe about the Future?

Niels Bohr is supposed to have said that “prediction is very difficult, especially about the future”. Besides the humoristic touch of this statement, there is indeed something peculiar concerning beliefs about the future. This is, it seems, because of the particular type of evidence we have for holding such beliefs. In contrast to beliefs about the past, we cannot rely directly on our memories to form an opinion about what will happen. No perception of future events can be remembered. In contrast to beliefs about the present, we cannot rely directly on our own current experiences to form an opinion about what will happen. Future events cannot be perceived. But surely, if we can rationally hold beliefs about the future, it has to be because our present and past evidence supports, in some cases, believing propositions about future events.

Several philosophers have recently argued that explanationist theories of epistemic justification, in particular, fail to account for the support that beliefs about the future can receive from past and present evidence. While such theories have sparked the interest of some philosophers because of the results they deliver in other kinds of cases, their supposed inability to account for the justification we have for holding beliefs about the future casts serious doubts on their plausibility. This paper discusses a problem for explanationism raised by beliefs about the future by examining whether McCain’s (2013, 2014b) definition of the evidential support relation can correctly account for a case involving such beliefs offered by Byerly (2013). Its aim is to show that the results delivered by McCain’s account in cases involving beliefs about the future are, in fact, plausible and that explanationism, if properly articulated, is illuminating with respect to the justification we have for holding such beliefs, as it manages to correctly distinguish evidence that only supports believing probabilistic claims about the future from evidence that is sufficient to believe that a particular event will happen.

To that end, I review McCain’s account of the evidential support relation and the problem that Byerly’s case raises for it. I then introduce the near neighborhood strategy considered by McCain to show that his account is, in the final analysis, able to meet the challenge constituted by Byerly’s case, and I present Byerly and Martin’s response to it. Next I show that, if properly articulated, this strategy can succeed despite Byerly and Martin’s concerns regarding it. In addition, I argue that the result delivered by McCain’s account in the case offered by Byerly, given the near neighborhood strategy, has independent plausibility in light of the fact that statistical evidence, on its own, cannot support believing non-
probabilistic claims. Finally, I show that McCain’s account of the evidential support relation is able to correctly track the distinction that can be made between statistical and non-statistical evidence and that this account is, therefore, able to correctly distinguish cases in which one is justified in believing that a particular event will occur from cases in which one is only justified in believing that there is a certain chance that a particular event will occur.
Marnie Binder
Lecturer, California State University, Sacramento and Cosumnes River College, USA

Pragmatism for History and History for Pragmatism: An Indispensable Dialogue for the Humanities

History, most broadly understood, is past time, or the events in the past. Historiography is the interpretation of the past time, of the events of the past. From a pragmatist perspective, the selection of events for recording and the interpretation of them is largely determined by usefulness. A pragmatist philosopher of history asks first what practical difference it would make for this or that historical fact to be taken as “true,” or at least “significant,” and then consider it the principal motivation behind what is recorded and what continues to circulate, including to what extent, in the annals of historical texts. We pay closer attention to and write about history that has practicality. Studying the direct democracy of Ancient Athens will tell us more about what daily life was like as opposed to learning how Plato celebrated his twentieth birthday. We cannot be epistemologically certain if at any time our pragmatic interests in history overlap with an objective historical reality, but from a pragmatist perspective, it still matters what is useful for us to consider as a historical “fact”—there is epistemic possibility in what can be discovered at the time of recording in the knowledge that pragmatic interests make possible. A text about history can tell us not just about the contents in and of themselves, but also about the time itself in which these contents were being recorded. A history book written today about Ancient Greece would certainly be very different from one written in the Middle Ages, not just because of what has been interpreted in between, but also because of pragmatic reasons that differed in each time period. A pragmatist dialogue with history considers the lens of the individual(s) who selected the historical details to record as well as the audience of the time, and how that content was useful for them. In this we can capture historical details about the time of recording, and with that, create a new kind of dialogue in history to enrich both academic disciplines of history and philosophy. This dialogue has much to offer for the topics of epistemic possibility and the metaphysics of humankind as historical beings. A Jamesian emphasis on experience can be understood in part as historical experience. Part of the methodology of pragmatism is derived from history, since usefulness is attested over time. Historical selection and interpretation are largely pragmatically determined. The dialogue between the two is indispensable for the humanities, certainly for the new era of digital humanities that is upon us, with all the new interpretations of historical documents that are to come as a result.
Krystof Bohacek
Researcher, Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic

Anamnestic Reading of Plato's Dialogues.
A Proposal of an Alternative Methodology based on KAIROS

Platonic scholarship has developed a number of interpretive methods to solve three fundamental challenges in interpreting Plato's text: The absence of author's own position, the large number of approaches presented, and the differences between early, middle and late dialogues.

Unitarian reading focuses on preserving the (supposed) unity of Plato's work. Developmental approach, on the other hand, highlights diversity and translates it into several stages of Plato's (assumed) intellectual development. Systematic interpretation largely resigns to positive textual evidence and seeks to (re)construct some philosophical system. Esoteric interpretation focuses on (alleged) secret Platonic doctrine, preserved by later authors. Sceptical reading totally resigns on the formulation of Plato's own philosophy.

The most widespread today is proleptic reading, which (seemingly) admits significant differences between dialogues, but interprets them in a unifying perspective. Proleptic reading is based on the methodological principle that the full meaning of earlier texts (especially the so-called "threshold dialogues" like Protagoras or Charmides) can only be appreciated by later ones, especially the Republic. I believe that such a reading overlooks the authentic perspective of shorter, early or transitive dialogues and unjustifiably favors Republic and texts related texts. Proleptic reading actually tells us that we have to read shorter/earlier dialogues with a glance in the future, and to assume texts that will be created in decades...

Therefore, I propose an alternative way of reading, exactly the opposite of proleptic reading. I believe that later or more complex texts can only be interpreted on the basis of earlier/simpler ones. On the contrary, simpler dialogues do not assume knowledge of more complex ones. My reading is based on the perspective of the reader, not the hypothetical perspective of the author: I suggest reading the dialogues with a view in the past, ie with the precondition of knowledge of earlier or more elemental texts.
Stephen Boyd  
John Allen Easley Professor of Religion, Wake Forest University, USA

Collaborating to Defend Native American Human Rights and the Earth: Theological Resources

Collaborating to Defend Native American Human Rights and the Earth: Theological Resources George Tinker, a Native American of the Osage Nation and Lutheran theologian, in his American Indian Liberation (2008), observed “American Indian poverty is and has always been a necessary condition for American wealth and well-being.” The historical effects of United States federal policy and judicial decisions substantiates Tinker’s claim. The missionary conquest of the Americas, coinciding with the rise of merchant capitalism, served to exterminate close to ninety percent of the indigenous population, perpetrating both physical and cultural genocide. The on-going violation of indigenous human, cultural, religious rights, coupled with concomitant environmental degradation constitutes an urgent ethical challenge for Non-Indian Christians and other US citizens. The paper offers a brief case study in which a multi-national mining company threatens a sacred ceremonial and food-gathering site of the Apache peoples, as well as devastating environmental harms the water, air, plant and animal life in Southeast Arizona. How might Non-Indian Christians join with Indian peoples to intervene in this, most recent, and other violations? This paper identifies theological resources that address Tinker’s call for “enlightened white resistance” include “the creation of new social spaces with Indians that encourage indigenous peoples to maintain the integrity of their communities and cultural values.” Among those resources are Mary Fulkerson’s, Places of Redemption (2007), identifying practices that create cultural “spaces of appearing” for members of groups routinely invisible to culturally dominant groups. Howard Thurman, a major inspiration to the US Civil Rights Movement, offers honest, if difficult, practices of cooperation for members of non-dominant groups (Luminous Darkness and Disciplines of the Spirit). Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s notion of “religionless Christianity” offers a theological frame that moves members of dominant groups toward intervention and cooperation with members of non-dominant groups (Letters & Papers from Prison and Ethics).
Johan Buitendag  
Professor, University of Pretoria, South Africa

The Challenges of Theological Education in the 21st Century and in Africa

The paper would reflect on the challenges of theological education in the 21st century and in Africa. The paper would argue for a multi- and transdisciplinary approach towards the natures of university and of theology. What is integral to Newman’s idea of a university is that theology is a branch of universal knowledge, because all knowledge forms one whole or ‘circle’ from which the various branches of learning stem. Religious truth is not only an aspect, but a condition of general knowledge. Therefore it is so important of pushing things up to their first principles. This is according to Newman a sine qua non for the idea of a university. Against this backdrop and the fact that the world has become merely a village, the following have emerged as driving forces of universities today: reputation, impact and funding. Academics must deliver a product that is saleable, or at least subject to quality control.

Is a university of Africa different to its counterparts in the developed world? Kofi Annan, a former Secretary General of the United Nations, strongly promoted the importance of universities for development in Africa: ‘The university must become a primary tool for Africa’s development in the new century.’ This means that universities have to become agents of change and ‘the critical source of equalisation of chances and democratisation of society by making possible equal opportunities for people.’ The question arises how hospitable universities would be to theology in future. I want to provide my own answer to this question as a sort of synopsis of the thrust of my argument. Hospitability at a university depends in my view, upon:

1. the idea of a university
2. the scholarly contribution theology can make as an important perspective on understanding reality
3. the extent to which it can be methodologically accountable
4. the resilience it shows to immanent criticism
5. the fidelity it asserts to its subject-matter as science of God
6. the values it reflects and the social cohesion it inaugurates in society

In conclusion, I offer a definition of what theology at a public university is all about. The distinction between ‘theology’ and ‘religious studies’ needs to be emphasised once more. If this distinction is to be abolished, theology dissolves in the Humanities and has to comply with all the demands of the various academic disciplines that study religious
phenomena. These choices are solely based on my presupposition of dialogue as a prerequisite for a meaningful relationship between theology and science. I am of the opinion that Theology is a scholarly endeavour of believers in the public sphere in order to make sense of multidimensional realities in a manner that matters. Obviously, this definition has a number of ramifications, but that is the agenda for subsequent discussion.
Susan Castro
Associate Professor, Wichita State University, USA

On the Natural and Cultural Logic of Renga

Like rhapsody in ancient Greece and rap battles in the West today, renga is a historically and culturally important Japanese art of linked verse. Unlike rhapsody, both the links and the verse of renga are improvised in the moment. Unlike rap battles, renga is a non-adversarial group activity.

In this paper I introduce renga by sketching the historical development of renga from its verse-capping Heian origins to its highly ritualized 100 verse hyakuin practice governed by Shōhaku’s 1501 rulebook (shinshiki), in which we find a plethora of rules: Rules for remote recurrence, rules for allusions to foundational poems, rules regarding things that may be appear as many as four times in a hyakuin, rules for things that must be separated by at least seven verses, and so on. I then argue that though Shōhaku’s rules superficially appear to be “incredibly complex and hopelessly trivial” (Carter 1983), the rules of renga have their own logic. Some rules are refinements of the core rules, whereas others embody a natural or cultural logic.

The core rules of renga dictate that a) each verse must be a poem in its own right and b) each new verse must link to the immediately prior verse, yet c) each new verse must break from the chain in an unexpected way to keep the play between poets lively and fresh and creative. Rules concerning repetition, seriation and intermission help refine the symmetry-breaking balance of renga practice.

The natural logic of renga is a seasonal, biological logic. The natural logic of renga dictates, for example, that we don’t wax on about bears stalking prey in midwinter. Bears hibernate in winter, and they’re not really stalkers like wolves. A stalking mid-winter bear would thus be jarring and incongruous rather than striking and poignant or profound. The natural rules characterize and prohibit a range of unnatural imagery.

The cultural logic of renga operates in a similar manner. The cultural associations and symbols that inform renga can be drawn from the arts (e.g. Chinese poetry or the Tale of Genji), religion (Shinto, Buddhism, etc.), and features of the social order. The cultural significance of a pine tree, for example, could amplify and add layers of meaning to an image or render the image trite and dull. Overuse can desensitize us, but poetry without foundation would be superficial or dissociative.

Putting these together, I argue that the rules of renga, explicit and implicit, are as complex as cultural literacy or biological science, but Shōhaku’s rules are neither arbitrary nor trivial. They have a systematic coherence that qualifies renga as a masterable art.
Xuxin Chen
Dean, Jiangnan University, China

The Endless Truth of the Inheritance and Development of Chinese Traditional Virtues
Anaxagorean Traces in Plato's Menexenus: The Case of the Myth of Autochthony

The aim of our contribution is to show that Plato's version of the myth of autochthony in the Menexenus (Men. 237b-238c) is in some respects inspired by Anaxagoras' account on the origins and development of life. Although Anaxagoras is not explicitly mentioned through the Menexenus, his significance within the Periclean Circle is well known. According to Plato (Phaedrus 269e), and other ancient sources (e.g. Isocrates XV, 235; Cicero, De orat. III, 138), it appears that Anaxagoras had a Deep influence on Pericle's philosophical and rhetorical education, (see, for instance, Gelmin, M, “L’influenza di Anassagora sull’oratoria di Pericle”, Rhetorica, Vol. XXXV, 2 (2017) pp. 123-136). Irrespective of Socrates' attribution to Aspasia of both Pericles' funeral oration and the speech he presents to the young Menexenus, it is commonly accepted that with the latter Plato attempts to imitate the typical argumentative procedures and to reproduce the contents of Vth century democratic ideology. On that ground, it is plausible to think that all or some of those procedures and contents could be reflecting the philosophical sources of inspiration of Athenian democrats, and particularly that they could have been built on some anaxagorean ideas. Our attempt to demonstrate that this is precisely the case of the myth of autochthony will be structured as follows:

1) We will place Anaxagoras within the frame of the history of the Athenian belief in the myth of autochthony. According to Rosivach (“Autochthony and the Athenians” The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1987), pp. 294-306) and Blok (“Gentrifying Genealogy: on the Genesis of the Athenian Autochthony Myth “, in U. Dill and C. Walde (Hrsg.), Antike Mythen. Medien, Transformationen und Konstruktionen, Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009, pp. 261), the application of autochthones, as meaning sprung from the land itself, or earthborn (γηγενής) to Athenian people, is a relative late product, merging from the blend of two different narratives of the origins of Athens (a) one leading to Erechtheus and his earthborn origins; b) one which claims the Athenians to be autochthones, understood as the first inhabitants of Attica). Rosivach (art. cit., p. 297, 301) also claims that the final stages of the blending of the two narratives took place at the first half of the Vth century. This period of time coincides with Anaxagoras first arrival to Attica (480BC), where he stayed for a total of thirty years (from 480 to 451 and from 432 to 431BC). Even with the break between 451 and 432, this is a long period of time during which he could have perfectly influenced a new approach to the popular belief on an
earthborn origin of Athenian people.

2) The evidences in the *Menexenus* giving support to that thesis will be provided in the second section of the paper, which will be divided into two different subsections:

a) Comparing Plato's version of the myth with the other extant epideictic examples (Lysias 2, 17; Demosthenes 60, 4; Isocrates 12, 124-126; 4, 24; Hyp. Or. Fun. 7) it is possible to find some striking peculiarities. Whereas the latter only mention the earth-born character of Athenian people, Plato's version frames that issue within a broader narrative on the origin of life, which includes men in general, animals and plants springing from the earth. At this respect:

1) we know that Anaxagoras claimed that animal life springs from the earth (see, for instance, Aetius II, 8,1); 2) and some available fragments of Euripides' plays (*Melanippe* (frg. 484 Nauck); *Chrysippus* (frg. 839 Nauck)), which are commonly believed to express Anaxagoras' doctrines, report exactly those same ideas. The similarities between Plato's version of the myth and the content of these fragments may then be plausibly explained as the product of Plato's attempt to present the topic of autochthony as it would have been conceived under the intellectual influence of Anaxagoras' doctrines on nature and generation.

b) On the other hand, the development of the myth operates has what we could call a trophic/dietetic basis. This development begins with the use of an argumentative topos consisting in the demonstration of the motherhood of the land itself through the identification, at the time of the first generation of men, of the existence of the adequate kind of feeding substances they needed to grow and develop themselves. This may not be considered a special trait of Plato's approach to the myth, as the same topos is used in Isocrates (12, 124-126) and Demosthenes (60, 5), but neither of these texts develops the idea to the extent Plato does. The text identifies a single fruit coming from barley and wheat, which is considered the most beautiful and the best to feed the human species (237e-238a). The use of the singular karpon to speak about the fruits of two different kinds of plants, suggest that it is a metaphorical way to refer a common product from those two plants: bread. Thus, the text implicitly states 1) that a single kind of feeding substance is sufficient for the growing and developmental process of human being; 2) that this substance is bread. If this is correct, those developments may be associated with the same set of anaxagorean doctrines on the generation and development of biological entities, both in its general scheme and in the particular way he would
have illustrated the formation of complex tissues and parts of human body from a single feeding substance: bread (see Simplicius (*Phys. 460, 4) and Aetius (I, 3, 5)).

Finally, the claim that women imitate the earth and not the other way around, is consistent with the anaxagorean idea about females as the place (*topos*) receiving the *sedes* provided by males (see Arist. *GA* 4.1 763b30-764a1). As the *topos* of generation and feeding, females imitate the earth.

3) Taking into account sections 1 and 2, the third and final section of our contribution will focus on the characterisation of the democratic regime in *Men.* 238b-239a, trying to show its consistency with a general anaxagorean theoretical frame.
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**Waismann, Church, and the Beginning of Alethic Pluralism**

Alethic pluralism developed from linguistic pluralism of Wittgenstein, and it is in his *Philosophical Investigations* that we can find a suggestion that truth could be plural. But it is only a suggestion, and the first philosopher who really tried to build a theory of pluralist truth was not Wittgenstein, but Friedrich Waismann. In his article *The Many-Level-Structure of Language* (1946) Waismann divided language into different “language strata” and believed that in each stratum the word “truth” has a different sense. As examples of language strata Waismann gave material object statement, a sense-datum statement, a law of nature, a geometrical proposition, ethical statements, and others. In different language strata we use different systems of logic or concepts of verifiability, and different senses of truth. A physical law cannot be true in the same sense in which a description of the building is. According to Waismann: “Truth, when applied to a physical law, means roughly speaking: it is well established by observation; it brings widely different things into a close connection; it simplifies our theoretical system; it makes us ‘understand’ what seemed to be a mystery before; it is fruitful leading to new predictions and discoveries” (Waismann, *How I See Philosophy*, 1968, p. 98). The case of a simple perception is completely different – your statement that the light is on in your room is true because it says so-and-so, and so-and-so is as you say it is. Truth of this statement has nothing to do with things like simplification of matters or connecting very different things. Waismann also described purely formal concerns of mathematicians to conclude that this “is a very good case for the ‘coherence theory of truth’” (Waismann, *How I See…*, op. cit., p. 113). Therefore there is no doubt that he played with a contemporary idea that we can apply different theories of truth in different regions of discourse. For Waismann truth was “systematically ambiguous” and, using contemporary terminology, we can probably call his theory an example of a moderate pluralism, according to which there is more than one truth property, some of which are characteristic of all true sentences.

Waismann insisted that there are no possible logical connections between different levels of language. Alonzo Church, who reviewed the book of Waismann, could not agree with the idea of impossibility of a deductive logical connection between physical laws and experimental results. According to him: “It would seem to be quite essential to be able to make inferences in which the premisses are of mixed character, some belonging to a mathematical discipline (such as the theory of differential equations), other being physical laws” (Church, *Review: How I see...*).
Philosophy 1973, p. 665). Review of Church is so interesting, because he seems to anticipate the objection to the alethic pluralism based on the existence of mixed inferences, formulated by Christine Tappolet quarter of a century later.
Jaroslav Danes  
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**Aristotle on War**

In my paper I will address several issues in Aristotle’s thoughts about war. First, are wars avoidable or unavoidable, natural or unnatural? Second, why do we wage wars? Third, can or should war be an ultimate goal of political action and behaviour? Fourth, is any ethical reasoning required when we opt for war? Fifth, how traditional or innovative are Aristotle’s answers to these questions? I will demonstrate that according to Aristotle wars are conditioned by nature and natural hierarchy: male/female, Greeks/barbarians, free/slaves. War *per se* cannot be a goal of political life. The causes of war (*ad bellum*) are many and various: a) defence, b) acquisition of property, c) establishment of just/proper hegemony, d) peace. Ethical reasoning is required except for one case: a war against barbarians. However, even in this case war is ideologically, and, therefore, normatively buttressed, albeit with a specific and unreflected social construct. Aristotle’s opinions are mostly traditional and even his new argumentation *ex natura* can be viewed in the light of Panhellenism and efforts to channel the Greek appetite for power.
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Image Ethics and Politics.
Is it Possible to Represent Hyperviolence?

In this paper I take and continue the debate opened by Georges Didi-Hubermann and Claude Lanzmann, from the year 2001, around the images-or not-of the Holocaust, asking whether this controversy could be compared to the old Western theme on the images-or not-of the divine. The thesis of the paper is that these are two different, heterogeneous, unrelated issues, and that it is very important to keep them as independent issues. I believe that it is important to maintain the prohibition on producing images of contemporary hyperviolence—for example, that produced by organized crime or drug trafficking, and I argue in favor of the possibility of maintaining some areas of public space free of images.
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Descartes and Music: The Relevance for Cartesianism

René Descartes wrote a book “Compendium Musicae” in 1618. This little treatise about musical theory and musical aesthetics it is a work of youth, but, Descartes rehearsal de method and turn the subject the starting point to think about music. In the same text, the author said that have to understand the soul, has relation to the body, and the passions to write morte about musical themes. He continuously discuss music in his correspondence with Marin Mersenne, Christian Huyguens, and others throughout his life.

Normally, some scholars tend to understand the music like a form to Descartes discuss mathematics, and this discussion is not really relevant to Cartesianism. However, the continuous presence of the music in the correspondence points that theme could have problems to be explained successfully with the Cartesianism.

This article will discuss how music goes through the works of Descartes and the questions that music raises to Cartesianism in its own texts.
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**The Justice in Question.**  
**A Debate in the Era of Globalization**

The globalization process, one of the main features of our times, has not only promoted uniformity, but also heterogeneity, pluralism, and differences in contemporary societies. Nowadays, we need a coherent normative political theory that responds to new social actors’ legitimate demands and requirements, which range from recognition, identity/difference, cultural rights and multicultural citizenship, among others.

Currently it is recognized that neither the citizenship nor the State are homogeneous, but are rather differentiated in a hierarchical manner. This leads to evident inequalities, discriminations, and exclusions. As highlighted by Iris Marion Young, this is about hierarchies that comply with diverse forms of domination and oppression, and a trustworthy reflection on justice cannot and must not take these subjects unnoticed. Actually, one of the still pending issues of politics—one that is major and urgent—is to create adequate institutions that enable these legitimate and varied re-claims of differences to be carried out without domination; that is to say, on institutional conditions that enable people to take part in determining their own actions.

To promote this creation, as noted by Nancy Fraser, thinking about justice cannot simply be reduced to defining what should be equalized between people, but it is also necessary to define who are the members, and which the relevant community. In many respects, although obviously not in every one of them, the citizens and the State have ceased to be relevant because the life conditions of the subjects of justice no longer depend exclusively in the political community of which they are citizens: there are offshore and non-territorial structures that have a much greater impact on these life conditions than the ones close-at-hand. Thus, in our globalized world the issue is not only the substance of justice, but also its frame, which ultimately depends on the structures involved in the inequality that is considered unjust and is intended to be corrected.

Among Fraser’s proposals that we want to follow, it is also the insistence on a three-dimensional view of justice. The injustices of the contemporary world do not only take place in an economic dimension of distribution, but also in a cultural dimension of recognition, and a political dimension of representation. Indeed, the great inequalities of our time are not exclusively related to economy, but also to culture and politics; ranging from exploitation and marginalization, cultural impositions and violence, and lack of political power and self-determination.
As we mentioned early, one of the major remaining tasks of politics is to create institutions able to address the new challenges of our time, which should be framed at various levels; not only stately, but also locally, supranationally, and globally. Regarding this, political philosophy must take on the challenge of thinking adequate concepts to help us to think of these new institutions. We believe the first step is to reconsider the injustice problems that had been originally formulated in the context of the nation-state and re-frame them in the process of globalization.
Claudia Simone Dorchain
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Why we are in Need of Negative Theology - The Destructive Role of Religion Proves Martha Nussbaum Wrong

„Religion creates culture, religion schools people in social skills such as empathy“ stated Martha Nussbaum in her famous study of 2003, „Upheavals of Thought“. The contrary seems to be true, with a quick glance at what religious wars today, even at the threshold of our home, create in terms of violence, hatred and barbarism, oftenly starting with a discussion about words and discriminating „infidels“.

In order to complete the somewhat fragmentary picture of what religion may or may not create in regard of culture Nussbaum paints, I would like to point out the hidden history of negative theology. Negative theology was a philosophical idea not exclusively claimed by certain schools, but a lineage commonly shared by those thinkers whose respect for the source of being was unrestricted by religious dogma. Starting with Plotin, Proklus and Dionysos Areopagita, then challenging mystics of the medieval age such as Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa, negative theology proved to be a philosophical „way without a way“ to describe the source of being above all confessional discussions. God, in their opinion, is neither good nor bad, neither white nor black, neither male nor female, the One is above all attributions, even the best, because attributions describe a being partially, which is not compatible with source which is one-and-all. Therefore, the „metaphysics of the One“ states that all religion basically means the same in different conventions of terminology, thus, that every war about words is useless, that culture is created not in the worship of a being superior, but in the worship of the divine source within mankind itself – a true humanist view.

In my opinion, we as a global society today with more and more open borders are in massive need of negative theology in order to cope with the potential of violence which is hidden within religion itself. If we intend to end religious wars, we must adopt the philosophical insights of the negative theologians and humanists of the past, and we must adopt them quickly, as there is few time left.
Eros and Experiences of Beauty in Plato’s Theory of Moral Progress

Plato speaks of aesthetic experience in different works and in different enough ways that we are led to wonder how or even whether these can all be fit together consistently. In the Republic, Plato maintains that aesthetic education is required for justice in a city and in a person’s soul, and that proper exposure to beautiful art can teach a person to “become fine and good.” However, in the Symposium, for example, he discusses the relationship between beauty and morality by specifically focusing on erotic experiences of beautiful people. Thus, we are led to wonder: Are there two different kinds of experiences of beauty? If so, what distinguishes them from one another? How are they related to Plato’s general theory of moral progress? These questions, surprisingly underappreciated in Plato scholarship, are the focus of this essay.

Ultimately, I shall argue that beauty plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral progress: (1) The experience of beauty via art, as described in the Republic, has the capacity to influence a person’s character and, hence, it can be used in moral training. This kind of experience is part of the proper education that prepares a person to live a moral life. The orderliness, rhythm, and appreciation of one’s response to beauty puts that person in a state that cultivates progress along the path toward virtue. This experience, thus, facilitates the forming of character, and the shaping of one’s views. (2) The erotic experience of a beautiful person invokes an emotional response that has the capacity to facilitate moral growth, as is described in the Symposium. By ‘moral growth,’ I mean that when the soul is directed to the Forms via a certain kind of insight, the soul is transformed in such a way that character development occurs. This kind of moral reformation does not involve training, but rather, a moral transformation and a growing and developing of one’s character as the result of an insight into the nature of true value.

In both the Republic and the Symposium, the love of beauty is something that is necessary for moral reformation. I suggest that the love of beauty toward which education aims in the Republic involves nonsexual eros, while the Symposium makes room for sexual eros. With this in mind, however, I try to show that the Republic and Symposium and their respective descriptions of experiences of beauty are not at all inconsistent.
The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended

According to accessibilism, there is an accessibility condition on justification. More specifically, accessibilism claims that facts about justification are a priori accessible - where a priori is used in the narrow or traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense modalities. The most prominent argument for accessibilism draws on BonJour (1980; 1985) and Lehrer's (1990) unfamiliar faculty scenarios. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against it. In this article, I defend the argument against three prominent objections from the recent literature.

The first objection is offered by Bernecker (2008), and it bites the bullet by saying that the beliefs of the subjects in BonJour and Lehrer's scenarios actually are justified. Against it I argue that Bernecker fails to recognize the intuitive force of the scenarios, partly because he mistakenly thinks that just because the faculties in question (e.g., reliable clairvoyance) don't really exist, our intuitions about them must be "biased".

The second objection is offered by (e.g.) Ghijsen (2016) and says that there are alternative, externalist explanations of the intuitions elicited by the aforementioned scenarios that are more plausible than the one offered by the accessibilist. Against it I argue that when the alternative explanations are spelled out in sufficient detail it becomes clear that they aren't able to account for the relevant intuitions.

The third objection is offered by Bergmann (2006) as a dilemma against accessibilism. Against it I argue that the version of accessibilism endorsed in this article (which avoids the problems that have faced other, more prominent versions in the literature) avoids both horns of the dilemma.
Cultural Challenges to Environmental Ethics

Today we face a variety of serious environmental problems, including climate change, destruction and depletion of natural resources and wilderness areas, explosive population growth, and toxic waste. Consequently, environmental philosophers, including biocentrists, ecocentrists, and ecofeminists, call for a radical change in our attitude towards nature and the development of a new set of environmental virtues. The idea that nature, including nonhuman life, natural objects, and ecological wholes have intrinsic value and, hence, moral standing, is a very recent development in Western philosophy.

Thus recognition of new virtues governing human attitudes and behavior towards nature is highly desirable, both by way of addressing an egregious lacuna in western thought, and as a necessary condition for anything like a viable planet. Unfortunately, as I will argue, a capitalist, consumer culture such as that of the United States presents a variety of obstacles to the successful inculcation of any new environmental virtues. The structure of the discussion is as follows: First, I develop a brief sketch of an environmentally good person. I do so by compiling a set of environmental virtues recommended by various prominent biocentrists, ecocentrists and ecofeminists. Second, I address problems posed by American culture for the development of these environmental virtues.
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The Conflict between the Poor and the Wicked in Psalm(s) 9 and 10 and its Significance for the South African Context

In many psalms including psalms 9 and 10, we encounter a struggle between the poor and the wicked. In all cases the oppressed seem to be the victim of the wicked who continue to oppress, exploit and discriminate against the defenseless poor. This struggle reflects what was going on in the community. Nevertheless, who are these two contending parties? Many scholars have tried to give attention to the above question; however, they remain divided on this issue. This paper will attempt to investigate the identity of both the poor and the wicked in psalm 9 and 10. I hope to establish as to whether the poor were just individuals or whether they represented the entire community of Israel. Furthermore, attention will be devoted to the question whether the enemies represented internal forces within Israel herself or foreign forces i.e external nations who threatened Israel and her faith. In the last section, the paper, will try to contextualize psalm 9 and 10 for South Africa today. It is here where the paper will start by looking at poverty in current South Africa. Then, it will round off this discussion by spelling out some theological implications of psalm 9 and 10 for the current South African context.
Reorientation in the Field: Why Religion Matters

Defining religion as a negotiation about “what it means to be a human in a human place,” David Chidester invites scholars of religious studies to critically examine and name what it is that we are actually teaching, writing about, and researching. Certainly, many colleagues in our field have called for the elimination of “religion” as an academic term for a number of legitimate reasons (the most compelling in my work is its restraining effect on adequately expressing Indigenous ontologies) and yet our field continues to grow and thrive as an intriguing, if befuddling, discipline. Comparative studies of religion certainly have an abhorrent legacy – being a field mobilized systemically as an efficient agent of empire, but also because even the most well-meaning among us still too often mangle, distort, and misapprehend much of what we encounter and then attempt to interpret, explain, and analogize. Nevertheless, I follow Chidester’s lead and argue for strategic retention of the term religion so as to reverse the flow of production, authentication, and circulation of what counts as knowledge about “religion.” Chidester identifies a historical phenomenon – what he calls a triple mediation, whereby colonial agents absorbed, extracted and documented their perceptions of Indigenous cultural practices and then transferred that knowledge to the centers of empire, thus enabling our intellectual predecessors - “experts” of language, myth, and religion, to extrapolate cultural particularities for consumption. This extraction has continued uninterruptedly – today however, the pipeline flowing directly to imperial spaces (like universities), mainly requires quotation in order to function, albeit in circular fashion that feeds back on itself and reinforces the imperialist agenda. Indeed, this circularity has had a dominating effect within our field. I argue that Indigenous theorists quoting imperial theorists however, is the opening for an important strategic move: it is destabilizing to be sure, but also suggests alternative ways of both generating knowledge but even establishing what is considered knowledge. Paying attention to these triple mediations, we may not only recover, but reclaim what has been erased by the flow from periphery to center, and also “engage the challenge of combining critical reflection on our past...with creative possibilities for working through enduring categories in the study of religion to produce new knowledge.” This paper then, offers an analysis of the Inuit film Qallunaat! Why White People Are Funny, to demonstrate the effectiveness of an often subversive but invariably intriguing counter-production of...
Desuperiorization in Educative Contexts

“When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for a people to advance from that subordination in which they have hitherto remained, & to assume among the powers of the earth the equal & independant station to which the laws of nature & of nature’s god entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the change” (Thomas Jefferson, original rough draft of the Declaration of Independence, June 1776).

This declaration of the causes necessitating independence from colonial rule could have been the beginning of a manifesto for Black Lives Matters, the MeToo movement, NoBanNoWall, March for Our Lives, the Arab Spring, Occupy Wallstreet, not to mention the Civil Rights Movement, the Animal Rights Movement, the Feminist Movement, Anit-Apartheid Movement, Black Consciousness Movement, the Chicano Movement, the Anti-colonial Liberation Movement…These social movements all seek in some way a decolonization. Jefferson goes on in this draft to complain that the king is, “paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another.” As a white South African teaching in secondary and tertiary institutions in the southeast United States, Jefferson’s words and the reality of advancing from subordination seem to be incongruous, if not wicked irony as neither of these citations made it into the final document or it seems into the permanent consciousness of the nation.

I will be sharing experiences of desuperiorization within educative contexts especially in relation to the bringing to consciousness of students as a means to explore how Jefferson’s draft was changed to suit the a new class of dominators and how we live out the consequences of that compromise to this day.
Socratic Method and the “What is x” Question

Socrates takes a rather narrow view of conversation. His preferred tête-à-tête is governed by a “What is x?” question, where x is either virtue itself, or an ostensive part of virtue, such as courage, justice and temperance. Usually Socrates directs the conversation onto the “What is x?” question by disavowing knowledge and asking the interlocutor to tell him what virtue is. Some interlocutors resist this approach, preferring to investigate an “is x F?” question instead (e.g. is virtue teachable? Is justice self-advantageous?). And Socrates is sometimes willing to go along with them. But when the discussion changes to a discussion of what we might call the attributes of virtue, he indicates this to be a mistake. Why does Socrates prioritise the “What is virtue?” question in this way?

The standard scholarly answer to this question is given by the principle of the priority of definition. According to this view, Socrates believes that knowledge of the essence of virtue is necessary for knowing anything else about it. Therefore, since a definition is a statement of essence, one can’t know any of virtue’s instances or attributes without a definition. And since it is impossible to act in a reliably virtuous fashion without this knowledge, the search for definitions is not of merely theoretical interest; it has a direct practical relevance to the living of the good life.

In this paper, I criticise the standard interpretation of the priority of definition principle and offer a different view. I argue that Socrates prioritises the “what is virtue?” question because it facilitates self-inquiry; the “is-x-F?” question does not. Philosophical self-inquiry is the means by which virtue comes to be developed in the soul.
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The Postmodern Constitution of an Ethics of Empathy

Arguing that “The Good”, as well as related concepts such as the ethical or moral, are, as are all concepts, derived from the language in which they are constituted, and as such are open, a la the Conventionalists and Deconstructionists to negotiation, the paper advocates for an ethics of Empathy, informed by Critical Reflective Analysis. However, so far from being a subjective and relative emotion, it is argued that empathy is a universal concomitant of the “putting of the self into the shoes of, and thus adopting the perspective of, the other”, which is ontologically inseparable from reflective self-consciousness, without which there would be no broadly credible notion of either moral sensibility, or of free choice, nor, therefore, of moral accountability.
In Defence of a Dynamic View of Reality

This paper defends a dynamic view of reality which is founded on the assumption of the existence of the flow of time. This vindication makes use of a metaphysical theory of the flow of time developed by the author which is based on the notion of dynamic existence. It is shown that such a conception allows one to explain the fundamental phenomena connected with the flow of time, namely the continuous changing of the present, the endurance of things, and the asymmetry of time. It is also argued that the proposed approach may be of some virtue for the empirical sciences because it explains the ubiquitous interest of scientists in the evolution of dynamic systems of different kinds, and provides us with an arrow of time which is lacking in theories describing fundamental physical interactions. The argument is advanced which aims to show that physics is unable to provide us with a theory of the flow of time and that we should look for such a theory in metaphysics. Thus, an approach to the relation between metaphysics and physics is vindicated that may help to overcome the difficulties blocking our understanding of reality as a dynamic one.
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Getting Delusions Right

When it comes to delusions, there is only one tissue undisputed; they are very hard to explain, the debate with its two main camps is stalled. According traditional top-down accounts, delusions are characterized as false beliefs based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary (DSM-IVTR, 2000: 821, Campbell 2001, Graham/Stevens 2005, Miyazono 2015, Bortolotti 2009, 2018). Defenders of the opposing camp, experience-based bottom-up accounts, argue that delusions should rather be characterized at a lower level. They suggested that (many) delusions might be grounded in unusual experiences, due to neural dysfunctions. Experience-based accounts see this malfunction as limited to experiential mechanisms (broadly construed). Delusion involves no damage to the mechanisms of belief-formation as such, delusional belief is a completely rational response to the patient’s experience. (Mahler 1999, Gold/Hohwy 2010, Hohwy/Rajan 2012) In addition, several kinds of hybrid accounts have been suggested, defenders of these two-factor accounts posit both an experience based and a higher cognitive deficit. (Pacherie 2009, Stone/Young 1997, Kaney & Bentall 1989, Garety 1991, Langdon/Coltheart 2000)

We also witness a new trend in this debate. It was argued that delusions are paradigm case of situations requiring externalist accounts, in particular embodied approaches and phenomenological approaches. (Gallagher 2009, Ratcliffe 2009) According to this new picture, all the competing existing accounts are internalist accounts, which is the reason that they necessarily have to fail: pure both traditional accounts as well as neuropsychological accounts, and also hybrids of any possible kind.

I look at the two main arguments presented to support externalist views. I argue that the arguments are not convincing and are based on a misunderstanding. The mentioned problems are no general problems for internalist accounts. It will depend on the kind of account, especially in hybrid accounts, how well they can avoid these problems. The real issue is the kind of internalist accounts used, not the fact that the accounts are internalistic.

I also argue that the whole trend is inauspicious. The proposed alternative framework of multiple realities is vague and gives us no explanatory advantage. It is descriptive, not explanatory. Neither does it increase the explanatory power of the accounts nor does it improve our understanding of delusions. It does solve the problems it is supposed to solve “by definition”.

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However, in my view there is a lesson we can learn from the debate that helps to get a better grasp on delusions. Personal level or embodied concepts are important, but we need to analyze what the cause of the phenomenological characteristics is. Then I present a revised strategy to explain delusions. I argue that a promising option is a bottom-up account, the underlying explanatory concepts for delusions are neurological concepts. A fine grained interface between the internal and the external, combined with a more flexible account of different levels of representation and experience will give a better account of what delusions really are and help to break the deadlock in the debate.
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Does Special Theory of Relativity Contradict with Theories of Time?

There has been a long-lasting debate between "A theories" and "B theories" in the realm of philosophy as well as physics. Rietdijk (1966) and Putnam (1967) raise a famous objection to standard A theories using Special Theory of Relativity (SR). If SR is true, it implies relativity of simultaneity, which means that there cannot exist an instant of time as the "absolute present", such that all the space-point members within such instant are simultaneous to each other. Without being able to assign a specific instant as the present, A theories' failure seems to be fatal. However, we must notice that "absolute present" itself is a concept of Newtonian space-time, and the A theories that Rietdijk (1966) and Putnam (1967) consider are all classical A theories. Since Stein (1968), many philosophers tried to "relativize" different A theories, of which the result I would call "relativistic A theories", and Rietdijk's and Putnam's objections do not apply to them.

The most important change from classical A theories to relativistic A theories is that all concepts of time and concepts relating to time, now need to be considered with regards to some specific reference frame. For example, relativistic presentism would need to claim that for each space-time point, it's only simultaneous to itself, and thus only itself exists. Relativistic growing universe theory would need to claim that for each space-time point, only events in its past light cone plus itself exist. SR also tells us that there does not exist a specific worldline that is more fundamental or ontologically significant than the others.

This paper first points out that relativistic A theories are perfectly consistent with SR. The challenge faced by relativistic A theories is instead a metaphysical - can we make sense of a relativistic concept of existence and reality, instead of an absolute one? I take it as a bullet that all relativistic A theorists need to bite: there's no objective reality, neither is there an objective becoming.

This paper therefore lists several objections against relativistic A theories' notions of worldline-dependent reality and becoming. With regards to reality, relativistic A theories need to accept that it's possible that as a persistent observer grows older, something in the future that she has influence to pops out of existence, or something in the past that would influence her pops into existence. Be aware that we are not discussing about change of epistemological status, but change of ontological status. With regards to becoming, a similar argument to Maxwell (1985) is
provided: there would not be an objective notion of becoming as well as objective openness of future.

Finally, appealing to our experience that we are able to step back from our subjective perspective, and look at the world from the perspective of "nowhere in particular" (Nagel 1989), this paper argues that we should at least be able to ask whether something exists or has become from the impersonal perspective. The question is valid, but relativistic A theories would not have an answer for it. An open option for relativistic A theorists, which seems to me also to be the only one, would be to commit to the anti-realist metametaphysical view, that is, there's no absolute fact about reality.
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The Paradox of Moral Education and Locke’s Second Perfection

Writing about moral education in the 1970s, the British philosopher of education, R. S. Peters, presented a puzzle that has since been known as ‘the paradox of moral education’. The problem was to explain how children can ‘enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition’. Although this is not a paradox in the logical sense, it is a dilemma for any broadly Aristotelian account of moral education.

Aristotle described the ability to be guided by reason as extrinsically habituated, but he did not explain in detail how habituation can lead to autonomy; and modern virtue ethicists, who draw upon his work, have not added much to his scanty account.

In the seventeenth century, John Locke (1632–1702) proposed a sophisticated theory of how autonomy develops through habituation. His account of autonomy-friendly habits is, arguably, one of the most elaborate attempts ever made to solve the puzzle presented by Peters.

To understand Locke’s explanation of how children become autonomous through habituation, we need to read his theory of education, presented in Some Thoughts concerning Education, in the light of what he said about rational self-control in the second edition of his Essay concerning Human Understanding. In the Essay, he drew a distinction between the liberty people enjoy when what they do is determined by their own will, on the one hand, and a ‘second perfection’, one that consists in their will being determined by rational argument or deliberation, on the other.

Locke’s analyses and arguments support the conclusion that this second perfection requires autonomy-friendly habits that are instilled through upbringing and adult guidance. The gist of his argument is as follows:

Without the second perfection our will is subject to irrational whims and impulses.
Without habituation we cannot acquire the second perfection.

Therefore: Without habituation our will is subject to irrational whims and impulses.
Correspondence Theory of Truth in Wittgenstein's 
On Certainty

In the history of philosophy, the correspondence theory of truth is a traditional model whose basic idea is that a belief/statement is true if it corresponds to the reality. This theory is very appealing and tempting to some philosophers, but it remains quite controversial to others. In his article ‘Thoughts’, Frege attacks this idea by pointing out a circular argument therein, and furthermore dismisses any attempt to define and – even – explain the truth. Wittgenstein also criticizes the same theory, especially in his last masterpiece On Certainty (=OC). Some arguments in OC might – at first glance – give the impression that he totally relies on Frege's approach. Wittgenstein uses the phrase, “You are already going round in a circle”, nearly identical to text that appears in ‘Thoughts’, which adverts to nothing but the malicious circularity of the correspondence theory. On that score, some secondary literature indeed draws an analogy between the criticisms of both philosophers. Nevertheless, in his manuscript, Wittgenstein crossed out a passage containing the phrase. Besides, the phrase itself does not seem directly related to his further claim that the problem of the correspondence theory lies in a lack of clarity of its application. How can we make all of them compatible? – In this paper, I present to what extent Wittgenstein agrees with Frege's arguments against the correspondence theory, and thus explore whether Wittgenstein’s criticism is actually directed towards the circularity, and whether he takes the idea of ‘correspondence’ to be completely nonsensical, by reference to his other remarks in OC as well as in the manuscripts on which it is based.
A Sensibility for Opacity, or how it is to Feel Tarrying

One of the main theses of the existentialism that can be found in the early work of Jean-Paul Sartre is that consciousness is entirely lucid towards itself. This thesis forms the basis of my argument. Sartre uses the lucidity of consciousness in order to reject the so called illusion of immanence, which is to say the belief in an image theory of the relationship between mankind and the world. This leads to the illusion that there exist images of objects, of other people and social structures, inside my consciousness that serve as the source of opacity. That this picture of the relation between man and world is an insufficient one should be evident. There cannot be anything in my consciousness other than its relation to the world, since this relation is not only the structure of consciousness, it is consciousness itself, the way in which we cope with the world. Here we are also confronted by the many different ways in which this relation can be expressed. That is why I take a particular emotion as the theoretical focus of this talk: Our sensibility for tarrying.

I chose “sensibility for“ to express the emotional gesture and movement of tarrying because it expresses the direct connection between the how it is to feel tarrying and the senses as vectored structures of the being in the world. tarrying as an emotion is an indicator of the relatedness of human beings to norms and moral figures, which are not chosen by them and the ability to make a conception of oneself through actions. This twofold condition of human reality is linked to the description of consciousness as entirely lucid one. Anyone, however, can have the experience of acting in accordance with certain regulative norms of society in which they cannot recognise themselves nor their conception of themselves. This void leads to a discussion of the question of authenticity and its connection to the sense of tarrying, if the latter indeed distinguishes the twofold condition of human reality into fixed social norms and the ability to act freely. This description of tarrying is one which can be found in Joseph Vogl’s On tarrying. Building on Sartre’s thesis of the lucidity of consciousness I will argue for a conception of tarrying that understands it as an important signifier of becoming aware of the inconsistency between fixed norms on the one hand and self-conceptions on the other. If this is true, then it is possible to change the question of authenticity into a question of negotiation between oneself and society. It would no longer be a question of whether I am acting in accordance with what I am. Rather, it will be a question of responsibility, since consciousness means coping with the world and thus all seeds of opacity are in the world. This does not necessarily mean that
consciousness is completely translucent to itself and makes it possible to make a connection between some of Sartres early position and the description of tarrying which Vogl develops with reference to Deleuze. This leads to the conclusion that the phenomenological method can be inclusive towards ideas from post-structuralism and can through them, assess the impact of *how it is to* live in an oppressive society and what options one has to begin decoding these structures that we become aware of in the mood of hesitation.
Induction and Aristotelian Epagoge

Aristotle’s concept of epagoge is usually translated and interpreted as ‘induction’. At first sight, this rendering of epagoge seems to be harmless and trivial, since both concepts appear to be very similar. Our concept of induction even stems from Aristotle’s epagoge. It was Cicero who translated it into Latin as inductio. By closely looking, however, it turns out that Aristotle’s epagoge and our induction have very little in common. There are at least three main areas of difference between Aristotle’s epagoge and our induction. 1) Induction is a progression from particular instances toward a general conclusion. Although epagoge could in some contexts resemble to induction (cf. Aristotle’s famous description of epagoge as ‘a way (efodos) from particulars to the universal (katholou’), Top. I,12 105a13-14), Aristotle – as we will see – in fact conceived of it rather as an application of a universal to particulars, which makes the identification of epagoge with induction very problematic, if not straightforwardly impossible. 2) Induction is a methodological procedure by means of which we gradually gain general or universal insight into the nature of things. Epagoge is, on the other hand, an immediate intuitive grasp of the relationship between particulars and universals. 3) The general or universal knowledge gained by induction is a result of a gradual process of our thought or cognitive capacities. As to epagoge, universals are not somehow acquired or even formed by a gradual cognitive process, but are already present or given. Since it is perception that provides us with universals, epagoge seems to be rather a cognitive capacity of how to combine universals and particulars to one another.
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Determining our Responsibility to Nature:
The Loss of Biodiversity

We find ourselves in a situation where there is substantial destruction of nature, caused by human influence, that is leading to the loss of biodiversity. Some organizations like to show off some responsible and eco-conscious counterparts to their destructive behavior. However, do we know what responsibility to nature in practice entails? How shall we grasp our responsibility to nature and its biodiversity? I’ll use the model of species conservation to demonstrate that active (and often consequentialist) access to saving species is problematic in a few ways. We generally allow that causing pain to individual animals and sacrificing individuals serves a “higher good”. We also justify other instrumental uses of animal life, follow anthropocentric goals, and create tech-managerial approaches to the conservation of nature, all with a bit of an arrogant attitude. My question is whether it is morally better to give up something valuable (some kinds of animal species) and accept a loss.
Preachers, Teachers, and Prophets: A Philosophical Exploration for a Christian Paradigm for Media Literacy

Problem: no concise, single textbook based on a Christian perspective of media literacy (ML) exists. ML includes the ability to understand the following: the messenger and their credibility (ethos) and ideology/worldview; the aesthetics and messaging (eliciting pathos in audience)—especially focused on Aristotle’s “thought”/theme; and the effects and moral/ethics of messages on individuals, culture, and society. Purpose of this paper? To share and get feedback on this approach for a book.

This paper will address the philosophical and religious/theological portions of a prospective media literacy book. It will be based on two fundamental, all-encompassing Christian principles: agape love and logos-truth. Agape-love will include a philosophical/scriptural exploration of the four different kinds of love—in an emphasis of agape as a corrective love related to the different Greek words for the concepts of “judgment” (perception, discernment, scrutiny, etc.) included in the New Testament. Logos-truth will consider the relevance of The Fall and human nature, powers and principalities, sanctification and stewardship, and other concepts of Christian identity, values, and behaviors related to media production/consumption. This invites the application of agape-love as primarily behavioral, and will include a relevant philosophical consideration of Aristotelian “pathos” versus Platonic reasoning in determining what’s best for achieving “the good.”

Logos-truth will also consider truths based on present-day ideologies and worldviews—including post-modernism and its affects on media content and media effects in the physiological, psychological, sociological, and spiritual dimensions of human experience. I will argue that values and beliefs are adopted through the socialization and enculturation processes of individuals and groups via media messages in pop culture media and news. I will describe how the media have a “curriculum” of their own, and serve as extensions of our educational systems. I’ll also reveal connections between Aristotle’s principles of pathos and elements of drama to Jacques Ellul’s classic propaganda theories.

The paper will conclude with the application of agape love and logos-truth as the foundational principle in ethical decision-making related to media consumption and production. I’ll utilize the Potter Box Model (PBM) approach for ethical dilemmas and decision-making – which focuses on the consideration of conflicting values, classic ethical principles, and the various loyalties/people who are involved in ethical
dilemmas. The principles include Aristotle’s “golden mean,” Kant’s “categorical imperative,” Bentham & Mill’s (and Plato’s) “utilitarianism,” Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”—and an examination of the limits and weaknesses of these principles compared to the Christian agape love.
Subjecthood and Definability in Aristotle's Investigation of Substance

Aristotle's science of being, the conception of which is found in books IV and VI of the *Metaphysics*, is fully developed in *Met*. VII–IX in the form of the theory of substance. Aristotle begins by understanding the inquiry into being (*to on*) as the inquiry into substance (*ousia*) at the end of VII. 1. During his discussion in VII, Aristotle examines what is regarded as substance in the sense in which 'substance' signifies neither an individual substance nor its universal (i.e. species or genus). Clearly Aristotle counts the essence (*to ti ên enai*) or form (*eidos*) of an individual substance as substance in this sense. However, it is not necessarily clear what he is thinking of as the criterion for substancehood.

On the one hand, Aristotle adheres to his view that substance is that of which other things are predicated and that which itself is not predicated of any other things. Although this view was originally stated in his characterization of an individual substance, it is repeated at the early stage in his inquiry into substance in VII, and it is presupposed even in the later chapters of VII, especially 13–16, where it is claimed that the essence or form of an individual substance is particular. On the other hand, Aristotle usually supposes that the essence or form of an individual substance is definable, and therefore universal. In fact, when discussing the notion of essence in VII. 4–6, he treats essence as what is being defined. Similarly, when reconsidering this notion from the hylomorphic point of view in VII. 10–12, he mentions the essence or form taken as definable, though he also mentions a particular form. So, roughly, there are two criteria for substancehood, namely subjecthood and definability, and Aristotle seems to be in a dilemma about which criterion to satisfy.

Aristotle seems to avoid this difficulty by restarting his inquiry in the last chapter of VII, chapter 17, where it is claimed that the essence or form of an individual substance is the cause of its being. I will argue that it is natural for Aristotle to restart his inquiry in view of the cause of being, given that he thinks of the science of being as inquiring into the causes of being. In addition, I will consider why Aristotle has in mind those two criteria in his inquiry in VII.
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&  
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**Xenophon’s Socrates and Archaia Paideia**

Socrates and his philosophy in general tend to be associated with the so-called new education and paideutical turn. The Socratic way of education reoriented the centre of education from *mimēsis* to *poiēsis* – education did not merely imply the mechanical transfer of the wisdom from ancestor to offspring, but emphasized elements of creativity and originality. This contribution is conceptually based on Marrou’s (*Histoire de l’Éducation dans l’Antiquité*) division of ancient education into *archaia paideia*, which is essentially identical with Homeric education and the new one, which is connected with Socratic way of education. The main purpose of this contribution is to analyse Socrates’s education in the Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* and to emphasize the continuity of seemingly “antithetical” paideutic ideals – e.g. Odysseus, Heracles vs. Socrates. This aim includes a comparative analysis of archaic education, based on the principle of imitation (*mimēsis*), with a new, Socratic type, based on critical and creative use of reason (*elenchus*). We will assume that the purpose of Xenophon’s *paideia* is to present Socrates as a new paideutic ideal that reconstructs selected aspects of archaic heroes associated with Homeric way of education. We focus on the first, the second and the fourth book of *Memorabilia*. 
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**Being and Beings: Ontological Explication and Systematic Comprehension**

Aristotle conceived ontology against the background of already existing special sciences. He conceives Being, the topic of ontology, through abstraction from kinds of beings, subject matters of special sciences. His ontology is meant to investigate what it is for anything to be rather than what it is for a thing to belong to a kind. But his reflective engagement in special sciences already involves an understanding that to be in the primary sense is to be a substance, an independent individual that can only have an attribute, never be an attribute of anything. Ascension of thinking to the maximally abstract conception of being does not find enlightenment about what it is for anything to be. The statement that to be is to be a substance or an attribute thereof can hardly express ontological wisdom. What Aristotle’s science of being qua being actually adds is an ontological hierarchy topped by God as pure actuality, unmoved mover, followed by beings that mix potentiality and actuality, and based on prime matter, pure potentiality, at the nadir. Aristotle’s ontology is properly described as a systematic comprehension of knowledge of the whole reality rather than as explication of what is contained in the general concept of being. Heidegger who claims to restore ontology to proper form from Aristotle’s alleged mishandling approaches ontology through an existential analytic, analysis of being human with the following rationale. Humans are special beings who desire to understand their own being, and such self-understanding presupposes an implicit understanding of Being. Existential analytic must thus provide a clue to the human meaning of Being. Being human, as understood in the authentic mode of existence, is being a temporally finite whole, with the present as the moment that connects the recalled past to the chosen future. Being that Heidegger pursues must be the transcendent being of the totality that transcends and comprehends the finite existential whole. Such a totality is an object of metaphysical speculation Heidegger can hardly venture into without transgressing his phenomenological scruples. Even if he were to find a promising path to transcendent metaphysics, it could only be one of alternative paths. The field of thinking resists final charting, especially given its horizontal expanse.
Metempsychōsis as Common Idea in Ancient Greek and India

Metempsychōsis, or transmigration of souls (psyche) was a doctrine in some pre philosophical traditions in Greece (Orphics) and part of teaching of some Greek philosophers (Phytagoreans, Empedocles, Plato). The term metempsychōsis is the best known from India as the doctrine of reincarnation, which forces us to compare the two doctrines, investigate possible connections and formative influences between the Greece and India. The doctrine of metempsychōsis in Greece and reincarnation in India, unlike earlier known similar ideas from shamanic and tribal traditions, share specific characteristic in details: the moral quality of past behavior determines the future rebirth of soul, the rebirth of soul in new body is not preferred and the final goal is in permanent and irretrievable exit from the wheel of further incarnation, liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth (lūsis in Greece and mokṣa in India). Anyway, in some points the two doctrines are only similar: cyclic time concept, understanding (the immortality) of soul as identical to immortality of universal and later exist from hilozoistic idea in Greece, belief in inner self (ātman) as a reflection of infinite consciousness or illusion of individuality (Jiva); and in some points are different: (in)ability to rejuvenate a reasonable soul in the animal body in Greece in the late learning phase. All of these similarities, and some differences, show that it is not possible to exclude formative influence of India teachings on Greek culture and philosophy.
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The Phenomenon of Following Rules and Some of its Problems  

In the Prolegomena to his Logische Untersuchungen Husserl argues that every normative science and, a fortiori, every normative rule presupposes a descriptive one, thus logic, as the science of meaning, should be based on or itself be conceived of as a descriptive science and meaning should be taken as a descriptive notion. On the other hand, Wilfrid Sellars relates linguistic meaning to the concept of rule-following and thus to a form of normativity, and simultaneously draws a distinction – relevant to the present topic - between ‗ought to be‘ type and ‗ought to do‘ type of rules.  

In this paper I first collate these seemingly different Sellarsian and Husserlian distinctions, then demonstrate how Sellars also recognizes some problems of normativity emphasized earlier by Husserl while making considerable efforts to avoid them (for instance, to alleviate the effects of the apparent circularity generated by his views). Sellars works out a conception that mediates between mere conforming to a rule and following a rule. By analyzing this distinction and Sellars‘ own mediating concept of ‘pattern governed behavior‘, which he worked out to solve the aforementioned problems, I finally address a problem which equally threatens the Husserlian and the Sellarsian conception of meaning.  

Through the discussion of the different approaches to the previously mentioned and seemingly different dichotomies (normative and descriptive, ‗ought to be‘ and ‗ought to do‘ rules, ‗conforming to‘ and ‗following‘ rules) the main purpose of my paper is to analyze the relationship between the concept of meaning and the acquisition of language, i.e. learning language games. With this I intend to demonstrate how and why the acquisition of language became the central problem for both the post-Husserlian phenomenology of language, and the post-Fregean and post-Russellian analytic philosophy of language in which Sellars is one of the most important figures.
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Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in Canada:  
Teaching Students and Medical Trainees about Relevant Ethical Concerns

In June 2016, Canada legalised voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide as “medical assistance in dying” (MAID) for certain kinds of adult patients under defined conditions. Very rapidly, processes were set up across the country to assess the eligibility of patients who request MAID. So far, over 3,700 Canadians have had their lives ended in this manner.

MAID is technically an easy procedure but there are many ethical issues that deserve close attention, such as: power balance between the patient and the MAID provider; consent; influence of external factors; monitoring and safety; providing access while protecting vulnerable people and communities; and freedom of conscience for medical practitioners and allied professions. The Canadian government is considering to expand the eligibility for MAID to include adolescents and children, persons who are not capable to decide but provided advanced directives, and persons suffering from mental illness alone. Each of those additional indications for MAID has its own set of additional ethical concerns.

Given these developments, it would seems desirable that all educational institutions provide their students at least a basic understanding of social and ethical issues involved in legalisation and delivery of assisted suicide and euthanasia. Those institutions providing education to health care professionals, especially to future physicians and nurses, need to give their graduates accurate and sophisticated understanding of this radical departure from traditional legal, social and medical standards concerning the protection of human lives. In jurisdictions with permissable legislation like Canada, these graduate will have to inform and search their conscience to decide to what degree they may get involved in the procedure that many consider incompatible with Hippocratic medical practice. Potential or actual legalisation of assisted suicide or euthanasia presents unescapable challenges not only to health care delivery but also to education system.
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Labour Exploitation:
A Left-Libertarian Analysis

Mainstream libertarians often deny or downplay the existence, and/or the wrongness, of forms of exploitation that do not involve the violation of libertarian rights. I defend an account of exploitation that identifies it as something libertarians *qua* libertarians have reason to condemn even when no libertarian rights are at stake. I also argue that particular exploiters (e.g., sweatshop owners) are culpable for such exploitation even when they make their workers better off, and even when they are not responsible for the background conditions that make their offers exploitative.
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Apologia of Kant

I would like to offer an “Apologia of Kant” in the context of the decolonial criticism to the western thought. Through this apologia I want to say mainly two things: Firstly, Kant as a philosopher has offered to the world an invaluable philosophical contribution and reflection on the human mind. Secondly, Kant solely in his Lectures on Anthropology shows himself as a man of his time. However, the Lectures on Anthropology were not written by him but by his students. That is why I would like to apologise his written legacy from three accusations: Sexism, racisms, and superiorization.

According to the first point, I would like to offer my reasons to consider Kant as an invaluable thinker. According to the second point, I would like to explain why the content of those Lectures lacks philosophical relevance, and it contradicts his own thought. However, even though the content of those Lectures can very questionably be attributed to Kant, certainly, that content reflects his reception. Therefore, Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology cannot be considered as a serious argument to disqualify his true written work and his name, but they can certainly be considered as a valid historical source to reflect on superiorization. Finally, I would like to argue that the decolonial objective must not necessarily aim towards the disqualification of the western philosophy, but rather this must aim towards its deconstruction, and towards the recognition of the other non-European epistemologies, which are enriched by a multiplicity of native approaches.
Liberal Justice

An important feature of contemporary liberalism is that as well as it focuses on ethical issues it has also absorbed the question of justice into its political philosophy. John Rawls introduced his concept of justice into its philosophy, upon which it became a significant part of liberal tradition. The most important contribution to Rawlsian ideas is the capability approach, as presented in the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, who made the problem of social justice the main topic of their research.

The theories of justice developed by Rawls, Sen and Nussbaum are examined in this paper. It sets itself the goal to perform a comparative analysis of these concepts and to demonstrate their mutual relationships. The analysis leads to the conclusion that they express more or less openly an attitude of political pragmatism. In addition, by taking into account issues which are neglected or insufficiently developed by Rawls, such as the quality of human life or the role of political emotions, the theories of Sen and Nussbaum make a new significant contribution to the political philosophy of liberalism. Finally, argumentation for the possibility of reaching a peaceful political arrangement on an international scale is presented. Here it is argued that this does not only require the adoption of rational criteria for a just international order, but also requires a political will to cooperate globally on the part of country leaders and their citizens. A necessary condition for this to happen is the existence of an ethical and emotional political culture in modern liberal democratic societies, based on a sense of human solidarity and justice.
Russell’s Theory of Proposition (1900–1919) in Relation to Pragmatism

1. The Problem

The conventional view has it that in 1905–1919 Russell was critical to Pragmatism. In particular, in three essays written in 1906–7, and published in Philosophical Essay, he criticized the Pragmatist theory of truth, emphasizing that truth is one, and is not relative to human practice. In fact, however, Russell was much more indebted to the pragmatists, in particular to William James. Above all, he borrowed from James’ The Principles of Psychology some of the concepts of his new epistemology. Such was the term sense-data, as well as the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (Milkov 2001).

In this paper, however, we are going to direct our attention to another concept Russell borrowed from James another concept: to his assumption that our access to is only realized through beliefs: We believe propositions.

In contrast to the concept of sense-data and to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, however, the understanding that we believe propositions—and not, for example, grasp them, or intellectually intuite them—was in tension with Russell’s extensional logic, expressed in the Principle of Extensionality. The latter maintains that “the truth or falsehood of any statement about a proposition \( p \) depends only upon the truth or falsehood of \( p \) and that the truth or falsehood of any statement involving a propositional function depends only upon the extension of the function” (Russell 1959: 87).

The point is that when we judge a mind-relation (for example, another belief), the latter is not a proposition, and so does not relate terms. Now, this point makes the whole system PM questionable.

2. Wittgenstein and Ramsey v-s Russell

The two most talented pupils of Russell—Wittgenstein and Ramsey—severely criticized the central place of propositional attitudes have in Russell’s epistemology.

(i) Wittgenstein analyzed ‘A believes that \( p' \) to ‘ \( "p" \) says \( p' \) (5.542). In this way, he eliminated Russell’s concept of belief from logic, thus rescuing the Principle of Extensionality.

(ii) Ramsey criticized Russell’s beliefs the other way round. He stressed on that belief is an ambiguous term, and can be interpreted differently.
It is, for instance, possible to say that a chicken believes a certain sort of caterpillar to be poisonous, and mean by that merely that it abstains from eating such caterpillars on account of unpleasant experience connected with them. (Ramsey 1927: 46)

Ramsey thus demonstrated that Russell’s theory of propositions is close to pragmatism.

3. Hermann Lotze

This implicit connection of Russell’s theory of propositions with the pragmatism had consequences with prime importance for the history of the 20th century analytic philosophy. Put in short, they look like this.

Some authors have recently pointed out that the dominance of the analytic philosophy in North that after the 1930s was not only connected with the influence of the logical positivists that emigrated there in the 1930 and 1940s. Rather, it is to be understood as a result of a long process of merging of the tradition of pragmatism with that of the logical positivism. That merge reached its symbolic apogee already in the mid-1930s, when Charles Morris delivered his paper “The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism” (1936) at the Prague World Congress of Philosophy, receiving a loud acclaim from Carnap (Dahms 1992: 240, 248).

Our contention is that this smooth merge between logical positivism and pragmatism was only possible because of the open possibility to interpret Russell’s theory of propositions in the sense of pragmatism—exactly like Ramsey did this in 1927.

But this is not the whole story. The truth is that, historically, Russell’s logical atomism and the pragmatism have the same roots—the German philosophy from 1870s. First of all, both pragmatism and Russell’s theory of proposition was based on the philosophical logic, which was the search for new logical forms, was launched above all by Hermann Lotze, as well as by some German Neo-Kantians, the purpose of (Milkov 2000). Secondly, the extensional moment in it, the belief, was also a Lotzean element in Russell’s philosophy (it penetrated in it through his teachers Ward, Bradley, W. James). (iii) Finally, the extensional element of pragmatism—belief that the meaning of “every theoretical judgement expressible in a sentence ... lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim” (Peirce)—was also set out in logic first by Lotze.
A Metaphysical and Epistemological Critique of Psychiatry

Current health care standards, in many countries, Australia included, are regrettably poor. Surprisingly, practitioners and treating teams alike in mental health and disability sectors, in particular, make far too many basic care-related mistakes, in addition to the already abundant diagnostic mistakes that cause and amplify great harm. In part, too many practitioners also fail to distinguish adverse effects for what they are and all too often treat adverse effects, instead, as comorbidities. Diagnostic failures are dangerous, the result of which generates and perpetuates harms that are extremely costly in terms of patient welfare, in addition to the financial burden placed on everyone. In this submission I contend that the authority bestowed upon psychiatry is misplaced. Subsequently, this misplaced authority affects the governing and investigatory institutions reliant and informed by psychiatry. The examination process undertaken in this investigation traces the metaphysics of psychiatric disorders relative to the Diagnostic-Statistical-Manual (DSM) in its iterations and to the epistemological construction process that serves to underpin the fundamentals of psychiatric practice. There exists a crisis of confidence in psychiatric practice and I urge drastic reform be undertaken to arrest the ongoing damage.
Kant and Moral Despair

John E. Hare has summed up the fundamental antinomy of practical reason as expressed by Kant in the joining together of two plausible assertions which appear to be contradictory. These two plausible but seemingly contradictory affirmations are that the highest good is possible and that the highest good is not possible. For Kant, the highest good is that virtue will bring about happiness. The sense of contradiction, then, is this tension: (1) that virtue will bring about happiness, for example, in the Golden Mean of ethics for Aristotle by which practical wisdom leads a person to balanced fulfillment of appetites through such wise virtues as courage, temperance, justice, and friendship but (2) in contrast, such virtues do not guarantee satisfaction of one’s desires because evil-doers can satisfy their appetites through evil habits which may likely crush the virtuous habits of good people. Kant’s solution to this contradiction between (1) and (2) is to make the postulate of practical reason that God exists as the supreme cause of nature and humanity such that God’s will ensures that virtue will cause happiness in the long run and that vice will not cause happiness in the long run.

In his book, Hare makes a defense of Kant’s purely rational argument for the categorical imperative, but Hare weakens his analysis by connecting Kant’s ethics of reason with moral faith, by admitting that ‘moral faith is consistent with some doubt about whether your continued well-being is consistent with your trying to live a morally good life. “Lord I believe; help thou mine unbelief” is a possible frame of mind. It is possible especially when... faced with a particularly glaring example of the suffering of the innocent and the triumph of the guilty.”

My paper will explore the strengths and weaknesses of both Kant’s argument for God and Hare’s argument for a moral order.
Adina Portaru  
Legal Counsel, ADF International, Belgium

The Need to Protect Freedom of Conscience of Medical Staff

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is a foundational human right, since without it no other human right can be fully enjoyed. Despite this, Europe has witnessed a deterioration of this freedom, highlighted by the fact that several EU member states do not fully guarantee freedom of conscience including the right to conscientious objection based on religious grounds.

In a number of European countries, staying true to deeply held moral beliefs may have severe consequences: dismissal from employment, financial penalties leading to bankruptcy, loss of reputation due to negative media coverage, permanent unemployment and social discrimination.

Many such conflicts are visible in the cases of midwives or nurses, who conscientiously object to life ending medical procedures, such as abortions or euthanasia. My presentation seeks to address the context in which staff working in the medical sphere are facing an insurmountable conflict: either violate their deeply held convictions and the moral code which says they cannot take life, or risk their livelihood and careers by staying true to them. Such situations represent a challenge for society, individual human rights and democracy.

Lastly, the presentation will show the need for the protection of conscientious objections – at the national, regional and international level.
Aristotle’s Appraisal of Epicharmus

If the origin of our actions, habits, and states were natural, the moral difference between good and evil would be lost. Both would be natural—that is, unchosen—results. Aristotle writes this in lines 1114a31 – 1114b25 of the Ethica Nicomachea. Yet it is also suggested here (and many passages before) that the source of ἕυδαιμων is not simply choice. The nature of a person is not changed by a whim, but is the result of habits. Further, those habits are not attained apart from society, as if they were natural cycles, nor are they merely chosen. Adding to the difficulty, Aristotle hesitates throughout these lines; it is not clear whether his rhetorical questions are resolved or left standing. Either way, active and passive dimensions are required for the emergence of virtue or vice.

To approach this question, I will examine two passages in which Aristotle cites and responds to lines attributed to Epicharmus (1113b14-15 & 1167b25-29). The word, πονηρὸς, appears both times. It is commonly translated by an overtly moral term, such as “wicked” or “bad”. But these choices miss how well the original Greek expresses the origin of a certain state (in this case, a negative one) by joining an active and a passive sense. Besides looking at Aristotle’s account of the origin of virtue, I will also consider whether the blind spot in πονηρὸς results from Aristotle’s appropriation or contemporary renderings. As some commentators believe, Aristotle may be putting the term to other uses—namely, as a reference to Plato—with Epicharmus’ lines serving as a front.
Mental Muscle and Action in Strength of Will

What is it to exercise strength of will? My aim in this talk is to answer this question by clarifying what genuinely qualifies as mental action, and what does not, in such exercise.

Building on the popular ‘mental muscle’ view, developed prominently by Holton (2009) and supported by psychologists’ ‘strength model’ of self-control (Baumeister, Vohs and Tice 2007), I contend that strength of will necessarily involves two key mental components.

The first is an agent’s practical commitment, a mental state analogous to a muscle in two respects: (i) in regular circumstances, it spontaneously (that is, involuntarily) exerts its normative powers and yields action, but (ii) it is undermined by the emergence of a strong resistive force – a temptation. The second component corresponds (to press the muscle analogy) to the voluntary and perhaps effortful use of the muscle: it consists in the agent’s actively controlling her psychological setup in order to rehabilitate her commitment’s motivational force in the face of the temptation.

Much philosophical ink has been spilled on whether intentional control over one’s mental states is possible and (if it is) how it is achieved. I set out to show that my dual model is consistent with two widespread assumptions on the matter: (i) one cannot intentionally form new mental states, but (ii) it is possible to intentionally bring it about that one entertains a previously entertained mental content (Strawson 2003; Mele 2009).

I assess the two possible forms that this control can take. Either it involves the agent’s performing some exclusively mental action(s) such as reasoning or directing her attention; or it involves what Hieronymi (2009) calls managerial control: the agent performs bodily actions, for instance closing her eyes or leaving the room, so as to modify the environment’s affordances in such a way as to ‘prime’ the conduct fitting her commitment.

Although I follow Vierkant (2013, 2014) in claiming that both forms of control constitute genuine exercises of strength of will, I reject his idea that managerial control of one’s mind through overt action amounts to the will extending into the environment. More importantly, I argue that the bulk of the motivation involved in exercises of strength of will is imported from the commitment formed by the agent prior to experiencing the temptation, rather than from the control which she exercises on the spot. This squares well with the intuition, borne out by Baumeister and colleagues’ empirical
research, that the mental muscle necessary for overcoming temptations must be built and trained before being efficiently put to work.
Alice Reininger
Independent Researcher, Austria

“Personae non Gratae” - The Successful Intervening of a Catholic State in the Papal Elections of 1903

Religion and politics had an eventful relationship with each other over the course of centuries in Europe. In the period after the Westfälischen Peace in 1648, Catholic rulers in Europe used their sovereignty to challenge the church and regarded their responsibility as a divine mandate. It was with this view that rulers justified the interference of the state into church matters.

In 1903 it was the Habsburger Franz Joseph I (1830-1916) who made use of the controversial right “ius exclusivae” to intervene in the elections of the new Pope. The “personae non gratae” against whom the veto was directed by state commissioned cardinals, was the favourite, Cardinal Rampolla. He was regarded as the “deadly enemy of Austria” and was also “no real friend of Germany who he rather feared and no less hated.” In 1888 as the first reports of Pope Leo XIII’s illness came filtering through, the accredited ambassadors in Rome began to show a strong interest in the future of the Vatican and the first alliances were forged.
G. Andrew Rembert  
Professor Emeritus, Washington & Jefferson College, USA

Socrates the Family Man:  
A Supplement to Plato’s Portrait of Socrates

Plato’s early dialogues are a vivid literary portrait of Socrates as a public figure, but Plato gave scant attention to Socrates as a family man, a husband and father. Moreover, Plato shows convincingly that Socrates was always in control of his emotions and never did anything except what he thought was right and best to do. But this makes it a mystery why Socrates married Xanthippe, a woman of generally quarrelsome disposition. Plato also says Socrates and Xanthippe had three children. I argue that this was not exactly true. I believe Xanthippe was a widow with a child from her first marriage, and that this child was adopted by Socrates when he married Xanthippe. They did have two children of their own some years later when Socrates was nearly 70 years old. But Plato’s portrait of Socrates gives no indication why Socrates thought that having these children so late in life was the right and best thing to do.

To supplement Plato’s pictures of Socrates, I offer my own speculations about why he married Xanthippe and why she married him. I also suggest why they had children of their own at a time when Socrates could not reasonably expect to see them grow into adulthood. I believe Socrates ultimately relied on his friends to take care of his family and educate his children after he was gone.
Φρόνησις: A Significant and Over-looked Dimension in Inter-religious Relations

The paper proposes the deployment of Φρόνησις [phronēsis] – whose semantic range traverses understanding, insight, practical wisdom, prudence, and even ‘mindfulness’ – as a hermeneutical lens through which to assess and even enhance inter-religious relations. The paper acknowledges: (a) the realities and challenges of understanding multiple religious traditions across sometimes daunting cultural and experiential boundaries; and that (b) there are those within, for example, the Christian, Hindu and Muslim (and other) communities who display indifference, reluctance or even opposition to intentional dialogue and cooperation across such religious divides. However, such conservatives deserve attention because of their numbers, activist inclinations and global influence, but they typically believe the practice of dialogue and even cooperation might or would compromise the faith that is central to their self-understanding. Nonetheless, implications of this Φρόνησις appear to challenge some of their central concerns and to point towards an alternative set of religio-theological starting points. In the presenter’s experience, persuasive reasons – including an appeal to the tangible virtues attached to Φρόνησις – can be advanced to help reluctant conservatives towards at least some forms of interfaith engagement. The semantic field occupied by Φρόνησις (and cognates) is traced from the Greek-Hellenistic world through to the Septuagint, Hellenistic Judaism and the New Testament. Drawing on his own exposure to global Hindu-Christian and Muslim-Christian encounter, the presenter then explores the positive and constructive consequences of an appeal to this Φρόνησις for the inter-religious praxis of Hindus, Muslims and Christians (and others):

- Φρόνησις and cognates offer pragmatic wisdom-driven reasons for dialogue (such as: enhanced understanding and the reduction of inter-communal tensions; the possibility of reciprocal anti-defamation; the promotion of communal harmony; joint responses to common social concern);
- Φρόνησις also further suggests some conditions for fruitful dialogue (acknowledgement of shared humanity and the ideal of community; sympathetic understanding of and openness to the other; the wisdom of the suspension of evaluative judgment; epistemic humility; patience with ambiguity including the tension between religious loyalty and empathetic openness to the other);
The appeal is further enhanced by a narrative dimension provided by notable exemplars of the virtues of Φρόνησις: in the case of Hinduism, Mahatma Gandhi; in both the Christian and Muslim traditions by Jesus / Īsā (given his extraordinary exemplary prominence in the Qur’ān).

The particular challenges of the fundamentalist and ideologically-driven exclusivist variants of Christianity, Hinduism and Islam are acknowledged and discussed. The paper concludes with a reminder and application of his findings to the presenter’s own religious tradition (Christianity): the way in which Φρόνησις and its cognates occurs some 45 times in behavioural, ethical and relational contexts in the New Testament, and helps counter the notion that inter-religious engagement necessarily compromises Christian faith; the way in which Jesus himself displays the virtues of Φρόνησις in his surprising openness to Gentiles, Samaritans, and other “outsiders,” and can act as an exemplar of the constructive and fruitful dialogue that is clearly needed in a painfully divided world.
Scott Rubarth  
Associate Professor, Rollins College, USA

Visual Perception in Ancient Stoic Philosophy

Winston Churchill reportedly said that history is written by the winners. This is never more true than in the history of philosophy where the survival of the primary documents is essential to the popularity or esteem that a philosophical position will likely hold in the future. In this paper I shall examine the Stoic theory of visual perception. The evidence for the Stoic position is fragmentary and sometimes inconsistent. And although most ancient Greek theories of perception seem odd or absurd to contemporary critics, the Stoic position seems exceptionally bizarre. According to the standard interpretation, we see an object when the pneuma from our soul strikes, via the eye, the external air between the subject and the object of perception. This generates a tensed cone of air that acts like a blind person’s staff and the visual information is stamped on the base of the cone, conveying the visual data back to the subject.

This theory not only seems odd and implausible to contemporary interpreters, it was at times ridiculed or dismissed by the ancients. The most direct and in-depth critique is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Mantissa. In this paper I shall offer an interpretation of the Stoic theory that is more philosophically plausible than that suggested by some of the sources — one that can respond to a number of Alexander’s criticisms. I shall argue that light must play a more active role in the Stoic theory than suggested and that ancient and contemporary criticism rest on this omission. I shall conclude by comparing the merits of the Stoic theory to Plato’s and Aristotle’s theory of vision.
Ontological Foundation of the Liberation Doctrine in 
Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra

The issue of liberation is a recurrent theme in all schools of Indian classical thought. In case of *advaita-vedānta* it is deeply rooted in ontology. The problem of ontological status of the world was the bone of contention for two competing non-dualist schools of *vedānta* – *vivaraṇa* and *bhāmati*. Maṇḍana’s *Brahmasiddhi* can be regarded as an important source of inspiration for the latter. The present paper is an analysis of Maṇḍana’s statements pertaining to the issue of *mukti* (or *mokṣa*) in contrast with those of Śankara, the exponent of *advaita* commonly (though erroneously) considered the creator and the most prominent representative of the school.
Wiesława Sajdek  
Professor, Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa, Poland

What Is ‘Knowledge’?  
Dialogic Quest for the Answer in Plato’s *Theaetetus*

The point of departure for the presentation is the dialogic character of the deliberation in *Theaetetus*. In accordance with his method, Socrates does not instruct young Theaetetus but asks him questions and expects him to answer correctly. It is Theaetetus’ replies that drive the conversation in the desired direction and determine its further course. Does it mean that truth ‘is being born’, as in the analogy suggested by Socrates? If the cognitive effort has essential impact on the quality and character of the cognition, then what kind of cognition does Socrates mean? Given the teachings of the most prominent sophists are discredited in the Plato’s dialogue, then what is the true knowledge?

Such questions concerning knowledge, wisdom and cognitive truth which also suggest themselves to the contemporary reader of the dialogue, have their significance nowadays. For the character of the questions is not exclusively connected with the historical reality of ca. 2500 years ago, or with the level of knowledge of those times, but they include an indispensable and universal philosophical dimension. The present paper is an attempt to find the right answers at various stages of the dialogue.

If the written wisdom is silent, if, as Plato suggests himself, books cannot answer the questions posed to them, then the dialogues, ‘written’ as they are, enable us to well-nigh stand in the very centre of the vivid action, to participate in the drama in which the actor is a thinking human being. The objective of thinking is knowledge. What is the knowledge then?
Tennyson Samraj
Professor, Burman University, Canada

The Concept of Multiple Realization and Phenomena of Emergence: The Possibility of Conscious Life beyond this Planet
Maja Schepelmann
Scientific Assistant, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Germany

Kant’s System of Metaphysics from a New Point of View

The whole works of Immanuel Kant are usually interpreted as a series of more or less independent writings, connected mainly by the idea that Kant stepwise was improving and developing his thinking. Consequently the whole conception of Kantian Metaphysics always seemed to be an aggregate of separate approaches, some of which were and are treated as really precious and adorable books while others felt into oblivion.

My new point of view now helps to tell a different story which is primarily the story of someone’s conceiving of a metaphysical system by ways of a sceptical method and a rhetorically stage-managed composition which quite clearly was targeted from the very beginning in the 1740’s. Of course not every detail of the later published writings and books was fixed in the beginning but the lines of arguing were that build a critical figure of a metaphysical whole that was surely planned as such and in which every writing has its own peculiar functionality that is determined by that very whole which means: by line and method of arguing.

Kant is in this perspective seen as a sceptical thinker who aims at teaching the reader thinking not Philosophy in the sense of a finished system, and who therefore discusses several problems taken from the history of Philosophy as well as from his contemporary debates by way of hypothetic arguments, by way of ironic and satiric presentation and a huge number of provocative passages that aim at irritating the readers’ expectations and pushing them into active arguing while reading.

Telling that very different story of Kant’s system leads to a re-estimation of everything that formerly was seen (and is seen until now) as a fault or error of Kant’s working.

Telling such a story makes it necessary to read (and re-read) all of Kant’s writings carefully and with attention towards any possible rhetoric way of treating a thought or a question.

Telling such a new story about Kant means also to take into account the many philosophical references - most of them quite allusive - that should be regarded as parts of a whole of a critical multi-front commentary that targets at almost every other philosophical author, more or less explicitly, to make clear that transcendental critical philosophy does in no way aim at partiality but at an independent test of argument from a superior point of view.

So this new point of view is a proposal of absolutely different presuppositions of interpretation and forms a new paradigm of understanding that is not compatible with the usual historical standpoint.
of explicating Kant’s own development. The genesis of the latter approach seems to root in the weak capacities of the 19th century that wasn’t able to find subtle irony or mockery in philosophical texts and that even wasn’t able to acknowledge the greatness of composers of the enlightenment’s century but tried to reduce everything and everyone towards being useful as an object of historicism.
Ananke was the primordial goddess (*protogenos*) of necessity, compulsion and inevitability. According to Parmenides Ananke is the goddess that bounds being, being according to Parmenides correspond to logic and therefore Ananke is also the archetype of logical necessity that leads to his radical metaphysical conclusion.

Plato adapted this enigmatic figure and molded her to some of his myths that portrayed his unique eschatological and physical worldview. Ananke plays a major role in Plato's myth of creation as the embodiment of matter. this status of Ananke gives a Platonic answer to the denial of the sensual world derived from Parmenides "way of truth".

By contrasting the role and characteristics of Ananke in Plato myth of creation to the position Parmenides gave Ananke in his worldview we would elucidate the transition between the figurative to the conceptual in Plato and Parmenides as divergent sides of an argument.
Jan Juhani Steinmann  
PhD Candidate, University of Vienna, Austria

**Hardship as Constitutive Principle of Subjectivity in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard**

In §354 of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche outlines a thought that is exceptional for his work. Under the title "The Genius of the Species" ("Vom Genius der Gattung") we read: "Consciousness is properly only a connecting network between man and man, - it is only as such that it has had to develop.” Furthermore, we also read there that in man consciousness “alone is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication”, due to need of "help" and "protection". In order to "express his distress, he had to know how to make himself be understood“. Consciousness therefore in the end went hand in hand with the development of language in order to create a "superficial and symbolic world" useful for us humans, but "relatively stupid". What Nietzsche presents to us here are the beginnings of a theory of the mind as a collective-human "connecting network" that is ultimately both held together and constituted by distress.

In Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*, on the other hand, we find a theory of the mind, which understands man as a "synthesis of the psychical and the physical" as well as “of the temporal and the eternal", which is determined in the "spirit" that sets this double synthesis in the first place. To this "spirit" man relates himself in the mode of "anxiety". It is an anxiety of the possibilities of freedom, namely to sin before God, i.e. to cooperate through sin in original sin (as the sum of all sins). But vice versa man also relates to himself as a spirit only through anxiety. Anxiety thus constitutes the human being as an individual in the spirit. Here Kierkegaard offers us a theory of the mind between the individual (sin) and the collective (original sin) in and constituted by anxiety.

If we connect both approaches, we state that they touch each other in a kind of collective intermediate field of split subjectivity on the one hand ("genius of the species") and of reconstituting subjectivity ("spirit as synthesis") on the other hand. This collective intermediate filed we can understand as hardship, condensing both “distress” and “anxiety”. The decisive question then is whether perhaps hardship could mutate into the representative dynamic of reconciliation of two supposedly incompatible traditions of naturalized or essentialist notions of mind, as we find them in the two authors.
Piers Stephens  
Associate Professor, University of Georgia, USA


I advance a four part argument relating of nature experience to human liberty. Firstly, I draw attention to two pre-modern traditions of thought in which direct experience of nature was associated with the stimulation, construction and defense of human liberty - agrarian thought and sylvan liberty - each of which connects to different concepts of human freedom and flourishing. Secondly I link these traditions to Bryan Norton’s work on sustainability and the preservation of options for human developmental growth, developing an argument as to how the transformative possibilities of nature experience may help defend the nonhuman world, connecting the continued existence and experience of nonhuman nature to a particular conception of human liberty. Thirdly, I then argue that space exists for an ontology of nature that avoids the excesses of man/nature dualisms on the one side and pure naturalism or social constructionism on the other, regarding naturalness as present in relative terms on a tripartite spectrum, and defined according to the extent that an item or area has not been transformed in accordance with certain historically specific, objectifying and anti-naturalistic types of human instrumental rationality. Finally, I argue that combining the liberty and ontology arguments demonstrates the worth of at least some ontological conceptions of nonhuman nature in the Anthropocene, and reaffirms linkage between nature experience and human liberty.
William Stephens  
Professor, Creighton University, USA

The Evils of Oysters and the Virtues of Vegetables:  
The Roman Stoics on Food

The four major Roman Stoics, Seneca the Younger, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, agree that how one obtains, prepares, serves, and shares food, what and how one eats, and how one understands food, reflect one’s virtue or vice. They all agree that the purpose of food is basic sustenance, not pleasure. They emphasize the necessity of frugality and temperance while denouncing extravagance and decadence. Seneca commends simple, inexpensive, unfussy, locally produced foods. He rejects seafood, luxurious delicacies, and exotic, imported foods. Seneca endorsed the arguments of Pythagoras and Sextius for vegetarianism that were presented by his teacher Sotion. But, despite the mental and physical benefits he gained from vegetarianism, Seneca gave it up upon his father’s request. Seneca judged that obedience to his father trumped the compelling philosophical arguments for abstaining from animals. Musonius advocates a frugal, lacto-vegetarian diet for a fit and healthy body. Meat, he contends, is more suitable for wild beasts than for humans. We’re worse than animals when it comes to food, because we embellish its appearance and fuss about what to eat and how to prepare it merely to amuse our palates. Epictetus advises strategic abstinence as a good way to discipline one’s desires. He urges eliminating all anxieties about food. Unlike his teacher Musonius, Epictetus does not advocate vegetarianism. He believes that God created some animals to be eaten, others to be used in farming, and others to supply us with cheese. Thus, Epictetus thinks a Stoic ought never to worry about food or its absence but need not avoid meat or dairy products. Marcus thinks that to glorify and crave fancy roasts and pricey wine is delusional, because it fails to recognize them as corpses and grape juice. Thus, Marcus argues that it is foolish to gourmandize meat and wine.
Michael Strawser  
Professor & Chair of Philosophy Department, University of Central Florida, USA

Levinas and the Spinoza Question

A glance at the philosophies of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), although separated by three centuries, would appear to show that they share a profound connection, in so far as each Jewish thinker emphasizes the central importance of ethics in philosophy and presents us with a radical and non-theological account. Upon closer inspection, however, one finds that Levinas considers his work to be in stark contrast to Spinoza, as he writes at the end of Section I in Totality and Infinity, “Thought and freedom some to us from separation and from the consideration of the Other—this thesis is at the antipodes of Spinozism.” Levinas thus develops a phenomenological approach to ethics that is grounded in the transcendence of the other, whereas he understands Spinoza as the great philosopher of immanence who reduces us all to the same. This opposition is further extended in Out of Control: Confrontations between Spinoza and Levinas (2016), where according to Richard Cohen, Levinas presents us with a radical phenomenologically grounded ethics, whereas Spinoza expresses a dehumanizing rationalism and philosophy of science. But are Spinoza and Levinas strictly antithetical thinkers? Why does Levinas appear to join in the rather long history of the Jewish hatred of Spinoza? Is a more constructive appraisal of the relationship between their ethics possible? These are the questions I shall attempt to address in my paper, and I shall offer a corrective to the exaggerated and inadequate account of Spinoza as a hyper-rationalist by maintaining that a more complete account of Spinoza’s philosophy involving the active ethical emotions of love and nobility brings our thinkers closer together. Rather than calling for a refutation, I shall offer a reading in which a more productive dialogue aiming at the ethical life and the practice of joining with others is paramount.
Kronecker, Einstein and the Cross

Two eminent scientists, the German mathematician Leopold Kronecker, and the German-born theoretical physicist Albert Einstein, made comments in which they refer to God in their respective rebuttals of the theory of transcendental and transfinite numbers and of the consequences of quantum theory. The apparent contradiction between the objective activity of science and the subjective experience of faith has been the subject of numerous commentaries over the centuries by scientists and philosophers, and a source of inspiration to many artists. In this paper, I present a brief review of this science vs. God dichotomy, starting with Voltaire’s “God the watchmaker”. I then describe my two recent artworks, *The Necessity of Chance* and *The Work of Man*, inspired by Kronecker’s and Einstein’s statements. Finally, I explain why I, an atheist, chose the Christian cross as symbol for these artworks.
Nguyen Ba Trinh
Professor, Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, Vietnam

Convergence Philosophy

In human history, there are too many battles, it is difficult to list fully. Entering the century XX- XXI, wars continued at different scales. Besides, there is also the division of the nation, the disintegration of the social system ... Is it possible, the world will be divided and increasingly distant each other? So far, still no theory has answered that question. Perhaps the main reason is not found a theoretical basis, or a thinking model.

As is known, in nature and human society, there are often common or similar laws, such as law of yin and yang, the dialectic law, the law of cause and effect... However, human society is a very complex system. Therefore, sociologists often take ideas from natural science as a scientific basis and research model. This method has been used by René Descartes, Herbert Spencer, Kenneth D. Bailey, Talcott Parson, Niklas Luhmann, Erich Jantsh, Peter Grimes...

We studied the change of biochemical molecules according to the degree of biological evolution. The results show that types: DNA, enzymes, collagen, reserve protein, reserve lipid, tend to increase a level of condensation in biological evolution. Not only in biological evolution, but also on the scale of the universe, matter has evolved in condensation trend. Thanks to that trend, the first stars are formed, followed by galaxies, black holes and heavy chemical elements ... Condensation trends also exist in the water environment on Earth and lead to life formation.

The material condensation model above was used by us to consider the evolutionary trend of human society. The fact that human society also evolved along the trend of convergence like the trend of condensation in the material world. In the prehistoric times, people lived scatteredly in groups, and later formed clans. From the clans the convergence lead into forming the tribes, from the tribe lead into forming the tribal alliances and emirates, then nation. Entering the era of civilization, the speed of convergence is increasing, it manifests itself through the convergence of urbanization and formation of national blocks, such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and many another forms to link countries with the different goals. Consequently, convergence is a general law of evolution in nature and in society.

Asymmetry and defects in each natural and social system are the cause of convergence to perfect each other. The convergence in society is expressed not only by the association of organizations in a country, through connections between countries, through the process of urbanization, but also expressed through the converging the ideologies of different countries on political and economic institutions, to reach
similarities. Currently mankind are faced with many challenges, such as environmental issues, terrorism ... Therefore, social convergence is not only a law but also an urgent need.
Johan A Van Rooyen  
Associate Researcher, University of Pretoria, South Africa

**Why Religious Human Beings Need Evolutionary Epistemology! A Theological and Evolutionary Viewpoint of ‘Why Humans Need to Embrace Evolutionary Epistemology**

I put forward an understanding of evolutionary epistemology that rescues something of the old and venerable idea of freedom, and it means that we as theologians should grasp our very nature realistically, beyond any illusionism and utopian dreams. The author feels that scholars, especially theologians, should firstly take evolution seriously and secondly regard evolutionary epistemology as important as evolution itself, the reason being theologians should know that it is of paramount importance for their systematic-theological intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications, which is embarking on a way of thinking that regards evolutionary epistemology as a friend in their accommodation of their respective theological fields of interest. This accommodation is substantial as it will enhance their respective theological disciplines as ‘an exhilarating vision of God’. Evolutionary epistemology takes a pragmatic view of humans. Evolutionary epistemologists question how humans really behave and what the true origin of their behaviour is. In contrast to this programme, many conceptions of humans are based on an idealisation of our species.

**Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications:** Evolutionary epistemology takes a pragmatic view of humans. Evolutionary epistemologists question how humans really behave and what the true origin of their behaviour is. In contrast to this programme, many conceptions of humans are based on an idealisation of our species. I then put forward my own understanding of evolutionary epistemology and conclude that evolutionary epistemology rescues something of the old and venerable idea of freedom, and it means that we should grasp our very nature realistically, beyond any illusionism and utopian dreams.
Ana Maria Vicuna
Adjunct Associate Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile

Philosophical Dialogue and Socratic Inquiry in Philosophy for Children

The purpose of this communication is to reflect about the role of philosophical dialogue, as practiced by Socrates and his disciples in fifth century Athens, in education for democracy in our time. The interest stems from the author’s experience of several years working in Philosophy for Children in Chile.

According to Matthew Lipman (1990), creator of the Philosophy for Children program, doing philosophy with children following Socrates’ model, helps develop thinking skills, autonomous thinking and “caring thinking”. This is because philosophical thinking works through the practice of philosophical dialogue, which requires openness to evidence and reason, respect for procedural norms such as listening with respect, going to the point, examining different perspectives, and the like. In other words, the method for developing thinking skills is inherent in philosophy itself. Moreover, practicing philosophy in this way implies practicing democracy. No one is the owner of truth, all opinions are subject to questioning, reason prevails over individual or group power and the whole endeavor is concerned with learning. It aims at getting a better understanding of a given problem in the interest of all involved and not at winning an argument or defeating an opponent.

A research conducted by the author with disadvantaged children in Chile showed that doing philosophy with elementary school children develops democratic attitudes and behavior (Vicuña & López, 1994). This communication explores further the advantages of philosophical dialogue for the education for democracy, reflecting on some central features of Socratic questioning, as presented on Plato’s early dialogues, and ancient Greek democracy. It also explores some ethical presuppositions for democratic life and the foundations of an education for universal mutual respect in our time, using Socrates as model of intellectual honesty and Socratic method of self-examination as a guide for democratic behavior.
Andrew Ward  
Lecturer, University of York, UK

**Had Parfit Refuted Kant’s Account of the Freedom Required for Moral Responsibility?**

In the chapter entitled ‘Free Will and Desert’ of his *On What Matters* (Volume I, Chapter 11), Derek Parfit launches two separate attacks on Kant’s account of the freedom required for moral responsibility: what Kant calls ‘transcendental freedom’. In his first attack, Parfit claims that Kant displays both muddle and straightforward error in supposing that the compatibilist’s, hypothetical, sense of ‘could have done otherwise’ is not sufficient for capturing the freedom required for moral responsibility. In his second attack, Parfit contends that, even if (a) transcendental freedom is a requirement of moral responsibility and (b) the phenomena/noumena distinction is acceptable, Kant’s own account of transcendental freedom is demonstrably inconceivable. I argue that neither of Parfit’s attacks justifies his dismissal of Kant’s account of the freedom required for moral responsibility and desert.
Joel Wilcox  
Professor, Barry University, USA

Four Objections to Essentialism, and why they Matter

Essentialism is the idea, deeply ingrained in western thought, that existing things of a given kind share a set of common characteristics that both constitute their “core reality” and distinguish them robustly from other kinds of things.

However, though it is very useful as a heuristic fiction, essentialism cannot be true, for four reasons: (1) Essences do not change, while things in space and time do change, which entails a Cartesian-type interaction problem. (2) If essences exist (and can be known), then any knowable kind of thing can be defined precisely; but that is not the case. (3) If essences exist, then a given object O can be physically separated from everything that is non-O, leaving O intact; but this cannot be done. (4) The idea of essence conflicts with evolution, which is surely true in some form.

Anti-essentialism matters because giving up the habit of thinking in terms of essences would be enormously beneficial for human beings, in two primary ways. One is that it would be much harder, or impossible, for humans to demonize other humans, whether within a culture or across cultures. The other is that it would be impossible for humans to distinguish themselves sharply from nature, thus eliminating a false dichotomy that is at the root of our various environmental crises.
Yi Wu  
Independent Researcher, The New School for Social Research, New York, USA  

**Philosophy as Memory Theatre:**  
**Plato's Odyssey**  

Contrary to its self-proclamation, philosophy started not with wonder, but with time thrown out of joint. It started when the past has become a problem, an impasse. Such was the historical situation facing Athens when Plato composed his Socratic dialogues. For the philosopher of fifth century BCE, both the immediate past and the past as the Homeric tradition handed down to the citizens had been turned into problematicity itself. In my presentation, I will examine the use of philosophy as memory theatre in Plato's Republic. I shall do so by interpreting Book X of The Republic as Plato's "odyssey" and argue that such Platonic odyssey amounts to an attempt to re-inherit the collapsed spatial order of the fallen Athenian maritime empire. In my reading, the Odysseus in the Myth of Er comes forth for Plato as the exemplary Soldier-Citizen-Philosopher who must steer between the Scylla of ossified political principles (arche) and the swirling nihilism of devalued historical values, personified by Charybdis. I shall further argue that Plato’s memory theatre also constitutes a device of amnesia and forgetting. The post-Iliadic Odysseus must drink of forgetfulness from Lethe, so that the revenant soldier, Er, and those who inherited the broken historical present during and after the Peloponnesian War, would be enabled to remember in a particular way. Such remembrance, I shall conclude, Plato means by philosophy, a specific form of memory theatre whose difference from the contemporaneous institution of tragedies and comedies is not as great as it would like us to think, and that for important reasons.
Danielle Wylie  
Assistant Professor, Mississippi State University, USA

**You Knew the Risks:**  
**A Puzzle for Moral Responsibility**

When 3-year-old Madeline McCann disappeared in 2007, many responded with outrage toward the parents who left her unattended in their vacation apartment. In arguments about the permissibility of abortion, a common refrain is that pregnant women must “take responsibility for the consequences of their actions,” even if they used birth control to prevent such consequences.

In these cases and many others like them, people seem to have in mind what I’ll call the Principle of Responsibility for Risk: if you perform an action with a foreseen risk of bad consequences, then if those bad consequences arise, you are responsible for them.

However, many ordinary intuitions about responsibility do not fit this principle. For instance, driving to a restaurant for dinner has the risk of causing a car accident that may harm someone. And yet, when such accidents occur, we do not blame people merely for driving unnecessarily. (We do sometimes assign an obligation to pay for the damage to the party who is causally responsible, but this obligation is relatively limited.)

What feature(s) of cases determine whether we assign blame or responsibility in the event of a risk gone wrong? In this presentation, I will first flesh out a variety of cases that bring out the puzzle that I describe above. I will then argue that some obvious features, such as a high probability of harm or the seriousness of the possible harm, do not fully account for our intuitions.

After surveying some options, I will argue that some of our most puzzling inconsistencies can be attributed to judgments about the morality of the initial risky action itself, independent of the consequences of that action. I will then apply this insight to cases (including abortion, rape, and negligence) in order to show its plausibility.
Luyan Xie
Professor, Harbin Engineering University, China

The Course and Enlightenment of Ecological Civilization Construction since the Reform and Opening-up in China
Wei Yang  
Professor, Hainan Normal University, China

The Ecological Wisdom of Confucian Harmonious Thoughts and its Enlightenment for the Construction of Modern Ecological Civilization
Nikolaj Zunic  
Professor, St. Jerome’s University, Canada

**Knowing What One Does Not Know:**  
Unravelling an Epistemological Conundrum

The topic of my paper is the epistemological problem of having knowledge of what one does not know, a problem that has bedeviled philosophers since Plato. How is it possible to know what one does not know? A simplistic and naïve approach to this problem regards it as sheer sophistry, but a sophisticated insight sees it as one of the deepest questions of philosophy. The paper is inspired by the work of the psychiatrist and philosopher Dr. Iain McGilchrist in his book, *The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World* (2009), where he presents an erudite theory of the relationship of the two hemispheres of the brain. McGilchrist argues that the brain’s left hemisphere does not know what it does not know, which is the reason why the right hemisphere, which bestows a holistic context, is needed to cooperate and guide. An important claim made by McGilchrist is that modernity is marked by a pronounced tendency to emphasize left-hemispheric thinking which leads our civilization into a self-induced condition of ignorance, namely, not knowing what one does not know. Although I am very sympathetic with Dr. McGilchrist’s assessment, I believe that the language he uses to describe the two hemispheres of the brain and their operations suffers from the Mereological Fallacy, an error in neuroscientific theories identified by P. M. S. Hacker and M. R. Bennett, which ascribes agency to material parts of the person as opposed to the whole person as such.

The trajectory of the paper begins with an overview of the main problem at hand, particularly in the manner in which Dr. McGilchrist identifies it. I then discuss some famous examples of how this conundrum has been dealt with by some key philosophers: Plato’s doctrine of recollection in the dialogue *Meno*; Aristotle’s claim that the soul is all existing things in *On the Soul*; and Martin Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein in terms of a pre-ontological comprehension of Being. I contrast these philosophies with that of René Descartes’ pursuit of certainty in his *Meditations of First Philosophy*, which occasions the modern turn away from “non-knowing knowing” and the immersion into a seemingly insuperable ignorance of what one does not know. I end the paper by rejoining my initial treatment of Dr. McGilchrist’s views by pointing out how his own theories can be improved by including a metaphysical perspective which understands thinking as the act of the entire soul or person, not merely the material brain.