

2016

Philosophy Abstracts

Eleventh Annual International
Conference on Philosophy
23-26 May 2016, Athens, Greece

Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos

THE ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH



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11th Annual International
Conference on Philosophy
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Preface

This abstract book includes all the abstracts of the papers presented at the *11th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 23-26 May 2016*, organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. In total there were 32 papers and 33 presenters, coming from 15 different countries (Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Iceland, India, Iran, Italy, Poland, Russia, UK and USA). The conference was organized into eleven sessions that included areas of Philosophy. As it is the publication policy of the Institute, the papers presented in this conference will be considered for publication in one of the books and/or journals of ATINER.

The Institute was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet in Athens and exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study. Our mission is to make ATHENS a place where academics and researchers from all over the world meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. To serve this purpose, conferences are organized along the lines of well established and well defined scientific disciplines. In addition, interdisciplinary conferences are also organized because they serve the mission statement of the Institute. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 150 international conferences and has published over 100 books. Academically, the Institute is organized into four research divisions and nineteen research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committee and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference together.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President

FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM
11th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 23-26 May 2016,
Athens, Greece

PROGRAM

Conference Venue: [Titania Hotel](#), 52 Panepistimiou Street, 10678 Athens,
Greece

Monday 23 May 2016

(all sessions include 10 minutes break)

08:00-08:30 Registration and Refreshments

08:30-09:00 Welcome & Opening Address (ROOM A)

- Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
- George Poulos, Vice-President of Research, ATINER & Emeritus Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.

09:00-10:30 Session I (ROOM C)

Chair: Dr. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

1. Gary Fuller, Professor, Central Michigan University, USA. Barry Loewer on Free Will and Indeterminism.
2. *William O'Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA. Karl Marx on Determinism and Freedom.
3. Yulan Liu, Associate Professor, Northeast Normal University, China. Marx's Concept of Freedom and its Post-Metaphysical Implication.

10:30-12:00 Session II (ROOM C)

Chair: Gary Fuller, Professor, Central Michigan University, USA.

1. Barbara Botter, Professor, UFES - Federal University of Espírito Santo, Brazil. The Honeyed Muse (hedusmenen Mousan) of Tragedy and the Platonic Dialogs.
2. Alexey Lyzlov, Associate Professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia. M. Heidegger and S. Kierkegaard on Ancient Greeks' Religiosity: Accordance and Difference of their Views (*Sponsored by RFH. Project № 16-06-00995a*).
3. Seyed Amir Reza Mazari, Ph.D. Candidate, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Iran. Approaches to Philosophical Hermeneutics (A Comparative Study: Paul Ricœur's Self-hermeneutics Versus Henry Corbin's Ascendental Hermeneutics).

12:00-13:30 Session III (ROOM C)	12:00-13:30 Session IV (ROOM D)
<p>Chair: *William O'Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA.</p>	<p>Chair: *Anna Olejarczyk, Assistant Professor, The University of Wroclaw, Poland.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. *Fengqing Zhu, Associate Professor, Harbin Institute of Technology, China. Patients' Responsibilities in Medical Ethics. 2. Yongsheng Shao, Associate Professor, Southeast University, China. Analysis of Situation Ethics in China Health Care Reform. 3. *Atli Hardarson, Lecturer, University of Iceland, Iceland. Rational Self-Control. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. *Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA. Global Ethics. 2. Andrew Alwood, Assistant Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA. Radical Moral Disagreement. 3. Krystof Bohacek, Researcher, The Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic. The Selective Use of the Figure of Friendship in Plato.

13:30-14:30 Lunch

14:30-16:00 Session V (ROOM C)
<p>Chair: *Fengqing Zhu, Associate Professor, Harbin Institute of Technology, China.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Andre Gallois, Professor, Syracuse University, USA. Willing Belief. 2. Mohamed Almisbkawy, Assistant Professor, Fayoum University & British University in Egypt, Egypt. Moral Foundations of Logic and their Impact in Development of Logic. 3. Saly Da Silva Wellausen, Researcher, University of São Paulo, Brazil. The Ion Tragedy of Euripides Revisited by Michel Foucault.

16:00-17:30 Session VI (ROOM C)
<p>Chair: *Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peter Vranas, Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. Informative Aboutness. 2. Bettina Mueller, Postgraduate Student, Germany. Accord, Agreement and Consistence in the Philosophical Investigations.

17:30-19:00 Session VII (ROOM C)
<p>Chair: Andre Gallois, Professor, Syracuse University, USA.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jaroslav Danes, Associate Professor, University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic. Euripides and the Theory of War. 2. Miguel Lopez-Astorga, Associate Professor, University of Talca, Chile. Chrysippus' Logic and Wason's Selection Task. 3. Robin Ward, Independent Researcher, University of Oxford, U.K. Parmenides - The Father of Quantum Mechanics.

21:00-23:00 Greek Night and Dinner (Details during registration)

Tuesday 24 May 2016

08:00-09:30 Session VIII (ROOM C)

Chair: Gary Fuller, Professor, Central Michigan University, USA.

1. Frederick Adams, Professor, University of Delaware, USA. More Non-Counterexamples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge.
2. Joshua Halberstam, Professor, City University of New York, USA. With All due Epistemic Humility.
3. *Penny Weiss, Professor, Saint Louis University, USA. Epistemic Injustice and the Everyday Silencing of Children.

09:30-11:00 Session IX (ROOM C)

Chair: *Penny Weiss, Professor, Saint Louis University, USA.

1. Simon Glynn, Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA. Phenomenological Consciousness and its Implications.
2. Joel Wilcox, Professor, Barry University, USA. Aristotle on Painting.
3. Divya Menon, Ph.D. Candidate, Stony Brook University, USA. On the Critical Dimensions of Marxian Political Economy.

11:00-14:00 Educational and Cultural Urban Walk Around Modern and Ancient Athens (Details during registration)

14:00-15:00 Lunch

15:00-16:30 Session X (ROOM C)

Chair: Simon Glynn, Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA.

1. Sandra Fairbanks, Professor, Barry University, USA. Technology: A Challenge to Moral Development.
2. Elena Lepekhova, Senior Research Officer, Institute of Oriental of the Studies Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia & Sergey Lepekhov, Professor and Deputy Director of the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia. The Religious Bureaucracy on the Far East: The Problems of Genesis.

16:30-19:00 Session XI (ROOM C)

Chair: Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

1. Barbara Lekatsas, Professor, Hofstra University, USA. Freud and Aristotle Read Sophocles' *Oedipus*: The Dramatic and Philosophical Roots of Psychoanalysis.
2. *Anna Olejarczyk, Assistant Professor, The University of Wroclaw, Poland. Socrates - Plato - Aristotle. *Phronēsis* in Greek Theory of Language and Communicative Acts. The Classical Period.
3. Diego Azevedo Leite, Ph.D. Student, University of Trento, Italy & Sara Dellantonio,

Ph.D., University of Trento, Italy. Strong Emergentism and Its Implications for Cognitive Neuroscience.

4. *Alejandro Farieta, Assistant Professor, Agustinian University, Colombia. Aristotle on the Normative Role of Practical Syllogism.

21:00-22:30 Dinner (Details during registration)

Wednesday 25 May 2016
Cruise: (Details during registration)

Thursday 26 May 2016
Delphi Visit: (Details during registration)

Frederick Adams

Professor, University of Delaware, USA

More Non-Counterexamples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge?

In 2004 in "Resurrecting the Tracking Theories" Adams & Clarke explained why a host of putative counterexamples to tracking theories of knowledge (including Kripke's) weren't counterexamples. Recently a spate of new examples by Haze, Williams & Sinhababu also purport to be counterexamples, but aren't. In this paper I give the examples, explain how they are supposed to be counterexamples, and why they aren't counterexamples.

Mohamed Almisbkawy

Assistant Professor, Fayoum University & British University in Egypt,
Egypt

Moral Foundations of Logic and their Impact in Development of Logic

Moral foundations of logic and their impact in development of logic in his famous distinction between "ought" and "is", Hume has argued that we cannot deduce what an "ought" from what an "Is". Whereas the descriptive statements about what "is" have their truth-values, the normative statements about what "ought to be" don't have such truth-values. This approach has reached its peak in logical positivism's firm distinction between meaningful and meaningless proposition. However the tradition western ontology has strongly been associated to classic logic, such relationship which makes an "is" statement attached in principle to logic, namely, to truth-values. Thus the previous distinction between "Is" and "ought" could be interpreted, from this perspective, as firm distinction between logic and its underlying ontological theory from one hand and the moral on the other.

The aim of this paper is to show that logical concepts are originally founded upon ethical principles and also to reveal to what extent such lurking moral foundation has created subtle obstacles to the development of logic and its underling ontological theory in terms of surpassing classic ontology and surpassing classic logic into non-standard logic.

Andrew Alwood

Assistant Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA

Radical Moral Disagreement

A situation exemplifies *Radical Moral Disagreement (RMD)* when the disagreeing parties have basic values and precepts that are disjoint. They cannot resolve their dispute by coming to agree on non-moral factual matters, because they fail to share common ground. This situation is surely possible, although many actual moral disputes are based upon factual disagreements such as 'Who did what?' and 'Does God exist?'.

RMD has been thought to support the theory of Expressivists (e.g, Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn, Gibbard), who reject moral objectivity and descriptive/cognitive theories of moral judgment. Yet recently this support has been undermined by alternative explanations of what RMD amounts to.

I will criticize recent proposals on which the parties to a moral disagreement can each speak truly, talk past one another, and yet still persist in genuine moral disagreement on account of their pragmatic adoption of ways of speaking, what Plunkett and Sundell call 'metalinguistic negotiations'.

Diego Azevedo Leite

Ph.D. Student, University of Trento, Italy

&

Sara Dellantonio

Ph.D., University of Trento, Italy

Strong Emergentism and Its Implications for Cognitive Neuroscience

Human cognition (or, more traditionally, human mind) has been considered since long time one of the most intriguing aspects of our reality, as well as one of the most exciting and interesting objects of scientific and philosophical investigations. One of the main difficulties in inquire about this phenomena, though, has been to present a complete explanation of its relationship with the human brain. However, many developments in natural sciences in the last century together with improvements in techniques and methodologies for brain research led to a great deal of optimism and enthusiasm about the possibility of a clear understanding of the relationship between brain and cognition. Many authors believed we were really close to finally understand how the brain "gives rise" to all cognitive states and processes. The subject remains in the present, nevertheless, one of the most difficult in science and philosophy. In this paper, firstly, we will show that one of the leading cognitive neuroscientists of the actuality, Michael Gazzaniga (2012, 2015), disagrees with a neurobiological reductionist explanation of mental phenomena and suggests a view called "strong emergentism". We will argue, then, that this view presents some positive aspects for research in brain and cognition (for example, it permits to consider neural states and mental states arguably in two radically different levels of inquire, one lower and other higher; thus, neurobiological reduction of mental states is avoided). Moreover, we argue that this view has also some important implications for the very work of Gazzaniga, as well as for the work of cognitive neuroscientists that accept this theoretical framework (the mainly implications concern the possibility and nature of a scientific explanation of the relationship between both phenomena; the attribution of mental states to the brain, parts of the brain, neurons or neural patterns of connectivity; and the possibility of downward causation of mental states on its neural basis).

Krystof Bohacek

Researcher, The Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the
Czech Republic, Czech Republic

The Selective Use of the Figure of Friendship in Plato

It is widely accepted, that in ancient Greece, friendship was a firmly established, well developed institution with sophisticated structure including levels of friends. My paper will focus on this topic in the field of Plato's dialogue, ie. the sophisticated text of many levels. I will show, that different ways, how Socrates addresses his interlocutors, should be read as a key for identification of the target audience for each particular passage. I suggest, that the figure of a "friend" serves as a tool for selection between levels of differently advanced readers in each particular passage. The occurrence of such selective use of "friendship" in various dialogues may also be used by the interpreter as one from a set of formal signs for the division of dialogues into the groups of early, transitive, middle.

Barbara Botter

Professor, UFES – Federal University of Espírito Santo, Brazil

The Honeyed Muse (hedusmenen Mousan) of Tragedy and the Platonic Dialogs

Several studies have thrown light over Plato's rejection of poetry in the *Republic*, although they have remarked, at the same time, the dramatic versatility the Platonic works manifest.

There are important reasons that justify Plato's critique to poets and tragedians. The most important are the morally degraded value that traditional poetry disseminates in the city, the pleasure the theatre affords, and the psychological identification it instills in audience's soul. Moreover, Plato regarded poetry as a kind of mimetic art and worried about the life-changing powers of *mimesis*, i.e. the skill of the imitative art to shaping the minds of listeners. Plato is fascinated and frightened by the transformative powers of poetry.

At first sight, the philosopher recommends a calm and wise kind of poetry for his pedagogical purposes and condemns all kind of poetry that fails to encourage an austere respect for the moral truth. Nevertheless, this kind of poetry could be boring, difficult to represent and, when represented, readily misunderstood. Finally, Plato is forced to recognize the inescapable charm of poetry and to admit that the pleasures of poetry cannot be simply dispensed.

In my paper I'll discuss the following two points: the kind of pleasure and the psychological identification the poetry, particularly the tragedy, instills in the public, and the reform of dramatic style established by the philosopher in order to turn the poetry into a useful practice.

Saly Da Silva Wellausen
Researcher, University of São Paulo, Brazil

The Ion Tragedy of Euripides Revisited by Michel Foucault

Foucault studied several areas of human sciences, as madness, disease, crime and sexuality, always having concern with the issue of truth. In archeology, Foucault analyzes the enunciation of discourses, rules of training and its relations with the discursive practices of an era. In genealogy, he resumes the analysis of games that work on the legitimacy of the strategies and practices of power. In subjectivity, our author analyzes how the enunciation games and power devices operating in the production of the subject and how these games historically unfold in the practices themselves. The final Foucault studies the constitution of the ethical subject, making it possible to link between the production of truth and modes of subjectivity. The truth for Foucault does not have a univocal meaning is rather a historical game. Foucault is included in the Kantian tradition of critical concept in regard to the ethical dimension of Aufklärung, away from the transcendental dimension of the subject. For Foucault, the true discourse on the individual is inseparable mechanisms contingent of power and certain subjection. Philosophy means the strategy that articulates truth, power and ethical subject, an immanent process. The truth games are inseparable from power and subjectivity production devices. The production of truth takes on the ethical dimension of courage to say true. Foucault studies the Ion tragedy of Euripides as a story of truth, ethical subject who has the courage to tell the truth to those who have a power greater than his. It is the story of Ion, a young servant in the temple of Apollo that seeks to know who their parents are. The account of this search involves half-truths and half-lies told by characters. The plot involves issues such as autochthony, citizenship, power relations, ethics, truth, gods, and humans, to complete with the truth that illuminates the facts.

Jaroslav Danes

Associate Professor, University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic

Euripides and the Theory of War

Euripides' play (The Suppliant Women, Heraclidae, Erechtheus, Hecuba, The Trojan Women) contain a lot of political and social theorising and issues. The present proposal aims at a critical reassessment of several political issues: war, justice, constitutional debates, civic education, customs, laws, and order. The focus will be especially on a cluster of questions pertaining to war. 1. Did Euripides differentiate between just and unjust wars and, if so, what kind of war is presented as just or unjust? 2. If he differentiated between these two kinds of wars, what concept of justice was it? Was war an instrument of divine or human justice or both? 3. Was war represented as an instrument of realistic foreign policy or *raison d'état*? 4. Was war also a constitutional issue for him? 5. How was the democratic order and the concept of education presented in relation to war?

Sandra Fairbanks
Professor, Barry University, USA

Technology: A Challenge to Moral Development

A prominent feature of contemporary culture in affluent countries is its wholehearted embrace and integration of technology. Technophiles sing the praises of the incredible benefits that technology provides, while luddites bemoan the loss of print culture and the cultural ruin brought about by the spread of electronic technology. The truth about the effects of this technology on contemporary culture is probably somewhere in between these two extremes. While it is obvious that electronic technology has contributed to tremendous advances in communication, information retrieval, scientific research, travel, medicine, food production, entertainment, and material comfort, it has also been linked to fragmented and diminished levels of concentration and rationality, loss of privacy, increased incivility, environmental damage, loss of free time, damage to personal relationships, and increased medical problems associated with sedentariness.

In this paper I will explore the merits of two prominent criticisms of technology. First, technology damages our cognitive functioning so that deep concentration, deliberation and reflection are greatly diminished. Second, technology impedes the development of close personal relationships including friendship and family attachments, particularly the parent-child relationship. Relationships triangulated or mediated by technology are allegedly more superficial because of diminished face-to-face interaction, less authentic and less intimate.

From the perspective of practical ethics, it is a fact that technology poses certain moral challenges that need to be fully explored, described and exposed so that ethical guidelines can be formulated to address these challenges. Technophiles should not deny that technology generates its own set of moral problems while Luddites should realize that the solution to these problems does not require the abandonment of technology or the nostalgic return of print culture. I will argue that technology does impede the formation of virtuous character in various ways but that it might also offer the potential for significant moral progress.

Alejandro Farieta

Assistant Professor, Agustinian University, Colombia

Aristotle on the Normative Role of Practical Syllogism

The aim of this lecture is to offer an interpretation of the Aristotelian practical syllogism -as is presented in EN vii, 3 and MA 7- as an authentic Aristotelian syllogism. In order to reach this aim, it offers, in first place, some precisions about the Aristotelian notion of syllogism. The main precision is that the role of the syllogism in the Aristotelian philosophy of science -especially in sciences as biology- is not only to establish a conclusion as "formally valid", but also to explain the conclusion in the syllogism. In second place, the main way to offer explanations in the Aristotelian biology, and therefore in the in their action theory, is a teleological one. Therefore, it is necessary to show how the syllogism is not necessarily a formally valid inference, but an acceptable explanation about a fact. In that way, this paper presents the practical syllogism in the same way as a valid explanatory reasoning in Aristotle's natural sciences. In third place, it displays how the logic of the natural sciences and the logic of the human action are not an apodictic chain of premises and conclusions; on the contrary, since the matter that is pretended to be explained with such these syllogisms is a fact, or a particular event, their conclusions are presupposed from the beginning, and their arguments, therefore, depends on a teleological logic -which is the proper way to explain in natural sciences- more than on a formal structure. Finally, it concludes with some remarks about the normative role of the practical syllogism as the explanation of the action. But, in the specific case of the human action, the practical syllogism is also the main tool for the moral valuations of the actions, which exposes and assess the psychological mechanism that leads to the moral action: the deliberation process.

Gary Fuller

Professor, Central Michigan University, USA

Barry Loewer on Free Will and Indeterminism

There has been a great deal, indeed an almost exhaustive amount, of work done on free will issues in the last decades or so. Still, there is no harm in tidying up loose ends. I want to look at an argument sketched by Barry Loewer some years ago, an argument that to my knowledge has not been discussed very much. This is the argument that if a certain argument in favor of the incompatibility of free will and determinism succeeds, then a similar argument for the incompatibility between free will and indeterminism also succeeds. The starting argument is the widely discussed consequence argument, introduced by Peter van Inwagen. Loewer argues that a consequence-like argument can be successfully run for the incompatibility between free will and what he calls objective indeterminism, which he claims is perhaps the most plausible kind of indeterminism supported by quantum physics.

I shall show that even if van Inwagen's consequence argument succeeds, Loewer's extension of it to indeterminism fails. It fails for a number of reasons. The most important reason is as follows. Even if we accept van Inwagen's implicit premise that if a future act is 100% objectively probable, then I have no control over it that does not mean that we have to accept Loewer's corresponding premise that if a future act is, for example, 50% objectively probable, then I have no control over it.

My aim is a limited one. Many have criticized van Inwagen's consequence argument, especially for its transfer principles. I am arguing that even if we assume that these hold, Loewer's version of the consequence argument still fails. Others have argued that the incompatibility between free will and indeterminism holds for reasons such as the connection between indeterminism and luck. There may be some connection between luck arguments and Loewer's version of the consequence argument, but my primary focus will be on Loewer's argument.

Andre Gallois

Professor, Syracuse University, USA

Willing Belief

In my paper I discuss the problem about belief and the will posed by Bernard Williams: is it a contingent truth that we cannot directly form beliefs at will? One distinction that has been drawn in other contexts is the distinction between attitude and content focused reasons. I argue that a belief is unwillable provided the attitude/content focused distinction applies to it. In addition, there are two further distinctions that apply to all and only unwillable attitudes. Explaining why that is so throws light on whether such states as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. are contingently unwillable. In doing so it also throws light on the nature of propositional attitudes, reasons and the transparency of the mind to the world.

Simon Glynn

Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA

Phenomenological Consciousness and its Implications

Many philosophers, such as Descartes and Locke for example, conceive the human subject as an essentially unchanging, self identical, mind, a substantial, if perhaps enigmatically unextended or immaterial, thing, initially separate or isolated from the world and others. However Phenomenologists and Hermeneutic and Existential Phenomenologists, such as Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre understand the human subject not as an ego or thing as such, but as essentially a certain state of awareness or consciousness, which as such is necessarily found in (intentional) relation to the world of material and immaterial objects and events etc. of which it is aware or conscious. A subject -- rather than a thing or object -- which moreover also finds itself as always and already in relation to others; which relations thereto and differences therefrom constitute its therefore continually changing extrinsic or social identity.

Moreover, not only -- not unlike the meanings of words, which, according to the Structuralists and Poststructuralists, are informed or defined by their relations to other words -- are human subjects' extrinsic identities, or what they are, informed by their social relations and interactions with, and differences from, others, and therefore, so far from ever being definitive, are constantly differing, changing or being deferred, but so too, surprisingly, are their supposedly intrinsic identities, or who they are. The values, attitudes and goals informing the aspirations and choices of projects which define these intrinsic identities being derived from the often changing practices and patterns of their cultural relations and interactions. While even the apparently most natural emotions, not to mention those apparently basic desires, emanating from that supposed last bastion of human nature, the Id, are, along with the unconscious also, following Lacan and Foucault, culturally mediated; human mental phenomena, and along with them human nature, and perhaps even more contentiously, human being itself, thus being deconstructively revealed to be a cultural construct through and through.

Joshua Halberstam
Professor, City University of New York, USA

With All due Epistemic Humility

Recent discussion about disagreement has largely centered on disagreements between epistemic peers. Presumably, when confronted by an explicit rebuttal by one's epistemic superior, conciliation, complete or partial, is generally appropriate. I propose here that this condition for epistemic humility is *much too weak*. For it shouldn't matter whether that expert is physically present or a thousand miles away, nor whether experts actually disagree. In fact, even a reasonable *possibility of* epistemic expert opinion with regard to some claim P presents an effective defeater that enjoins us to abdicate confidence in own opinion about P until confirmed by that expertise. As most of us aren't experts about most things, epistemic modesty is called for far more often thought, extending not only to recondite technical matters, philosophical theories and complex political policy debates but also quotidian beliefs about everyday objects, e.g. that this table in front of me is well constructed. I discuss here the relevant distinction between superior and expert, why this conclusion does not entail a radical skepticism (inasmuch as it assumes the possibility of epistemic justified warrant), can avoid self-refutation, and does not promote a "spineless" lack of doxastic self-trust. Finally, I note why a pervasive epistemic humility does not preclude adopting opinions (duly tentative and modest) in the normal course of pedagogy, scientific discussion and social discourse.

Atli Hardarson

Lecturer, University of Iceland, Iceland

Rational Self-Control

For ordinary humans self-control often fails: Sometimes people quarrel when they intend to have good time together; Students sleep in although they want to get up early and read for an exam; In spite of intentions to the contrary smokers fail to quit smoking; Good people want to forgive but can't get rid of angry thoughts. We have all sorts of plans that do not succeed because our minds are restive and ungovernable.

In my paper I analyse the concept of rational self-control and argue that an agent, A, has rational self-control if and only if all the following four conditions hold:

- i. A's belief about what is the best course of action is determined by available knowledge, i.e. by what A has strong overall reason to do.
- ii. If A has made a decision or formed an intention or resolution it is determined by A's belief about what is the best course of action.
- iii. If A's action is determined by a desire, that desire is determined by what A intends, decides or resolves, provided A has made a decision or formed an intention or resolution, else by A's belief about what is the best course of action.
- iv. A's action is determined by what A believes is the best course of action or by what A intends, resolves or decides to do or by what A desires.

Drawing upon recent work by Richard Holton, Alfred Mele and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, I argue that corresponding to these four conditions there are four different ways in which rational self-control can fail.

My analysis has bearing on fundamental ethical questions about moral virtues and responsibility. It is also relevant to recent psychological work on the interplay of trait self-control, as defined by Walter Mischel, and what Roy F. Baumeister describes as ego-depletion. A conceptual distinction between different types of self-control failures is needed to account for empirical results to the effect that those who score high on tests of trait self-control sometimes do not exhibit the type of willpower defined by the ego-depletion model. Furthermore, I also point out that my analysis can be used to clarify and categorize different theories of addiction and substance dependence, where some authorities, e.g. George Ainslie, locate the addict's failure at ii others, e.g. Timothy Schroeder, focus on iv. Arguably, the distinctions I draw are needed as a preliminary to combining the important insights provided by these two approaches.

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Global Ethics

If by “global ethics” is to be meant an ethics accepted and practiced by all human individuals and collectives none such exists at present or is likely to emerge at any time in near future. Human history shows diachronic and synchronic diversities of ethical systems. People construct diverse systems of values and norms that reflect and rationalize their diverse identities. People’s will to affirm and express their identity and pursue the ideal it sets forth is the primary cause of ethical conflicts. Ethical diversity and conflicts that human history manifests belies the position taken by some thinkers who believe the ethical system they have built on the basis of a theory of human nature and human subjectivity to be universally valid and binding on all persons. Kant’s transcendental idealism is a notorious example. The epistemic subject cum moral agent, he thinks, constructs nature, history and culture and legislates a law that obliges a rational will to intervene in nature’s course. Departing from Kant we situate humans in the world, where they construct, and are in turn affected by, history and culture. Ethical conflicts among people having diverse identities confirm this ontological stance. A global ethic can emerge only from reconciliations among vying systems in the form of a harmony of the diverse. Experience of existential conflicts arising from ethical differences, a shared interest in peaceful coexistence, empathy and instrumental rationality can lead to the acceptance of the Golden Rule, the rule of reciprocity, the application of which will urge and guide reconciliation and necessary changes in the identities and associated moralities that the contending parties bring to their interaction. Such reconciliation is a more effective way toward ethical convergence than an appeal to natural benevolence, compassion or rationality destined to prevail.

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Freud and Aristotle Read Sophocles' *Oedipus*: The Dramatic and Philosophical Roots of Psychoanalysis

Goal of this paper is to highlight the close connections between the philosophy of Seneca and Platonism. In this sense, the present essay focuses his attention on the *Letter LVIII of Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales*, which describes a hierarchical division of beings, belonging to Platonic tradition. This letter shows a sort of "betraying" of Seneca towards the Stoicism, since he refuses the Stoic hierarchy, that places the *Quid* on the top of hierarchy, for the Platonic solution, that instead places the *Quod Est* on the top of hierarchy, removing completely the *Quid*. As we said, at the top of this hierarchy it is placed the *Quod Est*, it is a sort of liminal concept that gives meaning at all the other things. Just below this, there is God, he is the being "*par excellentia*", who "is prominent and stands out above everything else". The next step is occupied by Ideas, that are the Platonic Ideas. While in the fourth step there are the *Idos*, namely the Aristotelian forms. Below these, in the fifth step, there are the "existing things", which represent all real things. Finally, in the last step there are the "quasi-existing things", such as the void and time. However, what is more striking of this whole theory is that, it is not a mere corollary to an essentially Stoic philosophy, but represents the ontological backbone of all Senecan philosophy. In fact, every step of this hierarchy has a perfect match in the corpus of Seneca, and this demonstrates how deep are the connections with Plato and the Platonic tradition.

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&

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The Religious Bureaucracy on the Far East: The Problems of Genesis

The term "religious bureaucracy" is widely distributed in modern religious philosophy. In this paper, we will use the meaning of religious bureaucracy as a system of administration of religious institutions, based on vertical hierarchy, specialization and division of labor, clear regulation of rules and depersonalization of relationship. Bureaucracy as the historical phenomenon appear as the result of professional administration, first, as it's additional element, used by inherited authority, and then, as the independent organization, trying to get all official powers. In this meaning, this term first was used by the French economist Vincent de Gourne in 1745, in comparison with "aristocracy", implying that bureaucracy is the antipode to the first one. Therefore, the problems of formation of the religious bureaucracy should be studied in the context of its relationship with authority (mostly, monarchical one). In the case of this study, it is based on the Far Eastern religious bureaucracy (Chinese and Japanese, mostly Buddhist) and its relationship with the emperor's court. In this study, were lyon methodological principle, suggesting the use of specific historical documents: theoretical treatises, codes of the Japanese Buddhist monasteries, emperors' edicts and so on. The term "religious bureaucracy", thus, is analyzing in the three ways. At first, as the according codified set of social-religious statuses; at second, as the system of social relations, existed at that time; at third, as the definite historical events, modifying codified social statuses and meanings. Therefore, the operationalization of the term "religious bureaucracy" occurs in two ways: in semiotic field of theoretical conception and in pragmatic of historical realities. The Japanese religious bureaucracy is determined both as the "routinization of charisma" of Buddhist patriarchs and the authorities' need of a compromise model of administration.

Yulan Liu

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Marx's Concept of Freedom and its Post-Metaphysical Implication

The exploring of freedom is closely related to the understanding of subjectivity. What does freedom mean? Is freedom theoretical or practical? What kind of subjectivity is freedom based on? How can people reach the state of freedom? This paper makes a discussion on the above issues. It argues that Marx's concept of freedom achieves a double transcendence over traditional Metaphysical freedom and modern capital rule. The real freedom is not founded on abstract reason subjectivity. Marx shows us that we should investigate specific social relations, collapse the modern fate of being ruled by non-divine image, and find a real way to achieve freedom. Freedom is not the identity domination towards the specific sensibility life, but more life of Individual differences, which can be expressed in Chinese as "GE MEI QI MEI, MEI MEI YU GONG". Freedom is free from identity, and free from being ruled by abstract stuff, which is the post-metaphysical implication of Marx's freedom concept. Marx advocated that people should occupy their essence in a comprehensive manner on uniform basis of naturalism and humanism.

Miguel Lopez-Astorga

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Chrysippus' Logic and Wason's Selection Task

Wason's selection task is a very simple reasoning test involving four cards and a conditional sentence. Its main problem is that; although, as said, its logical structure is not complex, most of the individuals tend to give a wrong answer when they execute it. But an important point is that the worst results are obtained when the task is presented in an abstract way, and that, if it is expressed with thematic content, the results sometimes improve. However, not any thematic content help improve participants' answers. For this reason, several theories have been proposed in order to account for these facts. Some of them, e.g., hold that the human mind have adaptive mechanisms for specific domains (the social contracts theory), or that there are special logics to be used with certain contents (the deontic logic theory). Nevertheless, in my view, the solution is easier and is related to the framework of an ancient logic: the Stoic one. In this way, in my presentation, I will try to show that the versions of Wason's selection task that cause more individuals to give correct responses are those in which the conditional included in them fulfills Chrysippus' criterion on the conditional: the denial of the consequent is in contradiction with the antecedent. Thus, I will argue that it is not necessary to assume some of the alternative theories offered to explain the difficulties of the mentioned task, and that the resources to face such difficulties were already available in the general interpretation of conditionals assumed by the Old Stoa. So, I will also insist in the advantages that considering theories raised in the past can have when new problems are analyzed.

Alexey Lyzlov

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M. Heidegger and S. Kierkegaard on Ancient Greeks' Religiosity: Accordance and Difference of their Views

It is well known, that Martin Heidegger continues a lot of themes initiated by S. Kierkegaard. Even the language of Heidegger's philosophy is related with the language of Kierkegaard's philosophy (f.ex. Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* is related with the notion of *Tilværelse* by Kierkegaard). In his understanding of the inherent for ancient Greeks way of being-in-the-world Heidegger does not simply continues Kierkegaard's thought, but polemically addresses to it. Heidegger is agreeing with Kierkegaard that the typical human being in the ancient Greece is a human being extremely converted outward, into the world, and so is not a subject with an inner world. Heidegger points out that the word "subject" (Gk. *hypokeimenon*) in the ancient Greek means not a person, but something what a person is dealing with in the world. Both thinkers agree that the ancient Greek human being has no reflection of him- or herself. But for Kierkegaard such a way of being (correlated with his *aesthetic* "stage on the life way") is something like childhood. It is a necessary stage on the way, leading to maturity; but human being must go beyond it. The main criterion for the mature human existence by Kierkegaard is the ability to practice genuine religiosity. Religiosity for Kierkegaard is first and foremost the realization by a person of an authentic relationship with the Other (God), who creates the human *self* (Dk. *Selvet*). Since the Greek human does not know his *self*, he is not able to implement authentically the religious relationship with God. So the religiosity of such a man, according S. Kierkegaard, may be only "external". For Heidegger, this "Greek" way of being is not a «stage», but one of the equal-valued ways of being. So, f.ex., this way of being is not worse or better for Heidegger than the way of being dominant in the New Europe. And Heidegger shows that this way of being doesn't exclude the possibility of authentic religiousness. He shows it, linking religiosity with the openness to the being (germ. *Sein*). The difference in the positions personified here by S. Kierkegaard and M. Heidegger may have important consequences for the practical (f.ex. psychological) work with the person. When psychotherapist works with a person, whose way of being seems to be like "Greek", should he help this person to carry forward to the other "stage" or to develop the inherent potentialities of this "Greek" way of being as such? The answers derived from the Heidegger's and the Kierkegaard's positions are different. I will try to show why the Heidegger's position seems to be more productive.

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**Approaches to Philosophical Hermeneutics
(A Comparative Study: Paul Ricœur's Self-hermeneutics
Versus Henry Corbin's Ascendental Hermeneutics)**

Paul Ricœur's criticism of Philosophical hermeneutics, highlighting metaphor and narrative resulting in self-hermeneutics, differs from the approach taken by Henry Corbin supporting the hermeneutics having roots in Shiism. Initially, Ricœur narrative hermeneutics highlights two human fundamental aspects including tragic trait of human status never reaching a whole self-understanding as well as human responsibility to come up with an answer to such a complicated issue. Conversely, being well aware of time and its relation with narrative, Corbin does not address human status as tragic. He strongly maintains that narrative fails to give birth to language unless under the light of Shia Imams. Ricœur, furthermore, refers to the possibility of both language nullification via the fundamental formalization in the contemporary time and refilling it through self-remembrance of the richest interpretations attached to human via the existence of the sacred. Similarly, Corbin, referring to linking language with the sacred, regards such a refilling as a response to the revelation. The evaluation of the both thinkers' interpretation of hermeneutics circle is the focus of the third aspect. To Corbin, being ascendental, hermeneutics context lies in Shiism. Conversely, the hermeneutics circle transformed to hermeneutics Arc by Ricœur is the commencing point of self-hermeneutics.

Bettina Mueller

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Accord, Agreement and Consistence in the Philosophical Investigations

The term "Übereinstimmung" in the Philosophical investigation is very close to rule following and the private language argument but more rarely a theme in the discussion of rule following and its surroundings. You find the term named with a minimum of 19 times in the PU and in other writings of him, the term is found, too. (On Certainty, 203) The idea of agreement is also discussed in a broader understanding in additional examples like the twins-example or the beetle in a box. So the twin-example is correlated with the pain theme and the beetle in a box with communication. Also in the same sentence about the private language argument the term "agreement" is found. (201)

So consistence in the PI should be considered in the relationship of language and reality (PI 134), definition and judgement (PI 242), language and opinions (PI 241) on the one hand. On the other hand with rules like in grammar. (PI 224)

The big ideas of word and world find an positive answer in the simple use of grammar.

Also questions around skepticism and the language skepticism should deepen the understanding of Wittgenstein – when do we use the term of agreement.

So the typical way of Wittgensteins philosophy is the key of understanding the philosopher, an inner dialogue brings us closer to the difficulties of language and life and he is so in his way of doing philosophy close to Platon, too.

Some sentences in detail:

Agreement is found in §134 (sentence and reality), §139 (cube), §186 (counting), §201 (private language argument), §224 (accord and rule=cousins), §234 (astonishment of rules), § 241 (language and opinions), §242 (definition and judgement), §271 (pain) §352 (the law of excluded middle) §386 (imagination) §416 (consciousness) §429 (harmony between thought and reality) §442 (the bang) §465 (an expectation), §492 (to invent a language), §538 (grammar) §594 (words significantly uttered) §607 (inner clock).

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On the Critical Dimensions of Marxian Political Economy

Although easy to lose sight of, the subject of a Marxian critique is always society, and, to be more precise, the historically specific form of bourgeois society (*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*). In his *Grundrisse*, Marx demonstrates how the categories of money and labor predate modernity but in forms yet to realize their potential over the course of concrete social development. Strangely, these concepts appear in the fullness of their simplicity only within the complexities created by social and historical progress. In Marx's view, both economists and socialists working around the mid-nineteenth century turned their analyses of these categories of political economy into justifications for capitalism, whether they intended to or not. But Marx's own method embodied a radical critique of the relation between labor and capital, analyzed through its manifestations as well as the misapprehensions that attended them almost out of necessity. My essay will study Marx's notes on political economy so as to identify their extra-economic bases. I want to argue that, cloaking himself in the same language as these economists and socialists, Marx bursts asunder their misconceptions to reveal what political economy really represents: a critical need, which if fulfilled, would render even his own philosophical system obsolete.

William O'Meara

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Karl Marx on Determinism and Freedom

In his writings, Marx has clear statements affirming the limitation of human consciousness by the material conditions of our life. For example, he affirms, in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, "The mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life". Despite such statements, this paper will argue that some interpreters of Marx, for example, Mandell and Arthur, have correctly held that Marx is not an economic determinist and that there is a significant role for human freedom in the creation of human history.

This paper will offer an explanation of how Marx's concept of the human as the species-being makes possible this co-presence of determinism and freedom in humans that Marx finds but with an emphasis upon freedom. Defending the readings of Marx by McMurtry and Henry, this paper will argue that the human experiences both determinism and freedom because human consciousness is both other and self. The human comes into consciousness, whether in the evolution of the human species or in the development of the child, only through language. Nature, the production process and society are incorporated into the self as what George Herbert Mead calls Generalized Others which enables the individual to be conscious of oneself from the viewpoint of the others. As such, they determine the individual both socially and historically, but they also render the individual able to be free. For the individual can use this process of looking upon oneself and one's actions from the viewpoint of another, for example, by imagining a society deeply rooted in the past and present society but yet new in richness of dignity for all humans, not simply for the capitalists, and thereby govern one's personal and social actions as self-determined by this freely imagined future society.

Anna Olejarczyk

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Socrates - Plato - Aristotle. Phronēsis in Greek Theory of Language and Communicative Acts. The Classical Period

It is my second attempt to reconstruct the ancient Greek theory of language. This time I would like to examine the Hellenic thought on 'acting in' or 'operating with' language and signs as general. Although the main field of my investigation are Plato's dialogues and some early works by Aristotle, I will start with the analysis of the semiotic fields of terms 'agōn', 'logos', 'theōria' and 'phronēsis' in Pre-classic period of Hellenic tradition (mainly by taking under scrutiny the Homers' and Hesiod's poetry). Then I will analyze Socratic tradition in the comparison to the whole Sophists Movement, and I will examine the Socratic thesis on a virtue as the knowledge and on a knowledge as the virtue. After the main points of Socrates' 'technē' is established, and the 'aretē' of citizen of 'polis' and 'aretē' of philosopher are defined, I would like to discuss 'logos' as 'ergon'. I will start with Plato's *Phaidros* (a dialogue on philosophical tools and proper way of thinking), when I am going to discuss the idea of 'technē basilikē' in his *Respublica*, to conclude with some remarks on the connection between ontological and political/ ethical domains (Plato's *Laws* and his *VII Letter*). The final step in the undertaken reconstruction is to work with the Aristotle legacy. I would like to compare Aristotle idea of 'phronēsis' (in his early works: *Eudemus*, *Protrepticus*, *De Philosophia*) and 'self-thinking thought' (*Metaphysics* in comparison to his *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*).

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Analysis of Situation Ethics in China Health Care Reform

Situation ethics is the way of decision-making that bases on a particular situation or background. It emphasizes that "love" is the supreme principle, and it gets together with "love" and the estimates of circumstances when making choice of action. The method of situation ethics is the one of "calculation of love", using "calculation of love" to conduct the moral selection which means that to calculate how to do a great favor in a particular situation. After the "calculation of love", the author thinks that how coordinating the relationships between equity and efficiency is a key and a realization approach in Chinese health care reform. In current situation, focus on equity is more important than focus on efficiency in the area of health service in China. Chinese health care reform must carry out the principle of "giving priority to fairness with due consideration to efficiency" which is a moral choice and can be come ture by government push.

Peter Vranas

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Informative Aboutness

Pretheoretically, (*B*) "all believers are immortal" is about all believers, but (1) *B* is not about any unbeliever; similarly, (*M*) "all mortals are unbelievers" is not about any immortal, but (2) *M* is about all mortals. But *B* and *M* are logically equivalent universal generalizations, so arguably they are about exactly the same objects; by (2), they are about those mortals who are unbelievers, contradicting (1). If one responds by giving up (1), is there still a sense in which *B* treats unbelievers differently from believers? I argue that there is. *B* is *uninformative* about unbelievers but *informative* about believers, in the following sense: for any object *o*, the information that *B* provides only about *o*, namely "*o* is a believer only if *o* is immortal", is entailed (and thus rendered redundant) by "*o* is an unbeliever" but not by "*o* is a believer".

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Parmenides - The Father of Quantum Mechanics

Parmenides' poem *On Nature* and the Platonic dialogue named after him are difficult to understand. In fact one could make a bold claim that since Aristotle nobody has understood them correctly. That is not to malign scholars, who since then have added greatly to the understanding of their philological aspects, but more a criticism of the framework that Aristotle created, that has never been questioned until now.

Aristotle laid down the rules and framework of logic that are in common usage today, the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle. He created these in his quest to formulate fixed definitions of the laws of physics and metaphysics. These principles operate adequately over short distances, but nearly always fail when extended to their limits in an operation that we know as *reductio ad absurdum*. The mediaeval world inherited Aristotle's thought and continued his researches into science until the early twentieth century, when physicists realised that his laws do not work at the subatomic level. Quantum theory then came into being to describe the paradoxical behaviour of subatomic particles. In brief, quantum mechanics deals with the probabilities of observing various aspects of energy quanta. The simple act of observation causes the set of probabilities to immediately and randomly assume only one of the range of possible values. Prior to that, all possible values within the probability range are superposed on each other, such that contradictory values are all possible.

To answer the question of its relevance to Parmenides one needs to go back to Presocratic science. Its purpose was to map out a theory of everything as it related to the universe, and its method of discovery was pure inspirational induction. This method pays no respect to fixed rules, but operates freely over an entire spectrum of logical forms. Significantly, it recognises paradox as one of the prime cosmological principles. Parmenides was not the first to discover these principles, but was the first to record them in a coherent fashion.

In his poem Parmenides discusses two entities, *being* and *non-being*. Meanings for these can only be extracted if they are considered as cosmological entities rather than logico-dialectical entities. Scholarship has until now considered *non-being* as a totally non-existent entity to be ignored. This has had the unfortunate result in focusing on *being* as a unique monist entity. Not only is this wrong at a conceptual level, but it has played out in the wider world. Since Aristotle monism has become the prime philosophical enterprise of all religious, political, scientific and

cultural expressions in the Western world. As a consequence, Parmenides himself has been considered a monist.

That this is a misreading of the poem can be seen from the goddess' words that, although *non-being* is nothing, there is nevertheless a necessity for it. This has two important implications: first, that the Presocratics had a sophisticated understanding of zero (or nothing) and its paradoxical qualities long before anyone has given them credit for it; and second that cosmologically we exist in a strictly dualist universe where both entities simultaneously coexist, although they are diametrically opposite to each other. This flies in the face of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction. If we consider *being* to be an expression of singularity or divinity, then *non-being* is an expression of its opposite or non-god, and both have an equal right to be respected in our universe.

The poem continues by the goddess giving Parmenides instruction in acquiring divine wisdom. This has a tortuous path, since not only does the Way of Truth need to be followed, but so does the Way of Belief before it is finally abandoned in favour of the former. This implies a deep level of paradox, since wisdom is to be found in both the divine and the mundane, but only the divine is meaningful.

The goddess urged Parmenides to follow the path of reason, a task he accomplished to judge by the dialogue in his name. In this he set out a hypothesis of paradox and proved it with supreme elegance. Asking what the consequences would be for the *one* if it *is*, Parmeneidis put the hypothesis through a number of logical tests. He arranged the hypothesis in two parts, first running the hypothesis through a set of symmetrical dualistic tests in one direction, which resulted in a positive conclusion and then running it through the same tests again in reverse, but this time resulting in a negative consequence.

In case there was any doubt about the paradoxical nature of these arguments he asked what the consequences would be if the *one* simultaneously *is* and *is not*. The result was simultaneously positive and negative. This particular part of the overall structure of the arguments demonstrates that he had not accidentally stumbled across an interesting, but weird property of logic, but that he understood perfectly the paradoxical nature of the universe. In this he was not merely the forerunner of modern quantum mechanics, but had created the world's first hypothesis and proof of paradox.

Penny Weiss

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Epistemic Injustice and the Everyday Silencing of Children

When considering the question posed in the title I will focus mostly on the texts of the classical Indian Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition. On this basis the concept of linguistically conditioned perception will be discussed. The process of imposing the grammatical structures, 'verbal conventions' (*saṃketa*) and "[language based] fantasy" (*vikalpa*), inevitably disturbs our knowledge. As far as it concerns the objective reality, the linguistic obstacles may be overcome. The subjective reality seems to remain beyond the grasp by definition. However, the incapability of grasping discursively the nature of the self (*puruṣa*) ultimately turns out to be a factor favorable to the growth of self-understanding. Here, the limitations of my self-knowledge-or inability to capture "subjectivity" in the objective discourse-appear to be quite a beneficial and motivating factor on the way to change the mode of one's perception, action and evaluation of one's own deeds. In this sense, language plays in regard to self-knowledge either -as in the case of Buddhist Pramāṇavāda- the role of a hindrance, in so far as it projects erroneous conceptions on one's self, or -as in the case of Sāṅkhya-Yoga- self-knowledge is a domain which is completely precluded to linguistical knowledge.

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Aristotle on Painting

Suppose I say, "Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day". According to the Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy, to make sense of the sentence, my hearer would fill in that he eats at night. They argue that this insertion of a meaning beyond the strictly literal is achieved through an epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) known as śrūtārthāpatti, or verbal postulation. In the ninth century, an Indian philosopher named Mukulabhaṭṭa, whose work resists easy identification with any single tradition, took the unusual step of identifying this as both a paradigm case of verbal postulation and a case of lakṣaṇā, or indication. Indication is a linguistic capacity which enables hearers to understand the non-literal meanings conveyed by speakers. Ordinarily, indication was thought to repair a lack of sentence-internal semantic compatibility (yogyatā), as in sentences like "The peasant is an ox", since we cannot literally identify a peasant with an ox. However, Mukula expands indication's scope, pointing out that we can have apparent inconsistencies between multiple factors: speaker, expression meanings, utterance meanings, place, time, and circumstance, as in the Fat Devadatta sentence, where incompatibility rests with Devadatta's fatness and that he is not observed eating.

I argue that Mukula's identification of indication and verbal postulation in this particular case is correct. I also argue that other instances of indication can be understood as verbal postulation due to the shared structure of the two epistemic instruments. Both are triggered by apparent incompatibility between a piece of background knowledge and a new bit of testimonial knowledge. Both rely upon tacitly held principles or axioms to postulate a conclusion which would remove the incompatibility. If Mukula is correct, this is a challenge to the distinction commonly found in the Indian pramāṇa system between indication (as part of the pramāṇa of testimony) and verbal postulation.

Fengqing Zhu

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Patients' Responsibilities in Medical Ethics

Patients have not been entirely ignored in medical ethics. There has been a shift from the general presumption that 'doctor knows best' to a heightened respect for patient autonomy. Medical ethics remains one-sided, however. It tends (incorrectly) to interpret patient autonomy as mere participation in decisions, rather than a willingness to take the consequences. In this respect, medical ethics remains largely paternalistic, requiring doctors to protect patients from the consequences of their decisions. This is reflected in a one-sided account of duties in medical ethics. Duties fall mainly on doctors and only exceptionally on patients. Medical ethics may exempt patients from obligations because they are the weaker or more vulnerable party in the doctor-patient relationship. We argue that vulnerability does not exclude obligation. We also look at other ways in which patient responsibilities flow from general ethics: for instance, from responsibilities to others and to the self, from duties of citizens, and from the responsibilities of those who solicit advice. Finally, we argue that certain duties of patients counter balance another wise unfair captivity of doctor's helpers.