2014

Philosophy Abstracts

Ninth Annual International
Conference on Philosophy
26-29 May 2014, Athens, Greece

Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos

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Preface

This abstract book includes all the abstracts of the papers presented at the 9*th* *Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 26-29 May 2014*, organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. In total there were 55 papers and 58 presenters, coming from 24 different countries (Albania, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lithuania, Nigeria, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA). The conference was organized into 21 sessions that included areas of Philosophy of Science, Phenomenology, Ethics, Philosophy of Language and other related fields. As it is the publication policy of the Institute, the papers presented in this conference will be considered for publication in one of the books of ATINER.

The Institute was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet in Athens and exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study. Our mission is to make ATHENS a place where academics and researchers from all over the world meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. To serve this purpose, conferences are organized along the lines of well established and well defined scientific disciplines. In addition, interdisciplinary conferences are also organized because they serve the mission statement of the Institute. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 150 international conferences and has published over 100 books. Academically, the Institute is organized into four research divisions and nineteen research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committee and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference together.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President

FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM
9th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 26-29 May 2014,
Athens, Greece
PROGRAM
Conference Venue: **St George Lycabettus**, 2 Kleomenous Street, 106 75 Kolonaki,
Athens, Greece
ORGANIZING AND SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

ORGANIZING AND SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
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& Celia Sakka

C O N F E R E N C E   P R O G R A M

Tuesday 26 May 2014

08:00-08:30 Registration

08:30-09:00 Welcome and Opening Remarks

- Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
- Dr. George Poulos, Vice-President of Research, ATINER & Emeritus Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.
- Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President of Academics, ATINER & Professor, Sam Houston University, USA..
- Dr. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

08:45-10:30 Session I (Room A) **Chair:** Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA	**08:45-10:30 Session II (Room B)** **Chair:** Saba Bazargan, Assistant Professor, University of California at San Diego, USA.
1. *Donald Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA. Infinity in Mathematics. 2. Patrick Fleming, Assistant Professor, James Madison University, USA. Arbitrariness and Choice in Practical Reason. 3. Favio Cala Vitery, Professor, Jorge Tadeo Lozano University, Colombia. Bohmian Quantum Mechanics as a Constructive Theory.	1. *Eric Kraemer, Professor, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, USA. Virtue Epistemologys: Confronting the Problem of Cognitive Vice. 2. Stephanie Rennick, PhD Candidate, University of Glasgow/Macquarie University, UK/Australia. "Why Foreknowledge does not always entail Problematic Predestination".
10:40-12:10 Session III (Room A) **Chair:** *Donald Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.	**10:40-12:10 Session IV (Room B)** **Chair:** *Eric Kraemer, Professor, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, USA.
1. Kazutaka Kondo, Assistant Professor, Waseda University, Japan. Socrates' Rhetorical Strategy in Plato's Apology. 2. Elena Akhmaeva, PhD Student, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia. The Transformation of the Ancient Worldview in the Consciousness of a Medieval Man.	1. Saba Bazargan, Assistant Professor, University of California at San Diego, USA. Moral Liability of Unjust Beneficiaries in War. 2. Andy Engen, Assistant Professor, Illinois Wesleyan University, USA. Communication, Expression, and the Justification of Punishment. 3. *Peter Oni, Lecturer, University of Lagos, Nigeria. African Initiation Rite in the Light of Hannah Arendt's Conception of Violence.
12:20-13:50 Session V (Room A) **Chair:** Kazutaka Kondo, Assistant Professor, Waseda University, Japan.	**12:20-13:50 Session VI (Room B)** **Chair:** *Peter Oni, Lecturer, University of Lagos, Nigeria.
1. Duncan Richter, Professor, Virginia Military Institute, USA. Sketches of Blurred landscapes: Wittgenstein and Ethics. 2. Ilse Somavilla, Researcher, University of Innsbruck, Austria, The Dimension of Silence in the Philosophy of	1. Andrew Alwood, Assistant Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA. Epicurean Pleasures. 2. Alexey Lyzlov, Assistant Professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia. Historicity and Postmodernity Towards the Positive Reflection of

Wittgenstein. 3. Mark Thomas, PhD Student, University of Freiburg, Germany. Does Kant Revive the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony to Synchronize Nature and Freedom?	Contemporary Human Situation. 3. Daniel Pallares Dominguez, PhD Student, Jaume University of Castellon, Spain. Reviewing of Neuroethics as an Applied Ethics and Fundamental Ethics.

13:50-14:50 Lunch (details during registration)

15:00-16:30 Session VII (Room A) **Chair:** Kevin Corcoran, Professor, Calvin College, USA.	**15:00-16:30 Session VIII (Room B)** **Chair:** *Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Canadian University College, Canada.
1. Vasudha Deo, Associate Professor, SANT Gadgebaba Amaravati University Amaravati, India. Swami Chinmayananda and Religion. 2. Kruttika Chincholikar, Associate Professor, Government College of Education, India & Sunita Totade, Associate Professor, Government College of Education, India. Theory of Cosmic Consciousness in Hindu Religion.	1. Alessandra Melas, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of Sassari, Italy. An Ontic Conception of Chance in Monod's Non-Teleological Evolutionary Biological Theory. 2. Tamara Kayali, Lecturer, The Australian National University, Australia. A Role for Bioethicists and Philosophers in Psychiatric Classification. (Monday 26 of May). 3. Svetlana Shibarshina, PhD Student, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod, Russia. B. L. Whorf on Cosmos, Individual and Language.
16:40-18:10 Session IX (Room A) **Chair:** Vasudha Deo, Associate Professor, SANT Gadgebaba Amaravati University Amaravati, India.	**16:40-18:10 Session X (Room B)** **Chair:** Tamara Kayali, Lecturer, The Australian National University, Australia.
1. Kevin Corcoran, Professor, Calvin College, USA. The Persistence of Persons. (Monday 26 May 2014) 2. Mai Suga Oki, Researcher, Waseda University, Japan. Where are Poets in Plato's Political Philosophy? 3. Maria Ortega Manez, PhD Graduate, University of Paris Sorbonne, France & Alessandro Gianfrancesco, Switzerland. Why has Plato Written about Mimesis?	1. Silvia Galikova, Professor, University of Trnava, Slovakia. Towards the Reality of Self-Agency. 2. *Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Canadian University College, Canada. Carbon Based Brain, Consciousness and Cognition: Understanding Cognitive States in the Context of the KK Thesis. 3. Jordi Cabos Teixido, Researcher, University of Barcelona, Spain. Strength and Limit Situations: Apology of Philosophy.

18:20-20:20 Session XI (Room A)
Chair: Mai Suga Oki, Researcher, Waseda University, Japan.

1. Martyna Koszkalo, Assistant Professor, University of Gdansk, Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, Poland. Voluntarism and Intellectualism. Thomas Aquinas versus John Duns Scotus.
2. Natasza Szutta, Assistant Professor, University of Gdansk, Poland. Is Aristotelian Concept of Phronesis Empirically Adequate?
3. Ni Yu, PhD, The University of Edinburgh, UK. The Analytical Comparison of Philosophical Methodology in Plato's Meno and Laozi's Daodejing. .

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1. *Emily Marie Kelahan, Assistant Professor, Illinois Wesleyan University, USA. Hume's "Former Opinions". 2. Alessandra Granito, University of Chieti, Italy. The Reasons of Nothingness. For a Comparison between 19th-20th Century Italian and German Philosophy on the Negative Ontology. 3. *William O' Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA. The Aristotelian Principle in Mill and Kant.	1. Christine James, Professor, Valdosta State University, USA. The Cultural Economy and Austerity Measures: Problematizing the Creativity Market. 2. *Jacinta Mwende Maweu, Lecturer, University of Nairobi, Kenya. I am Because We Are? The Irony of Ubuntuism, Ethnic Conflicts and the Crisis of Identity in Africa.(Tuesday 27 of May). 3. Dario Pagano, PhD Student, University of Palermo, Italy. The Ideal Origins of Natural Rights.
09:40-11:10 Session XV (Room A) **Chair:** *Emily Marie Kelahan, Assistant Professor, Illinois Wesleyan University, USA	**09:40-11:10 Session XVI (Room B)** **Chair:** *Jacinta Mwende Maweu, Lecturer, University of Nairobi, Kenya.
1. *Gary Fuller, Professor, Central Michigan University, USA. Physicalism, Composition and Realization. (Tuesday, 27 of May). 2. Fred Adams, Professor, University of Delaware, USA. Cognition Wars. (Tuesday, 27 of May). 3. Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu, Assistant Professor, Istanbul Sehir University, Turkey. An Attempt to Undermine the Extreme Claim.	1. *Luiz Paulo Rouanet, Adjunt Professor, Federal University of Sao Joao del-Rei, Brazil. Socrates, the Greatest Sophist? 2. Dana Munteanu, Associate Professor, Ohio State University, USA. Aristotle on Arts and Morality. (Tuesday 27 of May). 3. Hagit Aldema, Teaching Fellow, Tel Aviv University, Israel. From Aporia to the One (and Back Again).
11:20-12:50 Session XVII (Room A) **Chair:** *William O' Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA.	**11:20-12:50 Session XVIII (Room B)** **Chair:** Dana Munteanu, Associate Professor, Ohio State University, USA.
1. Jonas Ciurlionis, Lecturer, Vilnius University, Lithuania. On Identity and Simultaneity. 2. *Magdy Kilany, Professor, University of Alexandria, Egypt. Philo's Attitude towards Sophistai. 3. Rajyashree Yadav, Lecturer, University of Rajasthan, India. The Relationship between Health and Ethical Conduct in Philosophical Perspective of Ayurveda (an Ancient Indian Medical Science).	1. Sebastian Briceno, PhD Student, University of Nottingham, UK. Will, Action, and Being Active. 2. Marcelo Gross Villanova, Professor, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Religion and Politics by Hobbesian right of Resistance

12:50-13:50 Lunch (Details during registration)

14:00-15:30 Session XIX (Room A) **Chair:** *Magdy Kilany, Professor, University of Alexandria, Egypt.	**14:00-15:30 Session XX (Room B)** **Chair:** Blaine Garfolo, Chair, Academic Advising Committee for the DBA Program, Northwestern Polytechnic University, USA
1. Mine Balliu, PhD Student, University of Tirana, Albania. Totalitarianism of Arendt and the Case of Albania.	1. *Sander Wilkens, Lecturer, University of Berlin, Germany. The Theory of the Antonyms. 2. Enkelejda Hamzaj, PhD Candidate, Marin Barleti University, Albania. Jurgen Habermas: The Communicative Action and the Strategic Action. 3. Marta Zareba, PhD Student, University of Warsaw, Poland. Causalism and Intentional Omissions.

15:40-17:10 Session XXI (Room A) **Chair:** Jonas Ciurlionis, Lecturer, Vilnius University, Lithuania.
1. Kei Yeung Luk, Lecturer, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong. An Analysis on Slingerland's Interpretation of Laozian Wu-wei. 2. <u>Pedro Savaget Nascimento</u>, Professor, University of Birmingham, UK & Andityas Matos, Professor, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil. The Influence of Stoicism in Classical Roman Law: The Rescripts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius on Family Law and Freedom. 3. Shweta Singh, Assistant Professor, University of Delhi, India. Particularism in Buddhism: Morality without Frames? 4. Thomas Giourgas, Research Assistant, University of Edinburgh, U.K., The Chasm between Protagorean Ethics and Education.

17:30-20:30 Urban Walk (Details during registration)

21:00-22:00 Dinner (Details during registration)

Wednesday 28 May 2014
Cruise: (Details during registration)

Thursday 29 May 2014
Delphi Visit: (Details during registration)

Fred Adams
Professor, University of Delaware, USA

Cognition Wars

In case you missed it, there is a war going on in cognitive science over what counts as cognition. There are now theories of "embodied cognition" (that the kinds of bodies you have determine the kinds of mind you have—as well as the idea that cognition is not sandwiched between perception and action but takes place all across the sensorimotor systems of the brain). There are theories of "extended cognition" (that the boundary of body or brain is arbitrary and that cognition can and does extend into the environment when we interact with information bearing items—pencil and paper working math problems, an iPhone, rotating a jigsaw puzzle piece to see if it fits, and so on). There are also claims that cognition goes on in plants and in bacteria. Plants and bacteria behave in ways that look purposive and in ways that if we behaved that way would be attributed to learning, memory, and decisions making. Elsewhere, I have discussed embodied and extended cognition. In this paper, I will try to get to the bottom of the notion that there is cognition in plants and bacteria. I think there is something going on in plants and bacteria that is also going on in cognition, but I don't think cognition is what it is. In this paper, I'll try to say what it is and why it isn't cognition.

Elena Akhmaeva
PhD Student, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia

The Transformation of the Ancient Worldview in the Consciousness of a Medieval Man

The history of the development of human mind is presented as an ascent of the society from the lowest to the highest stage, as the process that has a successive connection.

Thus, ancient Christianity has become the heritage of medieval West. The process of social evolution with all its ups and downs creates a versatile tradition that makes up a successive connection between the new and old society.

Indeed, everything on the historical arena is interconnected, and the general evolution of the culture and society brings not only a new stage in the history but also defines the changes between the old and the new ideas considering one or another needs that are relevant in the course of time.

In research work the main lines are analyzes of transformation of two worlds – Ancient world and Medieval world and the consciousness of a men in that period. The process of social evolution with all its ups and downs creates a versatile tradition that makes up a successive connection between the new and old society includes personal characteristics humanity.

Hagit Aldema
Teaching Fellow, Tel Aviv University, Israel

From Aporia to the One (and Back Again)

The most surprising in Plato's "Parmenides" is that Parmenides seems to reject his own doctrine concerning the One and defends Socrates doctrine of Ideas. This surprise is about to be illuminated here, hopefully without losing its dimension. That means, in trying to treat this dialogue not as a series of arguments but to read it from the side of the form in which it is written, namely as a dialogue between the old Parmenides and the young Socrates. Briefly, it is a dialogue which ought to be read as an exemplary of training for how to philosophize properly.

The lecture will discuss the functions of the subject of the One in the dialogue, the function of aporia and the very necessity of dialogue itself in order to know, not this or that doctrine, but to know trough experiencing training itself. What kind of knowledge is it? We may say that this knowledge touches time and again the limit of the signifier and that it cannot be delivered as a given knowledge detached from dialogue itself as well as it cannot be detached from the signifier itself. In other words, it is the Real of dialectic itself that appears in "Parmenides" in his conversation with Socrates as well as in his drawing the hypotheses of the One. This Real "ought to be privileged by us […] because it shows in an exemplary way that it is the paradigm of what puts in question what can emerge from language." (Lacan S19: 12.1.72, p.5)

The concept of the Real, as is used in Lacan's psychoanalytic thought, can be generally defined at this stage, as what is left undefeated precisely after a successful argument. Such as the paradoxes that the hypotheses of the One produce (as well as the paradoxes revealed by Parmenides concerning the theory of ideas) time and again through "Parmenides" while revealing the necessity yet insufficiency of the law of contradiction for achieving knowledge. Thus, the Real that "puts in question what can emerge from language" is, for that matter, the dwelling in aporia with which the interlocutor is left defeated and it is this defeat that supposes to lead him not to give up but to produce a way out from it. A way out that doesn't necessarily directed toward solving great metaphysical problems but a way that *actualizes* the function of dialogue itself, since "that's what dialogue is, naturally, when it is the One who speaks." (Lacan, S19 15.03.72 p.7)

Andrew Alwood
Assistant Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA

Is Pleasure an Attitude or Experience?

A theory of wellbeing purports to reveal the nature of what is good for an individual: what determines that individual's self-interest. Hedonism is a longstanding contender that says an individual's own good is determined by the balance of pleasures and pains in the individual's life. One mark of plausibility comes from how it generalizes beyond human individuals. Other sentient creatures can have lives that go better or worse for them, and that too seems influenced by their pleasures and pains. However, whether this really is an advantage that can be claimed by hedonists depends on the nature of pleasure and pain.

Epicurus (in)famously distinguished the "static" pleasures of tranquility or ataraxia, enjoyed by a human at rest, from the "kinetic" pleasures enjoyed in the movement involved with a desire being satisfied, which is crucial for him to maintain that the ideally pleasant life is a life of moderation, restraint, and morality. Fred Feldman's 2004 book revives hedonism in part by distinguishing the pleasures of sensation and feeling from the attitude of being pleased about something. Feldman and others like Russ Shafer-Landau claim that hedonism could only be plausible if it is the attitude of being pleased that is the locus of intrinsic value.

But it's very unlikely that nonhuman animals are psychologically sophisticated enough to enjoy the attitudinal pleasures emphasized by Feldman, nor the static pleasures emphasized by Epicurus. Each of these requires a creature with a sense of itself that can reflect on its own experiences. Furthermore, if the sensory, kinetic pleasures have no intrinsic value, then the lives of non-humans are completely worthless: they literally don't have interests.

Instead, a hedonist can adopt an experientialist conception of pleasure and vindicate the idea that the moderate pleasures are most important.

Saba Bazargan
Assistant Professor, University of California at San Diego, USA

Moral Liability of Unjust Beneficiaries in War

According to the now-prominent reductive account of moral liability in war (developed by Jeff McMahan, among others) an individual forfeits a right not to be harmed in furtherance of averting some evil only by bearing some responsibility for that evil. Thus only combatants fighting in furtherance of unjust ends or means (as well as civilians who contribute substantially to such ends or means) are morally liable to be killed. Implicit in this compelling picture of liability is the presumption that causation is a necessary basis for liability. Accordingly, the discussion of liability in war has focused on *what sort* of causal contribution serves as a basis for liability to be killed, and *how great* that contribution must be to entail such liability. But I will argue that the presumption underlying this discussion -- that a causal contribution to a harm is a necessary basis of liability -- is mistaken. On the view I defend, many civilians who contribute nothing to an unjust war can nonetheless be liable to be harmed on the grounds that they have *unjustly benefitted* from that war. If such beneficiaries will culpably fail to transfer their wrongly derived benefits to those who whose unjust victimization made those benefits possible, then the beneficiaries are morally liable to be *preventively* killed if necessary to achieve the good that discharging their restitutional duties would achieve. In arguing for this, I will begin by laying out a framework for *restitutionary* duties. I will then argue that those who will fail to discharge their restitutionary duties can be liable to proportionate harms necessary to prevent such failures of restitution. The application of this argument to the context of warfare will yield the view the principle of non-combatant immunity is mistaken, at the level of morality.

Mine Balliu
PhD Student, University of Tirana, Albania

Totalitarianism of Arendt and the Case of Albania

The philosophy of Hannah Arendt in her work "The origins of totalitarianism" (1949), where she analyzes totalitarianism during and after World War II, reveals his three basic characteristics: violence, terror and ideology. All three of these elements were present, even quite evident in Albania during the communist period 1945 - 1990. Listed among the countries of the socialist camp east, under the strong influence of communist ideology, Stalinist dictatorship in Albania has been the most brutal than any other country in the east. With nearly 3 million inhabitants, the statistics show a high percentage of imprisonment, deportation, executions, reprisals against the population, especially against political opponents that did not fit with their ideology. The public and political dimension of the Albanian citizen was shocked too, under the communist. The regime truncated even the private dimension; terror and violence reached out to families. The Albanians were not free, not only within the society, but they were feeling unsure even inside their own families. Albanians were denied physical freedom and are not less but more than 25 thousand prisoners, nearly 80 thousand other political interned in work camps, with some 6 thousands people killed without trial, without mentioning the rest where hundreds of other victims traumatized, maimed or terrorized by psychological violence. Another part of the Albanian society, that was not isolated, was also feeling the same insecure and lonely, despite being formally part of the society, and felt threatened at any moment by possible punishments. Don't all these facts above give us the right to call the 45 - year-old system in Albania a totalitarian system? The paper is an approach and analysis of these three elements in the specific conditions of Albania during the communist regime.

Sebastián Briceño
PhD student, University of Nottingham, UK

How does the will stand to the Voluntary Action?

Humeans are driven by the impulse of denying the existence of mysterious entities like hidden powers and nomic connections between distinct existents. Anti-Humeans are happy to accept them if they provide good ontological explanations of appearances. As in many other areas of metaphysics, these positions also inspire alternative responses to the problem of how the will stands to the voluntary action.

Humeans takes the will to be a dubious transcendental phantom and the voluntary action a mere happening, externally related to other happenings. Anti-Humeans, by contrast, acknowledge that there seems to be a very relevant difference between voluntary action and a mere happening, and that this difference calls for an explanation. In general terms, the anti-Humean explanation is given by understanding that will and voluntary action stand to each other in a special relation, like the one that holds between a power or disposition and its manifestation, or like the one that holds between cause and effect.

In this paper I argue that neither of these responses is plausible and that the most adequate solution is instead along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein. First, the Humean is wrong, because not everything that happens to one is something one does. Second, the anti-Humean is also wrong, because his solution starts by taking will and voluntary action as distinct existents, and this opens a gap that stubbornly resists being filled by any shadowy bond. But this gap is the result of a distinction drawn where there is no difference. Because the will is not related to the voluntary action. Willing is acting. If will and action are related at all, then that relation is the merely formal relation of identity.

Jordi Cabos Teixido
Researcher, University of Barcelona, Spain

Strength and Limit Situations: Apology of Philosophy

Favio Cala Vitery
Professor, Jorge Tadeo Lozano University, Colombia

Bohmian Quantum Mechanics as a Constructive Theory

Einstein's (1919) distinction between what he termed 'principle theories' and 'constructive theories' has been applied by Jeffrey Bub (2000) to argue that Quantum mechanics in its standard-Copenhagen interpretation should be understood as a principle theory. I agree. Furthermore, I argue that Bohm's account of Quantum Mechanics (QM), also known as the pilot wave theory, can be understood as a 'constructive' theory in Einstein´s sense. A principle theory consists of empirical well established generalizations known as laws or principles such as the first and second law of thermodynamics or the principles of special relativity. One can also include the Born Rule of QM. According to Einstein the advantages of principle theories are 'security in its foundations and logical perfection'. However to grasp ultimate understanding of phenomena one should provide constructive theories that 'attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out'. So to speak, constructive theories provide models or intelligible pictures of physical phenomena. I argue that Bohm´s account of QM, with its extra microstructure, provides such a constructive model. It is shown that, in this theory, general quantum phenomena can be constructed from the model of statistical ensembles of microparticles in motion, provided that deterministic particle trajectories are guided -by principle of nature- by the wave function.

Kruttika Chincholikar
Associate Professor, Government College of Education, India
&
Sunita Totade
Associate Professor, Government College of Education, India

Theory of Cosmic Consciousness in Hindu Religion

21st century is the century of globalization. Human being is fond of materialistic lifestyle. Due to the struggle of existence and due to the aggressive competition of weapons in developing as well as developed countries mankind is not safe anymore. There is exaltation of greed of material wealth but total ignorance of mental peace. Due to lack of progress regarding self-consciousness, mankind is totally in a stage of loneliness. To establish the universal peace, we have to think about some questions:

- What is universe?
- What is the relation between human being and universe?
- What is human being?
- What is real nature of human being?
- What is the real meaning of life?
- What is the ultimate goal of human life?
- What is the proper way of universalization of mankind?
- What is consciousness?
- What is ultimate truth?

All these questions are satisfied by the fundamental theory of Hindu religion. There is assimilation of human being, universe and consciousness. Theory of cosmic consciousness is the foundation of Hindu religion. The message given in this theory is based on Advaita (non-dualism). According to Hindu philosophy, ultimate goal of life is Moksha. Ways to attain it are Mantra,Dnyana,Bhakti and Karma.

The Vedas are the original source of Hindu philosophy of life and system of education in India. Hindu philosophy is divided into Astika and Nastika.

Astika schools are as follows:
- Kapilamuni's Samkhya Darshan
- Patanjali's Yogashastra
- Gautama's Nyayashastra
- Kanada's Vaisheshika Darshan
- Jaimini's Purvamimamsa Darshan

- Vedanta- last segment of knowledge in Vedas
- Advaita Darshan of Shankaracharya
- Ramanujacharya's Vishishtadvaita

Nastika schools are as follows:

- Charvaka
- Jainism
- Buddhism

Present article will focus on the theory of cosmic consciousness in Hindu religion which can ultimately strengthen the universal peace.

Jonas Ciurlionis
Lecturer, Vilnius University, Lithuania

On Identity and Simultaneity

In this paper I'm going to analyze the interconnection of notion of identity and simultaneity. I'm going to argue that any notion of simultaneity depends upon notion of identity and that any notion of identity is spacio-temporal.

While we often talk about different types of identity: logical, ontological, or Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, we overlook that any "What is identical?" or "How is it identical?" depends upon "When is it identical?" or "Where is it identical?" Therefore, identity cannot be understood without spacio-temporal reference. Also, as any object can be described as an event or to make it more strict: any object is an event, thus anything considered to be simultaneous also must be considered as identical in time. However, while simultaneous objects (events) are considered to be identical in time, not all identical objects (events) are considered to be simultaneous. Following this consideration four possible types of spacio-temporal identity are analyzed. Any object (event) can be identical: a) in space and time; b) in space but not time; c) in time but not in space; d) neither in space nor in time. Therefore, all objects (events) that are considered as being identical fall into one of these four spacio-temporal categories. This is true whether we have properties, features or qualities or any other factors which let us consider objects (events) as identical. As we can see only a) and c) cases apply to notion of simultaneity, where objects (events) are considered to be identical in time. We also know that simultaneity is relative and depends upon system of reference. Therefore, we may expect that the same applies to identity thus forming idea of relativity of identity in those categories that depend on time.

Kevin Corcoran
Professor, Calvin College, USA

The Persistence of Persons

What does it take for a human person to persist through time? Can a human person cease to be humor: without ceasing to exist? Can a human person be constituted by different human bodies at different times? In her book, *Persons and Bodies* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), Lynne Baker defends a constitution view of human persons according to which human persons are physical objects wholly constituted by their bodies without being identical with the bodies that constitute them, and she offers an account of personal identity based on a constitution view. In this paper, I first sketch (without defending) the constitution view of human persons. I then offer a brief but plausible account of personal identity. Next, I present in some detail Baker's own account of personal identity and show that what Baker offers as a metaphysically *sufficient* condition for the persistence of human persons, fails. I also show that, contrary to Baker, a constitution view of human persons does not entail the belief that a single human person could be constituted by different human bodies at different times. Nor (again contrary to Baker) is it part of the theory of constitution that a human person can cease to be human without ceasing to exist. All of this leads to the following observation and conclusion: if you're going to adopt a constitution account of human persons, and you want to avoid the charge of being a dualist about persons (as does Baker), you are well advised to reject Baker's account of personal identity.

Vasudha Deo
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Swami Chinmayananda and Religion

Swami Chinmayanand is a great scholar of Vedanta in modern times and a great sage. He is founder of Chinmay Mission which has been working to spread the philosophy of Vedas. Swami Chinmayanand's thoughts abound with solutions to present day problems. Chinmay Mission has played a vital role in spreading his thoughts all over the world. Discipline, nationalism and religiousness are some of the features of his personality.

Swami Chinmayanand has stated valuable thoughts about religion. The society is being fragmented in the name of religion. The thoughts of Swami Chinmayanand give us hope in this dark period in the history of humanity. Swami Chinmayananda's definition of religion (dharma) is very clear. According to him Dharma is a Law of Being. Nothing can retain its existence without its inherent law i.e. quality. Anything remains in its own state because of its quality. This basic Law of Being is the religion of the thing. Gurudeo stated a very comprehensive outlook of religion. A person needs to be aware of his religion for his development. A religion shows path and aim to a developed person. The concept of God as propagated by temples, mosques, churches and gurudwaras can not be accepted because these places differentiate man from man. Gurudeo believed that the man made religions turn into deformed institutes. According to him religion is science. It is a system through which man comes to know his position in the vast world. He firmly believed that true religion never ends.

Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu
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An Attempt to Undermine the Extreme Claim

According to reductionism, personal identity consists in the continuity and connectedness between psychological and/or bodily states and not in a further fact. The reductionist view stands in opposition to the non-reductionist view of personal identity according to which personal identity consists in a further fact and does not reduce to facts about mental or bodily states. It's been argued that when reductionism is endorsed, one's concern for one's future, called the special concern, cannot be justified. Parfit (1984) calls this the extreme claim. The extreme claim is typically based on the view that continuity and connectedness between psychological and/or bodily states are irrelevant to the special concern and that there is no place for an appropriate subject of concern in reductionist accounts of personal identity. The need for something over and above mental states and the ways in which they are related makes the non-reductionist view the tempting one since most people think of themselves as not just a bundle of mental states but as the *thing* that has those mental states and therefore rightly justified about their futures.

My purpose is to undermine the extreme claim. I first argue against the claim that reductionism does not accommodate a subject of concern. Secondly I argue that the continuity and connectedness between psychological and/or bodily states figure in the determination of a mental state as a mental state of a particular kind, e.g. as a state of concern rather than a belief or a desire. Therefore continuity and connectedness can be seen as relevant to the special concern. Lastly, I argue that some examples used in favor of the extreme claim assume psychological criterion of identity and that those examples fail to support the extreme claim when bodily criterion is endorsed.

Andy Engen
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Communication, Expression, and the Justification of Punishment

In his influential "The Expressive Function of Punishment," Joel Feinberg argues that the definition of punishment must include not only its characteristic hard treatment but also its expressive character. Through the act of punishment society expresses condemnation toward the wrongdoer for the wrong committed.

I look at a group of subsequent theories of punishment (Duff, Hampton) that take up the idea that punishment can be used to communicate a message to the criminal and maintain that function itself justifies the harm of punishment. These communicative justifications of punishment follow Feinberg in highlighting the idea that punishment can be used to send messages, but rather than focusing on punishment as merely the expression of condemnation by the community, they conceive of it as a form of communication from the state to the criminal that what he has done is wrong.

I argue that communicative theories of punishment have difficulty justifying punishment because punishment seems intuitively justified in cases in which it fails as a method of communication. Punishment fails as communication when the punished ignores the intended message or fails to understand it. Among those most likely to ignore or fail to understand the message of punishment are the most hardened criminals, whom we typically think are appropriate targets of punishment.

I suggest that an alternative justificatory strategy, one that focuses not on the successful receipt of the message of punishment by the wrongdoer but on the expression of the condemnation by the community, is not subject to the same worry. The norms of successful expression are more easily met than those of communication, so that expression of the condemnation of the wrong action of a criminal might be justified even if he is unreceptive in the face of the expression.

Patrick Fleming
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Arbitrariness and Choice in Practical Reason

A value-based theory of reasons claims that there are facts about the value of actions that hold independently of any person's attitudes towards those actions. Our reasons for action are determined by these facts. A desire-based theory claims that facts about what we desire, or would desire on appropriate reflection, determine our reasons. Reasons for action depend on what we are like psychologically. The key difference between the two is to what extent our reasons are independent of our attitudes. The value-based theory advocates complete independence, while the desire-based theory accepts some measure of dependence. In this paper I argue what counts as *my reason* is arbitrary for a value-based theory. If no internal factor plays a role in determining our reasons, then what reasons are my reasons are outside my control. This might be an attractive feature of moral reasons, but it is deeply implausible for personal reasons. The paper will argue that the value-based theorist is committed to arbitrariness in cases of choices between rational eligible options. That is, cases where I have to choose a career amongst a set of rationally permissible options. The value-based theorist has no resources to explain why some ends are more valuable to an agent than other available ends. The main strategy they employ is the Contextualizing strategy. They can claim that one's context can determine how value-based reasons apply in a situation. However, we will see that one's context is outside of one's direct control. So we still have no control over what reasons among the available reasons count as our reasons. I argue that sort of arbitrariness is deeply problematic.

Gary Fuller
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Physicalism, Composition and Realization

Physicalism is roughly the view that all that exists (or at least all that exists in time) is physical: all that exists are physical objects, events, and so on. Physicalism with respect to the mind-body problem is the view that the mental is in some sense nothing but the physical. Early on philosophers tried to express mind-body physicalism using the notion of identity, by holding, for example, that all mental events are identical to physical events. Using identity to characterize mind-body-physicalism seemed too strong, however, even, some argued, in the case of token events. And so the idea of identity was replaced by the ideas of realization and of constitution. Mental objects such as persons are not identical to, but rather constituted by, physical objects such as brains, or brain-bodies. Mental states or events, such as the state of being in pain, are realized by physical states, such as the state of having one's C-fibers fire. Recently, some philosophers have attempted to distinguish between realization and constitution with respect to states and events. Pereboom, for example, has argued in a recent (2011) book that a notion of the constitution of mental states and events can be developed that is different from that of realization and that "the constitution-based view that I endorse" has important advantages over the realization-based view.

The aim of my talk is to ask whether Pereboom's view, or something like his view, is right. After spelling out his distinction between constitution and realization, I shall go on to discuss whether his constitution-based view deals better than realization views with such issues as the problem of the causal overdetermination of mental events and that of the projectibility of mental properties. I shall conclude with a discussion of Melnick's recent criticism that Pereboom's constitution-based view fails because it does not give us certain necessary desiderata of an adequate physicalism.

Silvia Galikova
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Towards the Reality of Self-agency

In everyday life we experience ourselves as living conscious creatures. We feel intuitively that our intentions and decisions play an important role in action and behaviour. The aim of my presentation is twofold. Firstly, I intend to point out a profound asymmetry between experienced inner self-agency and a theoretical explanation of the nature of felt conscious states. I will support my claim by experimental research and clinical practice on normal and impaired states of self-consciousness (Wegner, Damasio). Based on novel research findings many philosophers appeal strongly to a naturalistic explanation of conscious experience and self (Blackmore, Metzinger). However, the third person – reductionist approach has been criticized for not taking conscious self and „phenomenology seriously" (Chalmers) or neglecting the „irreducibility of the first person story" (Velmans). Antireductionists blame representatives of naturalism for neglecting the very existence of subjective conscious experience. The second aim of my presentation is to reveal misunderstandings concerned with recent almost paradoxical situation in consciousness studies. My argumentation is based on clarifying the following: a) sense in which conscious experience is considered as a real natural phenomenon and b) claim according to which what is *illusionary* is that which *does not* exist. Treating consciousness, conscious experience as nonexistent phenomena is not far from being the most ridiculous idea – a category mistake - in contemporary philosophy of mind. Finally, in order to avoid permanent confusions in the study of self, conscious agency and will, it is necessary both to outline in what sense experience of self-agency *is* and is *not* an illusion. Without a proposed clarification of fundamental concepts in question the search for a science of consciousness and self-agency would be futile.

Blaine Garfolo
Chair, Academic Advising Committee for the DBA Program,
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Who are you?

Who Are You? The question we are asked many times by others as they try to make a connection with us. Our mouths speak from the deposits accumulated in our hearts. Our hearts contain the elements or the molecules of our being. How do you talk? What do you say? Your words and actions express your thoughts. Your thoughts reflect you. So the question "Who are you?" is an interesting one and though the person asking may have many questions, and the process of knowing you has altered their consciousness and therefore their perceptions of you, you remain irrevocably who you are despite their altered state. As such, some of your answers they will understand due to the temporal connection they have made with you, and some of them they will not. Concordantly, while their first question may be the most pertinent (Who Are You?), they may or may not realize it is also the most irrelevant.

So how does one answer the question "Who Are You?? As a human being, we are just one part of the whole, called by us "Universe," which is a part limited in time and space. And though I experience many thoughts and feelings, as something that separates each of us from the rest, it is kind of an optical delusion of consciousness. So, "Who Are You?" or "Where Are You?" or "What Time Is It?" are all relative to the point in the time continuum you find yourself at in that particular point in your existence.

The equations of relativity show that both the space and time coordinates of any event are mixed together by the mathematics of the event in order to accurately describe what we see. Space consists of 3 dimensions, and time is 1-dimensional, therefore space-time must be a 4-dimensional object. It is believed to be a 'continuum' because so far as we know, there are no missing points in space or instants in time, and both can be subdivided without any apparent limit in size or duration. So, we are by default, embedded in this 4-dimensional space-time continuum, and all events, places, moments in history, actions and so on are described in terms of their location in space-time which does not evolve but exists.

Thomas Giourgas
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The Chasm between Protagorean Ethics and Education

In this paper, I argue that a careful analysis of Plato's dialogue, the Protagoras, can set the ground for a deeper understanding of the contradictions inherent in Protagorean moral thought and philosophy of education. The introduction of the "art of measurement" and the Protagorean adherence to the distinction between real and apparent goods induce an insurmountable puzzle for Protagoras.

In the course of the dialogue, a traditionally Socratic doctrine, the denial of akrasia, apparently relies upon a very un-Socratic premise, that is, the identification of the good with the pleasant. Does Socrates really intend to endorse the hedonistic premise? And if not, what is the role of hedonism in the economy of the dialogue? My contention will be that quantitative hedonism is introduced and exploited by Plato as a necessary premise for the exposition of the inconsistencies inherent in Protagoras' ethical system.

Famously, Protagoras claimed to be a teacher of virtue, while at the same time, he ascribed to an idiosyncratic position of moral subjectivism. I will argue that the Platonic argument in the Protagoras aims (a) at the drawing of a sharp distinction between (Protagorean) sophistry and (Socratic) philosophy by highlighting the divide between the philosophical and sophistic educational aims as well as between their ethical orientation, and (b) Plato's anti-sophistic argument intends to shed light on the contradictory nature of Protagoras' moral and epistemological thought.

In particular, Plato invites us to think that Protagoras cannot simultaneously hold his subjectivist views in the moral domain and his belief in the teachability of virtue. If decision-making relies not upon how things appear to be, but on how things really are and if our well-being depends upon choosing larger things instead of smaller alternatives, then our salvation in life will depend upon acquiring knowledge of the art of measurement and arithmetic. However, the latter distinction between real and apparent goods seems to be at odds with Protagorean epistemology ('man is the measure of all things') and Protagorean phenomenalism ('as things appear to man so they are').

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University of Chieti, Italy

The Reasons of Nothingness.
For a Comparison between 19th-20th Century Italian and German Philosophy on the Negative Ontology

The 19th and the 20th centuries are the time of the *crisis* of rationalistic dogmatism, the spread of a cultural pessimism, and of the *Lebensphilosophie* and Spengler's *Decline of the West*. During this period a new philosophical sensitivity (post-and anti-Hegelian), emerges, which not only dissents from the *reductio hominis* to an essence, but also against the systematic nature of thought and of rationalistic optimism. It is as this time that a philosophical-existential *Weltanschauung* emerges in Italy and Germany. This can be designated as a negative ontology, a disenchanted way of looking at reality as something negative. Both Italian tragic Thought – Giacomo Leopardi, Giuseppe Rensi, Carlo Michelstaedter, Andrea Emo and Adriano Tilgher – and German gnostic and skeptical Thought – Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, Eduard von Hartmann, Philipp Mainlander and Julius Bahnsen – see this as the *mysterium* of Being and of Truth (*ἀ-λήθεια*). On this view absurdity, contradiction, pain and death are *facta bruta* that are irreducible to conceptual simplification and to a normative ontological principle. Against this background, my paper will explain the commonality of research issues and research styles between the above-named leading figures of Italian negative thought and the most original thinkers of the German meontology, in order to offer a view of Italian Philosophy as an important *terminus a quo* for developing an European historical-philosophical debate in the terms of *Philosophieren ist Eraklitieren*.

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Religion and Politics by Hobbesian Right of Resistance

The Hobbesian state reputedly concentrates all political powers and rights; assembling legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, what it comes to proclaim as a «right» can never be unfair. In addition, it also possesses power over miracles and confessions («Macht ... über Wunder und Bekenntnisse») and spiritual and mundane authority, whose power on Earth is unequalled. By teaching the original covenant toward an almighty state, pactum societatis and pactum subjectionis are intertwined, diverting its sense in the tradition of natural right of contract. This refined construction of contract mirrors the renunciation of political opposition against the State. Within this fundamental conception, while the «soveraign» detains the rights and powers, the «citizen» (subject) is left only with obligations: «since it [the State] has all objective and subjective rights on its side, […] otherwise […] again the state of nature prevails». In such a picture, there does not seem to be something as a «right to resistance» to the citizens. Hobbes himself will insist against disobedience, insurrection, and tyrannicide. He was convinced that the city's supreme power should even limit freedom of thought in stimulating a sound doctrine and banning evil doctrines , examining books before publishing them, since «man's tongue is a trumpet to war and sedition». Prima face, Hobbes seems to be making a case for a doctrine of non resistance. Here we will explore where in the almighty State's wall fissures are opened. On the citizen already presents us a first clue, clarifying the commitment of obedience: «Though such obedience may sometimes rightly be refused for various reasons». This means disobedience to soveraign law. Maybe the best known instance is that of avoidance of imminent death, «since no law can oblige man to renounce to his own preservation». Elsewhere it had been established that theft can only be called such in face of recognition of property of the State. The extreme need, «when a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life», turns stealth into utterly pardonable. If, however, in this case, «nature forces the act», when we speak of «right of resistance», in which circumstances could this right be exercised, with legitimacy?

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Jurgen Habermas: The Communicative Action and the Strategic Action

Habermas thought recovers a classic concept of philosophy: the idea that the reality in which we live is penetrable by reason, and that it can structure the human society. It shows the possibility of a reflection on the historical journey reconstructing the potential rational, communicative and consensus on which society is based.

The problem of rationality in relation to communication is in the Habermas spotlight. He makes a partition on the instrumental action and communicative action. The instrumental action is oriented towards transformation of external reality and is organized for this purpose; the communicative action is oriented towards mutual understanding. This division corresponding with two types of rationality: instrumental and communicative. Referring to communicative rationality, we can say that an action can be defined as rational only if the speaker possesses the conditions that are necessary to achieve the purpose to understand something in this world, at least with another participant in the communication. Instead, a goal-oriented action can be defined as a rational if an actor fulfills the conditions which are necessary to achieve the purpose to intervene successfully in the world.

Habermas discussion is concentrated towards exploration and deepening of the conditions of communicative rationality, which according to the author, is possible only in the presence of a free communication liabilities, based on the principle that arguments can be answered only with other arguments. But the need for a communicative rationality through which individuals may find themselves is constant in the Habermas opinion, although he is leaning towards an evolutionary theory where individual and social evolution lead to free individual and social identities.

Starting from the last century with the industrial technological and economic transformations, the modern society has changed communication instruments and tools used. So, today we can talk about a weaving between communicative action and strategic action.

Christine James
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The Cultural Economy and Austerity Measures: Problematizing the Creativity Market

The recent economic recession, and the accompanying austerity measures in many countries, relates to the cultural context in an ambiguous way. In the last few years, academics have produced a variety of research on the potential for a "growth" in creativity during times of austerity measures. Traditionally, the cultural economy has been seen as secondary and dependent on the financial and manufacturing economies (Pratt 2012). The common-sense understanding of market and culture is that cultural pursuits depend upon the average person having disposable income to spend on entertainment and the fine arts. Recent research has shown that this common understanding is actually wrong. For example, after the 1929 stock market crash, attendance at films increased, and that time period is described as the Golden Age of Hollywood. In Spain, the theatre sector provided a variety of "creative" ways to work around new VAT taxes, including selling carrots as theatre tickets and supporting pop-up microtheatres in private apartments (Staines 2013). It can certainly be argued that the cultural economy is becoming more of a major player for many countries, as economic recovery often necessitates a resurgence in the arts, performance, and hospitality industries. In London, cultural economy ranks as the 4th largest sector of employment (Freeman 2007). The claim that it is imperative for economic purposes that a successful playground be built for the "creative class" has been argued for at least a decade (Florida 2002). However, often what is meant by creativity includes a variety of financial incentives that are not necessarily creative or "cultural" in their motivation. Rather, individual consumers support the arts even in times of limited discretionary spending (as in the Golden Age of Hollywood); and international business still sees profit potential and wise investment in creative endeavors and the arts (UNCTAD, 2008, 2010). State strategies to lure film makers, tax breaks for entertainment productions that are willing to relocate to countries under austerity measures, are a major influence on the current international scene (Christopherson 2009, Cobb 2006). The potential importance of the cultural economy in economic recovery in general, and the connection between the cultural economy and entertainment corporations that are motivated by economic incentives, require us to reframe the austerity-creativity connection. Following Wollheim's classic aesthetic theory of "criticism as retrieval," we should be mindful of the cultural values that are at stake in the creativity-culture market now being created. In any case, some scholars estimate that austerity measures in many countries will last until

2020, giving us ample opportunity to be even more "creative" with both financial incentives and artistic achievements.

Tamara Kayali
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A Role for Bioethicists and Philosophers in Psychiatric Classification

The creation of the latest version of psychiatry's "bible" has been accompanied by an unprecedented level of debate. The latest edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-5) contains several controversial diagnoses that have dominated the debate. One of the central criticisms of DSM-5 is that it pathologises some behaviours that were previously considered simply problematic, or variations of normal behaviour – e.g. fidgetiness, noisiness, abundance of energy, shyness, anxiety and bereavement. There has also been some criticism that although those involved in revising the DSM are scientific and clinical experts in their fields, their background does not adequately equip them to make judgements on moral issues and values.

I argue that part of the reason for the recent controversies surrounding the DSM is that its revision process involves making certain value judgements, yet requires a better means for explicitly and expertly addressing these issues. I further argue that it is important to do so because a) there are certain value-laden questions that science cannot answer but which nevertheless need to be addressed in psychiatric classification, and b) the effects of psychiatric classification stretch far and wide. As the DSM is influential in clinical diagnosis, research, funding, treatment, public policy and forensics, pathologising certain behaviours can have repercussions in all these sectors.

I suggest a means by which the value judgements involved in psychiatric classification can be more systematically and comprehensively examined – by including an independent ethics review panel in the revision process. An ethics review panel could include bioethicists and philosophers of psychiatry, among other experts who would be in a better position to address these issues.

Emily Marie Kelahan
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Hume's "Former Opinions"

David Hume advances an account of personal identity in Book I of his A Treatise of Human Nature, and then retracts it in the Appendix to that work:

"But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent." (T App 10)

His explanation appears, perhaps at first, direct:

"In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either in here in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case." (T App 21)

However, this explanation is, at best, mysterious. As has been made abundantly clear in the vast literature on this topic, the two principles cited above are not inconsistent. This tells us that there must be a third claim, or set of claims, with which the two principles are inconsistent. A core assumption of the debate surrounding this mysterious text is that the "former opinions" Hume has in mind are philosophical views he advanced earlier in the Treatise, such as his rejection of the Cartesian view of the mind or his claim that the association of ideas in the mind can be fully explained by the principles of resemblance and cause and effect. This assumption is mistaken. I argue that the "former opinions" Hume cannot correct or render consistent are pre-theoretical opinions he formed through socialization and education long before self-consciously pursuing his science of human nature.

Magdy Kilany
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Philo's attitude towards Sophistai

In this paper I shall try to follow up the critical attitude of Philo towards the sophists in general, and the sophists in Alexandria in the AD 1st century. I'll focus on the substantial differences between the sophists and the Jewish Therapeutai (θεραπευται). The paper deals also with Philo's attitude towards the negative role of the sophists with whom Alexandria was crowded in the AD 1st century concerning teaching virtue. The paper deals also with the relation between the sophists and the Egyptian magicians (Αιγυπτιοι μαγοι).

The most important questions raised in this paper are as follows:

- Why Philo compared basically between the sophists and the Therapeutai?
- Why Philo considered Moses in relation to the Egyptian opponents as Socrates in relation to the sophists?
- Can we consider Philo himself as a sophist since he has used dialectic (διαλεκτική) particularly in his "In Flaccum" and "Legatio ad Gaium" beside the dispute which happen between Philo and his nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander the apostate?

Kazutaka Kondo
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Socrates' Rhetorical Strategy in Plato's Apology

This paper investigates Socrates' intention in his defense speech against the first accusers in Plato's *Apology*.

As a defender, Socrates is, naturally, supposed to argue for his acquittal in a straightforward and effective way. However, his opening defense against "the first accusations" that he has investigated all things under the earth, and makes the weaker speech the stronger, does not seem to aid him in that respect. To the official and "later" indictment, Socrates here adds further accusations, which the official accusers themselves never brought up. For what purpose does Socrates seemingly incriminate himself, and through this tactic, what does he achieve?

Previous studies on this question generally offer two interpretations. Some argue that Socrates' argument against the first accusers is a reasonable appeal for an acquittal, because the official indictment depends on their claim (Brickhouse and Smith). Others contend that Socrates does not attempt to argue for his acquittal, but merely highlights the tragic and irresolvable conflict between his own sense of morality and the conventional ethics of the city (Colaiaco). This paper offers a third interpretation. Appealing to the first accusations as an example of the prejudice that he considers characteristic of Athens, Socrates tries to redirect the negative prejudice in favor of a more favorable one, without ever having refuted the accusations. His speech is less a matter of refutation than it is an attempt to elevate his moral status in the eyes of the common people.

This interpretation of Socrates' purpose in the first part of his speech sheds new light on the entire *Apology*, thus elucidating the work in a new way and making an important contribution to the ongoing discussion about Socrates' purpose therein.

Martyna Koszkalo
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Voluntarism and intellectualism. Thomas Aquinas versus John Duns Scotus

In my paper I would like to present intellectualistic and voluntaristic tendencies both in Aquinas' and Scotus' ethics and anthropology.

Due to differences among these tendencies it seems obvious that the terms intellectualism and voluntarism are somewhat confusing and not clear. First, I would like to distinguish some senses of these terms and specify their extension. Three types of voluntarism could be attributed to someone's ethics and anthropology: psychological voluntarism; theological voluntarism, and causal voluntarism (the will is taken to be the primary cause of free action, non determined even by the most perfect good).

According to psychological voluntarism the will is a nobler power that intellect and this position is usually attributed to Franciscan medieval philosophers. I will show that this position could easily be found in Scotus' texts (conf. Ordinatio IV, d.49, q. 4, n.210-266). However in Aquinas' text we can also find passages confirming the claim that the will is nobler than the intellect (S. theol. I, q.82, a. 3, resp.). Thus one can ascribe psychological voluntarism to Scotus and sometimes a weak psychological voluntarism to Aquinas.

Theological voluntarism is a standpoint that can hardly be found in Aquinas texts, because of two of his main claims: first of all, that God could not change the moral law (expressed in Ten Commandments), and secondly that the natures of things are not changeable. According to Scotus, the moral law is changeable according to God's will, but this change can only concern the law expressed in the second table of Commandments (conf. Ordinatio III, d.37, q. un). Duns takes the Commandments of the first table to be obligatory in a stronger way than the Commandments of the second table and this standpoint may generate the interpretation of Scotus' thought as voluntaristic but in a weak sense.

Finally, I will try to ascribe causal voluntarism to Scotus and weak causal intellectualism to Aquinas.

Eric Kraemer
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Virtue Epistemologys: Confronting the Problem of Cognitive Vice

Virtue epistemologists agree that knowledge consists in having beliefs appropriately formed in accordance with epistemic virtue, but they disagree about what constitutes an epistemic virtue. Some (Montmarquet, Zagzebsky) take an epistemic virtue to be a character trait (such as intellectual courage), roughly following the traditional Aristotelian conception of the moral virtues, while other (Sosa, Greco) take an epistemic virtue to be a stable naturalistic disposition which reliably produces true beliefs (such as proper perceptual practices). Both kinds of virtue epistemologists need to confront the problem of the enormity of psychological vice, as revealed by contemporary experimental cognitive science research (Kahnemann, 2011.) The problem is that even the most careful of epistemic appraisers is naturally prone to make numerous basic errors in evaluation of evidence. While epistemic biases have been recognized by epistemologists since ancient times (Sextus Empiricus), cognitive science research over the past several decades reveals humans to be much worse off in a number of respects than had previously been imagined. There is powerful evidence that humans are particularly bad at estimating their own ability for objective self-evaluations, and can be easily manipulated by a wide variety of subtle environmental factors into holding wildly inaccurate beliefs about others. The prevalence of epistemically vicious natural tendencies suggests the two opposing camps of virtue epistemologists would do well to join forces, and admit that an adequate virtue epistemology requires conjoining both natural dispositions and character traits in the effort not only to incorporate both character-traits and natural dispositions which lead to truth but also, and more importantly perhaps, to isolate both sorts of features which regularly lead to falsity. This paper examines several attempts at brokering such a marriage of virtue epistemologies. In particular it is argued that Sosa's 2011 virtue epistemology can be fruitfully re-interpreted as such a view.

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An analysis on Slingerland's interpretation of Laozian Wu-wei

Wu-wei, as a philosophical concept initiated by Laozi, literally means doing nothing or the negation of all kinds of human actions, desires and values. In *Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China*, Slingerland applies the term "the paradox of wu-wei" to interpret the significance of this crucial idea of Laozi's philosophy. According to Slingerland, Laozi's *wu-wei* is a genuine paradox that requires the sage's condition simultaneously being without desires and being possessed of desires. It would be helpful if it could be shown how "the paradox of wu-wei" contributes to a profound understanding of Laozian *wu-wei*; however no such argument is found in his interpretation. We have reason to believe that Slingerland deemed the Laozian's ideal spiritual state to be an illusion, unless Laozi could provide a practical method or solution to resolve such tensions.

This paper attempts to point out that the "genuine paradox" found in Laozi was merely a special conveyance strategy for promoting a different value orientation to prevailing convention, and demands the most appropriate manner of actions by re-examining the textual meaning. With the broad usage of the term "paradox" in western philosophy, such so called "genuine paradox" is actually similar to what W. V. Quine says "veridical paradox" rather than "antinomy." "The paradox of wu-wei" in Laozi can be dissipated by pondering its contextual significance, which Laozi champions. Therefore, I shall demonstrate that, both from the cognitive and behavioral aspects, the Laozian sage does possess values which differ from the conventional understanding of the world.

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Historicity and Postmodernity Towards the positive reflection of contemporary human situation

The thought about novelty of our time is already not very new. Now we know about "postmodern condition", and we already have the list of many deaths: the death of man, the death of subject, the death of author etc. We can also add to this funeral list the historical consciousness that was the attribute of the human of XIX and XX centuries. Contemporary man does not feel himself a participant of *history* (although he may feel himself a participant or a victim of global changes, upheavals, processes etc.), and the things don't have for him the dimension of historicity. This lack of historical consciousness sometimes is seen as one of the negative traits of our time. But I think, that the actual problem of contemporary man is not a problem of crisis of former concepts and ways of viewing. Any new era begins with such a crisis. The problem is that we characterize our time almost exclusively in negative terms - like a crisis or damage of something, that used to be beautiful, deep, strong. Contemporary man lacks a positive reflection of the present time. Accordingly to it we often attempt to "revive lost traditions" and as a result create just simulacra, i.e. the likenesses without internal resemblance to what they want to be like. Or otherwise we run without reflection, passively and uncreatively inscribed in time trends. But is the end of the previous historical consciousness not also the beginning of a new attitude to the past? I argue that it is so, and we can make this new attitude fruitful. For this we must positively reflect the specificity of our time, we must work out a language for such a reflection. In my report I want to make a modest contribution to the solution of this problem.

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I am Because We Are? The Irony of Ubuntuism, Ethnic Conflicts and the Crisis of Identity in Africa

This paper seeks to examine the crisis of identity in Africa, the recurrent ethnic conflicts in the continent and the irony of preaching the philosophy of *Ubuntuism* in the midst of such conflicts. The questions of what constitutes "African Identity" or who is an "African" and the place of ethnic identity in defining "Africanness" are at the core of African Philosophy. One of the 'answers' fronted in search of "African Identity" has been *Ubuntuism*. The philosophy of *Ubuntuism* is presented as a unifying worldview for the different ethnic communities in Africa to live as "One". Ideally, *Ubuntuism* is said to encompass the 'unique universal humanness' that makes Africans to relate with each other communally in contrast to the Western Philosophy of Individualism. The essence of *Ubuntuism*, is therefore "I am because We are". In the spirit of *Ubuntuism*, Africa can address the various challenges facing it among them ethnic conflicts. But the irony is that although *Ubuntuism* holds that one's identity is rooted in one's connection with others making it in theory a universal human value, in practice, it has often proved to be loosely limited to those who are of the same tribe, race, religion or nation.

In the spirit of "We ness, One ness and "my/ our people", ethnic communities have risen and killed one another most notably in Kenya and Rwanda and the xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Our argument in this paper is that the crisis of self identity and what constitutes "African identity" lies in the narrow and limited living out of *Ubuntuism* which only stretches as far as one's tribe, and/ or national border. The spirit of "One ness and Humanness" embedded in *Ubuntuism* can only offer solutions to the crisis of identity in Africa if such values are regarded not as 'unique' values defining 'Africanness', but as universal human rights values that are binding regardless of one's ethnic, racial, or geographical belonging.

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An Ontic Conception of Chance in Monod's Non-Teleological Evolutionary Biological Theory

In *Le Hasard et La Nécessité*, one of the most influential books in the story of Biology, Jacques Monod presented his non-teleological evolutionary biological theory. Starting from the idea – which someone ascribes to Democritus – that everything existing in the Universe is the fruit of chance and necessity, Monod maintains that each alteration in the DNA happens *by chance*. Hence, chance – according to Monod – is the origin of every novelty happening in the biosphere, and then the driving force of the evolution.

But which conception of chance is at the core of Monod's non-teleological theory? According to Monod, chance events are the result of the intersection between different processes that belong to *independent* causal chains. These accidental events are called "absolute coincidences":

«[...] C'est le cas, par exemple, de ce que l'on peut appeler les "coïncidences absolues", c'est-à-dire celles qui résultent de l'intersection de deux chaînes causales totalement indépendantes l'une de l'autre.» (Monod, p. 128.)

Despite its importance, this notion of chance is quite neglected in contemporary literature and it seems to eschew a precise definition. This study takes into proper consideration this coincidental conception of *hasard* and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, the main attempt of this survey is to endorse the idea that this notion of chance is *ontic*, that is it does not depend only on our practical impossibility to have a complete knowledge about the phenomena observed.

A central role in the discussion will be given to the *independence* between the intersecting causal lines, which is at the core of the this conception of *hasard*. As I will show, the typology of the independence plays an important part in providing a distinction between an *ontic* conception of coincidences and a methodological one.

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Aristotle on Arts and Morality

Although scholars (e.g., Halliwell 2002 and 2011; Zagdoun 2011) have noted various aesthetic links between tragedy in the *Poetics* and other arts, the problem of how arts represent moral character in various Aristotelian treatises has not been fully explored. In this paper, I assess ways in which painting and music can inform us about the ethical implications of drama in Aristotle's thought, by looking at the *Politics*, *Rhetoric, De Sensu*, and *On the Poets*. Artistic imitation of people in action regards various types of characters in the *Poetics* (1448a1-8): just as painters represent them, these can appear better (Polygnotus), worse (Pauson), or such as we are (Dionysius). Poets imitate in a similar way (Homer better, Cleophon like us, Hegemon of Thasos and Nicochares worse, 1448a9-15). After an account of how arts, particularly music, represent character and emotions in the *Politics* (1340a), Aristotle notes that, though visual arts do not represent character directly but only give indications (*semeia*) of character through colors and forms (while melodies do contain in themselves such representations), the young should not look at the works of Pauson but at the works of Polygnotus. In the *Poetics* drama and painting were linked as very similar, but they seem to have different imitative abilities in the *Politics*. Where does music stand as an art, and more broadly in relation to tragedy? While Aristotle generally abstains from moral judgment in how types of poetry and their characters may influence the young in the *Poetics*, this is not the case in the *Politics.* Special restrictions are in place for the paintings of Pauson, iambus, comedy, and playing the flute. In opposition to these lower genres, and by comparison, I suggest, ethical value can be ascribed to epic and tragedy.

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Where are Poets in Plato's Political Philosophy?

In this paper I inquire the rolls of poets in Plato's political philosophy.

Themes concerning poetry emerge as major concerns of his conception of the ideal polis, especially of its educational program. Although in the end of Politeia poetry seems to be banned from the polis, one can interpret that Plato recognizes the roll of poetry as education of souls of citizens, as Gadamer and Halliwell have emphasized.

Staying in accord with their interpretation, however, I stress Plato's statements about poets. When he lets Socrates speak, "we are not poets, but founders of the polis" (Politeia, 378e7-9a1) or "writers of narratives should be censored" (377c1), the need for poets in his ideal polis is implied. The question is, then, why Plato needs not only poetry but also poets here. In order to examine this question, I focus on the special ability of poets, i.e. "inspiration" or "divine power", which is scrutinized in one of Plato's early dialogues Ion. On the one hand Plato criticizes the ignorance of poets about the nature of virtue etc., on the other hand he admits their divine power, which is given by Muses. This power produces effects on rhapsodes and audience as we see the metaphor of magnets; therefore, as long as poets make good and useful poetry, Plato regards them as useful to appeal to the souls of the audience or all citizens. Since the normal audience tends not to listen to good poetry, that is, poetry aiming at virtue, if they are not educated with good narratives in their childhood, it is questioned how good poetry fascinates such audience. I will argue that Plato's solution to this problem is the inspiration of poets, and that the audience comes to be willing to follow good poetry, when they are fascinated.

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The Aristotelian Principle in Mill and Kant

John Rawls has identified a principle which he calls 'The Aristotelian Principle (Rawls, 427).' Although it is not necessarily true for all people, generally we may say that most people will prefer to express in action those abilities which are more challenging to realize and that people will enjoy that expression even more, the more difficult that they are to realize. Furthermore they will find both respect for themselves and for others in a community of those who strive to develop such a challenging goal of advancing, for example, human knowledge of higher mathematics. This Aristotelian Principle is a general tendency of human nature which we can find in key aspects of the ethics of Mill and Kant.

We can find the key points of the Aristotelian Principle in Mill's conception of the moral community and the moral person. First, human beings prefer the higher pleasures rather than the lower pleasures. Second, among these higher pleasures we find especially the higher challenge of living the difficult and higher life of virtue for the sake of both others and the self. Just as Aristotle cannot prove that his Principle must be true, neither can Mill prove either of these two points he has affirmed.

Kant's consideration of the proposed action of failing to develop one's talents allows us to see the Aristotelian Principle at work at the heart of Kant's ethics because Kant undercuts his own a priori application of Humanity as an End-in-Itself because he sees no direct harm to humanity when one fails to develop one's own talents. Consequently, in the ethics of both Kant and Mill, the Aristotelian Principle cannot be proven as an a priori principle, but is to be affirmed as a deeply felt preference rooted in human nature's empirical desire to advance both self and others.

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African Initiation Rite in the Light of Hannah Arendt's Conception of Violence

In her work, "*On Violence*" Hannah Arendt asserts that violence is often viewed as identical with power. Though related, violence and power are distinct concepts. In the light of this distinction and considering the misconception of violence in our part of the world, this paper lays the groundwork for an examination of the concept of violence within the age-grade ritual practice. It aims at providing an existential phenomenological account of violence in Arendt's perspective as well as the African metaphorical understanding of the concept. Hence, it draws from Arendt's dialectical presentation of violence and power, and shows a correlation between it and the African metaphorical conception of violence in the rite of initiation. The paper then submits that rather than subject the individual to the limitations of passions; efforts should be made towards a thorough understanding of violence which should raise the individual above the ordinary condition of existence to the loftier height of nobility.

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Why has Plato Written about Mimesis?

Mimesis is one of the "most baffling words in the philosophical vocabulary" [Eric A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, Cambridge (Mass.), Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 20]; its importance in the history of Western Philosophy, especially in regards to its aesthetic declination, is never sufficiently highlighted. The word appears in the ancient Greek language as linked to certain theatrical performances from Sicily, but it is Plato who first gave it an enormous philosophical scope. The concept is present all along the Dialogues, with an evolving – or even changing – meaning and function which constitutes a fluctuant reflection. Among these different uses, we will first distinguish between two semantic poles. On the one hand, *mimesis* allows Plato to understand and to judge phenomena as sophistic discourses as well as poetry and arts. On the other hand, although linked to this aspect, he will make it the bridge point between the two worlds of his ontology. In this way *mimesis* becomes the main justification for excluding the imitative poet (i.e. the theater's performer) from the *Republic*'s just city: imitation is untruthful (book III), and furthermore, it hides the reality (book X). It is nevertheless surprising that Plato builds his criticism around this concept when considering its semantic origin. Why would Plato use a theater-related word as such in order to develop a devastating criticism of theater? I will tackle this variation of a classic philosophical paradox (why Plato employs the dialogic form of writing, which is theatrical itself, whereas he condemns theatre?) according to a novel approach: the conceptual procedure applied by Plato to *mimesis* is at the very end his answer to a challenge proposed by theater. In order to demonstrate this, it will be necessary to analyze this conceptual procedure on its own, as well as to specify which kind of theater this challenge could possibly come from. This study thus aims to clarify the relationship between philosophy and theater which the concept of *mimesis* seems to bring to the front.

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The Ideal Origins of Natural Rights

The modern age jusnaturalism defined a new way of conceiving the socio-politic and ethical-legal institutions.

Through the tenet of natural, universal, inviolable, innate and pre-institutional rights, modern intellectuals laid the foundations for setting the fundament and sense of the civil society and of its political machinery. The spreading humanism and the consequent rationalist methodology used for the description and the evaluation of the various spheres of human experience, with specific attention to political, juridical and social themes, constituted the conceptual frame within which were developed the most relevant theoretical expedients and the most significant moral ideas whose echoes continues even now, occupying scientific debates with particular regard to problems set by human rights.

On the occasion of debates about the epistemological statute of human rights, a profuse philosophical current support its continuity with natural rights, consequently explaining its operative mechanism through these ideas: the ideas of a social contract, the dichotomy between state of nature and civil state, the conception of man as a rational being, able to explain, by intellect, physical and social mechanisms; conceived with the pristine features of liberty and equality.

The aim of this work is to demonstrate, with the help of historical fragments, that the conceptual presuppositions that inspired the modern jusnaturalists represent the formulation in juridical terms of ideas born in ancient age, that can be found in a tendency of the sophistic doctrine – of the utopist/naturalist type – and in the different phases in which the stoic doctrine articulates.

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Reviewing of Neuroethics as an Applied Ethics and Fundamental Ethics

Neuroethics is today a new interdisciplinary perspective whose normative and methodological relevance increases progressively. It seems that neuroimaging techniques allow in depth interpretations of issue that philosophy has studied all along, such as relationships between brain-mind, free will-determinism, emotion-reason or consequentialism-deontologism. From a philosophical point of view neuroethics is not without a thorough analysis of the results of their inquiries and their interpretations, so as not to confuse terms that lead us to believe in a brain moral determinism.

The different pathways of study that neuroethics has taken in recent years invite a critical reflection on the philosophical foundations that justified the field as either an applied ethics or as a fundamental ethical theory. Therefore, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, make a critical analysis of the various definitions that have been expressed in neuroethics, adopting an integrative approach and clarifying possible confusions. Second, assuming a critical argumentation, justify its existing more as fundamental ethics than as applied ethics –or bioethics part– in order to account for the delimitation of its study and the possibilities to guide human morality.

To achieve these objectives, the point of departure will be discourse ethics in the version of K. O. Apel and reinterpreted by A. Cortina. The main references in neuroethics will be A. Roskies, E. Racine, W. Glannon, N. Levy, J. Illes and K. Evers. The conclusions will point out to the need for further philosophical reflection on the study of neuroethics, not only in its psychological and biomedical applications.

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Infinity in Mathematics

Number distinguishing the mathematical vocabulary, when numbers are infinite, assuming infinity is humanly inconceivable, then mathematics is inconceivable. Logical operators being predicative states of being, not autonomous entities, a wholly syntactical mathematics is impossible. Necessarily distinguished by a vocabulary, constituent of the mathematical vocabulary is number. Mathematical formalism accommodates infinity in mathematical induction. Mathematical intuitionism accommodates infinity in enumerative axiomatics. Mathematical induction being indeterminate, and mathematical axiomatics presupposing infinite determination, neither successfully accommodates infinity. Numbers are understandable inclusively and exclusively, a numerated sequence being understandable in contradictory ways. It is understandable as generating both one thing, there being a number between any two numbers, or infinite things, there not being a number between any two numbers. Either every number is fused into one with nothing separating one from another, or every number is diffused into many with nothing linking one to another. Fused into one or some, infinity is conceivable.

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"Why Foreknowledge does not always entail Problematic Predestination"

This paper considers the folk intuition that a foreknown future would be counter-intuitively and unattractively fixed, and seeks to show that we make a mistake when we reject foreknowledge wholesale on the grounds that it entails problematic predestination ('metaphysical fatalism'). To this end I consider two crucial yet overlooked distinctions: (i) the different senses in which we might mean 'fixing the future', and (ii) the various kinds of foreknowledge the folk intuition might have in mind. I argue that neither ordinary foreknowledge nor the knowledge of the time traveler gives rise to problematic predestination, and that the latter arises only when extra characteristics (such as infallibility) are implicitly built in to our conception of a foreknower.

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Sketches of Blurred landscapes: Wittgenstein and Ethics

It is sometimes said that Wittgenstein says nothing about ethics in the *Philosophical Investigations*, but in fact he mentions it explicitly and when what he says is unpacked there is quite a lot there. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that, and to assess what he says. Someone who tries to find definitions corresponding to our concepts in ethics, Wittgenstein says, is in a position where anything and nothing is right. There is no defining these concepts, any more than there is a round square, because the concepts in question are not definite or sharply defined but blurred and merged together. G. E. Moore says that 'good' is indefinable and Sidgwick says that 'ought' is unanalyzable, and I think that Wittgenstein would (and should) basically agree. But Moore thinks the word 'good' denotes a simple thing that cannot be defined, like the smell of coffee, whereas its meaning is really not simple at all, as Aristotle points out. The goodness of honor is not the same as the goodness of pleasure. Sidgwick thinks the notion of moral obligation is basic, again like a particular smell or color, but there are problems with this view. We agree less about ethics than about colors, for instance. Ethics is not a science. It is closer to aesthetics, but in Wittgenstein's opinion ethics is not a subject at all. Moore says that if 'good' means nothing at all then there can be no such subject as ethics. Does Wittgenstein think that 'good' means nothing at all? The short answer is No. He says that the word has a family of meanings. But if ethics deals with what is good all things considered, as I think it does, then there is no specific ethical meaning of good. The whole family must be considered.

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Socrates, the greatest sophist?

Nietzsche once said: "Socrates was the greatest sophist: he sustained that exists something as the Truth". Indeed, when we examine the *Sophist*, there is a suggestion that the most elevated of the sophists would bare many similarities with the character of Socrates, as depicted by Plato. So, at the end of the dialogue, at 268 c-d, the Stranger and Theaetetus seem to agree that: "He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows – who, belonging to the conscious (ειρωνιχου) or dissembling section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class of phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of cretion, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine – any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth." So, in this paper, we shall demonstrate that Socrates was a character situated between the Sophist and the philosopher, but a new kind of philosopher, of which he is the paradigm: the ironical, self-suspicious searcher of truth.

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Carbon Based Brain, Consciousness and Cognition: Understanding Cognitive States in the Context of the KK Thesis

The intent of this paper is to define cognitive states in the context of the KK thesis (the epistemic awareness of knowing that we know) and note the relationship of cognitive states to neural/brain states. Part I deals with what this indubitable epistemic awareness entails? It is argued that to know is to: know *that we know*, know *what we know*, know *how we know* what we know, know *whether what we know is true of false.* Further. To know is to: know *why* beliefs are considered basic or non-basic know *when* justification for belief is considered internal or external and know *whether* we have control over beliefs are not. Here, it is noted that we do not choose to possess epistemic awareness nor can we choose to negate epistemic awareness—in that we cannot choose not to know what is known—though we may or may not choose to know what is known. From Gettier we learnt that TAK (JTB) can only prevent lucky guessing but cannot prevent lucky truth. Since then many authors have worked on the question of what makes beliefs true or false and how beliefs can be affirmed or falsified. So, instead of dealing with the ontological status of beliefs this paper is limited to defining what is entailed in epistemic awareness and notes the relationship of belief states to neural/ brain status. Part II deals with understanding the epistemic awareness of belief states in the context of neural/brain states. Questions discussed are: what are belief states and can they be reduced to brain states? Is knowing and believing different mental/neural states? Are self-evident truths brain states? The concern here is not to know what cognitive states can be considered as knowledge but understand why our carbon-based brain allows us to hold beliefs with, without, against and regardless of empirical evidence and know that we do so. It is argued that knowing and believing are not separate mental states if what is known is an empirical given ("seeing is believing"), but separate mental states, if what is known is not empirical given. That is why beliefs are held as 'true', with, without, against and regardless of empirical evidence. Ideas used are from Plato, Edmund Gettier, Alvin Goldman, John Searle, David Rosenthal, David Chalmers, Keith Lehrer, Ned Block, Louis Pojman and Sartre

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&
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The Influence of Stoicism in Classical Roman Law: The Rescripts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius on Family Law and Freedom

This paper will address the influence of Stoicism in the Classical Roman Law through the analysis of the legal decisions of Marcus Aurelius, emperor of the Roman Empire from 161 to 180 A.D. This approach is especially suitable to the understanding of how Roman Law was reformed by the hands of politicians and jurists whose major concern was to create and maintain a coherent legal system that did not oppose the laws of nature, logic and the ancient traditions. This paper will investigate the legal innovations implemented by the emperor-philosopher Marcus Aurelius in the fields of Family Law and *Ius Libertatis* (Right to Freedom), while giving evidence of the Stoic guidance of these reforms, based on the notions of equality, universalism and freedom. As a conclusion, we will give evidence that Marcus Aurelius' philosophically-oriented juridical responses contained: a) the use of a flexible logic, axiologically directed toward the Stoic idea of justice, which prevails over legal formalism and literalism; b) a serious concern that the legal interpretation must not produce neither absurd nor unnatural outcomes: a posture contemporarily called consequentialism; c) the development of interpretational principles that enable the cause of liberty to prevail over any other cause; d) the notion that the excessive institutionalization and rigor of the Roman family must not oppose its natural bonds.

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B. L. Whorf on Cosmos, Individual and Language

The complex set of ideas suggested by Benjamin Lee Whorf, an American linguist, ethnographer and chemical engineer by profession, is mostly known among scholars and the public at large as the so-called 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis'. References to it are often made in texts on relationships between language, mind, culture, perception, and experience. In fact, he is not the person who coined this term and formulated the fundamental principles of the hypothesis such as total linguistics dependence of thought and perception, absolute language non-translability, etc. One of the main reasons of the critics' misinterpretations of Whorf is that he argued from a non-traditional epistemological viewpoint involving Einsteinian relativity and quantum theories, Jungian psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, Eastern philosophy concepts and so on. His approach is better characterized as holistic as it links the cosmos and the individual. Instead, he was attributed with causal and reductionist ways of thinking. Although Whorf named and stated the linguistic relativity principle, his ideas should not be reduced merely to it. In this paper we try to show that he was actually concerned with a lot of important issues going beyond the links between language, thought and culture. The purpose of this study is to explain his ideas within the holistic approach he himself was inclined to. On the one hand, in his essays he uses rigorous scientific reasoning and at the same time he attempts to paint a broader philosophical picture of the cosmos and our interaction with it, where language, indeed, plays a very important role.

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Particularism in Buddhism: Morality without Frames?

"...idiots...and tenets of philosophers...rationally and methodically to find out, and set in order all necessary determinations and instructions for a man's life."1

Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations could not have been more subtle about his disagreement with the philosophers' way of life. In all fairness though, it might be mentioned that interpreting his words is not always easy. Being a philosopher himself, he might just be meaning to point the misleading traits of philosophers rampant in his time; or, he might just be making the point that philosophical arguments, though important, were not merely for enabling the rational understanding of the world, but to permit those rational understanding to inform the way in which one lived. In any case, 'necessary determination' and 'instructions' for a man's life are pretty heavy terminologies, and give a sense of a certain givenness which might not always be either fair or useful. My aim in the present paper is to indicate that the Buddhist metaphysics might have the aforementioned 'givenness', but its ethics does not. And the Buddhist ethics does not have this givenness because its ethical structure is primarily particularistic. For this purpose, the paper is divided into three sections. The first section briefly brings forth the distinction between the absolutistic and particularistic models in ethics, followed by explaining particularism as a meta-ethical theory keeping in mind the present purpose, and lastly, showing how the features of particularism explained in the second section can also be noticed in the ethics of specific Buddhist thinkers.

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The Dimension of Silence in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein

Even though Wittgenstein was preoccupied with language and language problems in his philosophy throughout his lifetime, the aspect of silence played a decisive role which must not be ignored.

The dimension of this aspect finds its most prominent and frequently quoted expression in the last sentence of the *Tractatus*, 7 "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" – however, to my mind, silence plays a major part in his very way of thinking and his approach towards the world and the world outside the world of facts. Besides, silence is inherent, i.e. "hidden" in numerous examples presented in his philosophical investigations, as a kind of counterpart to words, a means of *showing* instead of *saying*.

In my paper I will discuss this topic according to the following points:

1. Silence as a consequence of the limits of language, i.e. the philosophical consequence or résumé in an analytical sense – in order to separate the thinkable from the unthinkable. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes between propositions that make sense and propositions that are nonsensical in philosophy – according to 4.022 where he states: "The proposition *shows* its sense. The proposition *shows* how things stand, *if* it is true. And it *says that* they do so stand."

2. Silence as an attitude of wonder and awe at the world and the world beyond: This passage concerns above all the realm of the ineffable, and that what is usually considered as the so-called mystical aspect in Wittgenstein's approach. In this context, I will also discuss the problem of time and eternity as treated by Wittgenstein in connection with his reflections on the significance of living in the present not in time – a silent attitude in "nunc stans" so to speak, an attitude *sub specie aeternitatis.*

3. Silence as a means of expression in art: In this context the function of *showing* instead of *saying* plays a decisive role, even in another sense than that of the *Tractatus*. In the realm of aesthetics, Wittgenstein explicitly emphasizes the role of *showing* in art, be it music, poetry or architecture. Moreover, he hints at the significance of gestures, mimicry etc. as means of expressing what cannot be expressed by words.

4. Silence as regards to form: Wittgenstein's way of writing holds a strong ethical flavour in the sense of avoiding any superfluous word, in reducing language to a minimum, in restricting himself to the essential and thereby aiming at absolute clarity and transparency so that his philosophical concern, according to 4.112 – "The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts" and the "result of philosophy is not a

number of 'philosophical propositions' but to make propositions clear" – becomes obvious.

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Is Aristotelian Concept of Phronesis Empirically Adequate?

Contemporary virtue ethics, after gaining a strong position in ethics during the last decades of the twentieth century, has become an object of radical criticism. Situationists, such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman and Maria Merritt, inspired by the results of the research in social and cognitive psychology, questioned empirical adequacy of moral psychology on which virtue ethics was based.

In their view, not dispositions and character, but situational factors decisively determine human behavior and thinking. At first this criticism of virtue ethics was focused on questioning the existence of ethical virtues, which would explain stable, consistent and morally integrated actions; then, the critics moved on to questioning the ideal of practical wisdom (*phronesis*) understood as an acquired constant disposition to deliberately search the best ways to respond to given moral reasons, choosing what is right as well as to find best means to realize the goal of good life. Situationists, notice that majority of our cognitive and motivational processes are automatic and unconscious. They are often incongruent with declared moral values to such extend that the model of practical wisdom seems to situationists to be problematic.

In my presentation I will try to respond to the situationistic objections. I will analyze a number of experiments, to which they refer, and ask to what extend these experiments allow them for so radical conclusions. I will also present contemporary dual – process theories of cognition and show how they fit with the Aristotelian idea of practical wisdom.

Although virtue ethics is normative, there is no easy passage from the analysis of facts (situationists) to the formulation of norms (virtue ethicists), we must admit that formulating norms cannot contradict our knowledge about facts. And for this reason the situational criticism cannot be easily ignored.

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Does Kant Revive the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony to Synchronize Nature and Freedom?

In this paper I focus on one of the problematic aspects in Kant's account of transcendental freedom, viz. the problem of synchronizing the effects of freedom with the causal uniformity of nature. This is what I call the "synchronization problem." According to Kant, it is possible to regard the same event as both an effect of nature and an effect of freedom (cf. A543/B571). But how is it that the effects of freedom always line up with the causal series in nature, if freedom and nature are acting completely independent of one another? In the first section of the paper I present this problem and argue that Kant shows a recognition of it in the introduction to the third Critique (Ak V:175-6).

In the second section of the paper I turn to Kant's discussion of the highest good in the second Critique. I argue that a similar synchronization problem is involved here, and Kant resolves this problem by invoking a hypothetical pre-established harmony brought about by God (as a postulate of pure practical reason). In order for happiness to correspond to morality (as the highest good requires), God would have to create nature from the beginning in such a way that the causal series within nature produces happiness in exact proportion to our morality.

In the third section I argue that the same argument for postulating God as a necessary condition of the highest good applies in the case of transcendental freedom. Only God as the author of nature could pre-establish a harmony between nature and freedom such that the causality of nature lines up with the effects of freedom. God (hypothetically) would foresee the effects of freedom and creates nature from the beginning in such a way that the effects of freedom are incorporated into its independent causal chain. I conclude by briefly indicating how this solution fills in a gap in the interpretation of Kant's theory offered by Wood (and more recently by Watkins).

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The Relationship Between Health and Ethical Conduct In Philosophical Perspective of Ayurveda (an Ancient Indian Medical Science)

Ayurveda is an ancient Indian medical science. It flourished in India around 1000 B.C. and still provides effective treatment and preventive measures related with health & fitness. In *Ayurveda*, the theory of health and disease is built on the metaphysical assumptions of two famous philosophical systems named *Samkhya* and *Vaisheshika* to explain the nature and basic constituents of human body.

Ayurveda describes the natural uniformity of all creations whether living or non-living. There is always a continuous reaction between human body and external environment. The external environment and the human body, both are assumed to consist of same elements which are identified as *Panch Mahabhutas* in *Ayurveda*. Since both have the same constitution, we ought to follow a life style which is in unison with nature. As the nature or environment surrounding us changes in different seasons and also during day and night time, our regimen and other daily activities should also change accordingly. What we have to eat in daytime is different from what we eat during night. The same is applicable for different weathers and seasons. When the balance between nature and human body disturbs, we get ailments.

Apart from describing relationship between body and environment, *Ayurveda* also imposes the responsibility upon human beings of maintaining nature in its best condition.

The ideal life style for mankind shall preserve nature and should not destroy its natural contents. If human activities destroy or distort the natural environment, they are termed unethical in *Ayurveda*. Such unethical behaviour is the cause of various diseases and sufferings for us. It not only harms nature but is also fatal for the human body.

By analyzing the concepts of mankind and its health & disease, we can trace out the structure of ideal and meaningful lifestyle for human race that will ensure nature's protection and a healthy mind and body for every human being.

In this paper an attempt is made to put forward the ideal way of life and human conduct according to the *Ayurveda* and to prescribe methods on which various human activities can be judged as ethical or non-ethical and beneficial or harmful for the nature and human race.

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The Analytical Comparison of Philosophical Methodology in Plato's Meno and Laozi's Daodejing

In my paper, I attempt to explore the complex relation between philosophical methods and methodology in two far-reaching traditions of ancient philosophy of ancient Greek and China. With this topic in focus I chose a rare and innovative perspective of the analytical comparison of Meno's paradox in Plato's Meno and Chinese philosopher Laozi's core concept of Dao, meaning "way" as unification of Laozi's metaphysical and epistemological thought, in Laozi's Daodejing. In doing this, I am inspired by the latest reinterpretation of Meno's paradox and Laozi's concept of Dao in the ancient philosophy conference of the University of Edinburgh. I argue that there is a common and basic question in two classical texts: how to practice philosophy in order to bridge the gap of different knowledge to ultimately reach unhypothetical first principle and recognize the single metaphysical concept.

I argue for the fundamental unity of their key problem concerning philosophical methodology within their similar system pointing to political theory and good life. I try to give a deeper rationale that the difficulty in explaining philosophical methods to people with potential is one of the most comparable topics for Plato and Laozi by pointing up their similar ways to construct a temporary explanation of gaining useful true belief. Thus I analyze the well-known examples of slave boy in the Meno, specific description in the Daodejing as well as Cook Pao from Laozi's follower of Daoism to illustrate that there are common advantages and limits of the presentation of philosophical methodology in two texts. Moreover, by analyzing the dialogue Meno and monologue Daodejing I further expose the possible method to develop current studies of comparative philosophy.

In conclusion, I argue for the common exploration of aims of first principle and practical methods of philosophy in the Meno and the Daodejing, which might shed light on a presupposition that by comparison it is possible to reconstruct the core of highly unified ancient epistemology derived from at least two different cultural traditions, instead of simply acquiring some conceptual similarities on the surface in the research of comparative philosophy.

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Causalism and Intentional Omissions

The aim of the paper is to critically analyze Carolina Sartorio's exclusion argument against the causalist account of the intentional omissions which is designed to show that the proponents of causalism cannot explain the etiology of intentional omissions in causal terms because of the causal ineffectiveness of intentions. In my paper I would like to consider the prospects for causalism about intentional omission and to formulate some objections against the Sartorio's argument. To do so I will – firstly – examine three ways of thinking about omissions (omissions as absences of action, as actions under negative description and as failures to do one's duty). Secondly, I will answer the question why a comprehensive account of agency should encompass intentional omissions. Thirdly, I will offer an argument in order to show that Sartorio's reasoning is vulnerable to the infinite regress objection and defend the claim that it is not true that somebody's failing to do something is intentional in virtue of intentionally omitting to intend do to something. Finally, I will justify the claim that the proponents of the causal theory can easily reject the basic assumption of the exclusion argument, according to which an omission is never identical to some positive action.