Temporal Being and the Authentic Self

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This paper should be cited as follows:

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Abstract

The central concern of this project is twofold: firstly to supply conceptually plausible answers to Heidegger’s unanswered questions regarding the temporality of Being, which he raised at the very end of *Being and Time*. Secondly through this examination the aim is to explore the process of discovery and sense of authentic being as uncovered and developed by Heidegger. This project is situated methodologically within Process Philosophy, and it is from this perspective that draws attention to the role of human agency in which individuals are spatiotemporally construed in terms of Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) entities. Heidegger situates *Dasein* (human existence) in a temporal stream moving towards the nothingness of death. For Heidegger the spatiotemporal nature of one’s life is understood from the standpoint of Being-in-the-world, as an engaged participant, coexistent with the world, so that contextually it is through this engagement in recognition of this facticity or thrownness that one may come to recognise one’s own authentic self. There is a tension in this discovery between the individualistic sense of authentic self and the coexistent Being-in-the-world they-self (*Das Man*) that emerges from Heidegger’s analysis. Somewhat problematic then is the coexistent phenomenological recognition that one does not live in isolation and as such one may question what of the contingent, constraining and influencing factors that shape one’s sense of self particularly against the backdrop of self-other relations. Part of this analysis therefore is to provide the departure points of critique to later consider authentic inter-relations of community.

Keywords:

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Heidegger, in Division 1 of *Being and Time*, posits two categories of Being: *Zuhandensein* (readiness-to-hand) and *Vorhandensein* (presence-at-hand). *Zuhandene* things are available things in the world assigned with human values and significances (Brandom, 2007: 214). As such what we encounter as being-in-the-world he calls ‘equipment’, so described since through our actions we are mainly engaged in tasks. ‘The readiness-to-hand of a piece of equipment consists in its having certain significance’ based on its ‘appropriateness for various practical roles and its inappropriateness for others’ (Brandom, 2007: 217). *Vorhandene* things do not have a worldly determination, as it seems they are objective, person-independent, causally interacting subjects, as in natural scientific inquiry. The term *Vorhandene* refers to the occurrentness of things rather than through their use as tools or relations of uses. *Dasein* stands as the third category ‘in whose structure the origins of the two thing-ish categories are to be found’ (Brandom, 2007: 214).

As such the being of the ready-to-hand has in itself the character of having been assigned or referred (Brandom, 2007: 218). To reiterate each and every one of us is *Dasein*.

For Heidegger ‘moods’ reveal significant details about the fundamental structure of the world and also our way of Being-in-the-world in two subtle ways. ‘Moods assail us’, says Heidegger, disclosing that we are ‘thrown’ into a world not of our making, in that we find ourselves firstly in the world. Secondly, moods indicate something shared and essentially not always inner and private by tuning us into the world. Things in the world, like events and situations, therefore exude a quality that resonates with us as mood. Since for Heidegger Being-in-the-world reveals that we find ourselves in the world in a particular way such that we have a ‘there’, a meaningfully oriented situation in which to act and exist; hence we are disposed to things in ways that matter to us. Heidegger says that ‘Disposedness’ is an ‘attunement’, a way of being tuned in to things in the world (Hubert, Dreyfus, & Wrathall, 2007:5). ‘Mood’, ontologically speaking, as a way-of-being, can be physiologically regarded as a transmittable dynamical medium construable in terms of communicable information (molecules) receivable by others (feedback/feedforward). This explains the inherent receptive capacity we humans exhibit that enables sharing, the dynamics of affective social tuning via certain moods.

For Heidegger our *primordial* experience is a unified experience of being in the world in an inseparable way. Heidegger denounces both Husserl and Descartes’ for their dichotomised view of mind and body. Heidegger moved beyond Husserl’s articulation of the unfolding of ‘inner time’ (‘impression’, ‘retention’, ‘protention’) developing instead an understanding of ‘human beings as a ‘nexus’ of lived experience ... he recognises the priority of the ‘lived’ world [*Lebenswelt*] ... its three temporal dimensions ... *ecstasies*, in which we, as temporal beings, exist all at once’ (Ward, 2008:100). Heidegger recognises that ‘Being is essentially temporal’, in that ‘Being is always understood in terms of time explained by its temporal structure’ (Blattner, 2006:14). Yet Heidegger’s claim requires demonstrating how the temporal structure of Being, indeed of each Dasein, can be construed and understood.
An endeavour remaining unanswered that Heidegger himself admits at the end of *Being and Time*.

Arguably, however, one way to achieve this end requires a greater perspective shift than that taken by Heidegger whereby one’s existence is not simply hermeneutically observed as an entity occupying some volume of space for some duration of time but instead as being made of spacetime in a constitutional, compositional form. Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, is at pains to articulate the rather fundamental element of temporality as integral to being. My contention is that the concept of STEM containment-field as an embodying concept provides the appropriate conceptual mechanism to further ground Heidegger’s endeavour. As established in previous work the concept of Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) provides a framework and perspective to facilitate inquiries into human nature as a spatio-temporal being. Each STEM (human being) is a moving space-time agent, an ongoing event in and of life whose own constitution is subject to one’s environment (e.g. epigenetic process). Each STEM agent is construed as an ecosystem, operationally a self-organising system of Being. Genetics alone can only provide an incomplete account of the mechanisation of human existence. For the human body is largely a reciprocating organism and the subject of ongoing compositional change (particularly epigenetic chemical change, cellular change, emotional and intellectual change, to say the least.

Before this critical point can be developed we still need to explore Heidegger’s examination, which indicates that there are three existential features of Dasein: ‘existence’, ‘facticity’ and ‘fallenness’. *Dasein*, Heidegger maintains, has no essence, yet it exists, since for Heidegger ‘existence precedes essence’. *Dasein* has possibilities, whereby *Existenz* refers to a kind of *Being* relative to comporting oneself in a variety of ways as when engaging and acting on our possibilities, no less tied into our future in terms of our capacity to make choices (Heidegger, 1962:32-33). We live in the present, and the present is the historical movement of our own past from which the present is replete with the possibilities of actions that shape one’s own future. An alternate explanation is to conceive that each one of us (each *Dasein*) is a STEM containment-field replete with the intrinsic or essential faculties and memories, the source embodiment of one’s own actual and interpreted history, compositionally a temporalising self-organising Being. Primordially, as I construe, nested factically as Space-Time-Event-Motion entities, as constituted energy-motional entities such that each life is an on-going event in temporal process i.e. Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) entities within a world/planet Earth STEM. If existence precedes essence then the intrinsic spatio-temporal nature of one’s being requires demonstration. The spatio-temporal nexus of a being-in-the-world whilst simultaneously being interconnected to the world of motile *Beings* requires explanation. My model of STEM agency fulfils the requirements to arguably resolve Heidegger’s unanswered questions. The short answer is that humans are, constitutionally, spatio-temporal beings.
Let’s further develop Heidegger’s account and take *Dasein’s* facticity, referring to its Being-in-the-world, which makes evident the multiplicity of ways of ‘Being-in’ or engaged in everyday actualising events (making, breaking, losing, finding, determining, moving-around, etc.). Heidegger describes three distinguishable ways that *Dasein* encounters and realises already interconnected activities: ‘idle talk’, ‘curiosity’ and ‘ambiguity’. These ‘characterise the way in which, in [an] everyday manner, *Dasein* is its ‘there’ – the disclosedness’ of expressive modes ‘of Being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger, 1962:219). As ‘definite existential characteristics these are not present-at-hand in *Dasein*, but help to make up its Being’ (Heidegger, 1962:219). All modes of our experience and activities, as Heidegger construes, are determinate ways of being-in-the-world (Sheehan, 2007:197). At this juncture I hasten to add that each *Dasein*, phenomenologically speaking, observes from a primary and ongoing spatiotemporally oriented living event in activation so cognised through the myriad ways of engaging. Determinate ways of being-in-the-world as Heidegger claims are indeed ways of engagement and activities to which each *Dasein* attends but this observation espoused by Heidegger lacks the demonstrative explanatory power of detailing ‘how’ *Dasein* temporalises as an already existent being. To briefly add that each *Dasein* is to itself a frame of reference constituted as a STEM agent and always already a temporalising observer.

From Heidegger’s perspective however, he describes the concept of ‘Falling’ primarily to refer to these ways of engaging - ‘idle talk’, ‘curiosity’ and ‘ambiguity’ – explaining ‘there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness: ... the “falling” of *Dasein*’ (Heidegger, 1962:219). Yet ‘Fallenness’, for Heidegger, is not construed negatively but extends the manner in which *Dasein* may find itself ‘alongside the world of its concern’ (Heidegger, 1962:219). This observation is central to understanding Heidegger’s development of the authentic self because falling takes on the ascription of ‘inauthenticity’ as it were, it:

... has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they”. *Dasein* has... fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’. “Fallenness into the ‘world’ means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity (Heidegger, 1962:220).

Fallenness also indicates a pre-ontological mode of being (not questioning) in which *Dasein* essentially fails to acknowledge its ontological condition (capacity to question) and instead ‘falls back’ to everyday inauthenticity by falling back into tasks and consequently reverting back into *das Man*. Heidegger claims, contra Descartes, that the ordinary self is not an individual self, nor the self of Cartesian reflection, instead it is an “anonymous” self one defined by other people. The *Das Man* self, though essential to life, is not our
genuine self but a comparative self assigned by the roles we play and social categories (Solomon, 2000:62).

Heidegger provides an interesting psychological depiction of not being a genuine self though simultaneously resembling a condition of other self-making potentiality such that Heidegger’s analysis uncovers the manner of contrivance as born from social circumstance in that the ‘they-self’ construal once objectified is not a concrete or inflexible self. Essentially Heidegger’s analysis uncovers that what is highlighted from this process of phenomenological examination is the human capacity to exhibit and express different ways or modes of self-being. Witness the adoption and varied manifestation of the social-able self. Yet we are anchored by our spatiotemporal embodiment as the potential ground of authentic being in virtue of our individuated compositions, in many ways cognitively reinforced, through social or worldly community life. Counter-intuitively, it seems that the world of people in Heidegger’s analysis would otherwise be replete with no-self beings only social selves or Dasein’s whilst as the observational examiner nonetheless expects there exists the potential in each individual or Dasein to discover one’s own authentic self only through the recognition of exiting within a world of its being.

Heidegger’s sense of authenticity involves the somewhat foundational notion of ‘care’. Heidegger’s notion of the term ‘care’ (Sorge) is extensively construed to imply being involved, of being ‘concerned’, specific to having ‘ends and purposes’ entwined with Dasein’s potential (Solomon, 2000:62). The term ‘care’ captures ‘being engaged in the world’ and in our own lives, particularly with respect to our possibilities. We concern ourselves with the things around us and the situations we confront; and in doing so, “we do not just stand in indifferent or inert relations to them” (Blattner, 2006:44). For Dasein then, the concept of care reveals itself in a significant way such that all our activities and who we are, is suffused with caring (Heidegger, 1962:274).

As examined from the standpoint of Being-in-the-world Heidegger observes that ‘everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality’. Heidegger subsequently advances a conditional argument: “if temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein’s Being and this entity is one for which, in its Being, this very Being is an issue, then care must use ‘time’ and therefore must reckon with time” (Heidegger, 1962:278). Heidegger equates one sense of time by which “entities within-the-world are encountered-time as “within-time-ness” (1962:274). Through the “uncovering of the inner-time-consciousness of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world” the endeavour to penetrate the ‘inner heart of time’ sees the project move from the Being of time to the time of Being” (Ward, 2008:101). Heidegger contends that the “primary item in Care is the “ahead-of-itself” however explaining that “Dasein exists for the sake of itself” (Heidegger, 1962:279). Reckoning that ‘[A]s long as it is’ “right to its end, it comports itself towards its potentiality-for-Being”. The ‘ahead-of-itself’ as an item in the structure of Care discloses that in Dasein something is left outstanding, “not yet become actual” (1962:279).
Heidegger’s construal of this analysis is in terms of Dasein achieving ‘wholeness’ though in doing so he inferred would otherwise liquidate its Being-in-the-world as capable of being experienced as an entity (1962:280). Ontologically the quest consequently became characterising Dasein’s being-at-an-end and of achieving an “existential conception of death as an existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death” (1962:281). Though this observation is very significant and not to be undermined it however ushers in a phenomenological shift. In summary my contention is that to be a ‘being-there’ (Dasein) as a Being-in-the-world is to be an actualising temporal being hence a STEM embodiment first and foremost. Heidegger of course did not believe that time was a thing in and of itself independent of the world and specifically not independent of Dasein. On close examination Heidegger claims that “[B]ecause Dasein as temporality is ecstatico-horizontal in its Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made room, and it can do so factically and constantly” (Heidegger, 1962: 420ff). In Heidegger’s analysis where Dasein takes in space relates to the engagement with equipment relative and limited to a fallen state; such to bring something closer (e.g. in its use) one moves the thing from its “thence” and as such “making-present forgets the yonder”. But this analysis also demonstrates what is crucially lacking in Heidegger’s overall analysis and that is the perspective of embodied space. Instead Heidegger seems transfixed on the ecstatico-horizontal temporality as developed in the following pages of Being and Time.

Heidegger endeavours to analyse the coupling of space and time but never really captures the conceptual, let alone the ontological understanding, that being can be thought of as the spatialisation of time (spacetime) and together the enactment of the process of existence within the world/universe. Space and time are interconnected as Einstein’s theory of relativity has resoundingly demonstrated. One need only look out into the night sky at the distant stars to realise one is also looking back in time.

In Being and Time, Heidegger claimed that Dasein’s existence, facticity and falling reveal themselves in the phenomenon of death (or Being-towards-the-end) (1962:293). Falling, in this sense as Heidegger describes, is a kind of fleeing in the face of death such that being-towards-the-end has a ‘mode of evasion’ in the face of it, which takes the ascription of inauthenticity. Dasein, we recall is constituted by ‘disclosedness’, an understanding equated with a state-of-mind such that to ‘comport’ oneself towards death is “Being towards a possibility of Dasein itself, as the possibility of authentic existence” (1962:307). Hence the manner in which one comports oneself is central to achieving authenticity. Not surprising that the characterisation of being-towards-death involves anxiety (a state-of-mind) and ordinarily anxiety is directed towards cowardness. Interestingly, however, Heidegger sees this construal of anxiety as a perverted state (1962:311). Dasein’s selfhood is taken formally as a ‘way of existing’ and not as an entity present-at-hand. Heidegger claims that the ‘I’ for most part is not the ‘who’ of Dasein, he says instead “the ‘they-self’ (or Das Man) is its who” (1962:312). Heidegger claims that “Authentic Being one’s Self takes the definite form of an existentiell
modification of the ‘they’ announcing that this modification must be defined existentially” (1962:312). However, it seems that this way of understanding the self makes it a relative term, perhaps, as intended. For when Dasein brings itself back from the “they”, the “they-self” is modified ... it becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self. Apparently, since Dasein is lost in the “they”, it must first find itself and it can find itself only because it has already in itself, possible authenticity (1962:313). Most significantly what still remain undiscovered through this analysis are the substantive (factual) constitutive elements against which the relative authentic Dasein rests and not arguably the adapted version of the juxtaposed Das man self or the ‘they self’.

As we see for Heidegger the “I” is rather the subject of logical behaviour of binding together, such that “I think”, means I bind together. “All binding together is an ‘I bind’ together” (Heidegger, 162:367). I bind together from the factical state as I contend enabled only as a constituted STEM. Heidegger believes that the subjectum is ‘consciousness in itself’, not a representation but rather the ‘form’ of representation. The ‘I think’ says Heidegger, “is not something represented, but the formal structure of representing as such, and this formal structure alone makes it possible for anything to have been represented” (1962:367). Essentially Heidegger is contending that the ‘I’ as articulated as the res cogitans is not pointing to a substance as present-at-hand but instead to a process as “I think something” (1962:367). Dasein becomes essentially Dasein in so far as authentic existence constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness; and as such resoluteness, as a mode of authenticity of care, is thought to contain Dasein's primordial Self-constancy and totality (1962:370). However, if this primordial nature is not construed in any substantial manner what is not clear in this analysis is whether there is a distinction between mind as ‘I’, and mind as Dasein, though not an ‘I’ substantively construed but nonetheless recognisable simply, as Heidegger insists, a process? In one sense we are told it is ‘consciousness in itself’ as the ‘form of representation’. Yet in another sense somewhat conflated what is recognised is a process; but of what, consciousness? Surely one does not need to completely disengage from the world to be able to disengage from the constructive process of the ‘I’, of thought. Heidegger says ‘I binds’ and as such what he identifies is the process of it grasping, seizing, in making meaning by constantly attaching to objects in the world in an identifiable manner. Detaching from the mind that is to say not focusing on the content of one’s thought as when in deep state meditation for example, is however not a detachment from existence. Instead it can be a full emersion of authentic being, an understanding that has a long history in many Eastern meditative traditions. Given that Heidegger’s analysis of the conscience is consistent with the idea of nullity (no-thing-ness) that nonetheless in-forms as the ‘call of conscience’, arguably is equiprimordially of what I have previously argued is one’s unique Signature-Energy-Frequency (SEF) (Principle of Individuation) (Author JN to be inserted, 2011). An analysis quite consistent with Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world but in this case expanding the conceptual description of Dasein in terms of embodied STEM agency.
Heidegger suggested that temporality reveals itself as the meaning of “authentic Care” (Heidegger, 1962:376). Time goes on, he describes, and the authentic future is ‘the towards-oneself’. “Dasein is historical” (1962:381) and for Heidegger, this construal is significant in that its ascription identifies an aspect of being which differs from simply being part of history, as a part of some recorded event in history. Heidegger employs the term ‘Historicity’, not construed as history, but instead as the condition of being historical, of Dasein’s own life-history in an embodied manner. Connected to this is the understanding that Dasein is a being-in-time for “Dasein uses itself up”; that is, uses its time and in using time Dasein reckons with it. Reckoning with time is constitutive for Being-in-the-world Heidegger observes (1962:382). The notion of existence against this construal is conceived in the sense in “which one’s Dasein exists as a coming-towards-oneself such that projection is basically futural” (1962:385). This point of futural projection can only make sense if time is constitutive of being, more integrally, as I argue, in STEM composition. For what else could be the reference point for Dasein? Since for most part Heidegger construes the sense of authentic present against a counterpart inauthentic present. “That Present, which is held in authentic temporality and thus is authentic itself”, Heidegger calls the ‘moment of vision’ – understood in the active sense as ecstatics (rapture of three temporal dimensions co-existing) (1962:387). Augenblick in Being and Time is translated as ‘moment of vision’ taking the ascription “related to ‘sight’ or ‘insight’ [Einblick]. ...the Augenblick is the ‘vision’ into Being which reveals Dasein in its ownmost possibilities of Being, and through which Dasein can experience an extraordinary and ‘totalizing’ sense of Being” (Ward, 2008:112).

States-Of-Mind

“Understanding is never free-floating”, but is associated with some state-of-mind. The ‘there’ gets equiprimordially disclosed by one’s mood in every case or gets closed off by it in falling (Heidegger, 1962:389). Having a mood brings Dasein with its thrownness disclosed far more primordially in ‘how one is’”. “Existentially “Being-thrown” means finding oneself in some state-of-mind or other” and Heidegger concludes that one’s “state-of-mind is therefore based upon thrownness” (1962:389). One’s mood takes on the ascription of representation in realising ‘whatever may be the way in which’ one is ‘primarily the entity that has been thrown’ (1962:390). Heidegger explains:

*Bringing* Dasein face to face with the “that-it-is” of its own thrownness – whether authentically revealing it or inauthentically covering it up – becomes existentially possible only if Dasein’s Being, by its very meaning, constantly is as having been. ... the ecstasy of the “been” is what first makes it possible to find oneself in the way of having a state-of-mind”. The Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; one’s state-of-mind however,
temporalises itself primarily in *having been*. Moods temporalise themselves – that is, their specific ecstatics belong to a future and a Present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstatics are modified by *having been*” (1962:390).

Being-in-the-world, in the most inseparable way, is rooted in the spatiotemporal domain of existence. Moods, then are regarded as “fleeting experiences” which ‘colour’ one’s whole ‘psychical condition’ and because of this fleeting character Heidegger claims “belongs to the primordial constancy of existence” (Heidegger, 1962:390). The construal that one’s state-of-mind is grounded primarily in ‘having been’ means that the “existential basic character of moods lies in the *bringing one back to something*” as if to say something central about one’s being, of one’s core (1962:390). Genetically speaking each individual is relatable through their own unique genetic makeup. Likewise one level of analysis is the construal of an entity identifiable in terms of one’s own unique signature-energy-frequency (SEF) (Author JN to be inserted, 2009:191).

*Being and Time* we know was an incomplete work to which Heidegger in the final section of the work returned to the question of the meaning of being. At the very end he raises these questions after recognising that: “The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s being is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes. 1) How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted? 2) Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*? 3) Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?” (1962:488). It is with a measure of humility pace Heidegger I provide conceptual responses to these questions. For the first question: How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted? As it is constructed an answer arguably emerges from the perspective of Being as constituted spacetime as provided in this paper i.e. Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) containment-field (human being); and previous works where I have laid the foundation for this conceptualisation. The second question: Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*? At this stage of human development this is the most challenging question. One can however advance by inference to best explanation what is conceivably an appropriate hypothesis in the manner of a principle of individuation and identity: Signature-Energy-Frequency (SEF) principle. The evidence already exists supporting the plausibility of this account. Frequency, in the sense of resonance is fundamental in Nature associated with most, if indeed not all, forms of communications: auditory, chemical and relative energy expression.

To elaborate further, matter according to relativity theory is interconvertible to energy as was made famous by Einstein’s mass-energy equation \( E = mc^2 \). The fabric of the Universe according to this observation is physical and as such is reducible to energy. I draw on the observation of Planck’s constant which is a formula used by physicists to describe the constant
proportionality between the energy emitted or absorbed by an atom and the frequency of emitted or absorbed light (Jibu & Yasu, 1995). Energy characterised as such is the fundamental substance of the Universe definable in terms of frequency. Here, then, is one way to think about how primordial time could lead to an expression and to the meaning of Being as Heidegger hoped to answer. Humans are born within the world from pre-existing beings, i.e. our parents. Developmentally through our animated conscious engagement with the external world of phenomena our observations are partially turned outward via our sensory channels whilst concurrently being based or contained as a spatiotemporally embodied entity, invariably contending with the inner interpreting sensing mode of being whether expressed through emotively charged or other cognitive and visceral senses. As animated spatiotemporal embodied beings the external world of sensory information constantly requires being transformed into sense receptive, ideational or conceptual meanings. Of course, how the fundamental energy of the world transforms itself into the manifold entities and elements of the universe remains to be answered?

For the third question: Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being? I answer yes. Explaining in sum by saying ‘Being’ and ‘Time’ is the union and process of existence. That is Being is the spatialisation of time bound in union, the relation of the enacting process of embodied existence in STEM being. Heidegger, as the title of his work exemplifies examined ‘Being’ and ‘Time’ as added, somewhat to which we exist in time, just like occupying space only for a period of time. ‘Being-in-the-world’ was so significantly part of what it is for Dasein to exist that Heidegger, I believe, missed the crucial point of connecting ‘being’ ‘with’ ‘time’ so that ‘Being’ and ‘Time’ are coexistent as they are of course. Authenticity as developed in Being and Time refers to a “way of relating to our existence” described with no specific content, no universal platform issuing from every authentic Dasein (Carman, 2007:289). Heidegger shifts the idea of human existence understood as a unity with a phenomenological account of “Dasein owning up wholly – that is wholeheartedly – to itself in its existence” (Carman, 2007:289). Hence on this account to own up to oneself in one’s existence is to exist authentically such that the deep structure of human is revealed as falling thrown projection (Carman, 2007:289). As such then being authentic is to stand resolute against the Das man (the ‘One’), of the general everydayness. In authenticity the “public understanding of my world” is used by “projecting on my own possibilities” (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2007:8) achievable it is contended as STEM causal agents. The role of conscience calls to turn Dasein into the reticence of its existent potentiality-for-Being characterised as a resonant sense of understanding equiprimordially, I argued, of one’s SEF. Finally Heidegger’s account of authenticity remains somewhat undeveloped though providing an excellent basis to work from if reconceptualised in the manner undertaken in this paper. The task now then is to build on this framework.
References