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PHILOSOPHY

# ABSTRACT BOOK

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## PREFACE

This abstract book includes all the abstracts of the papers presented at the *5<sup>th</sup> Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 31 May 2010 & 1-3 June 2010*, organized by The Philosophy Research Unit of the Athens Institute for Education and Research (AT.IN.E.R.). In total there were 62 papers and 63 presenters, coming from 19 different countries (Australia, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA). The conference was organized into 21 sessions that included areas such as 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Eastern Philosophy, Ethics, Islamic Philosophy e.t.c. As it is the publication policy of the Institute, the papers presented in this conference will be considered for publication in one of the books of ATINER.

The Institute was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet in Athens and exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study. Our mission is to make ATHENS a place where academics and researchers from all over the world meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. To serve this purpose, conferences are organized along the lines of well established and well defined scientific disciplines. In addition, interdisciplinary conferences are also organized because they serve the mission statement of the Institute. Since 1995, ATINER has organized close to 150 annual international conferences and has published over 100 books. Academically, the Institute is organized into four research divisions and

nineteen research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committee and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference together.

Gregory T. Papanikos  
Director

# **The Semantics, Pragmatics, and Ontology of Fiction**

**Fred Adams**

Chair, Linguistics & Cognitive Science, University of Delaware, USA



# **Knowing the Sophist: An Encountering with the Law**

**Hagit Aldema**

Ph.D. Student, Minor Lecturer, Tel Aviv University, Israel

The lecture will focus on the moment of the interlocutors' parricide in Plato's *Sophist*, a moment in which they encounter the law of Parmenides.

My reading will be supported by some of the principles Heidegger draws in his course on the *Sophist*, as well as relate to his article, "What is Metaphysics" (Heidegger 1993). This essay will outline the relationship between negation and not-being as Heidegger discusses it in his aforementioned article, through an examination of the interlocutors' attempts to know the sophist in the *Sophist*. As I would like to show, their attempts to know the sophist are inherently bound with the relation Heidegger draws between negation and not-being.

My interpretation of the parricide is supported by psychoanalytic thought which considers it a myth that describes the becoming of the subject; a becoming that is perceived in the context of this lecture as the becoming of the philosopher's knowledge concerning the sophist.

According to psychoanalytic thought, the subject is established as such via an encounter with the law (Freud 1989: *Totem and Tabu*). This encounter embodies an impossible relation between the subject and the law; an impossibility that is structural, namely, that it cannot be fixed into a positive and reciprocal content relation between the subject and the law, which establishes him as such.

The significance of the reading of this specific dialogue is to try to outline the relation of philosophy to the sophist which can be considered as its other. Thus, the lecture will try to direct toward the general question regarding the complicated relation between dialectic and rhetoric which is referred throughout Plato's writing.

## **Influence of Philosophy on Islamic Mysticism**

**Sousan Alerasoul**

Associate Professor, Islamic Azad University, Karaj Branch, Iran

**Monirossadat Pourtolami**

Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University, Karaj Branch, Iran

**Monireh Sayyid Mazhari**

Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University, Karaj Branch, Iran

**Roohieh Naziripour**

Instructor, Islamic Azad University, Karaj Branch, Iran

Notwithstanding the fact that there are differences between philosophers and mystics in terms of principles, end and methods, Islamic philosophy has had a significant impact on Islamic mysticism. This impact is in three fields of ontology, the method of verification and transferring mystical findings, and the relation between human being and God.

1. In the field of ontology: the main subject and the aim of Islamic mysticism is pondering over God's essence in respect to His names and attributes in terms of reaching God. Despite the fact that Islamic mysticism presupposes personal union of being and considers the created world as manifestations of God and does not deem an independent existence for creatures, it does not ignore ontology and introduces a philosophical ontological system using philosophical terms.

2. In the field of proving and transferring the mystical findings: Since mystics' knowledge was personal, visionary and un-transferable, they were usually condemned. However, Ibn Arabi's effort and the mystics after him in terms of using logical reasoning helped Islamic mystics to make their internal and spiritual findings impersonal and convey to others resulting in introducing mysticism as a science. The mystic through rational description of envisioned reality, using philosophical language with a mystical content and through using rational reasoning for mystical findings has benefited from philosophy.

3. In the field of the relation between man with God: There is an affectionate relation between the creator and the creature with the consequential movement of passionate longing towards the Absolute perfect Beauty, God, in the lower degrees. The theoretical account of this perfectionist movement and its stages is influenced by the philosophical views of Aristotle, Plotinus and Suhrewardi.

## **Descartes, Luther and the Fifth Lateran Council**

**Aderemi Artis**

Assistant Professor, University of Michigan-Flint, USA

In the letter of dedication to his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes presents his work as the fulfillment of the bull produced by the eighth session of the Fifth Lateran Council under pope Leo X. This has not gone unnoticed by scholars, and a number of recent works on Descartes have given attention to the question of how Descartes' thoughts in the *Meditations* relate to the Council's bull. More specifically, these scholars have investigated how Descartes' treatment of the immortality of the soul relates to the competing doctrines on the soul attacked by the Lateran Council, namely, Alexandrism and Averroism. Recent commentators have largely agreed both that Descartes failed in his attempts to defeat the competing doctrines on the soul or provide a coherent account of the character and grounds of the soul's immortality, and that the immortality of the soul is the chief topic of interest in the Council's bull as it relates to the *Meditations*. If one accepts these conclusions, then one must also accept that Descartes failed in his attempts to carry out the bull of the Fifth Lateran Council, and, moreover, that the church might well have been correct in placing his work on the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, at least according to its own standard of judgment. However, I argue that the main purpose of the eighth session was to assert the doctrine of "single truth" against that of "double truth," and so deny that philosophy has access to truths distinct from or potentially at odds with the truths of faith. I further suggest that the misunderstanding of the meaning of the bull can at least in part be traced to the writings of Martin Luther, and, finally, conclude that Descartes was in fact successful in carrying out the edicts of the Council's bull.

# **Sustainability, Science, and Ethics: A New Paradigm for Global Change**

**Ignacio Ayestaran**

Professor, University of the Basque Country, Donostia-San Sebastian, Spain

Since 2001, there is a debate about the core research questions of *Sustainability Science* (Kates RW, et al., ‘Sustainability Science’, 2001, *Science*, vol. 292, no. 5517, pp. 641-642). A Sustainability Science research program has begun to take shape that transcends the concerns of its foundational disciplines and focuses instead on understanding the global change and the complex dynamics that arise from interactions between human and environmental systems.

In 2001 this group of leading natural scientists, social scientists, and policy analysts from around the world, outlined the core questions of the field. Central questions (Clark WC, “Sustainability Science: A room of its own”, 2007, *PNAS*, vol. 104, no. 6, pp. 1737-1738) include the following:

1. How can the dynamic interactions between nature and society be better incorporated into emerging models and conceptualizations that integrate the Earth system, social development, and sustainability?
2. How are long-term trends in environment and development, including consumption and population, reshaping nature-society interactions in ways relevant to sustainability
3. What factors determine the limits of resilience and sources of vulnerability for such interactive systems?
4. What systems of incentive structures can most effectively improve social capacity to guide interactions between nature and society toward more sustainable trajectories?
5. How can science and technology be more effectively harnessed to address sustainability goals?

Kates et al. advocate the development of a new ‘Sustainability Science’, and list four methodological challenges: (i) spanning the range of spatial scales; (ii) accounting for temporal inertia and urgency; (iii) dealing with functional complexity and multiple stresses on human and environmental systems; and (iv) recognizing the wide range of outlooks. Swart et al. (‘Critical Challenges for Sustainability Science’, *Science*, 2002, vol. 297, no. 5589, pp. 1994-1995) expand this list of challenges to include (v) linking themes and issues (e.g., poverty, ecosystem functions, and climate); (vi) understanding and reflecting deep uncertainty; (vii) accounting for human choice and behaviour; (viii) incorporating surprise, critical thresholds, and abrupt change; (ix) effectively combining qualitative and quantitative analysis; and (x) linking with policy development and action through stakeholder participation.

On the other hand, there is the proposal of a unified (but transdisciplinary) program for the study of the Earth system as a whole. In 2001, delegates from more than 100 countries participating in the four major international research programs on global environmental change endorsed the 'Amsterdam Declaration on Global Change', which formally established the 'Earth System Science Partnership'. On this basis the international global change programmes urge governments, public and private institutions and people of the world to agree that: i) an ethical framework for global stewardship and strategies for Earth System management are urgently needed; and ii) a new system of global environmental science is required.

It is worth analysing the new challenges of this *Sustainability Science*, in order to study its methodological insights, its specific domains, its fundamental models, its philosophical purposes, and its critical debates. We have several questions related to this issue: is *Sustainability Science* basic (epistemic) research or applied (pragmatic-operational) research?; which are the core methods of this emerging scientific program?; is it a new Kuhnian paradigm or an old dream?; and last but not least, what values, ethics, and axiology are expressed in this integrative system?

## **Autonomy as a Moral Virtue**

**Neera Badhwar**

Professor, University of Oklahoma, USA

An autonomous person is self-governing. Joel Feinberg expresses the idea at the heart of autonomy when he quips: “I am autonomous if I rule me, and no one else rules I.” And I rule myself if and only if my own values and decisions characteristically determine my judgments and actions.

Most of the contemporary literature on autonomy discusses autonomy as a condition of free agency and responsibility, rather than as an excellence. Thus, it is often argued that actions and judgments are autonomous just so long as they are caused by your character, or by the desires or values with which you reflectively identify. But whereas this “structural” account may well be enough as an account of free agency and responsibility, it is not enough as an account of autonomy as an excellence, the contrary of the heteronomy of conformism, blind obedience, servility etc. For your character or your reflective identification may itself be heteronomous in one or more of these ways. There are some discussions of autonomy as an excellence, but most of them assume that autonomy is a non-moral excellence, like scientific intelligence or musical virtuosity. I argue that (i) autonomy can meet the conditions for being an excellence only if there is a reliable self in charge; (ii) a reliable self must be realistic (informed and reality-oriented); (iii) realism is a virtue; and hence (iv) autonomy is a virtue. Autonomy is contrary not only to control by others’ evaluations and decisions in important matters, but also to control by impulse or illusion. But autonomy does not entail a blanket refusal of reliance on others’ testimony. Understanding and accepting the limits of our powers as human beings and individuals, and the consequent necessity of relying on others’ testimony, is just as much a part of being realistic as understanding the limits of reliance on others and the importance of being autonomous.

# **Schopenhauer as Internal Critic of Kant: Holding Kant to a Deterministic Conception of the Inclinations**

**Ryan Beaton**

Ph.D. Student, Toronto University, Canada

While Kant's influence on Schopenhauer is undisputed, the full weight of Schopenhauer's critique of Kant remains perhaps unappreciated. Analysis of this critique tends to dismiss much of his detailed interpretation as misunderstanding Kant's transcendental idealism. This is especially true of Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy, and is perhaps justified by the fact that Schopenhauer seems to ignore the vital distinction between the transcendental and empirical (or rational and causal) orders involved in perception/cognition. Schopenhauer does not hesitate to identify Kantian transcendental acts of synthesis with causal-physiological 'brain functions'. This seems to beg an essential question of method, or at the very least to suggest that Schopenhauer offers at best an external critique of the Kantian philosophy.

I argue that Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kant gains considerable bite when we examine carefully the connection between the theoretical and practical sides of his critique. On my analysis, the key to this connection is an implicit, yet cutting, critique of Kantian 'inclinations' ('Neigungen'). Kant has the inclinations do double-duty in the Critique of Practical Reason: first as part of the mechanical phenomenal realm, and second in their complex relation to the noumenal self. Kant's deterministic claim, to the effect that we would be reduced to 'mere mechanism' were the inclinations our only source of motivation, fits rather awkwardly with the second of these roles. I explain in detail how Schopenhauer might then be seen as more consistent with respect to: 1. the separation of causal and rational orders (namely by denying there is any strict separation at all), and 2. a deterministic conception of inclinations, or desires (through his rejection of noumenal causality). Whether or not we ultimately accept Schopenhauer's position on these two points, I argue that his critique of Kant is deeper and more internally grounded than we might initially suppose.

# Plato On Rhetoric – Neoplatonic Interpretations

**Bettina Bohle**

Ph.D. Student, Freie University, Germany

*Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* – on rhetoric: that is the subtitle to Plato's *Gorgias* since Antiquity. Plato's view on rhetoric, regarding the *Gorgias*, is mostly taken to be a negative one. The *Phaedrus*, on the other hand, is taken to present a more charitable view of this topic.

Most modern scholars agree that the variety of topics covered in the *Gorgias* is by no means captured by the subtitle. What the main topic of this dialogue is and how rhetoric fits into that, has, in my opinion, not been satisfactorily answered yet. The answer to this question, however, is important both for the interpretation of rhetoric in Plato as well as the interpretation of the *Gorgias* on the whole.

The interrelation of topics and the interpretation of single statements in their context is one of the main aims of the approach of the Neoplatonists to Plato's dialogues.

Olympiodorus states in his commentary on *Plato's Gorgias as skopos* the principles of constitutional well-being (πολιτικὴ εὐδαιμονία), that is: how to live well in society. *Skopos*, for the Neoplatonists, is the main topic of a given text which constitutes the insight or knowledge the author intended to convey. In this hermeneutical approach the dialogue is read as a unity and all of its topics are shown to relate to the main aim of the text.

In this paper I propose to show which role rhetoric plays in relation to the *skopos* which Olympiodorus postulates for the *Gorgias*. The passages on rhetoric in *Plato's Phaedrus* as well as the commentary on this dialogue of *Hermias* provide helpful insights in this undertaking.

Approaching the remarks on rhetoric in this way leads to a different interpretation of rhetoric in Plato. Furthermore, the views presented in *Gorgias and Phaedrus* will turn out not to be as distant as they usually seem.



# **The Role of Sociological Assumptions in the Construction of Ethical Theories**

**Marcos G. Breuer**

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Dusseldorf, Germany

There are currently different normative approaches in the analytical ethics, such as utilitarianism, Rawls' neo-contractualism, and subjectivism or conventionalism. When philosophers develop and propose a new position in that debate, they pay attention mainly to the meta-ethical and normative aspects of their theories. In this paper, I will argue that, when constructing an ethical theory, philosophers also make use of sociological assumptions – but in an implicit way. In other words, sociological assumptions play a key role in the theoretical elaboration of moral positions. These assumptions concern central dimensions of any model of human action, like the type of rationality the actor supposedly has, the kind of his preferences, altruistic behavior and moral dispositions, etc. Consequently, I will maintain that an original and fruitful way of approaching and contributing to the debate in ethics consists precisely in focusing and reflecting on those assumptions. Current empirical and theoretical research in the social sciences studying human action may not support the anthropological conception implicit at the basis of a given normative approach. As a case study, I will briefly present the normative framework of conventionalism such as initially proposed by J. L. Mackie and then expanded by R. Nozick and D. Gauthier among others. After highlighting the sociological assumptions of that model, I will show how a reflection on those aspects can prompt to a revision of the position. I will conclude the paper stressing the relevance of the much overlooked role of sociological assumptions in ethics and arguing that a more intensive interdisciplinary cooperation between sociology and ethics can decisively contribute to the construction of moral theories.

## **True City – True Soul**

**Paul Carelli**

Assistant Professor, University of North Florida, USA

It is Glaucon's insistence on gold couches and delicacies that launches Socrates into the description of the luxurious city that takes up most of the Republic, but before this he describes a much simpler city that he calls the true city. Towards the end of the Republic he also describes a soul that is much simpler than the tri-partite soul and refers to this as the true soul. I contend that just as the luxurious city is an analog to the tri-partite soul, so the true city is an analog to the true soul and that these simpler models of city and soul more closely approximate an ideal city and soul. In the Laws the Athenian describes the ideal city as one in which all property is held in common and no commerce exists with other cities; thus unity and self-sufficiency form the basis of the ideal city. Similarly, in the Timaeus the divine world soul is described as unified and self-sufficient - it has no appetites or passions since there is nothing outside of it that it could need or with which it could have any relationship. The human soul is variegated and dependent because it is attached to a body that has things outside of it that it needs (food, drink) and with which it can have relationships (other bodies) and these require the presence of appetites and passions. Analogously, the first city of the Republic is transformed into the city with a fever because the desire for luxurious items requires commerce with other cities which in turn requires a variegated class system. The tripartite soul is still an important model since it represents the human soul as we find it in life, but the ideal soul remains the goal of the good life.

# **The Folk Psychology of Free Will: An Argument against Compatibilism**

**Gregg Caruso**

Assistant Professor, Corning Community College, USA

Incompatibilism maintains that free will is at odds with causal determinism and that the two cannot be reconciled. Compatibilism, on the other hand, maintains that our folk-psychological or commonsense notions of freedom and moral responsibility are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. This paper examines existing results and experimental evidence in social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis. In section I, I spell out the compatibilist position and briefly discuss the standard incompatibilist argument, the so-called consequence argument. Although I find the consequence argument compelling, I conclude that the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists ultimately comes down to who is right about our folk-psychological intuitions. In section II, I then take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will. I argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research in social psychology reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions of freedom and responsibility are essentially incompatibilist and libertarian in nature. I attempt to show this by drawing on the empirical work of Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe, Paul Bloom, and others. I further consider one standard compatibilist reply based on conditional analyses, but argue that it is philosophically unsound and psychologically unjustified. I conclude in section III by examining the phenomenology surrounding agentic experience and argue that it further supports a libertarian conception of freedom. I suggest that our folk psychology is inherently incompatibilist and libertarian because such a conception of freedom is experientially encoded in us.

# **The Transvaluation of Representation**

**Kieran Anthony Cashell**

Lecturer, Limerick Institute of Technology, Ireland

Revisiting the classical definition of art as mimetic practice, this paper re-evaluates Plato's notorious decree that art, because it is representational, is thrice removed from truth. I argue, and go on to confirm, that the Theory of Forms, that by which Plato alienates art from truth, is itself a model epitome of representation.

Ever since the epistemological consequences of Platonic ontology were systematized in the Πολιτεία (books V-VII), truth has generally been conceptualized as adequate correspondence (ὁμοίωσις / adaequatio). And representation, on the other hand, has been, as it was in Plato, downgraded on the basis of its alienation from truth. The conception of truth, according to which art is found deficient, is therefore 'adequate correspondence'. Yet this conception of truth, as Heidegger has demonstrated, is reducible to the correctness of representations.

By tracing the origins of this concept of truth to Plato, the aim of this paper is to establish that truth and representation, as delineated through the history of philosophy, are dialectical duplicates; representation, evaluated on the basis of truth, is verified as adequate or inadequate – true or false – according to a criterion of truth that is itself representational.

My central thesis is therefore reciprocal: In the history of philosophy from Plato, truth and art are exact mirror images of each other; however, one is elevated while the other is devalued. But art, because it is representational, I argue, cannot be downgraded as alienated from truth according to a conception of truth that is itself, like the Theory of Forms on which it is founded, representational in essence. I conclude by suggesting a transvaluation of representational art by demonstrating that its mode of revelation is closely affiliated to what Heidegger regards as the primordial essence of truth (ἀλήθεια / unconcealment).

## **H.L.A. HART: The Separation of Law and Morals**

**Sule Sahin Ceylan**

Research Assistant, Marmara University, Turkey

H. L. A. Hart was one of the famous English legal philosophers of the 20th century, whose main focus was about the core problems of jurisprudence. His famous work, *The Concept of Law*, is a milestone at jurisprudence and an excellent guide of legal positivism. In this paper the main ideas propounded by Hart, such as the separation of law and morals from the point of significant features of advanced legal systems, the distinction between primary and secondary rules, the divergences of primitive and modern law will be mentioned.

His main contribution to jurisprudence is to categorise the legal systems at the light of the rule types. According to Hart, a legal system is the union of primary and secondary rules. All legal systems, primitive or not, have “primary rules” which are directed to all individuals, confer rights and duties, impose obligations. However the other kind of rules, which he calls “secondary rules”, are the distinguishing feature of modern law. Secondary rules define the characteristics of the primary rules; allow the creation, alteration or extinction of the former. There are three kinds of secondary rules. First one is “the rules of recognition”: They exhibit what the primary rules are, how they are applied, concisely expose what counts as primary rules. Second one is “the rules of change”: They enable the law to change according to the social, economic and political movements. Third one is “the rules of adjudication” which are about the courts, their operation, the efficiency of the enforcement mechanism. When a dispute arises, adjudication rules expose how and by whom it will be resolved. These three kind of rules and the primary ones build the modern legal system together and exhibit the abstraction of law from a system directed by morals.

# **Truth, Proof and Axiomatic Independence - Turning to Algorithm for an Explication of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics**

**Pak Kiu Chow**

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Certainty is the virtue of mathematical truths, but philosophers have found the claim of this virtue difficult to justify. Consider the geometries of Euclidean and non-Euclidean systems. While the perpendicular axiom endorsed by the former system eliminates the possibility of intersection for any pair of perpendicular lines, the latter ones refrain from the elimination. There had been little ground to take both kinds of systems as true until a proof was devised to show that the perpendicular axiom in the Euclidean system is independent from the other systems. Such a proof paved the way towards pluralism and therefore weakened the universal claim. It showed that mathematical universality was never there to lend any support to certainty.

Hilbert shifted the focus from independence to consistency. He sees mathematics as a chain of axiomatic systems linked together in terms of consistency. For many, consistency may give support to certainty. But it was only wishful thinking smashed by Godel's incomplete theorem. Such a smashing effect is due to the proof of unprovable mathematical truths existing in the system of real numbers. Truths of this kind are independent from the axiomatic system. For those who care about certainty, independence gives trouble again. Firstly, the axiomatic system is regarded as incapable of capturing all the mathematical truths. That means, axiomaticization is not a reliable method for accounting for mathematical certainty as some eligible truths are neglected. Secondly, it seems that unprovable truths are recoverable only by discovery. It lures one to Platonism which assumes that all mathematical truths are discoverable. Mathematical proof is belittled.

Algorithms are orders of calculations that yield solutions (results). We may group together the algorithms that involve the same kinds of calculations. Some of these algorithms are identical with the proofs of some theorems. Given the proofs, the results of all the related algorithms are taken as true. There is no truth apart from proof. Proof is therefore crucial to mathematical certainty. One may find new proofs in the form of algorithms that are not identical with those found in axiomatic systems. This is very much in tune with Wittgenstein. Axiomaticization is sidelined.

## **The Idea of Colonial Conquest and Christian Evangelization According to its Aristotelian Echoes in Suarez and Vieira**

**Rui Manuel Coimbra Goncalves**

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In several manners we can distinguish the approach between the western and the eastern culture during the first two centuries of the Society of Jesus. Among those sights there is that only glanced from the theoretical practice through the severe eyes of treatises and classes at the European universities.

Francisco Suárez wrote plentifully about the relationship with the gentile people and the right kind of rule under which the western Christian countries should make peace and war with the eastern in order to submit and evangelize him into Christianity.

According to his writings, such as *De legibus* (On the laws) and in the treatise on the war, he starts to asking us whether is the fighting with the stranger intrinsically bad. The conclusion of this austere man that never leaved Europe and some of its European centres of wisdom from his time (according to which the Christian Church would maintain a kind of legitimacy to employ strength against the reluctant people to religious message of the Gospel), is able to convince us about the intentions with what he would show the way to overwhelm the pagans from America and the Far East that he never known.

This idea can find its roots in the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Aristotle (a work largely quoted both by Thomas Aquinas in his reportations, and later by the Spanish Second Scholasticism, since the beginning of the XVIth century), when the ancient philosopher argues that there were man intended to serve and another to rule according to the social position granted by each one of themselves.

At contrary, Father António Vieira stepped a long time on the missionary territories of Brazil. And in spite of not having been in India, China and Japan, he knew them in a specific kind of information sharing, with the yearly letters sent and exchanged among the Jesuits all over the world.

Nevertheless his originality consists in the exposing of the belief (in the Sermon of the Holly Spirit), that, despite the appearances, the evangelization of East would be deeply easier in comparison with that developed by him and his colleagues in the Amazon basin and in the inner Brazil. And the simple reason for this he could find was that of the writing language produced by sophisticated civilizations on the other side. This situation was not sure that he found in the Portuguese colony in America, with its unaccountable amount of languages, unable to cataloguing and learning in order to proceed with the mission tasks.

The Aristotelism reached Vieira mainly through his theoretical predecessors from the Spain, such as Francisco de Vitoria, Luis de Molina and the own Suárez, with who he discusses deeply, in the third book of the *Clavis prophetarum* (The key of

Prophets), the limits of freedom in face of the sin intended to recognize by the new colonial power and the Christian Church to the slaves traded from Africa and the Indian savages from the bottom of Brazilian jungle.

There are two outstanding spirits, both plenty identifiable with the complex and fascinating adventure of discovery of the other (accomplished under their times), but sure all deeply due to themselves' own ages, according to those they were its produces, each in their manner.



## Thoughts by the Sea, Reflections on Happiness

**Louis Colombo**

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Every conception of happiness, philosophic or otherwise, contains within it the seeds of revolution, the promise of utopia. The only question then is whether this promise is made explicit or remains implicit, whether it is drawn out into the light of day or buried and repressed. In my essay I examine Simon Critchley's article "Happy Like God" which was published in the New York Times in light of this claim. It is my contention that Critchley not only allows the utopian promise of happiness to remain buried, but equally facilitates this burial. In so doing, Critchley offers a conception of happiness which functions as an apology for the status quo. My essay seeks to address the shortcomings I see in Critchley's piece, first by giving what I hope is a fair account of Critchley's concept and attempting to make a case for it. I depart from Critchley in that I attempt to draw out the contradiction already at work between the concept of happiness elaborated by Critchley and the social world in which this concept operates. It is my contention that this contradiction is already at play, and that Critchley is not unaware of this. It is this contradiction which makes the concept compelling. But what Critchley's article fails to do, and what I hope to do, is to reflect on the meaning of this contradiction, for it is here that we find the utopian promise of the concept.<sup>1</sup> Finally I turn to an evaluation of Critchley's concept of happiness, again finding that this concept points in directions that Critchley has chosen to overlook.

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<sup>1</sup> As Marcuse writes, "To the degree to which the established society is irrational, the analysis in terms of historical rationality introduces into the concept the negative element - critique, contradiction, and transcendence". Herbert Marcuse. "The Catastrophe of Liberation", p103. It is the last three that I hope to draw out of Critchley's conception of happiness.

## **Euripides and Plato on Autochthony**

**Jaroslav Danes**

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The myth of autochthony was one of the key elements of ancient Athenian democratic ideology. Therefore, it is not surprising that two clever critics and observers of Athenian democratic society – Euripides and Plato – paid particular attention to this myth. According to the myth of autochthony the citizens (or the ancestors of the citizens) were not born of human mothers and fathers but fashioned in the earth. What are the political implications of the myth of autochthony in general?

1. It provides the unity of political society and strictly separates citizens from non-citizens.
2. It explains the equal rights of the citizens.
3. It implies a world of cities whose boundaries are determined by nature and not by human contract or agreements.
4. It legitimates the exclusion of women from politics – the earth is the only mother of all citizens.
5. The myth of autochthony avoids the insistent questions: to whom does or did the land belong?

In his tragedy *Ion* Euripides questions the myth of autochthony and its implications for the foundation of a political society without women (the character of Kreousa). He also suggests that Athenian society, which thinks of itself as tolerant and open, is, in fact, on the basis of this myth, intolerant and xenophobic (the character of the old Tutor). On the one hand, the myth of autochthony provides order to the city, but on the other hand it closes and limits the possibilities of the city.

Plato's attitude is a little different. In the *Republic* he obviously acknowledges the value of this myth for the unity and stability of the political society, but he tries to eliminate the egalitarian implications of this noble lie, as he calls it (*Rep.* 414c). So he introduces his own autochthonous myth concerning the three classes of citizens (gold, silver, and iron), thus legitimating a hierarchical political society.

## **When Ethics is the Problem?**

**Fidel Davila**

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Conflict is natural to the human animal. Usually conflict is based on one group's moral Good versus another group's moral Good, i.e., ethics. Accordingly, ethics is the problem! Identifying common Good may seem impossible; yet, there is usually a common hierarchical Good in which each side's other Good-in-conflict neither wins or loses.

Intrinsic values create an individual's moral philosophy, i.e., ethic. Individuals then aggregate in groups ("tribes") based on similar ethics. From time immemorial, "Primeval tribes" have had hierarchical leadership with this leadership determining the tribe's ethics and with everyone in the tribe (at least outwardly) adhering to the tribal ethics. Otherwise, they are converted, persecuted, shunned, banished, imprisoned, and even killed.

In the last three millennia the aggregation of Primeval tribes in close proximities and the hegemony of victorious outside tribes that were tolerant of the Primeval tribes' local ethics lead to the development of "Modern tribes." These Modern Tribes only cared about their Good, i.e., military and taxing control and allowed the other Primeval ethics to continue unchanged. The basic difference between Primeval and Modern tribes is the tolerance of other tribe's local Good.

Contemporary conflicts are still rooted in one Primeval vs. another Primeval or Modern tribe's Good. Resolution of Good vs. Good conflicts required an identification of when each Good needs to be preserved and then the identification of a higher Good that both tribes can accept. Normally, the failure to identify an ethical higher Good is associated with the failure to respect basic human rights.

This paper will explore the compositions of Primeval and Modern tribes and how morals and moral decision-making varies according to tribal moral values. It argues that when ethics is the problem only ethics is the solution. Without an ethics solutions conflict cannot be resolved.

# **Justice, Injustice and Chinese Soybeans: An Inquiry from the Perspective of Kant's Publicity Principle**

**Yi Deng**

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China was once a major producer and net exporter of soybean. However, it has been the world's largest soybean importer since 2003, two years after its accession to the WTO. This change raises a series of questions: What are the effects of this shift in export and production status on the lives of Chinese soybean farmers? What benefits has the shift provided soybean farmers in other nations? Does this dramatic change signal that some kind of injustice has occurred?

This paper examines these issues by appeal to Immanuel Kant's account of international justice, foremost through his publicity principle:

*"All actions relating to the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity."*

Many scholars interpret the publicity standard either as the sub-principle of Kant's universal principle of justice or as the mirror image of his categorical imperatives. I argue that these interpretations underestimate the value of the publicity principle for bridging the disagreements between moralities and policies like those I believe are present in the Chinese soybean case.

My richer reading of the principle rests on discussions of general and negotiable consent and uses Kant's distinction between the political moralist and the moral politicians to explore the possibility that a politician is sometimes obligated to advance moral ideals. It also appeals to evidence gleaned from interviews with both Chinese and American soybean farmers. I conclude, by arguing that, on a Kantian analysis, the Chinese soybean case has indeed involved injustice.

## **The Ontology of “Light” in the Philosophy of Ishraq**

**Mohammad Farahmand**

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Knowledge of existence and the nature of its origin has been a big concern for scholars and philosophers over years. The fact that there is an origin and base for the universe has drawn the attention of experts in different disciplines. Relying upon the world of nature and material, some people have taken to elaborate on existence and materialist cause of its origin in physical limits. Some others, however, believe in metaphysical force. Sohrevardi is believed to be one of those who, under the light of his extraordinary genius and profound knowledge established the philosophy based on the Islamic education and the Holy Quran. This philosophy has illuminated the universe from the East to the West over eight hundred years. His knowledge of the Quran and mysticism enabled him to find a strong and appropriate base for his logical reasoning through which he could extend his philosophical thought to the world. In his opinion, existence can only be elaborated well under the “Noor” (light) of the Quran and the unity cosmology. Resorting to the holy verse “Allah-u noor-u samavat-e wal arz” (God is the very light of skies and the earth) he established his philosophical theory in the Islamic world. The referred light above is neither physical light nor the light of Divine Essence, rather, it is the Noor of “Robubi” (the light of divinity) and activity of God which has given existence to the universe. According to Sohrevardi, the stand assumed for every creature is dependent upon the degree of taking advantage of that light or the degree of being deprived from that Light. In this view, this Light is “Noorolanvar” (light of lights). This Light is the determining Light which came to determine existence. To understand Sohrevardi and his philosophy of Light one has to have a better understanding of Quranic noor (Quranic Light) and the differences in manifestations and hierarchy of existence, and the degree of taking advantage of that Light.

## **Personal Identity and Narratives**

**Gary Fuller**

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Many thinkers, traditional and recent, hold that there is a close connection between stories, or narratives, and personal identity. The idea, which can take various forms, is roughly that some kind of narrative unity is constitutive of personal identity. I shall argue against this general idea. After saying a bit about personal identity and stories, I shall look at various hypotheses and arguments that attempt to connect the two and show that they fail.

# **Perceptual Knowledge and Perceptual Discrimination: A Puzzle for McDowell**

**Andrea Giananti**

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1. Philosophical wisdom about perception holds that the supporting grounds a subject has for holding a perceptual belief can never entail an empirical fact. If my experience presents to me that the book is on the table, the supporting ground for the correspondent belief is that it looks to me as if the book is on the table. This picture generates problems, because it doesn't allow us to reconstruct the epistemic satisfactoriness involved in expressions like "seeing that" In this situation, scepticism might become unavoidable.

2. McDowell claims instead that in cases of veridical perception we have grounds that are absent in case of a matching hallucination. In the good case, we see that the book is on the table, where seeing is factive and entails the correspondent state of affairs.

McDowell incurs into troubles when he tries to square this Disjunctivist view with a form of Internalism, according to which the supporting grounds must be reflectively accessible to the subject. But if the subject cannot discriminate between the good and the bad case, it becomes problematic to say that he has access to his factive reason in the good case.

3. We need to rethink the relation between perceptual knowledge and perceptual discrimination. Pritchard (2008) claims that a distinction between reflectively accessible factive grounds and reflectively accessible discriminating grounds is helpful. We should not require that the subject be in possess of discriminating grounds, but only factive grounds, with the extra condition that the subject be able to give favouring evidence for p over not-p alternatives; discriminating grounds should only be required in case the subject makes an explicit claim to the effect that he knows that p. This allows us to deal with the sceptical threat and account for the conversational implicatures generated by explicit claims to know.

# **The Myth of Gyges and the Possibility of Altruism**

**Chrysoula Gitsoulis**

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In the Republic, Book II, the character Glaucon sets out to show that when human beings practice justice, they do so against their will, because they are by nature unjust. No one is ever just willingly, he claims, but only because they are constrained by law to be. If self-indulgence could be practiced without fear of punishment, then the tendency for being unjust will prevail. In this paper, I will exam Glaucon's account for why he takes this be the case, and show that it fails to establish his claim about human nature.



## Why there is ‘no such thing as a Language’: Chomsky’s Mistake

**Patricia Hanna**

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...there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed.  
—Donald Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”

In this paper, I explore Donald Davidson’s remark and argue that it should be understood in the larger context of an attack on the view that human language is guided by rules. This view is essentially the one advanced by Noam Chomsky, which has, in one form or another, held sway over contemporary research in cognitive science, linguistics and much of philosophy of language. This view has it that language is to be understood as a set of rules, embedded in the cognitive structure (the “mind/brain”) of the speaker/hearer, which guides the speaker/hearer’s use and understanding of language. I argue that Davidson is right to say that if this is the only way to understand language, then there is ‘no such thing as a language’.

Building on work by Bernard Harrison, I argue that this absurd conclusion needn’t trouble us. A proper understanding of language, and the function of rules, is to be found in Wittgenstein, arguing that one of the fundamental problems in trying to approach Chomsky from a Wittgensteinian perspective lies in the simple, but generally overlooked, fact that they are quite simply not talking about the same thing, and that of the two, only Wittgenstein is talking about language as we ordinarily understand it.

## **Heidegger's Ontological Coordination (Gleichschaltung) of Temporality and Language**

**Richard A. Hearn**

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Shortly after his resignation as Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1934, Martin Heidegger delivered a series of lectures entitled *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*. Although in these lectures Heidegger never explicitly refers to his infamous Rectoral Address given just one year earlier, the lectures can be viewed as Heidegger's attempt to provide a philosophical basis for those remarks. But, in attempting to justify the coordination (*Gleichschaltung*) of universities with the State described in these lectures as the historical being of a people (*Volk*), Heidegger exposed a danger inherent in his understanding of world formation.

After claiming in *Being and Time* that the totality of equipment discovered in a region is primordial to the being of any ready-to-hand equipment found therein, Heidegger claims that these totalities of equipment, i.e., regions, are somehow bound together to constitute a primordial totality which he calls "significance." Then, in Section II of *Being and Time* dealing with temporality, Heidegger claims that these significance-relationships determine the structure of the world. Although Heidegger argues that original temporality as itself already unified gathers these significance-relationships together to form the world, he provides no basis for this claim in *Being and Time*.

In the lectures, Heidegger attempts to relate language and temporality through the being of a *Volk* as historical. Heidegger concludes his lectures with the claim that "language is the ruling of the world-forming and preserving center of the historical *Dasein* of the *Volk*." Heidegger's claim that language, like temporality, is world-forming allows Heidegger to ground the unity of the world in either temporality or language because each grounds the other. But, in such ontological self-grounding, Heidegger's philosophy offers nothing ontic to save us from the danger of misconstruing the world as a region or any region as the world.

# **Phenomenal Concepts and the Mode of Presentation Problem**

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In recent decades a number of arguments have emerged purporting to show that physicalist theories of mind fail to do justice to the nature of consciousness. A popular physicalist answer to these arguments is the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ (PCS). According to PCS, there are special, first person perspective ‘phenomenal concepts’ that can explain the phenomenological intuitions that underlie the anti-physicalist arguments without succumbing to them. In thus appealing to a special kind of concept, differing from the concepts of physical or functional theory, PCS is a version of what is known as ‘Type B physicalism’. But PCS must give an account of the mode of presentation of phenomenal concepts that is consistent with physicalism and otherwise satisfactory in its own right. Taking an argument by Horgan & Tienson (H & T) (2001) as my point of departure, I argue that this is an as yet unresolved problem for PCS.

One possibility for PCS is to construe phenomenal concepts as pure self directed type demonstratives as proposed by Janet Levin (2007) and (perhaps) Brian Loar (1990, 1997). Call this the ‘TD’ account of phenomenal concepts. H & T offer a criticism of the TD account, appealing to what Ned Block (1995) calls ‘superblindsight’, that, following Levin, I argue the advocate of the TD account can answer. But I offer another criticism, one that shows that the TD account cannot accomplish what PCS aspires to accomplish, but reduces to a form of Type A physicalism.

There is another version of PCS, the ‘quotational’ version, proposed by, e.g., David Papineau (2002). According to this version, phenomenal concepts have the unique quality that they refer by presenting or displaying the phenomenal properties they refer to. But I argue that it is hard to see how this version can be made consistent with physicalism of any form.

## **Another Paradox of Williamson's Margin for Error**

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In accordance with the epistemic views, vagueness is a form of ignorance. For example a vague predicate either applies to an object in the borderline or it does not; exactly one of these occurs, but the speakers of the language do not (or even cannot) know which. In other words, there is an unknown (or unknowable) sharp line separating positive and negative cases of the predicate. As an especial case, one can mention Williamson's epistemic theory of vagueness, extensively expressed and defended in his famous book *vagueness*. It is one of any epistemic theory's duty to explain why the speakers do not (or cannot) know where is the sharp line between positive and negative cases of a vague predicate, for example. In his book, Williamson constructed a neat epistemological system to justify the ignorance claim. It is based on some principles he call margin for error principles. These principles are criticized extensively in the literature on different bases: epistemological, logical and .... This paper aims to construct another paradox in his system. the paradox is in some respects similar to Gomes-Torrente 's. but the benefit of this paradox is that it uses on intuitive premise, rather than two, which is the case in Gomes-Torrente 2002. With this new paradox we can show that even the iteration of knowledge operator sharpens our vague predicates, Williamson's system is paradoxical.

# **Tyranny in the Corner: Structural Violence and Human Agency**

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‘...the rich and the powerful should not be able to put a price on assaults on the weak and the poor; otherwise wealth, which is the reward of industry under the protection of the laws, feeds tyranny. There is no freedom when the laws permit a man in some cases to cease to be a person and to become a thing: then you will see the efforts of the powerful devoted to discovering from amongst the mass of civil relations those in which the law most favors his interests. ...in some states which have all the appearance of being free, tyranny is hidden or worms its way unforeseen into a corner neglected by the lawgiver and gathers strength and grows unobserved’  
- Beccaria. On Crimes and Punishments. Violent Crimes

Humanity’s entry into the 21st century was marked by heightened attention to resolving issues of poverty, inequality, and injustice. Consequently, various international conventions and protocols seek to reinforce universal commitment to protection and empowerment of all human beings. Yet, heeding Beccaria, do international conventions and ensuing state laws deliver on the objective of protection and empowerment; or do they provide venues for enhanced forms of violence and suppression?

This paper builds on notions from Marx, Arendt, Agamben, Balibar, Zizek, and Beccaria to: first, examine contemporary forms of violence which ‘worm [their] way unforeseen’ and become reinforced through legal, economic, and socio-cultural constructions; and second, explicate the impact and effect of these forms of violence on human rights (often referred to as ‘the rights of man’). Lastly, the paper explores the aforementioned authors’ conception of human agency, and, specifically, human’s ability to challenge structural violence and re-define political, social, and economic structures.

To this end, the paper focuses on tensions arising from several sets of dichotomies: First, tensions arising from protection and empowerment based on ‘status’ (legality) rather than on ‘being’ (pure humanity). Second, empowerment and re-integration as contingent upon observance of an imposed set of rights and obligations rather than on individual agency and right for self-determination. Third, building on Balibar’s concept of anti-violence, the paper examines structural arrangements that make the ‘civil state’ more violent than the ‘state of nature.’

# **Aristotle on Moral Responsibility and the Situationist Challenge**

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Aristotle argues that moral character is not the work of nature but an achievement of ours based on voluntary actions and moral training. Since in this sense we ‘choose’ our characters, we are responsible for our virtues and vices and for the conduct that flows from them. Aristotle’s commentators find his account of moral responsibility unsatisfactory but the most recent challenge to it comes from situationist social psychology. So far, this challenge remains largely unanswered and the main purpose of this paper is to discuss it. Situationists cite studies which show that (a) the situations we are in, not our characters, determine and better explain our behavior; (b) character traits are not robust i.e. are not manifested across trait-relevant situations consistently but only ‘locally’; (c) human psychological organization is not ordered by robust character traits. Based on these findings, a group of philosophers argue that situationism undermines major Aristotelian notions such as moral responsibility and moral education.

In this paper I examine how situationism might threaten Aristotle’s views on moral responsibility. Claim (a) may undermine Aristotle’s claim that agents acquire their character voluntarily (in a general sense, by choice). If situations (e.g. one’s environment and trainers) determine the trainees’ behaviour, then trainees cannot do otherwise (become good or bad) or be the source of their acts and character. Claim (b) of situationism may undermine Aristotle’s ‘characterological’ view of responsibility which holds that agents are responsible for their actions to the extent that the actions derive from robust character traits. If character traits are not robust, then agents are not fully responsible. Claim (c) of situationism undermines the Aristotelian project of character education which in turn casts doubt on his characterological view of responsibility. For if trainees could not develop robust character traits, then trainees are not responsible for their character-based conduct.

# **A Comparative Study of the Role of Harmony in the Thoughts of Confucius and Plato on the Cultural Cultivation of Music**

**Mei-Yen Lee**

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“Harmony” was a key concept in both ancient Chinese and ancient Greek musical aesthetics. This case study aims to discuss the significance of harmony in the thoughts of Confucius and Plato in regard to the cultural cultivation of music. Based on historical texts, such as Lun-yu, Yue-Lun and Yue-Ji, dealing with ancient Chinese musical philosophy and aesthetics, the author will analyze the concept of harmony in order to clarify and simplify the exegesis of its significance.

After illustrating the intricate significance of harmony in depth, the author will further discuss how ancient Greek culture, especially as reflected in Plato’s thoughts, likewise emphasized harmony in the cultural cultivation of music, and why Plato incorporated it into his ideals. Then the author will compare these two ancient sages’ thoughts with the aim of analyzing the similarities and differences regarding their concepts of harmony in the cultural cultivation of music.

Finally, the author will reveal that “harmony” was virtually synonymous with morality in Confucius’ and Plato’s perspectives regarding the cultural cultivation of music. However, due to the cognitive differences concerning human nature and viewpoints of music, Confucius and Plato took different paths to attain their goals. In addition, the author argues that the differences between the concepts espoused by Confucius and Plato regarding harmony in the cultural cultivation of music were also due to the metaphysical and political diversity.

## **Hume and Ancient Philosophy**

**Peter Loftson**

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This paper examines Hume's comments on and claims about ancient philosophy, as revealed in a survey of his published philosophical writings, his essays and historical work, and the letters and so-called 'early memoranda'. A clear and consistent picture emerges from doing so. While Hume is a lover of ancient literature, and reads the Greek and Latin texts fluently in their originals, he holds ancient philosophy in very low regard, as passage after passage discloses; with one qualification and one important exception. The qualification is found in Hume's appropriating the mantle of 'Academic' sceptic for himself; but in fact his Academic (or 'mitigated') scepticism has only minimal affinity with the ancient school of this name, having more in common with early modern sceptical positions. The exception is found in the 'painterly' depictions of character and other features of moral life, where Hume holds many of the ancients in very high regard, seeing them as superior to the moderns. The bases of these respective views of Hume's are explored, with an interpretation which makes expanded use of Hume's well-known 'anatomist'/'painter' contrast, interpreting it (contrary to the views of some of Hume's readers) as intended non-ironically, and as having serious philosophical purpose in his work. On the anatomist or theoretical side, Hume nonetheless (contrary to the views of a number of his prominent interpreters) sees a radical, dramatic break between early modern 'scientific' philosophy, and anything which preceded it. He regards philosophical work prior to Bacon and Galileo as merely speculative, and lacking in a developed observational/experimental empirical methodology which alone can enable philosophical inquiry to be scientific. Nevertheless Hume views ancient depictions of character, and psychological motivation, and the convictions of the authors of those depictions, as having a universal validity which does not depend on scientific methodology, and as more perceptive and accurate than most of the rationalistic moral theorizing of his own period.



## **ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ: Word-concept**

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Present-day discussions of what philosophy is are incomplete without taking into account the meaning of an ancient Greek word φιλοσοφία. The word served a means of self-affirmation of a new type of cognition as opposed to mythology and wisdom, and at once being rooted in cultural tradition. Hence it appears that our understanding of this word meaning has crucial importance for the comprehension of what philosophy is as it was developed by ancient Greek philosophers.

The meaning of the word φιλοσοφία for our contemporaries is not quite clear, especially due to vagueness of the meaning of its component, ancient Greek word σοφία. Departing from etymological research of V.N. Toporov, we stress the synonymy phenomenon of the words σοφία and τέχνη, that is art in some contexts. These words act as synonyms in mythological conception of the origin of cosmos. According to this conception both σοφία and τέχνη mean wisdom as a characteristic of mind to be concerned with the origin of cosmos. With that, the word σοφία is related to the version of self-generation of cosmos, and the word τέχνη – to the version of its creation.

Our research displays that sophia-wisdom either includes techne-art as its point or is included into the latter as its point. We come to the conclusion that the word φιλοσοφία surmises what the founders of philosophy had to surmise: problematical character of wisdom – cognition in principle. So how do the matters stand: does σοφία depend on τέχνη or vice-versa? And after that question comes another one: does cosmos originate from self-generation or creation? This question is a preimage of what was later called the main issue of philosophy.

# Friendship and the Common Life: Happiness in a Modern Polis

**Philip Matthews**

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At the heart of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* lies an awareness of the role that friendship plays in the formation of moral character. This ontological aspect of moral deliberation stands in stark contrast to the decision-making protocols currently in vogue for most forms of practical ethics, particularly the style of preference utilitarianism adopted in Australia.

As the twentieth century began to unfold, a series of technical achievements in science caused a technical anxiety that had hitherto been unknown. Two major developments serve as book-ends to this twentieth-century period of technical anxiety, Einstein's theories of special and general relativity (1905, 1916) and the completion of the human genome map (2000). One of the practical applications of  $E = mc^2$  was the development and use of atomic weapons. For several decades after, the threat of a nuclear exchange between feuding nations produced a social anxiety that psychiatrists labeled "nuclear anxiety."

At the other end of the century, advances in the genomic sciences produced a technical anxiety over the hereditary risks associated with transgenic species, the moral issues associated with cloning, and the "big brother" risks associated with genetic information. At the start of the Human Genome Project (1990), researchers from the National Human Genome Research Institute acknowledged public anxiety over genetic research and devoted US\$18 million dollars annually to what they refer to as the "Ethical, Legal and Social Issues" (ELSI) associated with mapping the human genome.

This paper will make two related claims. First, it will argue that something like Aristotle's understanding of friendship is required for the formation of moral character, and second, the type of impartial rationality commonly advocated in practical ethics is deficient because it ignores this ontological dimension.

## **Does God Have Free Will?**

**Hugh J. McCann**

Professor, Texas A & M University, USA

Presumably it would be an enhancement to God's perfection that he enjoy libertarian free will, since this would enable him to create any sort of universe he chooses, and would render him fully responsible for whatever he creates. It has been argued, however, that God does not have free will, that as a perfectly good being he is driven to create the best of all possible worlds. When presented with an array of possible worlds among which to choose, God must inevitably opt for the best, and so must lack freedom in creating the universe.

Responses to this argument typically maintain that there is no best possible world. On one account, any possible world can be improved upon, so that the array of possible worlds represents an ascending scale of perfection that has no limit. Accordingly, God can choose any very good world to create, and will exercise free will in doing so. The other account has it that although there is a top tier of possible worlds it contains more than one member, so that God is free to choose among worlds at the top level.

I argue that both these solutions fail. The first compromises God's perfect goodness by forcing him to create imperfectly; the second limits God's rationality by having him make a choice that violates sufficient reason. The correct solution is to realize that these are models not for creation but for a certain kind of manufacturing—for the enactment of a plan that is given a priori. True creation involves no prior plan. Rather, it is a kind of artistic endeavor, in which the plan comes with the product. God creates the world with the spontaneity of a perfect artisan: able to produce a world that is perfect, but with complete freedom.

## **Does Preference Determine Action? A Defense of Davidson's Principle, P1**

**Michael Michaelakis**

Assistant Professor, Yonsei University, South Korea

In this paper I defend the following principle, proposed by Donald Davidson: "If an agent wants to x more than he wants to y, then he will intentionally x if he either x-s or y-s intentionally." John Searle rejects this on the grounds that it contradicts free will, where free will amounts to the causal insufficiency of prior conditions to bring about an action. His main argument for this is that we experience such causal insufficiency. I argue, however, that our experience is simply that no conditions outside of us are sufficient for action, which leaves open the possibility that causes operating through us are sufficient. More pertinently, I argue that his rejection of Davidson's principle on the grounds that it stipulates sufficient conditions for action is mistaken. For the principle only asserts a necessary connection between preference and action on the condition that action is taken. Thus it is consistent with cases in which one has a preference but does not act accordingly, since, for example, it is possible for an agent to change his preference before acting. I go on to argue that the causal insufficiency of a preference for action is entirely consistent with psychological determinism – though, accepting Davidson's principle need not commit one to psychological determinism, for the principle says nothing about those cases where one has no preference. My deeper challenge to Searle is that he has the wrong model of psychological causation. Desires, intentions, and other psychological states are not (ordinarily) entities that stand outside the self, but rather are states that the self is in. Thus normally there is no competition between the self and such states, nor is it the case that the self can somehow act apart from all such states. In conclusion, Davidson's principle is compatible with free will.

## **The Problem with the Censor**

**Elizabeth A. Murray**

Professor & Chair of Department, Loyola Marymount University, USA

Freud first coined the term ‘the censor’ in his pivotal work  
*The Interpretation of Dreams*:

On the frontier between two agencies, where the first passes over to the second, there is a censorship which only allows what is agreeable to it to pass through and holds back everything else....what is rejected by the censorship is in a state of repression.

Freud’s notion of the censor and the very idea of an unconscious realm of the psyche came under blistering attack by Sartre and Ricoeur, yet other thinkers such as Lonergan and Doran continue to employ the notion of the censor. In this presentation I will address the question of whether it still makes sense to speak of a censor operative on the edge of human consciousness. I contend that if there is a censor, it should not be conceived of as an independent psychic function, which stands guard at the gate separating ‘me’ from the unconscious, distinct from the conscious ‘me.’ The self who desires to know and to understand is the selfsame I who interferes with the images that would enable me to understand. That the same self would have conflicting desires is not in itself a problem; it is a manifestation of the fact that the self exists as a unity in tension. The difficulty is that the concept of the censor requires that the self apprehend and understand and neither apprehend nor understand the same thing at the same time. The notion of the censor poses, in short, an epistemological problem. I propose to lay out the problem and to suggest how we can make sense of the censor phenomenologically.

## **Ontology that Matters: Binding Relations**

**Giuseppe Naimo**

Lecturer, University of Notre Dame Australia, Australia

In this paper I defend an ‘ontology of relations’ entailed in a critical examination of the concept of being based on a new perspective of the human organism (though not exclusively) conceived as a Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) entity or containment-field of being. The paper explores the psychophysical affect of interaction at a systems level, at an environment level and, at the level of compositional entanglement.

## **Metaphysics of Power and End of Play in Nietzsche's Philosophy**

**Rouhieh Naziripour**

Instructor, Islamic Azad University – Karaj Branch, Iran

Power as a metaphysical center ends the joyous play in Nietzsche's philosophy. While all binary poles like good and evil depend on their opposites, power seems to be the logos and god who does not have any opposites. Power does not depend on anything else. It is self sufficient and Aristotelian First cause. Every thing originates from power, but power does not have any origins. Power like a mysterious god of pantheism penetrates everywhere. Power makes "metaphor" dominant in metaphor/fact binary. It gives an absolute status to poetry and lie versus science and truth. Consequently, Nietzsche makes partiality and prejudice dominant over impartiality and rationality.

Furthermore, in a meta-discourse level, an absolutism is revealed in his profound concern with "play" as an absolute "goal". This seriousness in play negates a play in general, and a joyous play in particular. With static absolutism, the play as an absolute serious goal is not going to be a play any more. In fact, the absolute play is the death and end of the play. Also absolutism in uncertainty and anxiety are turned to a kind of certainty and peace. Ironically, this peace reveals "weakness" and a will to getting rid of encountering a changeable strategy in a dynamic world. Absolutism, reveals a telos, truth or maxim to which one must be committed. Self contradictorily, this maxim of power, which is supposed to create strong man –Übermensch, functions as a religious order excommunicating the blasphemous strong wo/man disobeying it. The religion of power depending on these maxims stops the play. Instead of joy in the play, there is a fear from the ones shaking the maxim on which Nietzsche's discourse "depend". Again, self –contradictorily, "dependence" reveals weakness as the base of power, deconstructing power's metaphysical status.

## **Cultural Models in Adaptation and Argumentation**

**Will Newsome**

MSc Student, University of Edinburgh, UK

A cultural model is an intersubjectively shared understanding of a particular ordered system, arrangement, plan, or theory in the form of an outline or model. They are frameworks that underlie the ability of speech, and more specifically argumentation, to "paint a picture" or "path" to a desired outcome. These models are not static, but can "adapt" given drastic changes in the domain they pertain to. One such drastic change is the change of the master-apprentice model, given a drastic change in its target domain (namely, from two people working together on a craft, to many people working together via a website). Raises questions in epistemology concerning the importance of socio-cultural contributions to argumentation and rational speech in general.



## **An Adverbial Interpretation of Pragmatism**

**Carol Nicholson**

Professor, Rider University, USA

Pragmatism is an “essentially contested concept,” in W.B. Gallie’s phrase, and there is no agreement about what it means or about whether it can be defined at all. Giovanni Papini points out that pragmatism cannot be defined, because it stands for a flexible habit of mind in contrast to most other philosophical schools of thought whose names end in “ism.” Rather than attempting to define pragmatism, I develop an interpretation of pragmatism that rejects the nominative case and describes pragmatism in terms of adjectives and adverbs. I see the essential insight of the pragmatists as their advocacy of a particular type of temperament. Following William James’ dichotomy between tough-minded and tender-minded philosophies, I make a distinction between two different styles of thinking—the flexible and the fixed. The flexible way of thinking values openness to uncertainty, change, and different points of view. The fixed way of thinking values strict adherence to principle, consistency, and resistance to compromise or change. I illustrate these two different temperaments with the examples of Barack Obama and George W. Bush. Although both ways of thinking are essential for philosophical contemplation and everyday life, depending upon the circumstances, it seems to me that the philosophical tradition has over-emphasized the fixed habit of thought over the flexible (with the notable exception of Socrates). I argue that the pragmatic temperament, i.e. the disposition to think flexibly with an open mind to doubt, change, and differences, should be given serious consideration as a corrective to the dominant mentality in our discipline, as well as in our social, political, and educational practices, in order to provide the versatility and balance that is necessary for good judgment.

## **A and B-Theories of Time: A Debate**

**Nathan Oaklander**

Professor, University of Michigan-Flint, USA

Time, A- theory, B-theory,

Beginning with Clifford Williams' "The Metaphysics of A- and B-Time," and continuing with recent articles by Steven Savitt, Mauro Dorato, and others there has been a consistent challenge to the very idea of a genuine debate between A-theorists (after McTaggart's A-series of terms ordered by the determination of past, present and future) and B-theorists (after McTaggart's B-series of terms ordered by the relations of earlier/later than). Some have argued that the debate between presentists and eternalist is vacuous hinging as does on an equivocation on the words "to be" or "exist." Others have claimed that the tensed/tenseless debate as it is also called is vacuous because there are in fact no tenseless senses to form the basis of the debate. Recently, Yoav Dulev has argued that the A/B- theory debate, while serving a purpose in getting us to a post-ontological understanding of time, is guilty of a faulty ontological assumption, which is "the idea that reality claims—claims to the effect that events and objects are or are not 'real'—are the key to the philosophical understanding of time." The aim of my paper is to consider these skeptical and anti-metaphysics arguments and then offer a two-fold response. I shall first show that the skeptical arguments are faulty and then go on to explain what exactly I take the main disputes between the A- and B-theories to be.

# **Connectionist Semantics, Feature Processing, and the Interpretability of Dimensions in State-Space**

**Ian O'Loughlin**

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Churchland's account of the semantics of neural networks depends on distributed representation, where the content of a vector space is determined solely by its topological relations to other state-space regions. A consequence of this is that individual dimensions of the state-space are not semantically interpretable. Prinz draws on the relationships between prototypes and features in the psychology literature to argue that semantically uninterpretable dimensions are irreconcilable with empirical data (and with our basic and apparent cognitive capacities), and hence that Churchland's semantic holism is unacceptable. For Prinz, this lacuna invites a concept empiricism that grounds the semantics in feature-based dimensions. Prinz's argument, however, depends on an equivocation on decomposition: it is an unwarranted assumption that the conceptual or linguistic capacity for reflective decomposition of prototypes is interdependent with the semantic decomposition of state-space content vehicles into feature dimensions. Prototype concepts with a holistic semantics can exhibit features in just the way Prinz is detailing, consistent with feature-prototype relationships demonstrated empirically and with Churchland's semantic holism. Furthermore, the alleged dependence of feature processing on semantic decomposition is belied by the results from existing connectionist systems. The partitioning of activation patterns in the hidden layers of well-known connectionist networks seem to directly contravene Prinz's objection, as the resulting partitions appear to be semantically interpretable and decomposable despite the fact that individual dimensions do not map to features.

## **Merleau-Ponty's Doctrine of Objects**

**Henry Pietersma**

Professor, Emeritus, University of Toronto, Canada

I interpret Merleau-Ponty here in the wide framework of transcendental philosophy going back to Immanuel Kant. There are important differences between the two philosophers, but even so objective thought and objectification, characteristic of everyday thought as well as science, are the important philosophical problems for both. Within a transcendental framework, the task a philosopher sets concerns the manner in which an experience of objects comes about. For both concepts and their relation to temporality play a central role. A temporal manifold, Kant argued, is objectified by means of the transcendental application of concepts. So does Merleau-Ponty, although he does not hold that the concepts involved have their origin in pure reason. He rather interprets them as modes of temporality. Objects for him are a kind of primordial transformation or modification of time and what he calls primordial perception.

Merleau-Ponty distinguishes primordial from what he calls empirical or secondary perception. The latter is what we ordinarily mean by sense perception of more or less permanent things around us, but in the former the distinction of appearance and reality is predominant. He uses the idea of transcendence in the sense of passing over and going beyond. Here one does not dwell on what is before us but takes it as appearance of a reality beyond, which is accordingly called world or horizon. Perceptual objects are constituted (in the transcendental sense of that term) by temporality, namely by a halt or suspension of its inherent transcendence. He gives a similar account of reified concepts, so-called abstract objects.

# **The Evolution of Knowledge - A Unified Naturalistic Approach to Evolutionary Epistemology Taking into Account - The Impact of Information Technology and the Internet**

**Stefan Pistorius**

Head of Software Department, Software Company, Germany

How can we describe and understand the impact of information technology on the evolution of human knowledge? In order to answer this question, we develop a naturalistic formal model to describe both the individual and collective evolution of knowledge. We conceive this evolution as a dynamic global network consisting of the networked knowledge of both humans and their cognitive tools. In order to define 'knowledge' and the 'knowledge network', we introduce the algorithmic concept of interactive adaptive Turing machines (IATM). IATMs are an extension of the classical 'universal Turing machine' (UTM) as applied in functionalist approaches to describe the human brain. Using a simple mathematical argument, we prove that the UTM model cannot describe the phenomenon of knowledge acquisition. IATMs are more expressive since we can now describe the interaction processes between individuals (i.e. humans and/or computers) and between individuals and nature. We argue that these interaction processes cause the propagation and evolution of new knowledge.

The model supports a hypothetical realism according to which all knowledge is provisional. Furthermore, it turns out that the ontogeny of an individual's knowledge follows the same rules as the phylogeny of 'knowledge domains' and the overall global knowledge network. Thus, the model represents a unified approach to different branches of evolutionary epistemology. Above all, the network view of knowledge evolution enables us to derive new epistemic insights from results in complex network research.

## **Being as the Set of All Things**

**Donald V. Poochigian**

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Being is thought indefinable because whatever the content of what is, constituent of it is being. Primitive, being is simple. Simple, it is irreducible. Irreducible, it is indefinable. As the set of all things, however, being is definable, instances and whole mutually identifying properties.

Being constitutes experience, and experience composes quality and abstraction. Quality is ontologically extended in time and space, and is epistemologically sensate. Abstraction is ontologically unextended in time and space, and is epistemologically sense. Endlessly divisible randomly, quality is irrational. Simply indivisible, abstraction is rational, constituting logic. Quality being irrational, abstraction cannot be an instance of quality, when an instance of quality is rational. Rather, occupying neither time nor space, when occurrent within time and space, ontologically abstraction occurs coextensively with quality without displacement. It occurring coextensively identifies quality as limited, rendering quality rational.

Unknowable independently of its manifestations, however, being is knowable dependently of its manifestations, abstract and qualitative. It is thus as the set of all things. Identifiable, an abstract set is as real as a qualitative object. Composing one and many, being is definable in terms of itself, alternately as one and many. Conjunctive fusion of constituents renders a particular indistinguishable from the continuum. Disjunctive diffusion of constituents renders a particular distinguishable from the continuum. Cyclic transitive conversion of constituents from fusion to diffusion and diffusion to fusion renders a particular distinguishable and indistinguishable from the continuum. Resolved is the apparent paradox of the set of all things containing and not containing itself. A non-empty set does not contain itself when its elements are unrelated, and does contain itself when its elements are related.

## **The Role of Theoretical Mysticism in Solving some Philosophical Controversies**

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To give a rational account of being matched with the real world has been the subject of philosophers' permanent endeavor. However, it cannot be claimed that philosophy has been successful in its attempt at all times. For this reason, we have witnessed numerous controversies and challenges on ontological issues among philosophers. On the other hand, mystics have also aimed at reaching truth all the time. Contrasting with a philosopher whose relation with the world is subjective and conceptual, a mystic intends to have existential relation with the truth of being. Considering the intention of his endeavor, a mystic takes resort to intuition and knowledge by presence rather than gained knowledge in order to reach the truth of being. However, mystics have gradually realized that comprehending, expressing, and conveying the sublime teachings resulted from the mystical ecstasy and intuition cannot be fulfilled without profiting from the power of thought and philosophical reasoning.

The present essay intends to indicate that finding the accurate answers to some philosophical questions and solving some controversies among the philosophers require mystical intuition in addition to the power of philosophical reasoning. Furthermore, many philosophical speculations will reach deadlock without profiting from the mystical observations and findings. As an illustration, philosophy necessitates a mystical vision and intuition in some issues such as the unity of being and multiplicity of creatures, the quality of God's knowledge in terms of His Being and creatures, the full and perfect appearance of all creatures before God.

## **Epictetus and the Ethics of Perception**

**Scott Rubarth**

Associate Professor, Rollins College, USA

The mental presentation or "phantasia" has a long and complex history from Plato to late antiquity. Gerald Watson (1999) surveyed the ever-shifting uses of the term in antiquity and for the most part ignores Epictetus. This is a shame since Epictetus is in fact doing something philosophically interesting and different with the concept. In early Stoicism the phantasia, that is, the mental presentation produced by the senses, primarily played an important epistemological role. In particular, the early Stoics used the phantasia, specifically the apprehensive (*kataleptikê*) phantasia, to establish and ground an empirical, foundationalist epistemology. The apprehensive phantasia reportedly assured the possibility of certain knowledge in specific circumstances. The Stoic position however faced a crippling attack from the middle Academics (Arcesilaus and Carneades), initially producing a highly productive philosophical debate but concluding in a philosophical stalemate.

I argue that Epictetus' main philosophical contribution is his refusal to engage in this debate. Instead Epictetus takes the phantasia in a very different direction. For Epictetus the phantasia is given a greater normative role and the epistemic function is downplayed. Indeed, the significance of the phantasia for Epictetus rests not on its objectivity, but on its malleability. Consequently, this new ethical focus of the phantasia has further implications. Rational choice or "prohairesis" begins to play a more central role in later Stoic ethics. Moral correctness is not so much defined by epistemic accuracy but in terms of moral productivity resulting from one's choice regarding how best to use or respond to any given phantasia.



## A New Interpretation of Plato's *Crito*

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Plato's *Crito* has traditionally been taken to put forth a version of social contract theory. However, that conclusion is clearly the result of misguided analysis; for a social contract is an agreement between citizens, members of a community, the population, etc., i.e. it is an agreement between *people*. In the *Crito*, though, there is little, if any, textual support for an agreement between citizens. Instead, the laws of Athens repeatedly claim that there exists an agreement between Socrates and *the laws themselves*. Furthermore, using an agreement, even a "tacit" one in the Lockean sense, as the source of Socrates' obligation not to flee Athens ignores the fact that Socrates repeatedly appeals to a *just* agreement. So, if agreement is the issue at hand, the question should be what makes an agreement just, not whether there merely is an agreement in the first place. In light of these shortcomings within the contractarian interpretation, I propose that the laws are instead appealing to an obligation of piety. Furthermore, I claim that, contrary to the standard reading of the laws as an embodiment of the actual, physical laws of Athens, the dialogue is actually between Socrates and the divine "form" of the Athenian laws. I draw a parallel with Socrates' *daimonion* and appeal to Gregory Vlastos's work on that subject, showing that interesting aspects of the *Crito*, such as the "persuade or obey" clause fit perfectly into Vlastos's picture of Socrates as a rational thinker. Finally, after dealing with the potential counterargument that I have opened Socrates up to an accusation that he is an anarchist, I point out that this new interpretation accounts for a notorious seeming contradiction between Socrates' doctrine in *Crito* and certain statements he makes in the *Apology*.

## **Plotinus on Art and Knowledge**

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Beauty and art have main position in Plotinus' (203-273) philosophy. He specifically worked on art and beauty in three treatises of Enneads: sixth treatise of first ennead, eighth treatise of fifth ennead and seventh treatise of sixth ennead. In two parts of Plotinus' theory, beauty and art are the same. He says the artist should make himself beautiful and get far from dirt to see the intelligible beauty. Thereby, he comes back to his self and realizes it as it is and therefore he becomes beautiful and can see intelligible beauty. In another part, he says that artistic creation is similar to creation of nature, soul and nous. In other word, as they create the beauty by looking, artist also creates beauty by looking the intelligible forms.

So what leads in all creations is knowledge. Therefore in plotinus' opinion, aesthetics is epistemology and ontology. In this ideology, comprehending the being needs becoming beautiful and getting beautiful is becoming good.

# **The Necessity of the “Necessary Connection” of Mind and Body: Revisiting Kant’s Metaphysics to Save Science**

**Irmgard Scherer**

Associate Professor, Loyola University Maryland, USA

I argue that a legitimate metaphysics is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition in any area of knowledge claiming to be a science. This seems to be resurrecting Kantian claims that we seem to have long since surpassed; scientists in their labs are doing quite well and see no obstacles to research from the side of metaphysics; they find verification of their hypotheses, often with spectacular success, without recourse to philosophy.

Is there then a real need for metaphysical foundations in science today? What would such a metaphysics look like?

I will pursue this line of questioning by first resurrecting an old but still relevant debate of two famous protagonists, Hume and Kant, Hume arguing radically against metaphysics while Kant attempting to save it for science. Kant’s Copernican-like revolution in thinking has not been put to rest even today, in the sense that it is, albeit as a shadowy participant, present in one of the two contemporary camps of thought in the debates in philosophy of mind. The first, materialist computational theories that tend to embrace the new science of neurophilosophy, holds, similar to Hume, that human consciousness is a kind of physical sponge in which thinking is one of the components along with feeling and sensing. The second camp, admittedly a smaller contingent, is anti-materialist in nature, arguing for a non-reductive dualist theory of mind, the latter’s irreducibility to physical properties reminiscent of a kind of a priori structure in the mind that Kant had in mind.

This paper revisits the Hume-Kant debate, and ends by suggesting that we must see Kant in a new light, such that some of his central ideas of the way in which the mind works resonate in contemporary thinking and have found renewed attention. The a priori conditions of the mind that organize the appearances necessarily seem to still hold a worthwhile answer to establishing, in some limited way, the necessary connection between body and mind, phenomena and noumena, thinking and feeling, and thus the knowability of the world.

## **A Phenomenology of Child Play**

**Audrey Skrupskelis**

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The value of child play is misunderstood and underestimated, yet it is essential for healthy development. Programs such as “Baby Einstein” and “Babies Can Read”, among others, make claims that are not supported by recent brain research, which shows that unstructured, imaginative play is how children learn to understand the adult world in their own time and space. The drive to play in mammals is genetically inherited, yet with the emphasis on forcing very young children into academic situations is not only counterproductive, but goes against the nature of children.

There is too strong an association of play as mere recreation and fun. In my paper, I will give a description of play based on the phenomenological method as interpreted by Robert Sokolowski. Several major themes emerge revealing that play is a great deal more than mere fun: play as freedom, play as imagination, play as harmony, play as friendship, and play as mystery. I will especially emphasize the theme of freedom, in the sense of self-initiating thought and action. I understand by freedom the ability to formulate one’s own goals and experiment in the search for means of their realization. What I especially emphasize is the contrast between the world of the child and the world of the adult. The adult world, the child experiences as an alien power, which has no meaning for him. The child must come to deal with the adult world on her own terms. In the play event, the child constructs a world which he can understand, confront and master in cooperation and sometimes in confrontation with others. The description of play will show that play is not mere play, but is an essential human function, intimately linked with what we most value in personality.

# **Metaphysics and Semantics of Folk Psychology**

**Krzysztof Swiatek**

Professor, Grant Macewan University, Canada

A long-lasting debate in the philosophy of mind concerns the metaphysical status and meaning of the concepts posited by folk psychology. Beliefs, desires, and other psychological attitudes play two roles: on the one hand, they helped to explain and predict others' actions; at the same time serving as the foundation of everyone's self-account and rationalization of one's behaviour, on the other. The two roles need not individuate the same propositional attitudes since the account of another person's behaviour is based in propositional attitudes ascribed through a process of external rationalization while the self-ascription of beliefs or desires results from agents themselves making sense of their own behaviour. The discrepancies between the external and internal accounts have always cast doubt upon the reliability of folk psychology as a theory of behaviour. However, with the origin of materialist theories of the mind it has become exceedingly clear that posits of folk psychology resist attempts to reduce them to categories of neurophysiology.

In this paper I propose a theory of folk psychology that bridges the metaphysical and semantic differences between the eliminativist and realist accounts of propositional attitudes. Building on Michel Seymour's distinction between material and intentional components of meaning, I argue that the concepts of folk psychology postulated to explain others behaviour represent idealized types of mental states that correspond to neurophysiological types and serve to explain broad types of behaviour. The concepts of such folk psychology are material in Seymour's sense; they belong to the public account of one's behaviour and are perceived by external observers as causally efficacious. However, they do not square with the agent's own account which is intentional: based in his own perceptions of his intents, the objects he posits into existence, and idiosyncratic senses he attaches to the concepts of public language. Neither the material nor the intentional accounts are fully accurate. While the material folk psychology explanation represents an attempt to account for the agent's behaviour in categories that are too general and broad, the agent's own intentional account is but his own interpretation of the real neurophysiological causes of his behaviour. The true folk psychology theory of behaviour results from the process of social interaction between the agent and external observers that simultaneously brings about a modification of the idealized categories of material folk psychology, re-assessment of the agent's own intentional account, and a corresponding adjustment in the underlying brain states.

## **Structural Norms versus Neuroscientific Facts**

**Elzbieta Szymanska-Swiatek**

Professor, Grant Macewan University, Canada

Many philosophers now writing on the nature of human morality follow a trend of scrutinizing the latter by a naturalistic or scientific approach. These philosophers refer to a novel picture of morality that advocates “the new synthesis” based on biologically evolved and culturally sensitive brain systems.

These new conception of a relatively old field of study which is morality becomes now known as moral psychology. The prospects of achieving good results from its implementation are sufficiently robust to warrant this philosophically new trend in ethics. It looks that finally we are in a position to find at least some neural underpinnings or correlates of moral sensitivity. We are able to explain brain mechanisms that underlie what philosophers have called moral judgments. Perhaps, someday neuroethics will provide us with explanation for the rest of traditional ethical concepts like moral value, moral character, moral development or moral obligation.

However, there is a growing consensus that moral psychology inasmuch as it remains committed to the empirical method, questions human powers of reasoning and reinforces the intuitionist perspective on morals. One of the most interesting features of this position is that it blurs a sharp distinction between facts and values or the “is” and “ought” of traditional ethics.

In this paper I try to find a suitable central concept to account for a normative moral theory to accommodate moral insights of traditional ethics without leaving aside recent attempts to naturalize ethics. I hypothesize that traditional ethical theory constitutes the structure and its objects (norms/values) have no properties independently of those relating them to other objects of the same structure.

In concentrating on norms moral theorists have chosen to look at objects from a certain frame of reference in which they are individually identifiable yet not finite.

I find the concept of the structure intellectually satisfying as it does not prejudge the extent to which normative ethics satisfies the ontological commitment imposed by evidence from neuroscience. By analogy between mathematical intuition which can account for perceptual and structural objects, I will claim that structurally understood norms are directly squared with the concept of moral intuition endorsed by a perceptual phenomenology of neuroscientific experiments.

## **Reconceiving Philosophy as Bodily Discipline: Clues from Master Zhu**

**John Thompson**

Associate Professor, Christopher Newport University, USA

What is philosophy? This simple question is one many of us hear, be it from students taking intro classes (often merely to satisfy general education requirements) or from new acquaintances over the hors d'oeuvres table at spouse's office party. A recent textbook several of my colleagues use defines philosophy as "the rational attempt to formulate, understand, and answer fundamental questions." By and large this definition is pretty good as far as it goes; generally we think of philosophy as a mental activity. And indeed, those of us who study and teach philosophy in academia are often said to be engaged in the "life of the mind." Increasingly, however, I find such views disquieting, if only for the simple fact that they uncritically assume a metaphysical dualism between the mental and the physical and along with it, a corresponding valuing of the former over the latter. Yet while we philosophers are engaging with ideas and thinking deep thoughts, what are we doing with our bodies? Don't they matter at all? I want to argue for a different way of understanding philosophy, one that places our bodily being at its center. To do so I will examine the program of study outlined by Zhu Xi (1130-1200), perhaps the greatest and most influential figure in the "Neo-Confucian" tradition. Among his many accomplishments, Master Zhu devised a thorough holistic education curriculum aimed at transforming a person intellectually, morally and spiritually. I argue, however, that more fundamentally Zhu established a system of disciplining and shaping the bodies of his students, and that such bodily discipline was central to his project. While this subject may seem rather exotic and far-removed from us today, it has intriguing and critical implications for what we are actually doing as philosophers.

# **The Perplexity of New Beginnings: The Will and the Foundation of Freedom**

**Camila Vergara**

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Engaging with the discourse of political origins in the early 1960s, Hannah Arendt puts forward in *On Revolution* a political project that presses for revisiting the moment of revolutionary foundations. Against the Jacobin model, she attempts to elaborate a theory of foundings that conceptualizes new beginnings as relative and as carrying their own set of principles from which immanent authority can emanate. By taking as her (ideal) model the American Revolution, Arendt argues for a theory of new beginnings that contests the predominance of violence and advocates for an overarching guiding principle “of mutual promise and common deliberation.” In contrast to Schmitt, for whom the validity of a new constitutional order is derived from the existential will of the sovereign in a state of nature, Arendt’s theory is constructed opposed to the so-called will of the multitude operating in a void as the basis for legitimacy. For her, *liberium arbitrium*, the inherent arbitrariness of the will, of the sovereign decision and its violence, is too volatile to be capable of creating stable spaces for freedom to flourish. Moreover, the inherent unpredictability of the will could easily lead to despotism and an abortive revolutionary project.

In this paper I will examine Arendt’s theory of new beginnings, exploring her apparent aversion to popular sovereignty under the light of her last work on the will. Through a radical analysis of her work, I will engage with the contradictions and unresolved perplexities she left before us. Which principles should be present, according to Arendt, to create a well-constituted, stable order? Is there any space in her theory of spontaneous collective foundings for popular sovereignty, for the will-as-choice? If there is such space for voluntarism, what are the implications of the decision for the whole process of new beginning?



# Rorty and the Linguistic Turn

**Timo Vuorio**

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Richard Rorty released in 1967 an anthology named *The Linguistic Turn* which made the very phrase, originated by Gustav Bergmann, widely known. There Rorty gave it a meaning of “philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use”. The analytic philosophers (e.g. Timothy Williamson and Peter Hacker) have recently argued if the ‘the linguistic turn’ in philosophy has come to end or not.

But what was Rorty’s own stance towards the linguistic turn? Already in the quoted anthology he seemed to doubt whether there was meta-philosophical success in seeing ‘problems of philosophy as problems of language’. In his infamous *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) he seemed to have made up his mind that there wasn’t any; it was a “rather desperate attempt to keep philosophy as an arm-chair discipline”. However, Rorty never seemed to doubt that the turn, after all, was a step of *progress* in philosophy. In practise, this can be seen in the very way he is doing philosophy; for example, a word ‘vocabulary’ is a technical term Rorty constantly applies in his argumentation.

In my presentation I will reconstruct how the linguistic turn does constitute a meta-philosophical background for Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. I will argue that it can be divided into three successive steps:

- (1) Seeing problems of philosophy as problems of language
- (2) Seeing language as antirepresentational
- (3) Seeing ‘poetic’ as a function of philosophy

I will discuss each of these steps and how they are related to each other. In addition, I will compare the point of the third step to the meta-philosophical discussion in the analytic philosophy today.

# **Intergenerational Rights: A Philosophical Examination**

**Makoto Usami**

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In the field of political philosophy, one of the primary views on our supposed obligation towards future generations invokes the notion of the rights of not-yet-born people. In a similar vein, a growing number of authors argue that those living in the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are entitled to demand financial reparations for the historical injustices from which their distant ancestors suffered. However, these claims of intergenerational rights face theoretical objections based on the non-identity problem addressed by Derek Parfit. The non-identity problem refers to the fact that the biological identity of each person depends on the numerous past events that affected the circumstance of conception. To circumvent these objections, several rights theorists, notably Lukas Meyer, advance the threshold conception of rights in discussing relationships between generations. Despite the significant implications of this conception of rights, few attempts have been made to examine its validity.

This paper attempts to plug such a gap by examining what extent to which the threshold conception of intergenerational rights is pertinent. I also point out that the motivation behind this conception suffers from the ambiguity of a traditional dichotomy between perfect and imperfect duties. The paper concludes by suggesting non-rights-based solutions for the problem of obligation to posterity and that of reparations for historical injustices.

# **Compassion and Well-being: An Aristotelian – Buddhist Perspective**

**Andy Wallace**

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**Paradoxicality of Institution,  
De-Institutionalization or the Counter-Institutional  
in Classical Chinese Chan Buddhist Thought**

**Youru Wang**

Professor, Rowan University, USA

In this paper I will examine the philosophical issue of the paradoxicality of institution, de-institutionalization, or the counter-institutional in classical Chinese Chan Buddhist thought. My examination of Classical Chan thought will be limited to the texts and teachings of Hongzhou School, one of the most influential schools of classical Chan. I will discuss the issue in two parts. The first part will analyze the problem of the iconoclasm model used by the 20th century scholars to characterize the classical Chan attitude toward institution, a problem that contradicts the undeniable fact that the so-called Chan iconoclasts do not abandon the institution or institutionalization at all. How could we then solve this contradiction between the so-called iconoclasm and the Chan involvement in the institution? The first part of my paper will also reveal the limits of current critiques of this model, the recent tendency to return the images of the Chan masters to traditionalists, opposite to iconoclasts. It has become another example of imposing our oppositional way of thinking on the ancient Chan masters. The second part of the paper will thus introduce a new paradigm for understanding or interpreting the classical Chan attitude toward institution, the model of de-institutionalization, which borrows certain insights from the later Derrida's discussion on the counter-institutional. Despite the borrowing of the Derridean insights, the paper will elaborate on the point that the model of de-institutionalization is strongly supported by the Chan heritage of the Mahayana Buddhist philosophy of relationality and non-duality. This new model is able to describe more accurately the Chan understanding of the paradoxicality of institution, the subtle Chan relationship of being "with and against" institution, and the Chan efforts as a "middle way" to transform the institution, making the institution open to the universal process of flux and change.

## **Middle Path Aristotle and Buddhism**

**Manasvini Yogi**

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My paper aims at comparing Aristotle's and Buddhist concept of virtue—a task justified by the presence of some vital similarities as well as distinctions between them. Similarities are; for both, virtue is ontologically a mean but axiologically a golden extreme. Is it possible to practice virtue thus understood? Yes, if we obey both the concepts. Each complements the other. Aristotle's definition of virtue finds its concrete illustration in the Buddhistic Eightfold middle path specifying concrete virtuous actions like Right (samyak) knowledge and Right livelihood etc. Aristotle does not openly touch any such concrete action, but more importantly provides the theoretical and rational authenticity to these actions by showing that they do confirm to his definition of virtue. Both make their concepts of virtue the ideals to be followed. Aristotle's virtues are also formal the greatest good of the greatest number. Conversely Buddhism talks of individual virtues. Whether these, when practiced would lead to an ideal state or not remains unanswered there. Blend of the two therefore seems imperative to formulate a principle covering both theory and practice. The comparison between the two is quite apparent as they both talk of virtue in different words. Both perhaps thought it was always wrong to eat too much, but each person will find his/her own relative mean between eating too much and eating too little. A virtue ethics of moderation is still normative, because the principal determinants in finding a workable mean for eating are objective not subjective. If people ignore these objective factors—e.g., temperament, body size, metabolism, and other physiological factors—then their bodies, sooner or later, will tell them that they are out of their respective means.

## **Nietzsche and Women**

**Julian Young**

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## Two Notions of Rigidity

**Marian Zouhar**

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If a definite description is rigid, it describes an object as an instance of a certain (essential) property of the object. This is captured in this (Kripkean) definition:

A definite description, *d*, is a rigid designator iff *d* refers to the same object, *o*, in all possible worlds in which *o* exists.

Call this K-rigidity. K-rigidity is interwoven with metaphysical issues like essentialism; for an expression is said to be K-rigid because of some facts dealing with the object designated.

There is another notion that is not so metaphysically laden. It is captured here:

A definite description, *d*, is a rigid designator iff *d* refers to the same object in all possible worlds in which *d* refers to anything at all.

Call this P-rigidity. A similar definition has been proposed by Hilary Putnam, but it did not win much attention and was wrongly considered (even by Putnam himself) as equivalent to Kripke's.

P-rigidity differs from K-rigidity in that the former is defined solely in terms of the expression's behavior. This fact enables us to divorce the notion of rigidity from metaphysical issues. Some descriptions are P-rigid without being K-rigid; they are rigid without describing their referents as instances of essential properties. Consider the description 'the individual that both authored *The Republic* and is identical to Plato'. There are possible worlds in which Plato exists without being the author of *The Republic*. Since the description fails to refer to anything in such worlds and, in other worlds, it refers to Plato exclusively, it is P-rigid (though the property expressed by it is not essential to Plato); however, it is not K-rigid because in some worlds it refers to nothing, even though Plato exists in these worlds. There are also some other philosophically interesting consequences stemming from P-rigidity, as opposed to K-rigidity.