Greco-Cypriot Relations in 1960-1974 in the Light of American Diplomatic Documents

İlksoy Aslım
Lecturer
Vice Chairperson of the IR Department
Near East University,
Nicosia (North) Cyprus
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İlsoy Ashım
Lecturer
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Near East University, Nicosia (North) Cyprus

Abstract

Greece and Cyprus relations are generally perceived as perfect. However, in the light of the American diplomatic documents this is not completely true. Their relations also had ups and downs and this paper tries to examine the problematic issues in their relations.

The formation of the Republic of Cyprus was a compromise between Turkey and Greece reached under the auspices of the United States of America. This compromise was never accepted as a just solution by Makarios, the first President of Cyprus.

The relations between Greek leaders and Makarios before 1960 have been seen as “perfect” because they all supported the unification of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis). Clearly, after 1960 there was a divergence between the policies of Greece and Cyprus. Greece was a member of NATO and Cyprus was a member of Non-Alignment Movement. Usually, to be non-aligned that time usually meant a leaning toward the Soviet front. Containment policy of the US required close cooperation within NATO and a problem in Cyprus could poison the bilateral relations of Turkey and Greece.

After the destruction of the unity of the Republic of Cyprus in 1964 Greece pressured Makarios for a “moderate” stance in intercommunal strife to preserve NATO unity. Makarios rejected Greek pressure and relations between Greece and Cyprus soured. In 1967 the military government thought that it had more leverage on Makarios and its pressure even made the relations worse. The result was the Greek military coup in Cyprus in 1974 that deposed Makarios out of office.

Contact Information of Corresponding author:
Introduction

Relations between Greece and Cyprus are generally perceived as perfect. However, in the light of the American diplomatic documents this is not completely true: those relations also have ups and downs. This paper discusses the problematic issues in the relations in 1960 - 1974 and challenges the myth that Greece and Cyprus always had good relations. It is mainly based on the sources in National Archives of the US (NARA).

The formation of the Republic of Cyprus was a compromise between Turkey and Greece reached under the auspices of the United States of America. Nevertheless, President Makarios, who also was the archbishop Cyprus, never accepted this compromise as a just solution. Before 1960 the relations between the Greek leaders and Makarios have been seen as “perfect” because they all supported the unification of Cyprus with Greece (enosis). The formation of the Republic of Cyprus was officially the end of enosis policy. Clearly, after 1960 there was a divergence between the policies of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus because Greece was a member of NATO and Makarios was supporting non-alignment policy, which usually meant a leaning toward the Soviet bloc. The containment policy of the US required close cooperation within NATO and any problem in Cyprus could have poisoned the relations between Turkey and Greece. Consequently, the main concern of the US was to prevent any clash between the two NATO partners, and one way to reach that goal went through Athens: it was to get Greece to pressure Makarios for a “moderate” stance in the intercommunal strife to preserve NATO unity.

Republic of Cyprus and the Civil War

Cyprus was declared a republic on August 16, 1960 and Archbishop Makarios became its first President. According to Makarios, he was forced to accept the guarantor system and the Turkish Cypriot rights in the constitution. In 1962, when President Makarios declared his intention to change the constitution the problems started between Greece and Cyprus. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff reaffirmed their desire to encourage Makarios to moderate his behavior. Nevertheless, if Makarios sought to force the revision of the Constitution, Greece would go its own way. Greece informed Makarios in a letter about its intention. That was one of the first warnings to the Greek Cypriots. Similar warnings followed during the coming years.

After the resignation of the powerful Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis in 1963, Makarios felt that he was in full control on the Cyprus issues. The new Prime Minister Panayiotis Pipinelis was appointed only until the elections and he did not have any power to control Makarios.

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2 Drousiotis, M. (2008), 50. Translated from Averoff-Tossitsas, Evangelos, History of Lost Opportunities (in Greek vol), 172.)
The Turkish Cypriots considered that the Greek Cypriot aim was to limit dramatically their autonomy and did not accept Makarios’ amendments in the constitution. In the end, the civil war broke out in the island, and Turkey declared its intention to invade the island.\(^1\) While the situation got worse in Cyprus Makarios on March 13, 1964 departed for Athens to meet Prime Minister Papandreou and General George Grivas.\(^2\) There he accused the Turkish Cypriots of creating a situation which would give Turkey a pretext for the intervention. Makarios and Grivas agreed that if Turkey moved, Greece also would move.\(^3\) President believed that the guarantor powers did not have the right to intervene in Cyprus.\(^4\) Clearly, the increasing nationalism, the weakness of the Greek government and the presidential post of Makarios gave him leverage in the international arena.

Makarios’ Soviet Arms procurement and the need to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey forced the US to go for a solution in Cyprus problem. When the US Under Secretary George Ball got the impression that Greece was for a strong American intervention for a settlement, he acted. The Americans immediately met with the Turkish and Greek Prime Minister in Washington DC. For the Americans enosis could have been the solution in Cyprus. Ball found Papandreou’s repeated references to enosis as a healthy sign. Enosis would have meant that a NATO government rather than ‘the wolf in […] priest’s clothing” was in charge. In order to reach enosis “some of the provisions were made for those Turkish Cypriots who wanted to leave’ the island, and ‘to make this palatable to Turkey there would have to be some kind of […] territorial concessions by Greece.’\(^5\) During their visits to Washington DC by the end of June 1964, both İnönü and Papandreou accepted to discuss the US proposal to solve the Cyprus problem.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, Makarios found the plan totally unacceptable. He asked Papandreou to give a negative reply to Dean Acheson, but Papandreou wanted to deliberate the issue.\(^7\) This was the starting point of the clashes between the Republic of Cyprus and the Greek government. The Western powers preferred to solve the problem within NATO, but for Makarios this was not acceptable.

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\(^1\) Rusk, Deptel Circular 1675, 12.3.1964: POL 23-8, box 2082, NARA.
\(^2\) Labouisse, Embtel Athens 1398, 13.3.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2082, NARA. Grivas was the leader of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) that organized armed resistance movement against Britain on April 1955.
\(^3\) Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 963, 13.3.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2082, NARA.
\(^5\) Memorandum from Ball to Johnson, Subject: The Cyprus Problem, 11.6.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, 2086, NARA.
\(^7\) Labouisse, (for Acheson) Embtel Athens 172, 30.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA. Labouisse had received the information from ERE leader, Canellopoulos. Dean Acheson was the representative of US President in Geneva who was mediating the Turkish and Greek representatives to find a solution to the Cyprus problem within the context of his plans, namely the Acheson Plans.
When the Americans were hosting the prime ministers, Grivas returned to Cyprus in June 1964 and was appointed as the Commander of the National Guard, whereas Makarios’ plan was to appeal to the UN at the next General Assembly. He was sure that the Socialist and Non-Aligned countries would support his cause.\(^1\)

**Makarios’ sabotage of the Geneva Conference**

When the parties in Geneva were formulating their positions, so did Makarios in Cyprus. After his visit in Athens he tried to bring about a fait accompli in Cyprus to prevent a Greek move in Geneva. In fact, Makarios favored a military operation in Cyprus to sabotage the Conference.\(^2\)

When Turkish threat did not stop Makarios the Turkish military operation started on August 6. The military operation occurred in the Mansoura-Kokkina area where the Turkish Cypriots had access to the sea. It was seen by the Greek Cypriots as an area was used by Turkey to assist to the Turkish Cypriots with arms and men. For this reason, the Greek Cypriot leadership had made it one of its top ‘cleaning’ priorities.\(^3\) During the hostilities, the Americans put pressure on the Greek Cypriots for a ceasefire to avert the threat of a Greco-Turkish war and also to save Acheson’s initiative.

It was all about a dual game. On one side Makarios was playing his own game with Greek Minister of National Defense, Petros Garoufalias in Cyprus, on the other side Mediator Dean Acheson in Geneva and Ambassador Labouisse in Athens were trying, in coordination with Ball, to shape the final plan which Papandreou could accept.\(^4\)

The strong US pressure and the Turkish air strikes worked and Makarios accepted a cease-fire and Grivas had to resign.\(^5\) During the Turkish military operation Greece was not strong enough to support the Greek Cypriots as Andrea Papandreou confessed.\(^6\) Makarios was disappointed and sought military aid from another direction, the Soviet bloc. Here, we must remember

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\(^1\) Drousiotis, M. (2008), 234-235.

\(^2\) Ibid, 241. For Drousiotis, ‘even a limited conflict would dramatically exacerbate Greco-Turkish relations and would bring about the swift demise of the Acheson plan.’ Although Salih shares Drousiotis’ views on Makarios he criticizes the position of Athens. According to Salih, Greece was partly responsible because they had supplied Makarios with men, arms and moral support. Salih, H. İ. (1978), 52.

\(^3\) Drousiotis, M. (2008), 242.


\(^5\) Ball to Belcher, Flash Deptel 128, 9.8.64: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2089, NARA.

\(^6\) Andreas Papandreou described the position of his father as follows: ‘Makarios demanded that we dispatch our Air Force to provide his cover. We did not, not because we did not wish to, but because it was technically impossible. Cyprus was far [from] Greek air-bases, and our fighters would have had no more than two minutes flying [time] over Cyprus. We would therefore only have provoked Turkey into further action without offering substantive aid to the Cypriot ground forces.’ Papandreou, A. (1977), 177.
that in summer 1964, the threat of a ‘Mediterranean Cuba’ was real for the Americans and they did their best to prevent it.

1967 events: Greek forces out of Cyprus

In 1965, both Turkey and Greece realized that enosis and partition could not lead to a lasting solution: thus, the best option was some form of ‘independence’. Also Makarios had now a similar view on enosis: it was impossible without substantial concessions. Consequently, the independence turned to a more attractive solution.

On April 21, 1967 a military junta took power in Athens. Makarios informed Ambassador Belcher on April 24 that he did not want to get involved in Greek politics. However, he believed that ‘recent events were [a] death blow’ to the dialogue and hoped that a way could be found to resume talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Makarios’ offer was that the talks would be held in Cyprus and the solution was not needed urgently.

After the coup in Greece, the relations between the Greeks and Greek Cypriots turned sour. Rumors of a Greek coup in Cyprus were circulated both in Athens and Nicosia. Also, Grivas criticized Makarios for the removal ‘several restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots’. In 1967 Cyprus again became a battleground that disturbed Greece when the Turkish Cypriots provoked the Greek Cypriots. When Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish Cypriots Turkey bombarded the Greek Cypriot targets and placed the responsibility for the incidents on the Greek Government. Finally, it was the American action that secured the peace in the island. Grivas’ departure from Cyprus was an achievement for Turkey. Of course, the major Greek concession was the withdrawal of the 7 000 troops and heavy weapons from Cyprus. On January

1 Belcher, Airgram Nicosia A-249, 2.6.1967: POL 1 CYP-US, box 2029, NARA.
4 Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 1560, 24.4.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2023, NARA.
5 Talbot, Embtel Athens 411, 24.6.1967: POL 23-9 CYP, box 2077, NARA.
6 Belcher, Airgram from Nicosia A-50, 5.9.1967: POL 2 CYP, box 2021, NARA. Makarios’ plan was, in time, to disarm all posts and fortifications, to remove all permanent roadblocks, and to provide absolute freedom of movement.
7 The story of Turkish Cypriot provocations is in: Uludağ, S. (2008).
8 Hart, Embtel Ankara 2393, 18.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA.
10 Talbot, Embtel Athens 2224, 20.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA.
11 Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 1178, 17.1.1968: POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA. For Turkey, Grivas’ provocation and illegal infiltration of the Greek forces in Cyprus since 1964 had increased the tension on the island. Turkey asked withdrawal of illegal Greek troops, arms and Grivas. Hart, Embtel Ankara 2393, 1811.1967: POL 27, box 2024, NARA. Ambassador Talbot, in Athens, urged Prime Minister Constantine Kollias to order General Grivas to return back to Athens in order to calm things down. Kollias claimed that he could not do this and it
12, 1968, Makarios declared that ‘while enosis was still the desire of the Greek Cypriots, this goal was for the foreseeable future not obtainable, and that in the meantime a feasible rather than a desirable solution must be sought.’ Now, the junta did not have a big number of Greek troops in the island and Makarios got opportunity to act more independently from Greece.

Confrontation and assassination attempts on Makarios

The parties committed to enosis opposed the new policy of Makarios. On April 5, 1970, Grivas claimed that Makarios opposed the enosis. He called the youngsters to ignore the ‘feasible solution callings’ and to remain committed to enosis. On 31 August, Grivas secretly returned to Cyprus in order to organize a terrorist group called EOKA-B which was a kind of continuation of the anti-British organization EOKA formed in 1955.

The question of whether Grivas was sent by the Greek junta is problematic. Mayes (1981) writes that Grivas returned without the approval of Papadopoulos. Coufoudakis (1976–77) has a different opinion and he thinks that 73 years old Grivas could not return to Cyprus without the approval of Papadopoulos. However, for Clerides, it is obvious from the events of 1967 in Cyprus that the junta could not control Grivas. He came to Cyprus with the support of ‘certain circles within the military opposing the junta leaders, and by Greek Cypriot groups opposing Makarios.’ Clerides is right.

After long discussions, the expanded talks, where also the Turkish and Greek advisors participated, were opened by the UN Secretary General, Waldheim, on June 8. The main problem of the talks was the division of the Greek Cypriots. One group - the supporters of a “realistic solution based on independence” - gathered, around Makarios and Clerides. The other group was the right-wing nationalists supported by some Greek military circles, who still called for enosis. The last step was the assassination attempt in August 1968 against the junta leader Colonel Papadopoulos in which the Cypriot Minister of the Interior Polykarpos Georgadjis was accused of being involved. Clearly,
this issue increased tension at the top. Although Makarios deposed Georgadjis, nobody thought that it was enough to satisfy the junta.\textsuperscript{1}

The Greek government was not happy with the development in Cyprus. As Pipinelis defined in Athens, instead of working on Makarios, Greeks preferred to work with Turkey to settle the problem. Hence, Greece displayed that there was no possibility of enosis and it therefore preferred cooperation with Turkey to reach a solution in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{2}

On March 8 1970, it was reported that Makarios had escaped the assassins’ bullets that downed his helicopter.\textsuperscript{3} American intelligence reports suspected the former Minister of Interior Georgadjis and the National Front.\textsuperscript{4} Clerides (1989) (1989) extends blame to the influential Greek General Dimitrios Ionnides who was also responsible for the attempt.\textsuperscript{5} Nevertheless, Makarios himself also blamed the ‘Greek Cypriots acting on their own or [as] agent for others.’\textsuperscript{6} For Makarios, others obviously meant the Greeks. When the Greek Prime Minister clarified Greek support to the continuation of intercommunal talks Makarios was relaxed.\textsuperscript{7} Obviously, the Greek Government was acting in concert with the the Lisbon consensus.\textsuperscript{8} Although Makarios was relaxed, the constitutional compromise request was not acceptable for him.\textsuperscript{9}

Makarios rejected the Greek proposals but Papadopoulos escalated his insistence on June 19.\textsuperscript{10} Clerides (1990) puts Papadopoulos’ threat on record as follows: ‘Should the contrary occur, should you break our common front, I am bound to tell you that […] the Greek Government would find itself faced by hard necessity, to take those measures which national interest and the best interests of Cypriot Hellenism demand, irrespective of how bitter these may be.’\textsuperscript{11} Makarios replied to Papadopoulos letter on June 24 and told the Greeks that he was the responsible person for Cyprus.\textsuperscript{12} This was the beginning of another strained period between the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots.

\textsuperscript{1}Belcher, Airgram Nicosia A-126, Subject: Cyprus: Heritage of Violence, 20.6.1969: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2077, NARA.
\textsuperscript{2}Tasca, Embtel Athens 1065, 6.3.1970: POL 27 CYP, box 2225, NARA.
\textsuperscript{3}Rogers, Deptel to Nicosia 34093, 8.3.1970: POL 15-1 CYP XR POL CYP-US, box 2224, NARA.
\textsuperscript{4}George C. Denney to Rogers, Intelligence Brief, 10.3.1970, POL 15-1 CYP XR POL 13-10 CYP POL 27 CYP, box 2224, NARA.
\textsuperscript{6}George C. Denney to Rogers, Intelligence Brief, 10.3.1970, POL 15-1 CYP XR POL 13-10 CYP POL 27 CYP, box 2224, NARA.
\textsuperscript{7}Tasca, Embtel Athens 6470, 30.11.1970: POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA. Papadopoulos confessed that since no solution could be imposed from outside, the only alternative was the continuation of the intercommunal talks.
\textsuperscript{8}In Lisbon, Turkish and Greek officials agreed to support the continuation of the intercommunal talks.
\textsuperscript{9}Popper, Embtel Nicosia 1012, 16.6.1971: POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA.
\textsuperscript{10}Crawford, Embtel Nicosia 1538, 25.8.71: POL 27 CYP, box 2229, NARA.
\textsuperscript{11}Clerides, G. (1990), 77-79.
\textsuperscript{12}Crawford, Embtel Nicosia 1538, 25.8.71: POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA.
The U.S. prevents the Greek Coup against Makarios

In January 1972, when Makarios received 4000-5000 Czech small arms, Athens feared that the arms might wind up in the hands of Communist elements.\(^1\) Greece insisted that Makarios place the weapons under National Guard control. Makarios replied that he needed the arms for protection against Grivas.\(^2\) On February 11, 1972, Greece delivered a note to Makarios.\(^3\) The note note required that the arms should be put under control of the UN and that the government should include persons from the nationalist forces in Cyprus.\(^4\)

Greece was not acting particularly covertly, in fact it openly informed Turkey of its intentions concerning Makarios. The Greeks asked the Turks to treat the issue as a Greek internal matter.\(^5\) After long discussions, Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou and the UN Secretary General’s special representative agreed upon ‘safe storage and inspection of the imported weapons.’\(^6\)

During the arms crisis, Popper was urgently asked on February 14 to meet Clerides, the Speaker of Parliament. Clerides asserted that ex-Greek Ambassador Panayotacos had requested that Makarios had to withdraw from the presidency. Makarios had heard that the Greeks planned to move ‘tonight.’ Makarios asked Clerides to see Popper immediately and request a direct intervention by President Nixon to Papadopoulos, to forestall any attempt by the Greek military in Cyprus.\(^7\)

It seems that Popper’s telegram alerted Washington DC and Ambassador Tasca was instructed to meet with Papadopoulos urgently. Tasca emphasized to the Greeks that the US Government was against any attempt to overthrow Makarios and his Government.\(^8\) Consequently, no coup took place.

End of the road

Prime Minister Papadopoulos was overthrown by Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, the head of the military police, on November 25 1973. A briefing report prepared on January 7, 1974 expressed Ioannides’ belief that the previous Greek Governments had failed to prevent Makarios’ proclivity sacrificing anything for self-survival. Ioannides overthrew Papadopoulos for

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\(^1\) Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Note RNAN-7, 17.2.1972: POL 23-8 CYP XR POL 27-4 CYP/UN, box 2225, NARA
\(^3\) Executive Secretariat, Subject: Strains in Relations between Greece and Cyprus, Issues of Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 9, 1.3.1972: Entry 396J, box 29, NARA.
\(^4\) Popper, Embtel Nicosia 309, 17.2.1972: POL CYP-GREECE, box 2228, NARA.
\(^5\) Handley, Embtel Ankara 975, 10.2.1972: POL 27 CYP, box 2228, NARA.
\(^6\) Bush, Embtel USUN 971, 17.3.1972: POL 27-4 CYP/UN, box 2230, NARA.
\(^7\) Popper, Embtel Nicosia 322, 14.2.1972: POL 27 CYP, box 2228, NARA. See also: Clerides, G. (1990), 133-134.
\(^8\) According to Clerides, Popper told him that Tasca had already seen Papadopoulos and that the Prime Minister had given him the clear and categorical assurances he had demanded. Ibid.
his Cyprus policy and to start to democratize Greece. ¹ For Bahçeli (1990), Ioannides who had previously served in Cyprus also had great antipathy towards Makarios. ² The power shift in Greece clearly had an impact on Cyprus: Ioannides would act tougher than Papadopoulos.

In Cyprus, Makarios’ real concern was the pressure of Athens. He believed that Athens would launch a propaganda attack against him if the talks were successful. ³ Consequently, Makarios was afraid of being seen as ‘selling Cyprus’ and had even less interest in proceeding quickly.

After the death of Grivas in the spring of 1973, his organization EOKA-B came under the direct control of Ioannides. EOKA-B’s attacks mounted and Makarios decided to act. Firstly, he tried to control the names of Greek officers sent to serve in Cyprus to prevent them engaging in anti-governmental activities. ⁴ When a high number of arms were stolen from National Guard’s camps Makarios perceived the action as preparation for a coup d’état by the Greek officers. ⁵

However in 1972, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots agreed that the center of Hellenism was Athens and Ioannides, referring to that agreement, rejected the decision of Makarios. Consequently, Makarios’ further action was to write a letter to the Greek President, General Phaidon Ghizikis on July 2, 1974 and to demand the withdrawal of all Greek officers serving in Cyprus. ⁶ This was the end of the road. On July 15, National Guard soldiers commanded by Greek officers were moving to the Presidential Palace. ⁷ The Greek coup had started. Drousiotis (2006) contemplates the reason why Makarios did not take measures to prevent the coup. His answer is that the junta’s misinformation campaign before the coup was the cause. ⁸ According to Clerides (1990), the coup took Makarios by surprise. He did not believe that a coup would be staged against him, contrary to his recognition of earlier threats in February 1972. This was because in July 1974 the Greek junta did not have an agreement with Turkey regarding a solution of the Cyprus problem. ⁹ We have to remember that for many years a power shift in Cyprus was expected in case of a Greco-Turkish agreement. Thus, Makarios believed that if there was no agreement between Greece and Turkey, the junta could hardly move to overthrow him.

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¹ Greece-Dimitrios Ioannides, 7.1.74: Briefing Books, 1958-76, Lot 75D146, Entry 5037, box 206, NARA.
² Bahceli, T. (1990), 84.
⁵ Ibid, 313-314.
⁷ Davies Embtel Nicosia 1338, 15.7.1974: Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951-76, Chronology of Cyprus Issue and other Documents, Entry 5405, box 24, NARA.
⁹ Clerides, G. (1990), 334.
Ioannides believed that Turkey understood that the matter was an internal Greek Cypriot affair and they had not declared enosis. For him, Greece and Turkey could talk and solve their differences peacefully. In order to support his stance, Ioannides asserted that the Greek Cypriots in the National Guard had asked for the Greek assistance.¹

In any case Ioannides’ view was wrong and Turkey used Greek coup as an excuse to act militarily in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the relations between Greece and The Republic of Cyprus could only develop after the collapse of junta in Greece.

Conclusion

Between the years 1960-1974 Greece and Cyprus relations usually were problematic and not perfect. During these years great powers confrontation was in full gear and members of the alliances could not act independently. The main problems between Greece and Cyprus derived from their different world views and alliance membership. During this period the United States pushed Greece to affect Makarios policies in Cyprus but the president usually found a way out and did not follow the advices of Greeks. Greece’s moderate policies rarely affected the policies of the Republic of Cyprus. Even though Makarios had the power of being both the President and the Archbishop, this could not prevent the Greek junta to seize a coup on the island which gave Turkey the opportunity it was waiting for since 1964. Consequently, the Turkish military operation triggered the opposition against the Greek junta in Greece and junta could not continue its existence.

Consequently, the Republic of Cyprus and Greece relations became to be moderate and friendly with the democratic governments both in Greece and Cyprus. Now, Greece shows respect to the decisions of the Republic of Cyprus and it seems that they do not have any problem.

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