The Subterranean Politics Blues; Contesting Third Wave Consolidation in Portugal and Greece

Dr. Christianna Nichols Leahy
Professor of Comparative Politics
Department of Political Science and International Studies, McDaniel College
United States of America
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Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos
President
Athens Institute for Education and Research
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Dr. Christianna Nichols Leahy
Professor of Comparative Politics
Department of Political Science and International Studies, McDaniel College
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Abstract

The early third wave transitions clearly demonstrate the fallacy of the simplistic equating of elections with democracy. Lest the same facile formula be repeated in transitions of the fourth wave, the conventional wisdom must be challenged. Indeed, the current demands for more genuine participatory societies beyond voting are illustrative of the need for further analyzing what constitutes democratic consolidation. Rather than an expression of disillusionment with the narrow issues of austerity, the current wave of subterranean politics is illustrative of the greater malaise from the democracy deficit. This ‘bubbling up’ of subterranean politics (organic protests, occupations, and spontaneous collective expressions of political demands) represents a rebuke of the electoral obsession in the transition literature. It also points to new avenues for the consolidation of democracy in social movements that are far more relevant to democratic transitions becoming truly consolidated and legitimate. The first of the third wave transitions, Portugal, shows the importance of the broader spectrum liberalization process. The other case study hails from whence democracy was born and where formal electoral democracy is being overtaken by subterranean politics, Greece. Both offer a cautionary tale to the current transitions of the fourth Wave regarding premature elections, overemphasis on the electoral process, and ignoring, or worse, suppressing of subterranean politics. Popular participation, consensus building, non-hierarchical decision-making are essential components of the liberalization process crucial to the true consolidation of democracy and its legitimacy. The renegotiation process of ‘what democracy looks like,’ in Portugal and Greece is the focus here.

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Corresponding Author:
Introduction

Drawing on the literature on democratization, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation, two early cases of what came to be called the third wave of transitions to democracy: the revolution of carnations in Portugal and the collapse of the Greek Junta (both in 1974), illustrate the need for a broader understanding of what constitutes democratic consolidation. Elias Papaioannou and Gregorious Siourounis in Economic and Social Factors Driving the Third Wave of Democratization provide a rich data set that demonstrates that economic development and education are strongly correlated with successful third wave transitions. Along with economic development and education, organic mass movements played, and continue to play, a critical role in mobilizing society for the transition to democracy and, more importantly, in the consolidation of democracy. The current demands for more direct and participatory democracy in both Greece and Portugal in the wake of the devastating eurozone crisis should be seen as part of a broader and deeper democratic consolidation process that began almost four decades ago and continues in earnest today.

Far too much emphasis in the democratic transition literature has been placed upon the electoral process, whereas the role of social mobilization in overthrowing autocratic regimes and in the post-revolutionary consolidation of democracy has been largely neglected. Lest the same simplistic formulas be repeated in the transitions of the fourth wave, the conventional democratic indicators must be challenged. Indeed, the current demands for more genuine participatory societies beyond voting speak to the need for analyzing and for re-evaluating what constitutes democratic consolidation, and democratic legitimacy.

Even in Juan Linz' and Alfred Stepan's ambitious volume Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, the definition of what qualifies for a democratic transition is dependent upon a free and popular vote that produces a legitimate government. However, their argument is tautological because they define legitimate government as the holding of elections. Looking at the broader processes of liberalization in a much more comprehensive way, is a necessary step in studies of democratization that would avoid the circular argument of defining successful democratic consolidation as the holding of regular elections. Additionally, liberalization as a process is not limited to one type of economic liberalization either, nor should it be conflated with the existence of free markets. By broadening the concept of liberalization to include political processes along the lines emerging from the subterranean politics of post eurozone crisis Greece and Portugal, theorists can reach a broader agreement upon what constitutes democratic consolidation in theory as well as practice.

The data garnered from the recent collaboration between the London School of Economics and the Open Society Foundations shows a pronounced disillusionment with democracy as it is currently practiced. Indeed, rather than an expression of disillusionment with the narrow issues of austerity, the current
wave of *subterranean politics* across Europe is illustrative of the greater malaise of the *democracy deficit*. The findings of the field research in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Hungary reveal widespread concerns with accountability and transparency in current regimes, and a desire to re-think democracy with new techniques of consensus building. What the study terms ‘bubbling up’ of *subterranean politics*, namely the organic protests, occupations, and spontaneous collective expressions of political demands such as the creation of *micropolis* spaces, represent a rebuke of the electoral obsession in the transition literature. It also points to new avenues for the consolidation of democracy in collective movements that one can argue are far more relevant to democratic transitions and that would facilitate the transitions becoming more sustainable and more legitimate.\(^1\)

Indeed, in the case that Samuel Huntington credited with initiating the age of *third wave* democracy, Portugal (the first of the *third wave*), various forms of *subterranean politics* emerged in the immediate aftermath of the 25 April coup by the Movimento das Forças Armada (MFA). This *subterranean politics* was critical in the initial democratic transition, played a significant role in the consolidation process, and is now emerging once again in much the same way as in the four polities of the LSE/Open Society study. The first of the *third wave* transitions, Portugal, demonstrates the importance of understanding the broader spectrum liberalization process.

Another case study that is notably absent from the LSE/Open Society project is perhaps the most important one, for it is where democracy was born and where formal electoral democracy is currently being overtaken by *subterranean politics* namely, Greece. In comparing the Portuguese and Greek cases, there is an argument to be made regarding popular participation, consensus building, and non-hierarchical decision-making as essential components of the liberalization process that make a critical contribution to the true consolidation of democracy. The inadequacy of traditional political parties in the transformation, consolidation, and now, renegotiation process of ‘what democracy looks like,’ should also inform these arguments. The shared disaffection with the Socialist Parties by those of the *subterranean politics* persuasion (with the PS in Portugal, and PASOK in Greece) is another driver that helps to explain the demands for what many are calling *participatory societies*. Both transitions offer a cautionary tale to the current transition makers of the *Arab Spring* regarding premature elections, overemphasis on the electoral process, and ignoring, or worse, suppressing of the emerging *subterranean politics*.

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\(^1\) The current demonstrations, protests, and occupations are less ‘joined up’, more heterogeneous than similar phenomenon revealing something special in that the ‘resonance’, of this politics strikes a chord in mainstream public opinion. They label this new phenomenon *subterranean politics*. The most salient characteristic of such politics is extensive frustration with formal politics and the collective re-imaging of democracy, and of its practices to everyday life. Kaldor, Mary & Selchow, Sabine (2012). ‘The “Bubbling Up” of Subterranean Politics in Europe.’ *Project Report. LSE Research Online*. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44873/
Psephocracy or ‘Consolidation’ in Greece and Portugal?

Recently, Ashis Nandy employed the Greek word *psephocracy* (a system completely dominated by electoral victories and defeats) to refer disparagingly to India, a *second wave* and theoretically *consolidated democracy*. The term is certainly portable and can apply to Greece and to a lesser extent to, Portugal. The use of the term provokes questions about how democracy goes awry and more importantly how it can be refashioned in a manner that is not limited merely to electoral procedures. Pankaj Mishra argues for starting with the question ‘which figure or political formation looks likely to manage the social, political, and economic conflicts unleashed by uneven globalization, and on whose behalf.’\(^1\) The answer to that inquiry in both Portugal and Greece is unclear; however, there is agreement on which figure or political formation most certainly is not the answer, namely, the *Troika* (i.e. the European Central Bank, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund), nor the political parties who have been in power for most of the transition, nor those currently in power.

When over a million and a half people marched in response to the seventh *Troika* visit to Lisbon on 2 March, 2013, the gathering passed a *people’s censure motion* stating ‘this government does not represent us. This government is illegitimate. It was elected on the basis of promises it did not fulfill.’ The declaration went on to delineate the unfulfilled promises, among them: not increasing taxes to unbearable levels, not robbing pensions, not cutting financial support to workers, not sacking public servants, nor increasing unemployment.\(^2\) Many of those who took part lived through the peaceful revolution of 1974 that overthrew the oldest fascist dictatorship in history via a left wing coup by the *Movimento das Forças Armada*. That coup symbolically began with the MFA seizure of the national radio station and the playing of *Grândola, Vila Morena* with the refrain ‘who most rules within you, oh city, is the people.’ The tune is popular once more. In April 2013, thirty-nine years after the revolution, demonstrators sang it in parliament to drown out the prime minister, forcing him to abandon his prepared speech on the latest austerity agenda. Despite surviving four votes of no confidence and calls for his resignation the prime minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, and his government continued with further austerity measures and cuts to public services. On 5 April 2013, the Constitutional Court in Portugal found the proposed cuts (for holiday bonuses for civil servants and pensioners, as well as reductions in sick pay and unemployment benefits) unconstitutional. While some may write off the actions of a million and a half members of a mass movement against


austerity, it is not so easy to dismiss the legitimacy of a ruling of the highest court in a democratic system.

Similarly in Greece, the Court of Auditors ruled that cutting pensions for a fifth consecutive time since the first bailout in May of 2010 would be unconstitutional because it violates a number of constitutional principles of individual dignity and equality before the law. While opinions of the Court of Auditors are nonbinding, it is nonetheless more evidence of re-conceptualizing the duties of the state to the individual that begs the democratic question again, of who best to do so. The actions of the courts, in both Portugal and Greece, are a significant measure of *subterranean* issues ‘bubbling up’ to the formal institutions of the state demanding greater participation and genuine accountability while simultaneously revealing the degree of profound stress that austerity is putting on the democratic system per se, the challenges it presents to the legitimacy of the democratic system, and the questions it raises regarding how consolidated the democracy really is.

Dimitri A. Soiropoulos in a piece entitled, *A Democracy under Stress: Greece Since 2010*, argues that this period of extreme economic crisis has tested the limits of Greek democracy and is revealing a greater crisis of governance that challenges the political system itself. The causes are not limited to the economic crisis, but rather stem from what he argues are long term deficiencies of the democratic regime that emerged in the *metapolitefsi* that include: the intrusion and replication of party competition in all administrative and social institutions, the capture of public policy sectors by strong interest groups, and an ineffective welfare state that protects a number of ‘insider’ groups. The variables he examines are the combination of extended income inequality and low quality of democracy as measured by deficient rule of law and lack of adequate voice and accountability.¹

While the economic crisis has had devastating effects on the economy, it has also revealed longer-term deficiencies of the democratic regime itself. As for Greece, Soiropoulos believes that the crisis has signaled the end of one of the strongest two-party systems in Europe as well as the rise of a new dichotomy between pro-European and anti-European camps. This dichotomy has produced a genuine tension within the electorate over their desire to remain in the euro zone pitted against their resentment of the *Troika* and decisions made between their national elites and the elites of Brussels. Indeed, the proposal by Prime Minister Papandreou to hold a referendum on continued membership in the eurozone in October of 2011, (during the height of the crisis) and its quashing by those external elites is illustrative of that tension.²

²Costas Douzinas sees the referendum proposal, as ‘an irrational “acting out” and an attempt to regain the initiative by a regime that had lost touch with its people. The proposal had two targets. First it was a threat to the Greek people, telling them that unless they accept the new catastrophic measures, they would be condemned to leave the Euro zone and suffer a further collapse of living standards. Second, it was addressed to backbench PASOK MPs, who had stared stirring in response to popular pressure and the catastrophic opinion polls.’ p. 13. Douzinas, Costas (2013). *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis*. New York: Polity Press.
Similar democratic deficiencies exist for Portugal in its transformation of the same period and similar assessments apply. Portuguese political scientists, such as Luís de Sousa argued in a 2007 study entitled *Political Parties and Corruption in Portugal*, that while exempt from major corruption scandals, voters in Portugal appeared tolerant of the unethical behavior of political leaders and parties, noting too that parties simultaneously were becoming less responsive to the electorate.¹ That changed profoundly with the unfolding of the eurozone crisis. By 2012, the assessment internally of the Portuguese transition to democracy being threatened by the crisis was a major topic of concern. One law professor in Portugal described it as an issue of the very legitimacy of the state, a crisis management failure, and a loss of a sense of justice by the citizens. He argues that ‘there is a strong feeling about political partiality and disrespect, about impunity of the political class and corruption crimes. It is an issue of the *governability of the people*’.²

Yet, both cases of the *third wave* democratic transition bear the label of *consolidated democracy* as if it were some teleological end point of a finite linear progression. In reality, there is no end point, it is the processes of democracy per se; the ongoing struggles for greater agency and participation that define democracy rather than the number of political parties and the votes they receive at specific intervals through elections that is the issue. Most political scientists would have to admit that citizen passivity and indifference, control of the media by economic powers, endemic corruption, lack of internal party democracy, and elite dominance hinder political engagement and threaten democratic legitimacy. In the period preceding the eurozone crisis that is exactly what the citizens of Portugal and Greece had in common. They were becoming accustomed to the *psephocracy* (from the ancient Greek-literally ‘to vote with pebbles’) but the eurozone crisis transformed the passivity of merely voting with pebbles (going through the motions) to voting with rocks to repel police abuse, and to voting with boulders to cordon off public space for occupations.

particularly in Greece, and later in Portugal the eurozone crisis challenged the consolidation phase (not in the alarmist sense of derailing the transition from authoritarianism) but in the infinitely more positive (and, arguably more hopeful) sense of resubmitting the essential questions of which figure or political formation looks likely to manage the social, political, and economic conflicts unleashed by uneven globalization, now and on whose behalf. The answer to the question of which figure was categorically dismissed for obvious reasons. In a democracy the notion of one individual, one leader, one political figure as the decision maker *par excellence* is anathema. In their respective traditions, the political formations were the parties of social democracy (in


Greece, PASOK, in Portugal, the PS or their more centrist partners New Democracy, and the Social Democratic Party respectively).

Perceptions of Kleptocracy and Evidence Thereof

The socialist parties in both countries that have ruled for the vast majority of the transition period have gone rife with corruption, clientelism, and lack of accountability. The expose on kickbacks from the German corporation Siemens to PASOK has gone unpunished despite the fact the party treasurer admitted receiving one million Euros. In Portugal, similarly, a wiretapping scandal implicating the PS government, a media scandal allegedly involving the PS, and the 2009 vote-buying scheme allegedly involving PSD candidates (who were also under investigation for fraud and corruption in a separate case) tarnished the images of both major parties, distracted voters from substantive issues, and contributed to voter disgust and passivity.

Public opinion data from Portugal and Greece reveals high levels of disgust with the political parties, widespread belief in corruption by them in general, distrust of the political class in particular, and an overall distain for electoral politics. The title alone of Stavros Lygeros’ book From Kleptocracy to Bankruptcy is revealing in and of itself. Nick Malkoutzis argues that it appears that many voters were willing to turn a blind eye to waste and corruption in the public sector as long as the politicians responsible rewarded them with civil service jobs, public contracts or social benefits.1 The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer found that nine in ten respondents in Greece view the political parties as corrupt (the second worst in the world with only Nigerian parties faring worse in their public’s eye). In Greece eighty-three percent of citizens believe the government is ‘either largely or entirely run by a few big entities acting in their own self-interest’ (the highest rate in the OECD).2

In Portugal similarly, between 2000-2008, the mistrust level of the citizenry toward political parties was not only extremely high (around eighty three percent), but it has remained so (which is higher than the average in any of the established first and second wave democracies).3 Ironically, though in both Greece and Portugal citizens view parties as ‘indispensable actors of representative democracy,’ yet, the citizens in both polities are still highly critical of their performance. Thus, there appears to be a contradiction in attitudes concerning parties. Indeed, if on the one hand the democratic legitimacy they give to parties is undeniable, on the other their unhappiness

and dissatisfaction about the way existent parties carry out their representative and governmental functions, is also evident from the data.

The Occupations: The Indignant and the aganaktismenoi

It is the eurozone crisis that has shaken the passivity of the electorates (in both Greece and Portugal) and galvanized a formidable resistance to the dictates not only of the Troika, but to those of the long ruling political parties. Costas Douzinas dates the end of the sense of complacency, 25 May 2011 when Syntagma Square in central Athens, and later, squares in over sixty cities in Greece were occupied by the aganaktismenoi (indignant) in a tribute to the Spanish indignados. The Syntagma occupation started spontaneously and harkened back to the previous mobilizations. Unlike earlier occupations, though, Douzinas argues that those who occupied Syntagma Square for three months ‘rejected the logic of representation, party or political leadership and opened up to large parts of the population who were not politically active or were voters of the established parties.’¹

The earlier occupations are, nevertheless, important precursors to the Syntagma aganaktismenoi. The uprising of December 2008 while initially sparked by the brutal police killing of Alexandros Grigoropolous, was not the first but is the most symbolic precursor to the aganaktismenoi. The public space of the killing, of the unarmed fifteen-year-old boy, in Exarcheia is of enormous symbolic importance. The issue of ‘spatial dominance’ is a major variable of resistance as Makrygianni and Tsavdaroglou argue, because urban space operates as ‘a symbol of power and authority’, as well as a ‘signal of overall dominance in political and everyday life.’ What took place in Athens in December 2008, they contend was ‘a parallel struggle not only for territorial dominance but also for control over meanings produced by the city space.’²

Indeed, David Harvey raises the notion of the right to the city as a collective right rather than an individual one, since reinventing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of some kind of collective power over the various processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake cities is, for Harvey ‘one of the most precious yet most neglected of human rights’.³ Harvey discusses the British media’s use of the pejorative term feral for describing the protestors and occupiers. Turning the term on its head, Harvey posits a feral capitalism that is at the root of the crises but he notes with enthusiasm

glimmers of hope in the *indignant* movements in Greece and Portugal and others all over the world.

The return to public spaces of mass resistance is the hopeful component that Douzinas sees as a continuum of spontaneous insurrections and occupations that include the Paris *banlieues* riots of 2005, the Athens December 2008 uprising, all the way to the Arab Spring, the Spanish *indignados* and the Greek *aganaktismenoi* occupations, Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Lisbon, and other occupations throughout the world (and now, the Occupy Taksim Square movement unfolding in Turkey as well as the massive Brazilian uprising, and the continuation of the Egyptian revolution). All of them are questioning the fallacy of the simplistic formula ‘elections = democracy’). He equates the police killing of Alexopoulos in Athens with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia, noting that ‘standard political science, obsessed with the machinations of governments, parties, and parliaments cannot understand these spontaneous events and dismisses them as *unpolitical*.’

The extensive solidarity campaigns throughout Greece, the farmers markets using barter exchange (e.g. the ‘potato movement’), free healthcare centers, the antifascist motorcycle brigades protecting immigrants, neighborhood defense committees, the resistance to privatization of water in Thessaloniki and of the public television station, ERT, are not addressed in the mainstream literature of democratic consolidation and instead are framed as insolence undermining the government. When in fact, these *subterranean* movements and organizations are the very essence of civil society so widely praised in the democracy literature. The linkage of solidarity between unemployed highly educated Greek youth (around sixty per cent unemployed) and poor African immigrants is undeniably a profoundly progressive and democratic phenomenon. Unlike established nongovernmental organizations that receive training, support and even funding from external actors, these organic communities that ‘bubble up’ signify civil society at its most genuine. The self-management of the Viomichaniki Metalleutiki factory in Thessaloniki is providing an alternative to austerity via a processes that involves nonhierarchical relationships, direct democracy, anti-authoritarian structure and a ‘break with vertical ways of organization and relating, but a break that is also an opening.’

Likewise in Portugal, while the occupation of Rossio Square in Lisbon may have been minute in comparison with Athens, and the demonstrations in eighteen Portuguese towns on 25 May 2013 were smaller than any in Greece, the sentiment was identical. The *Manifesto* approved by the Popular Assembly at Rossio Square in May of 2011, carries almost identical slogans (e.g. ‘real democracy will never exist as long as the world is managed by financial

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dictatorship,’ ‘we, citizens, women and men, workers, migrants, students, unemployed and retired people, united by our indignation in front of a situation that we refuse to accept as inevitable have taken our streets, we thus join those that around the world today fighting for their rights against the constant oppression of the ruling economical financial system,’ and ‘we intend to assume control of our lives and intervene effectively in each and every process of political, social, and economic life).’¹ Thirty-nine years after the revolution of carnations, in April 2012, what began as a symbolic occupation, in solidarity with a squatted school and social center, evicted days before in Oporto, quickly evolved ‘into the collective desire of building up a new island of autonomy and resistance,’ proclaimed the squatters in Oporto signifying the same spirit as those occupying spaces throughout Greece.²

The consciousness of the struggles in Greece and Portugal being interconnected make the two case studies compatible in deeper ways. The antifascist movements in both Athens and Lisbon are very much apprised of one another’s work. On 19 January, 2013, during the International Day of Antifa Action, activists in Lisbon demonstrated their solidarity with the Villa Amalias squat and antifascists in Greece at the central square in Comões in Lisbon unfurling a banner of solidarity. Photos of the solidarity banner appeared on Greek blogs and Occupy sites all over the world. The use of the Internet in sharing information, strategies, and ideas has certainly contributed to their solidarity. The types of discussions on the various blogs, websites, Twitter feeds, and other social network postings reveal a profound understanding of the stakes that are being contested. There is a commonality and sophistication to the analysis of the movements in Greece and Portugal. Perhaps it is because they have so recently transitioned from authoritarian exclusionary regimes that their memories are long and their expectations are high. They seem to understand the essence of the crisis and the profound challenges it has opened up to the regimes.

They invoke Habermas as they debate the crisis not only in economic terms but also vis-à-vis decision-making. They recognize that as the margins for decision-making get smaller, policy makers are confronted with the political choice of whom to pass the social cost of the crisis. They grasp the fact that as crises shift from the economy to the government, they re-politicize the questions of debt, wealth distribution, and the very organization of society that were effectively de-politicized and obscured by the market mechanism.³ The eurozone crisis has thus re-politicized the process and in doing so has raised the fundamental contradictions to the surface of the social structure once again.

(as they did during the 1974 transitions to democracy). As Habermas argued years ago, when the policy makers lag behind the expectations of the citizens, the penalty for the failure to reach these expectations is a withdrawal of legitimation to the political system.\(^1\) With the loss of legitimacy, policy makers are confronted with issues of governability. As the system’s legitimacy is lost through a crisis, policy makers desperately try to confront the expectations of the citizens who will begin to question the procedures of how a policy such as austerity comes into being. That is exactly what is being negotiated via these subterranean movements in Greece and Portugal.

**The Twin Crises: The Eurozone Crisis and The Legitimacy Crisis**

Jonas Van Vossole argues that when regimes such as those in Portugal and Greece are confronted with a legitimation crisis and contestationary movements, they search for a relegitimation of their power position through a number of tendencies (e.g. searching for technocratic less democratic solutions, simply abolishing the democratic procedures because the democracy seems to prove its inefficiency and harm free markets and economic interest, or progressive redistributive and emancipatory strategies that have a tendency to strengthen the position of the less powerful and decrease the power gap).\(^2\) The latter strategies present the possibility for change, especially when the city is the place for such contestation. Frances Fox Piven would concur with that analysis and add that the rise of disruptive protest movements reveal that ‘democratic successes flow not from the influence of voters and parties taken by themselves, but from the mobilization of a more fundamental kind of power that is rooted in the very nature of society.’\(^3\) George Kastiaficas (theorist of the *eros effect*) emphatically agrees, arguing that ‘ordinary people, acting together in the best interest of the group, embody a reasonability and intelligence far greater than any of today’s corporate elites.’\(^4\) He points out that even Samuel Huntington when confronted with the insurgent democratization movements had to metaphorically swallow his denunciation of the democratic distemper and switch to robustly singing the praises of democracy. The Tory apologist for neoliberal orthodoxy, *The Economist* had to admit in its leader *The March of Protest*, ‘even now, the inchoate significance of 2013 is discernable. And for politicians who want to peddle the same old stuff, the news is not good.’\(^5\)

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Conclusion

Both Greece and Portugal, having experienced democratic transitions that renegotiated the relationship between the state and the citizen, the elites and the non-elites, the metropolis and the localities, along with the ongoing struggle precipitated by the eurozone crisis are opening up the possibilities for new types of more equitable, participatory, just, and effective governance. Those who resist the austerity mandates in the streets of Athens and Lisbon (as well as in towns and cities throughout both countries) realize that they are at a critical juncture in the consolidation of the democracy for which they have struggled since 1974 to create, maintain, consolidate, and legitimize. In both case studies it is the citizens themselves articulating what ‘democracy looks like’ and resisting the reduction of it to merely contesting elections, joining political parties, and occasionally choosing from one set of elites over another. The experiences in Portugal and Greece should compel scholars of democratization theory to provide new ways of conceptualizing democratic consolidations of the third wave. Hopefully this will inform and enrich not only theoretical approaches, but practical programs of assistance to the fourth wave transitions that are currently unfolding. As the process of what constitutes democracy and liberalization continues in the city squares as well as in the formal institutions of the state, it is critical that the ideas that the evolving subterranean groups are articulating be integral to that process; for a democracy can only be truly ‘consolidated’ by those who comprise it, not by elites who merely ‘govern’ it.

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