Lessons Learned: Successes and Flaws in Hong Kong’s New-town Planning

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An Introduction to

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URL: www.atiner.gr
URL Conference Papers Series: www.atiner.gr/papers.htm
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ISSN: 2241-2891
1/09/2014
Lessons Learned:
Successes and Flaws in Hong Kong’s New-town Planning

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Abstract

Historically, Hong Kong consisted of two urban nuclei: Victoria City and Kowloon. However, rapid population growth and industrialization during the postwar period caused tremendous changes in the spatial distribution of Hong Kong’s population into the traditionally rural area known as the New Territories. To diffuse the stress caused by overpopulation in the urban areas in Victoria and Kowloon, the British authorities produced a series of plans to establish satellite towns in the New Territories. Now, more than fifty years later, the new-town program continues to grow, reaching further north as the need to accommodate the growing population continues to increase.

The success of urban planning in Hong Kong’s new towns can be attributed to three factors: maximum density, community building strategies, and a highly efficient mass transit system. This paper analyzes how architecture, community, and infrastructure have contributed to the success of this urban planning program. It focuses primarily on an analysis and evaluation of urban planning techniques over a period of five decades. The oldest new-town, Tsuen Wan, serves as a primary case study whose indices—economic independency, standard of living, urban amenities, and quality of infrastructure—are reviewed to measure the efficiency of the government’s execution of its plans and intentions.

Keywords: Hong Kong New-Town, Urban Planning, Community Building
Introduction

Hong Kong is one of two special administrative regions of the People’s Republic of China (the other is Macau). Hong Kong occupies an area of 398.5 square miles and is located on the South China coast. Important economic activities were generally concentrated in the areas surrounding the harbor and urbanization rapidly developed into the twin cities of Victoria on Hong Kong Island and Kowloon on the peninsula. Situated within a few miles of a modern metropolis, the New Territories remain largely undisturbed and unaffected by the progress of modernization. Despite their size, which is greater than Hong Kong and Kowloon combined, they have become a mere rural appendage to Hong Kong and Kowloon.

Consequently, the New Territories retained a primitive economy based on human-labored agriculture, local marketing, and the provision of goods for trade occurring around the harbor. Politically, the government never issued a master plan or guidelines for land use in the area. In addition, the laissez-faire policy of the British administration allowed villages in the New Territories to essentially have their own semi-autonomous local authorities. Political boundaries were often marked by different clanships, and social organizations and traditional calendars of village festivals remained largely unchanged after the British arrived. The British did, however, implement standard public law to ensure social order, raise awareness in sanitary matters, and increase attention to public health.

Many urban problems resulted from the relatively sudden influx of refugees and subsequent overpopulation of Hong Kong. The urban nuclei simply lost its ability to cope with the speed and scale of the population’s unprecedented growth. Towns encroached into the country, old villages were bulldozed and replaced by grand-scale urban development, and village market centers expanded into substantial towns. The New Territories was transformed from being part of a large agricultural area in southern China into a colonial urban-commercial complex, not unlike the area around Hong Kong harbor as it developed towards the end of the nineteenth century. A combination of capital from the nearby harbor and cheap skilled and semi-skilled refugee labor accelerated the process of industrialization in the New Territories. As Hong Kong became overcrowded, suburban movement of the population was virtually inevitable. Plans for satellite towns with provisions for green belts at Sha Tin, Tai Po, Castle Peak and Tsuen Wan began to gain more government attention as potential solutions to overpopulation problems.

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1Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Davis, 329.
6Lo, 273.
Birth of Hong Kong’s New-Town Planning

Whereas a great deal of attention has been given to studies of Hong Kong’s metropolitan area, less has been paid to research on "new-town" development within the New Territories and its crucial function as a population relief device for the highly overpopulated Victoria City and Kowloon. In fact, the policy to create new towns led to vast physical, social, and demographic changes that ultimately transformed the New Territories from a predominantly rural, agricultural landscape into a combination of urban areas and country parks.\(^1\) Generally, new-town developments in Asia were governmental devices integral to reducing pressures caused by urbanization. These programs typically promoted housing and industrial progress through the decentralization of employment and population.\(^2\) The goals of the development of Hong Kong’s new towns follow this political and economic model rather closely.\(^3\) However, its commitment to holistic planning and the speed and intensity of urbanization distinguish Hong Kong’s new-town development from others in the region.

In Hong Kong, the new-town policy emerged incrementally during the late 1950s and 1960s in response to growing population pressure in urban areas. In the early 1950s, the British administration passed a progressive initiative to create satellite cities outside of Hong Kong and Kowloon with the hopes of diffusing the strain on Hong Kong’s urban fabric. The policy resulted in the development of Kwun Tong, a satellite town near Kowloon whose construction began in 1953. However, unlike the new towns of the next generation, Kwun Tong was not planned to be a self-contained community. Although the policy demanded the government provide housing estates, the government’s involvement was limited in scope when compared to its role in later new-town policy. When it was first conceived, the new-town development was divided into three different phases, and each focused on constructing a few new towns at a time. The first phase began in the early 1950s and focused first on building Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin, and Tuen Mun to accommodate approximately 1.3 million people. The second phase began in the 1960s and concentrated on the construction of Tai Po, Fanling-Shueng Shui, and Yuen Long. Finally, the third phase in the 1970s focused on Tsueng Kwan O, Tin Shui Wai, and North Lantau.

The colonial government’s initial attempt was to create long-run strategic development plans for Hong Kong. In 1965, it established a Colony Outline Plan (COP) whose broad aim was to provide “a framework for a balanced approach to the planning of individual areas.”\(^4\) The COP was designed to

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\(^1\)Ibid.


\(^3\)Ibid.

incorporate proposals for future land-use and land development programs. It also produced important studies including the Mass Transit Study (1967) and the Long Term Road Study (1968).\textsuperscript{1} The comprehensive COP was eventually completed in 1970. It instituted various planning standards and offered guidelines for the provision of a range of community facilities and other land uses. In this plan, the government of Hong Kong established a clear purpose of development to target specific urban issues: to reduce overcrowding, better manage social problems like crime and disease, avoid haphazard urban sprawl as experienced by some western societies, and improve community facilities.\textsuperscript{2} The master plan of this comprehensive urbanization project also included a large-scale expansion of the mass transit system and other infrastructure to connect the city to remote and rural farmlands deep in the New Territories. In order for these new towns to be economically self-sufficient, the master plan also envisaged “a balanced development with a mixture of developments of public and private housing, dependable utility services, a well-organized transportation system, open space for recreation, and a broad range of community facilities for health, education, and social welfare.”\textsuperscript{3}

In order to attract businesses, the government constructed factory space to encourage the relocation of industry and to resettle businesses whose facilities were demolished in the course of building new towns. Early in the planning process, the New Territories Development Division of the Public Works Department—a government agency established by the British colonial authorities to oversee the new-town planning—proclaimed, “industry and housing will grow in step, and no housing will be completed until the full range of social and community support facilities for its residents is assured.”\textsuperscript{4} The provision of schools, hospitals, cultural centers, and infrastructure was to be coordinated and integrated with housing and industrial projects so that the new towns could develop independently from Hong Kong and Kowloon (Table 1).

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2}Scott, 659-675.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid.
Table 1. Projected Expenditure on Housing and Amenities in the New Towns, 1981-1982 (in millions of Hong Kong Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public housing</th>
<th>Temporary housing areas</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Hospitals and clinics</th>
<th>Recreational facilities</th>
<th>Other public buildings</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsuen Wan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sha Tin</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>136.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>220.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuen Mun</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>103.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai Po/Fanling</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural New Territories</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>30.0*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>159.9</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Temporary housing areas will be built in the new towns and other areas where suitable sites are available.

Another distinctive feature of Hong Kong’s new-town planning policy was the government’s expectation of high population growth rates. Due to the necessity to diffuse population pressure—88% of the population recently lived in 7% of the colony’s land—the new towns were conceived to alleviate the population strain. By the mid-1980s—a decade after the policy was undertaken—40% of the total population (approximately 2.4 million people, 100,000 in excess of government projections) had relocated to the seven new towns in the New Territories. In comparison, twenty-five new towns in Great Britain from the same period took approximately twenty-five years to reach a population of 1.4 million. Hence, the scale and speed of the developments in Hong Kong were at a much larger scale.

Unlike garden cities in Great Britain or suburbs in North America which are generally characterized by one or two-story single-family houses, Hong Kong’s new towns are primarily composed of high-rise buildings—most residential towers there are thirty-five stories or higher. The housing development program has been pivotal in improving the life of its citizens, both environmentally and socially, and approximately 1.9 million people reside in housing projects subsidized by the government. For example, Sha Tin in the New Territories East was a rural township of about 35,000 people until the mid-1970s. Today, it is home to over 620,000 people who live in several compact neighborhoods within the larger urban community (Table 2). Furthermore, the natural environment such as the mountains, Shing Mun River, and Tolo Harbor feature parks, promenades, bicycle paths, and recreation facilities. Finally, the astonishing growth of Ma On Shan sums up the riveting scale and speed of new-town development in Hong Kong. Originally, Ma On Shan was a mere sub-community in the Sha Tin District, a community built on reclaimed land from the estuary of the Shing Mun River and a former quarry site. However, it grew rapidly throughout the 1980s and 90s despite being the farthest town in Sha Tin District from the urban centers of Kowloon and Hong

Kong Island. Since then, the population has grown exponentially to approximately 160,000 inhabitants.

Table 2. Population Growth in the New Towns between 1981 – 1981¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New town/development area</th>
<th>Population of full development</th>
<th>Expected population at March 31, 1981</th>
<th>Expected increase in 1981–82</th>
<th>Expected population at March 31, 1982 as a percentage of full development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsuen Wan</td>
<td>958,000</td>
<td>686,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>(715,000) 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sha Tin</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>(200,000) 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuen Mun</td>
<td>547,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>(178,000) 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai Po</td>
<td>228,000</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>( 81,500) 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fanling/Shek Wu Hui</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>( 45,500) 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuen Long</td>
<td>129,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>( 50,000) 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other rural townships</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>( 41,000) 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,838,000</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td>(1,311,000) 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1972, the government realized that the initial plans for housing development were not sufficient to accommodate the population. As a result, they created an even larger plan that laid out a ten-year housing program. The goal for this expansion was to produce 1.8 million housing units predominantly through low-rental public housing.² At the same time, a new Housing Authority and the New Territories Development Department were formed³. These second-generation master plans and the implementation of the established comprehensive planning standards and guidelines were intended to create balanced and self-sufficient communities with a focus on manufacturing.

Infrastructure and Transport Planning

During the same period that high-density housing development was underway, a parallel development of strategic transportation planning was undertaken to establish a more rational hierarchy for the phased development of transit infrastructure and services.⁴ The parallel development of strategic land-use and transportation planning was designed to ensure that the new towns were relatively self-contained entities in which the majority of the work force would be employed locally. By providing services and including economic stimuli in the master plans, the government aimed to prevent the new towns from evolving into bedroom communities.

The transfer of population into the New Territories increased the demand for better connections between the new towns and the larger metropolis. Thus,

¹Ibid.
²Scott, 659-675.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid.
for the decentralization policy to succeed, Hong Kong’s transportation planners had to solve the problem of connecting variously sized pieces of land with diverse geographical profiles that were separated by water. The government had long understood the importance of a continuous New Territories road system, but the difficult relief around the hillside areas yielded cost estimates that delayed any plans for extensive expansion.\(^1\) It was not until 1954 that a complete circuit New Territories road system was completed and a modern communication network emerged.\(^2\) By 1964, there were 202 miles of roads—out of a total of 542 miles in the entire Colony—dedicated to connecting the new towns of the New Territories.\(^3\) This road development was simultaneously accompanied by an equally rapid extension of cheap bus services to various parts of the New Territories. Additionally, a momentous breakthrough took place in 1972 when the Cross-Harbor Tunnel was opened. The tunnel—which runs beneath the harbor between Hong Kong Island and the New Territories—promised a better integration of Hong Kong Island with Kowloon Peninsula. After the opening, the tunnel’s impact was immediate. It instantly became a significant linkage between Hong Kong and the New Territories and the world’s busiest four-lane facility, carrying an average of 10,000 vehicles per day.

In addition to facilitating private transport, the government devoted considerable resources to providing an efficient and reliable public transportation system. It became apparent that economic development and the successful implementation of the government’s public housing and new-town programs relied heavily on the efficiency of the mass transit system.\(^4\) Further incentive for the development of a reliable mass transit system was in the ability of the government to use underground railways to avoid the complications of land reclamation and the expense of purchasing properties in prime urban areas. As a result, the government planned to construct an efficient public transit system irrespective of cost, and the construction of the Mass Transit Railway totaled about US$3.85 billion. Regardless of the astronomical costs of construction and maintenance, the public transportation system was intentionally kept as affordable as possible due to the government’s efforts to provide a variety of options in speed, cost, level of comfort, and accessibility.\(^5\)

Railways are capable of facilitating fast transportation between main urban areas and the outlying districts in Kowloon and the New Territories. With a daily average of 2.1 million passengers, the mass transit system is the best mode of transportation to integrate the different neighborhoods of Hong Kong. Through careful planning and efficient route designs that permit convenient interchanges between different lines and other modes of transport, the New Territories is now much more accessible. Moreover, the Kowloon-Guangzhou

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\(^1\)Lo, 273.
\(^2\)ibid.
\(^3\)ibid.
\(^5\)ibid.
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railway, completed in July 1983, offers further connection between Hong Kong and the PRC. The railways, which runs from Kowloon through the New Territories and terminate in Guangzhou, China, serve as both a primary commuter train for the residents in the new towns located along this route and a crucial freight carrier between Hong Kong and the PRC.

Community Building

In addition to physical construction, community building was a main concern for the planners of Hong Kong’s new towns. Fortunately, the administration was not as naïve as Ebenezer Howard when it came to the social and community aspects of creating them. The administration was well aware of the potential for undesirable social and physical consequences resulting from creating new communities from combinations of the urban populations of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula and the rural peoples of the New Territories. For example, problems of social integration could arise between people already living in the rural areas and those with no previous familiar or social connections to the land. Ian Scott illustrates the severity of the interrupted social networks when he reveals that “a survey taken in Tuen Mun, for example, shows that in one low-cost housing estate, over 75% of the relatives of the inhabitants were distant, in social and geographical terms, from Tuen Mun.”\(^1\) Like other Asian countries facing similar problems, Hong Kong’s government, which previously devoutly adhered to the laissez-faire policy, opted to assume a more interventionist role in the development process. Hence, it was necessary for critical adaptations of administrative structure and attitude to take place.

One of the main issues that worried the administration was the unpreparedness of the administrative structure of the New Territories in tackling urbanization at an effective scale and speed. Before the advent of the development of the new towns, the administrative configurations in the New Territories were designed primarily for rural administration in accordance with the conventional British colonial practice. Hence, a structural overhaul was required to re-equip the existing structure to strengthen administrative coordination and serve the diverse needs of the new urban communities. Failure to channel demands and grievances from the new and potentially volatile populations of the new towns could potentially result in an array of undesirable social tribulations including social disorder.

As a result, the role of District Officer was created "to anticipate and deal expeditiously with any social, political or industrial problems that may arise so that development is not impeded."\(^2\) Essentially, the mission of a District Officer is to oversee the success of administration in the new towns. The indices used to measure these successes are maintenance of a good

\(^1\)Scott, 659-675.  
environment through land control, inter-departmental harmony, and vigorous communal activity. This position is also intended to foster political participation within newly established structures and garner social stability by encouraging, financing, and providing support staff for community organizations.

Another government agency, the New Territories Services Department (NTSD), was created in April 1979 to ensure that the new towns would be both engineering feats and well-balanced communities. The NTSD primarily focuses on the importance of human-based services in the administration of the new towns such as cultural activities, environmental hygiene, and planning and development. The NTSD is the authority responsible for administering the Public Health and Urban Services Ordinance, whose function, as defined by the government, is “the maintenance of adequate standards of public health and the administration of such services as cemeteries and crematoria, cleansing and pest control, hawkers, the management of public markets and the provision of recreational and cultural amenities.”

In the 1980s, after political and organizational adaptations had relatively stabilized, the government became more aggressive about social constructions and creating stable community buildings on a human scale. Decidedly, the government made a conscious effort to assume an important role as an intermediary implementer. Therefore, it would coordinate the different constituencies and interests to the growth of mutual aid committees. Soon after the launch of these committees, desirable effects were immediately detectable. Active and innovative, the mutual aid committees expanded the scope of their mission to include smaller-scaled—yet arguably more effective—activities: picnics, dinner parties, soccer matches, and other outings. In Tsuen Wan, for instance, the high level of performance of these committees was controlled through the allocation of activity funds to prevent them from becoming inefficient or defunct.

Social Ramifications of Creating New Communities from Urban Overspill

Although the new-town development has successfully allowed for people to live further from the city’s downtown area yet still within easy commuting distance of the center, the plan eventually became overburdened. Even though the Hong Kong government attempted to appease the population explosion with the provision of premier infrastructure, administrative reform, and proactive community building, it was not capable of matching the scale and

1 Ibid.
2 Scott, 659-675.
4 "The mutual aid committees were described in the Legislative Council in 1976 as "a group of responsible citizens, resident in the same multi-storey building, who work together to solve common problems of cleanliness and security." Hong Kong Hansard. Report of the Sittings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong. Hong Kong, 21 January 1976."
speed of the urbanization it initiated. In the late 1980s, the rapidly increasing new-town populations outgrew the government’s original development plan, and the established services were unable to appease their needs. The deficiency of the services also revealed administrative flaws. Overall, the problems illustrated the government’s inadequate planning and lack of organization on the master planning level.

Since the problems were no longer direct results of extreme land shortages in the New Territories, they seem to suggest instead missteps in land-use policy. Critics of Hong Kong’s new-town planning point out that the overall scheme lacks a comprehensive master plan and most planning has been done at the local level with little regard for regional cohesion. Ian Scott suggests “the most significant land-use problems in the New Territories that have arisen from the new-town development result from the fact that they have been conceived largely as isolated urban schemes and little attempt at integrated regional planning has been made.” Indeed, new-town planning and construction were executed primarily on an individual project basis through the New Territories Development Department. Unfortunately, while much attention was given to the actual process of urbanization, less was devoted to the effect of such an intense procedure on existing communities. In other words, the government may have been more successful if they had made urbanization more of an integration and less of an invasion.

Generally, the government considered the rural areas as vacant agricultural fields ripe for urbanization. The thought of creating a symbiotic relationship between the industrialized modern city and the rural countryside was scarcely considered. This attitude eventually led to an unplanned infiltration of industry into the rural areas and created urban sprawl despite initial intentions to foster new-town developments as controlled and well-planned.

While almost all medium- and large-scale industry was constructed on specially prepared and officially provided land as part of a scheme to attract businesses to the new towns, small-scale industry did not have the financial capability to compete in the formal accommodation market nor on private premises due to the high costs of land. As a result, small-scale industry thrived in the countryside where low rental and labor costs were readily available. However, unlike their larger-scaled counterparts, the smaller industrial facilities were not subject to the government’s planning framework. The severity of the problem of unplanned industrial infiltration can be gauged by the statistics of squatter factories in Tsuen Wan where “the number of officially recorded squatter factories increased from 89 to 801 between the years 1971 and 1978 alone.” The substantial unplanned industrial infiltration into the rural areas of the New Territories is a serious problem requiring critical reconsideration of the government’s position on the relationship between urban and rural areas as addressed in its planning philosophy.

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1Scott, 659-675.
2Ibid.
In providing services and stimulating the economy of the new towns, the government intended for them to be relatively self-contained entities in which the majority of working-age residents both lived and worked. Unfortunately, the new towns have yet to achieve this goal. On the contrary, most new towns shifted away from their intended functions as self-sufficient market towns to become virtual dormitory towns for Hong Kong and Kowloon. A large population of Tuen Mun continues to commute elsewhere for work, further straining the already overburdened public transit system and, more importantly, jeopardizing community building efforts in the new towns. This lack of a satisfactory balance of residential and work spaces presented a threat that—if not handled properly—will pose severe long-term social consequences for the communities affected.

Conclusion

Considering the new-town planning in Hong Kong, one is easily impressed by the astounding scale and speed of growth that it has accommodated; however, the Hong Kong new-town development teaches us something about the power of local community, or lack thereof, in a state-directed planned development. The less apparent role of the central government in building the new towns lend strong support to the suggestion that its powers are being eroded in the face of autonomous municipal administrations. In the late 1980s, the phase of administrative reform in Hong Kong new towns was characterized by the power transition from the higher-level government to local level administration on one hand, and the construction of a local administrative system on the other. These were two related but different processes with different orientations. Unfortunately, they merged in the case of the Hong Kong new towns. As a result, the two processes burdened local community with governmental tasks and eventually coerced the local administrations to make decisions, without regarding the larger regional plans. The aftermath led to an implementation that was inefficiently redundant, a lack of regional coherency and deviation from the essence of community building.

As more amenities such as shopping centers, schools and hospitals became available in the suburbs, more families decided to relocate to the new towns on the New Territories. While this movement succeeded in reducing the high density of the Hong Kong city center, it has triggered the type of suburban sprawl and a series of social difficulties resulting from creating new communities out of urban overspill. These social issues required the government to realize the benefits of more proactive principles of urban design including construction and management that focused on integrated development. Coherent planning at the strategic, sub-regional, district, and site scale became an essential measure to ensure that interlinked aspects including land use, transit, infrastructure services, engineering, three-dimensional design, 

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1Ibid.
conservation, landscape, economics, finance, and environmental management were integrated into a comprehensive yet interactive system. To achieve this system, the government carefully constructed and managed systems that incorporated the collaboration of a wide range of professional, political, and community perspectives in order to increase efficacy in formulating, evaluating, and refining a dynamic package of alternatives with the ultimate goal of producing a well-balanced and integrated plan.

The lessons from and about the Hong Kong new towns revolve around the strengths and weaknesses of this method of building dynamic communities from uprooted individuals. Concerning the context of urban operations, the government’s attempt to balance imagination with practicality while emphasizing a perceptive, flexible, and comprehensive approach, allowed propitious room for local focuses to take over appropriately. However, there seemed to be a lack of a reviewing process of the development projects’ performance to ensure their capacity to meet the challenges that technological, physical and socioeconomic transitions evoked. In final analysis, the new towns of Hong Kong were confronted with typical social and infrastructural issues that most global metropolises on a comparable development trajectory face. But it was the blazing speed and scale of their growth that coincided with a transitional period in both domestic and international politics that made their development quite distinctive.

Figure 1. Map of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, Jerry Crimson Mann, 2005


Figure 5. Junction of Kwong Fuk Road and Kwong Fuk Street Near Tai Wo Town, Tai Po, New Territories, Hong Kong, 2005. The old low-level buildings in the Foreground Provide a Stark Juxtaposition to the High-Rise Apartments in the Distance. (http://baike.baidu.com/picview/1130389/1130389/0/310f3b1ff068efdba7866992.html#albumindex=0&picindex=0)
Figure 6. Residential Towers that Were Construction in the Vicinity of the Tuen Mun Station Reflect the Government’s Intention to Provide Convenient Transit for New Town residents, 2007. (http://zh.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tuen_Mun.jpg)

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