The Effect of Media Polarization on Contents: A Study on the Digital Newspapers in Turkey

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Abstract

Since media play a key role in shaping ideas and political preferences, the relationship between politics and the media has always been a subject of much debate. The level of such a relationship changes from country to country. For some countries, it is negligible, while in some others it is observed as an intense relationship. As this relationship is intense in Turkey, as if it is treated according to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Polarized Pluralist Model. Historically, Turkey has always been experienced in polarization. Though this polarization has increased or decreased according to the current period. Rapid polarization occurred resulting from the neo-liberal policies which commercialized the Turkish press and changed the structure of ownership implemented in Turkey after the 1980’s. When the AKP came into power the party found a very suitable situation for the press-party parallelism and implemented the polarization policies in media corresponding to its policies. Thus the media bias has increased. Media bias can be observed as selectively omitting relevant information that conflicts with the financial and political interests of the media institution and the viewers’ beliefs. If ignoring the events or staying silent is impossible the news is presented in a distorted way. The quality of the news is changed, it is evaluated in different points of view and the events are shown as neutral or unimportant. Thus, as the desire of partisans to receive confirmatory news is met, the viewers’ circulation can be increased. This study aims to explore the effect of polarization on the contents by examining the pro-government and anti-government newspapers’ contents. Therefore, in this study, recent important news were undertaken to display how the contents in media are influenced by the polarization in Turkey.

Keywords: Digital newspaper, Media bias, Media discourse, Polarization, Turkey.
Introduction

Since the role of media in shaping the political choices and ideas is regarded as significant, the relationship between politics and media has always been a subject of debate. While this relationship is negligible in some countries, this could be very intense in others. It seems to be intense in Turkey, just in accordance with the Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Polarized Pluralist Model. However, polarization either increased or decreased, depending on the period. With the impact of the neo-liberal policies put into practice after 1980, the Turkish press, rapidly-commercialized and possessed by different bosses, was quickly polarized in the 1990s. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, they found a very appropriate place for media parallelism and pursued the polarization policies, which they had adopted in politics, and realized them with success. Therefore, the profound polarization experienced in politics accelerated advocacy in media. Advocacy in media manifests itself in several ways. The most widely practised ones are repression of information, manipulation and de-contextualization of events so as to fit in their views. Thus, the demands of the partisans seeking to hear the news in line with their own ideas, thoughts and beliefs were met, on the other hand, the view ability in media went up.

However, common people or citizens with moderate views request unbiased and neutral information. Citizens with rational views understand the bias in media, yet cannot eliminate deficiencies or falsities. From an economical point of view, bias in media hinders positive externality. Researches generally focus on the effect of the media over how keeping in line with the political authority impacts the elections and votes. In this study, Hallin and Mancini (2004), while defining media systems, analysed/depicted Turkish media through the variables like Media Markets, Political Parallelism, Professionalization of Journalists, and the Role of the State.

Polarisation

As the political elites get gradually polarized and produce more partisan messages, the media chosen to transmit these start moving in the same direction and get polarized. Readers then choose to read the ones in line with their worldviews from the varied media thanks to digitalization, becoming homogenous. In this sense, the events on the agenda of the mass media before digitalization, used to be discussed by people with different views, however, today people tend to look at the media, which share similar ideas with their political views. Thus, polarized media congregate ideologically homogenous people together and sharpen political attitudes more by merely giving rise to a group polarization (Ableson, 1995). Stroud states that when media consumers come across with similar worldviews in media, they tend to manifest much more polarized attitudes (2010:557-558). Stroud partially based his idea on Klapper’s (1960) “selective exposure”, “selective perception” and “selective
retention”, yet he emphasized that “selective exposure” must have changed today. Because Klapper put forward these ideas within the framework of limited effects whereas selective exposure now serves as a significant indicator of media effect. Thus, partisan selective exposure contributes to political polarization (Stroud, 2010:557, 569). According to Prior (2013), partisan selective exposure also explains the polarization towards attitudes as to the political candidates.

Table 1. Hallin and Mancini’s Contrastive Media Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model</th>
<th>North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist Model</th>
<th>North Atlantic or Liberal Model Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Industry</td>
<td>low newspaper circulation; elite politically oriented press</td>
<td>high newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation press</td>
<td>medium newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation commercial press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parallelism</td>
<td>high political parallelism; external pluralism, commentary-oriented journalism; parliamentary or government model of broadcast governance; politics-over-broadcasting systems</td>
<td>external pluralism especially in national press; historically strong party press; shift toward neutral commercial press; politics-in-broadcasting system with substantial autonomy</td>
<td>neutral commercial press; information-oriented journalism; internal pluralism (but external pluralism in Britain); professional model of broadcasting governance; formally autonomous system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalization</td>
<td>weaker professionalization; instrumentalization</td>
<td>strong professionalization; institutionalized self-regulation</td>
<td>strong professionalization; non-institutionalized self-regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the State in Media System</td>
<td>strong state intervention; press subsidies in France and Italy; periods of censorship; “savage deregulation” (except France)</td>
<td>strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, particularly strong in Scandinavia; strong public-service broadcasting</td>
<td>market dominated (except strong public broadcasting in Britain and Ireland)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While the partisan polarization in media draws attention amongst academicians, polarization has been discussed in several dimensions. In this way, Levendusky and Malhotra (2015) carried out a research on how the partisan media in the US affected political attitudes and suggested that polarized media news led the readers to view the opposition party as more negative and gave rise to the impression that the disharmony between parties
escalated. Polarization in media basically moulds the perceptions of the electorate about political world, thereby shaping their attitudes (Levendusky and Malhotra, 2015:4).

Hallin and Mancini (2004) talk about four variables affecting media and political realms; professionalization (circulation and commercial newspapers), political parallelism of media (the degree media is affiliated with a certain political movement or a party), the level of professional journalism and finally the role of the state in media (freeing media more rather than putting them under state control). In Table 1, general features of models are presented in tables (Lucini, 2010).

If we follow Mancini and Hallin’s external and internal pluralism categorization (2004:29 in Gencel-Bek, 2010), in the case of Turkey, we can say that it is external rather than internal pluralism. According to Mancini and Hallin, while external pluralism along with political parallelism emphasizes the stronger features of media systems, political parallelism covers media content, organizational relations between media and political parties, political relations of journalists, and partisanship of viewers (2004). Humanes et al. indicated that the disintegration in audio-visual media and niche viewers taking place televiewers tend to have external pluralism, leading to political parallelism and polarization (2013:567). Therefore, in Turkey, external pluralism and political parallelism are in harmony. From Mancini and Hallin’s point of view, in broader terms, external pluralism comprised of a polarised majority can be seen in Turkish media via interpretive journalism, governmental inspection over audio-visual media, interventions imposed through regulations on audio media, etc.

Likewise, the columnists, who were called, “new aristocracy” by Rifat Bali and conceptualised as a new class, have been on the rise since the 1980s. In their columns, stating their own personal beliefs on events or on persons, commenting as such becomes easier compared to making news, thus legitimizing the political system and protecting the media groups (Adaklı, 2006:308-310). Elda Brogi, the academician studying on pluralism in the EU, stated that dealing with a subject from the same point of view is natural, yet claiming that he had never come across the picture anywhere except Turkey in which eight newspapers put the words of the same politician onto their headlines without even using quotation marks for the sake of broadcasting propaganda (Birgün, 30 Nisan, 2015).

Basically, all of these variables – such as the Newspaper industry, Political parallelism, professionalism of journalists, role of the state which were employed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) while categorizing media systems, are also used in the analyses of Turkish media.

Struggle for Hegemony over Media in Turkey and Polarization

Media industry/market

With the introduction of neo-liberal policies after 1980, the relationship between media and politics were shaped accordingly. With neo-liberalism, in
which market processing is not regarded as a phenomenon, a regulation dependent upon political, legal, institutional and cultural interventions emerged. With the military intervention (coup d’état) on 12th of September in 1980, the relationship between the understanding of sovereignty based upon state-centralism marked by the new rightist government and liberalization oriented by markets (Özkazanç, 2005:636-37) was observed. With the implementation of neo-liberal policies (shrinking, privatization, deregulation, etc) after 1980s, structural transformation was experienced in media sector. The AKP government which came to power in 2002 effectively has been using the methods to control the media as well as applying neo-liberal policies. The media in Turkey has been operating under the yoke of the pressure from the political power and the relations of media moghuls and political powers with economic and political dominion. While the businessmen having invested in several fields started to invest in media after 1980, media owners began to invest in non-media sectors. However, in the 1990s, at the onset of privatization in broadcasting, media trusts started to invest in several sectors, like mining, energy, tourism and construction as well as media (magazines, newspapers, TV and radio).

Furthermore, with the advent of internet technology, convergence of conventional media and new media has led to an increase in the number of and variety of media tools the media trusts possess.

The trust working in media sector in Turkey are: Dogan Group (Aydın Doğan), Ciner Group (Turgay Ciner), Dogus Group (Ferit Şahenk), Zirve Group (Orhan Cemal Kalyoncu – family business), Turk Media Group (Ethem Sancak), Albayrak Group (Ahmet Albayrak – family business), Demirören Group (Erdogan Demirören).
Table 2. 2002-2016 Period - Changes in the Ownership of Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Star TV and another channel were confiscated from Uzan Group and were sold to the businessman, Ali ÖzmenSafa and the channel was renamed as 24 TV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>SDIF (TMSF in Turkish) confiscated ATV-Sabah Group, which was under the control of Ciner Group. ATM, Sabah, Takvim, Fotomaç, YeniAsır, YeniAsır TV, İzmir TV were sold to Çalık Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Doğan Group sold Star TV to Doğuş Group in 2005 through SDIF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>ATV, Sabah, Takvim, Fotomaç, YeniAsır, YeniAsır TV, İzmir TV were sold to Çalık Group. SDIF (TMSF in Turkish) confiscated ATV-Sabah Group, which was under the control of Ciner Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Doğan Group sold Star TV to Doğuş Group in 2005 through SDIF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>DK News Group, initiated with the partnership of Demirören and Karacan bought Milliyet and Vatan in May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Turgay Ciner bought Show TV from Cukurova Holding, which was confiscated by SDIF in 2013. Çalık Holding sold ATV-Sabah Commercial Merger (Turkuvaz Medya) to Zirve Holding. Türkmedya Group was bought by Ethem Sancak, a name affiliated with the ruling party, AKP in 2013 and 360 TV, Akşam and Güneş started to be controlled by Sancak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Bugün, Millet, Bugün TV, Kanal Türk and Kanal Türk Radyo, owned by Ipek Group was appointed trustees and then these media groups were closed down in 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Digitürk belonging to Çukurova Group was sold to BeIN Media Group, a Qatari media group within Al-Jazeera group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Feza Gazetecilik AŞ (News Corporation, running Zaman, CHA, etc) was appointed trustees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. The general manager of Çalık Holding is the son-in-law of the former prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In order to realise the sale, the group procured 750 million dollars of the sum from the state banks, like Halk Bankası and Vakifbank, which created some hot debates on the agenda. CHP deputy, Ahmet Ersin, moved a bill to the parliament on the allegations related to extraordinarily long term/low interest loans with high risk – through the interventions of the prime minister then, including the claims of political pressure and threat of deposal (Radikal, 24.04.2008).

2. After the enactment of law, titled Radio Television and Broadcasting Services Law, the article numbered 6112 item 19 part 1 (d), put into action in 2011, stating that the market share of media companies is to be increased to 30%, Doğan Group sold the StarTV, which they bought from TMSF, to Doğuş Group.

3. In 2013, in Milliyet, a piece of news about the arrests related to Imralı led to a crisis within the newspaper and the editor-in-chief, Derya Sazak, left his post. Related to this, the alleged phone-call, between the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Erdoğan Demirören, the founder of Demirören Group, was broadcast in the “tapes”, revealed on the Internet in 2014. Derya Sazak: “Actually, on one hand, on the day when we published the news about Imralı, I heard that Erdoğan called Demirören from his plane. The next day, he came and said: “I only wept yesterday in my life”. “Hearing such insults are immoral and shameful. What did we do? We just published those notes” (7/3/2014 Radikal).

Political Parallelism (the degree media is affiliated with a political movement or a party)


Based on the changes in ownerships in media (Table 2); the media groups supporting the ruling party, AKP (*Sabah*, *Star*, *Akit*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Aksam*, *Güneş*, *Zaman*, *Milliyet*, *ATV*, *NTV*, *Haber Türk* etc.) and Doğan Group of Aydın Doğan (*Hürriyet*, *Kanal D*) and pro-Kemalist *Cumhuriyet*, as the biggest groups, can be seen as the major players in polarizations.

Professionalization of Journalists

Professionalization in media is comprised of either vocational training or the rules and regulations by which the media organizations are regulated. Education of journalists in Turkey started in 1965 at Ankara University at the School of Media and Press (BYYO). The professionalism of media (work ethics, self-auditing, etc) is conducted through such organisations as Association of Journalists – Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (1946), Trade Union of Journalists – Gazeteciler Sendikası (1952), and Press Council - Basın Konseyi (1986). Furthermore, there are also some state organisations like, Institution of Press Commercials - Basın İlan Kurumu, which regulates the process of media (1961, the origins dating back to 1930s), RTÜK – Radio and Television Supreme Council - a regulatory board of radio and television – (1994) as well as Press Rules and Regulations (2004).

Though there are certain ethical principles determined by the Association of Journalists, Press Council and media organisations, these principles started not to be implemented as a result of the policies imposed after 1980, mergers and purchases in media, intensification and internalization processes. As the Press Council does not produce solutions to the problems among the members of press and as it becomes ineffective, it is not regarded as effective any more. The disagreements and withdrawals from the Press Council, even at its early beginnings there were certain discrepancies, led to hindrances in fulfilling its duties, furthermore it is criticised for being playthings of Dogan Group (Uzun, 2009:67). Press Commercials Institution serves as an intermediary in publishing official press releases and state commercials by public organisations – whose publishing procedures are determined by the General Council without looking for differences in opinions and convictions (http://basinilankuru mu.gov.tr). Since its foundation in 1931, as it has been under the control of various ruling parties, the transparency of the procedures in distributing the official public commercials and advertisements is under question.

The selection of the members of the board of RTÜK – Radio and Television Supreme Council which was founded in 1994 - a regulatory board of radio and television to regulate and audit their activities, has been performed under the influence of parliament and political power.
Unionization, under the influence of trusts and intensification in media, has been on decrease especially since 1990. Moreover, with the impact of the ruling party, it can be claimed that the professional freedom of journalists is too limited, lacking financial security as well. With the clearance of the members of the union from the mainstream newspapers, *Hurriyet* and *Milliyet*, a new distribution of workload and workers profile emerged. On one side, there are well-paid columnists who are thought to bring higher circulation and ratings and also high ranking administrators, on the other side there are the ones who really produce news (Kaya, 2001).

In the 1950s, during which free press’ institutional entity began to be shaped, master-and-apprentice relationship, which reflected a sort of craftsmanship, started to change radically. The relationship between top managers and correspondents became more professional and less close, whereas the media personnel, like in many other institutions, are controlled by the Human Resources Units (Adaklı, 2006:303). Although the journalists, who are basically young, energetic, well-educated professionals, and members of high qualified circles, fall into traps at different levels of media games even though they like to do their jobs in the best possible way (Tunç, 2015).

### Role of the State

From a historical perspective, the Turkish press has always been in a close relationship with governments in terms of demands and preferences of the regime and ruling power. Some mechanisms like censoring the publications – likely to be a threat to the regime, stopping their financial resources, and penalizing authors via legal sanctions. The stature, titled *Takrir-i Sükun*, led to the imprisonment and exile of many journalists and closure of several newspapers, is a specific example of such mechanisms, while the Publishing Code (*Matbuat Kanunu*), enacted in 1931, brought harsh restrictions to Turkish press (Adaklı, 2006: 97, 104). Until their capitalist developmental stage, the press was supported directly via financial publications subsidaries like paper subventions, official advertisements, incentive documents, tax exemptions in tariffs, etc. Transfer of printing house equipment or sales were some of the supports given by the state. *Hurriyet*, which has a great role in popularizing Turkish media, has always forwarded special duties to the state (Adaklı, 2006: 107, 124).

It can be stated that there are newspapers close to political parties and there is a political parallelism in Turkey. However, though there is a favouritism based on political-ideological affinity between political parties in general and specifically media, financial favouritism is seen more widely. According to Nielsen AdEx, the public state advertisements are given to the newspapers known to be affiliated with the government. In the first quarter of 2014, this number went up to 63 million dollars. Surely, the opposing newspapers like *Zaman*, *BirGün*, *Bugün*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Meydan*, *Millet*, *MilliGazete*, *Sözcü*, *Taraf*, *Today’s Zaman* and *YeniAsya* cannot get this support (Tunç, 2015).
Clientelism can be defined as the distribution of the present wealth of the public resources through bids and privatization rather than increasing the quality of public goods and services to the companions and political supporters (Özkanan and Erdem, 2014). Though varying in types, political clientelism is more closely associated with economic favouritism. Aforementioned, since the 1980s onwards, with the radical shift in the ownership and capital in media owners, the relationship between media and politics became more visible. Media owners, who piled up their wealth out of non-media sectors, sought for close ties with the government and made use of the media for the sake of their interests in private entrepreneurs, ignoring public benefits (Tunç, 2015). One of the most important resources in their accumulation of wealth for media owners is the public bids. The article 29 in RTÜK Law 3984, which restricts the ratio of capital by media owners, cross possessions in media, prohibition in public bids and ownership in financial firms, had to be amended via pressure from the media owners (Görmüş, 2013), and amended by the law numbered 4756 in 2001 and these restrictions were also abolished in the last amendments enacted in 2011. As a result of these changes, for instance, Dogus Group, owner of NTV and Star TV, won the bid for GalataPort in Karaköy (worth 702m dollars), one of the biggest tourism ports in Turkey and İhlas Holding, owner of, Türkiye, İhlas News Agency, TGRT TV, likewise, got the bid for Renovation of Gaziosmanpaşa, worth 1.86 billion dollars, and Erdoğan Demirören, owner of Milangaz, won the bid for the shopping mall in İstiklal street (www.freedomhouse.org), at the heart of Istanbul.

While the supporters of political power benefit from public bids, the opponents are penalized through tax, trials or the sanctions imposed by RTÜK. Briefly, government employs political and economic methods so as to put media under control. In the recent years, the lawsuits for journalists and media in opposition seriously threaten press freedom.

On coming to power, AKP was initially backed by the media. This positive atmosphere began to be spoiled with their success in the second election in 2004, the opposition from the biggest media group, Dogan, increased their opposition activities. AKP pursued a two way strategy for this. By either imposing heavy tax penalties on the Dogan group to diminish their power or reshaping the mainstream media (Kurban and Sözeri, 2012: 54).

The New Relations with the Political Power During AKP Period with the New Bosses

It was claimed through the “tapes” going viral on the internet that Sabah-ATV group was sold for 630 million dollars. The examples can be multiplied: Kalyon Construction, a company of Zirve Holding, got the bids for the third airport, Çanakkale-Ezine-Ayvacık Highway construction and infrastructure. Likewise, Ethem Sancak and his nephew Murat Sancak bought Star Media Group, which includes Star ve 24 TV, also got the BMC bid – he solely applied - for armoured vehicles in the Turkish Armed Forces and Murat Sancak became the biggest shareholder in cashier boxes and credit card machines market through their IT company called MT Information Technologies.
Although the new RTÜK law numbered 6112 and secondary regulations are claimed to have brought a freer media environment, it can be maintained that these changes do not reflect the necessary amendments necessary for audio-visual arrangements (Darendeli, 2013:305). Furthermore, while some firms are favoured in licensing and publishing in the temporary laws and regulations, some other companies are not let to take place in call for bids, which causes inequalities and unfairness, thus it is planned to end the non-licensed temporary practices. Thus, the regulation exceeding its initial purposes will have to abide by the commitments imposed by international law and be able to set up a licensed aural media environment (Darendeli, 2013:305).

Polarization in Media Discourse

Antonio Gramsci (1977) stated that ruling class sets up its hegemony either by force or by free will. According to Gramsci, media serves as the state’s ideological apparatus (SIA) in establishing and maintaining hegemony (Gramsci, 1997; Althusser, 1994). The Islamist ruling class in power in Turkey is trying to set up its own hegemony through Turkish Islamism in compliance with neo-liberal ideology. To that end, AKP aims at controlling the possessions of opposing secular press, thus claiming their administration.

During the recent years in Turkey, in media just like in every sphere of the society, between the ideology of ruling Islamist capitalist class and the western and secular ideology, whose foundations were established in the early Republic era, there is an ongoing struggle. In the discourse of two media tools supporting these opposing ideologies, polarization is experienced. In many empiric studies, it has been shown that media chooses daily events and facts in a different way and discusses them differently, presenting them partially for the benefit of the political party in the spectrum (Gentzkow et al., 2014:1). We can see many examples of it in Turkish media, some of which are as follows:

The chief editor of Cumhuriyet, Can Dündar and Ankara representative Erdem Gül, was convicted for spying, membership of a terrorist organization, revealing the state’s confidential files for the news they made and then they were arrested. 45 different columnists from 12 newspapers wrote about the arrest and 37 of them were against the verdict. However, in Sabah, Akit, Yeni Şafak, Star and Bugün, eight columnists regarded the event as an act of spying and clearly supported the verdict. (www.gundemturk).

Similarly, in May 6th, the news about the assault on Can Dündar conducted in front of the Justice House, is an example of polarization in media, too. The newspapers affinity with the ruling party ignored the incident and called it “theatre play”. Strange enough, the news which took place in Vatan and Milliyet for a short period of time, for which Can Dündar worked many years as a columnist, was withdrawn by the order of the media owner, Erdoğan Demirören. When the news was given room in the other news agencies, three hours later, the same news was put on the web sites again (T24.com.tr, 6 May, 2016). Erdoğan Demirören is known for his affinity with the ruling party after his purchase in 2011 from Aydin Doğan.
Since the establishment of the Republic, secularism has always been a hot topic with the Islamist circles, and the newly elected president of the Turkish National Assembly triggered a new discussion with his words: “The new constitution should not be secular”. All the mainstream and leftist newspapers disagreed with these words, yet this was found to be “rejoicing” by Yeni Akit (www.haber.sol.org.tr/). The columnist from Yeni Şafak, Yusuf Kaplan, depicted secularism as a sort of collar around his neck (www.yenisafak.com). Such views may lead to problems in consolidating democracy in Turkish Republic based on secular principles (Bardakçı et al., 2014:15), the discrepancy between secularism and religious affairs in governmental activities began to be blurred.

With the claims that the current government was attempted to be toppled via anti-democratic ways by armed forces in the name of a terrorist organisation called Ergenekon during the years 2003-2004, the lawsuits were started in 2008 and the trials took nine years, all of which deepened the polarization in media. Those convicted in trials, experiences faced during this process and the friction between the ruling party and the religious sect / community led by Fetullah Güven were all met with reaction in media and political, biased and subjective news were made. The majority of the media, violating the ethic principles, refused all the claims in the bill of indictment in thousands of pages, or acknowledged them. Defendants, evidence, and claims were published without being checked, and comprehensive verdicts were penned rather than giving the news objectively. With the cassation of the verdict owing to mislead and procedural mistakes, the case was adjourned on April 21, 2016 by the Court of Cassation/Supreme Court, biased and accusatory comments were placed in the Turkish media.

Conclusion and Discussion

When seen from the criteria of Hallin and Mancini, there is polarization in Turkey. In other words, high external pluralism, comment-oriented news making rather than giving news, weight of politics in publishing sector, unbalanced news away from professionalism, interventions of the state through regulations and direct interference all gave rise to a more visible polarisation. The subjective view as to the news, choice of headlines, subjective evaluation of the news put forward the strong ties between media and political systems.

Deregulation owned by media, ownership in media and the mosaic of financial capital changed radically. Especially the amendments enacted in 2002, marked a turning point in cross possessions in media, whereas with the article numbered 6112 enacted in 2011, all the restrictions became void. Thus, media organisations began to easily fall into the hands of great trusts which operate in different fields. The owners which had background in conventional journalism started to invest in various fields, leading to fundamental changes in the content, professionalism, working environment and work ethics in many newspapers.
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