Organized Collective Violence in Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Tuscan Countryside: Some Case Studies from Central and North Eastern Tuscany

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Abstract

Organised collective violence was not an option available to all social groups within the medieval rural society. While this kind of violence was a basic factor of aristocratic life, some monasteries and rural communities appear incapable of exercising it even in situations in which this incapacity was not due to political, economic or practical reasons. Consequently, the causes must be sought in the social and cultural field. The following cases will be illustrated: the monastery of Passignano and its struggle for local power; the hermitage of Camaldoli, especially its relations with the aristocracy of the upper Val Tiberina; the monastery of Prataglia and its conflict with the community of Frassineta. As for rural communities, the inhabitants of Poggialvento displayed a warlike attitude while those of Frassineta did not resist against a hastily assembled band of armed men in the service of their lord. As for clerics, while the abbots of Passignano engaged in an armed conflict with local aristocrats, the hermits of Camaldoli refused to resort to force even when their seigniorial rights were usurped. Military style violence was used by some rural notables in their attempt to establish their local power; but in doing so they also imitated aristocratic behaviour and showed their desire to be considered aristocrats. Conclusion: ability to exercise or promote organised collective violence can mostly be explained as the result of aristocratic leadership or influence. As far as rural communities were concerned, the low degree of cooperation in everyday agricultural activity probably hindered self-defence collective actions.

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Violence is often thought of as a characteristic of all medieval societies. How such societies chose to exercise this violence is therefore a good, and understudied, way into understanding the basic rules about how they worked. Concentrating on twelfth and thirteenth century Tuscany, my intention is to show that a specific form of violence, namely organized collective violence, was not an option available to all social groups within the medieval rural society of northern Italy, and to investigate this phenomenon with particular attention to the social and cultural conditions that determined the attitude of families, religious communities and rural communities towards this kind of violence. Some social groups indeed appear substantially incapable of exercising it, in situations which clearly demonstrate that this incapacity was not due to political, economic or practical reasons. Consequently, the causes for this must be sought in the social and cultural field. The issue of rural revolts will be left out, since such outbreaks of violence were connected to specific conditions and are thus less suited to an investigation aimed at illustrating dynamics operating in the everyday life of rural society.

I want to make clear that by the phrase ‘collective organized violence’ I refer to violent actions such as plundering, damaging estates and goods, beating and wounding, usually carried out by small groups of about a dozen armed men, sometimes in the course of local conflicts for power over small areas, comprising one or two castles at most. Such local wars could last for years and even more than ten years; nonetheless, men were seldom killed in this type of conflict. Of course, since we are talking about central Italy, I use the word ‘castle’ to designate a fortified village, not an aristocratic fortified residence. Residences of that type existed, but they were situated within fortified villages.

Just a few words about primary sources. Even though in this article I mostly refer to historiographical literature, I have checked and examined the published editions or the original documents mentioned in the relevant sections of those works. Moreover, I have carried out a thorough investigation on the late twelfth and thirteenth century documentation coming from the archives of the monastery of Passignano, the hermitage of Camaldoli and the monastery of Prataglia. For the most part, the primary sources used for this study consist of documents recording conflicts in which violent episodes occurred, that is agreements, reconciliation or arbitration deeds and legal proceedings, mostly unpublished and relatively abundant for the twelfth and thirteenth century Tuscany.

Let us start with the monastery of San Michele of Passignano, on the Chianti hills, in the valley of the Pesa river. In the late twelfth century, in that part of the Val di Pesa a rather violent struggle for local power took place. The opposing parties were the monastery itself and a local aristocratic family, the Malapresa, a branch of the Firidolfi family (Wickham, 2000, 327-42; Faini, 2010, 157). The object of the struggle was the area between the monastery and the Pesa river, just a few square kilometres comprising two small castles, that of Passignano and that of Poggialvento. Documents clearly shows that both parties resorted to the force of arms: both the Malapresa and the monks had their own locally recruited armed retinues, and those small groups of armed men carried out a series of clashes and raids which lasted more than ten years and ended in the 1190s with the victory of the monastery. During this conflict a
serious episode occurred, I mean serious in the context of such a ‘low intensity’
armed confrontation: a member of the Malapresa family was killed, and since
the monastery paid compensation to his brother without protesting, we can be
reasonably sure that he had been wounded to death in a clash with the abbot’s
followers (Casini, 2009, 208-11).

Let us now consider the hermitage of San Salvatore of Camaldoli. In the
thirteenth century the hermitage held seigniorial rights over several castles: one
of them was Castiglion Fatalbecco, in the valley of the Sovara river, not far
from Anghiari. There, the hermitage had awkward neighbours, namely the da
Montacuto, a local aristocratic family (Scharf, 2010; Delumeau, 1996, 276,
343-45, 363, 466-68, 954-55, 1069-70, 1137, 1139, 1191-92, 1197-99, 1217-
18, 1235-39, 1443). For about seventy years, starting from the late twelfth
century, the da Montacuto seriously interfered with the exercise of the
hermitage’s seigniorial powers on Castiglion Fatalbecco; in certain periods, the
da Montacuto even assumed total control of the castellany. The prior of
Camaldoli was soon forced to grant the da Montacuto the right to receive a half
of some local revenues pertaining to the hermitage, but that did not stop
usurpation. When, in the 1260s, the conflict ended and the prior was finally
able to exercise his powers on the castellany without interference, it was thanks
to the commune of Arezzo, which backed the hermitage against the da
Montacuto. Nonetheless, the prior continued acknowledging the da
Montacuto’s right to a half of the profits of justice and other revenues. Now,
the da Montacuto surely had a local armed retinue, while in all that time the
priors of Camaldoli did not establish one and never tried to chase the da
Montacuto from Castiglion Fatalbecco by the force of arms.

So why did those two ecclesiastical institutions, in similar conditions, act
in such different ways? It is true that the abbot of Passignano struggled to
acquire control over the area in which the monastery itself was situated, while
Castiglion Fatalbecco was far from Camaldoli. But the hermitage owned wide
estates in the Valtiberina and adjacent valleys, like the Sovara valley, and the
castellanies over which the hermitage held seigniorial rights were not so many
(Delumeau, 1996, 580-89, 596-98, 635-39, 712-42, 1356-68; Jones, 1980, 296-
302; Scharf, 2003, 241-63). So I do not think that the Camaldolites’ conduct
can be explained by lack of interest.

I believe that the reason for the different behaviour of the abbots of
Passignano and the priors of Camaldoli resides in their social origins. I am
convinced that, in the late twelfth century, the abbots of Passignano came from
the aristocracy, maybe from a local family known to Italian medievalists as ‘da
Callebona.’ The da Callebona had transferred to the monastery sizeable assets,
including their family castle. But also the Alberti counts, one of the most
important aristocratic families of twelfth and early thirteenth century Tuscany,
were in good terms with the monastery at that time. Also the Attingi and
Figuineldi, two minor aristocratic families of the upper Valdarno, could have
provided abbots, since they were connected with the monastery in the twelfth
century (Cortese, 2009, 164-78; Pirillo, 2004, 252-56). Unfortunately, those
abbots are known to us by first name only, hence there is no way to verify this
hypothesis. But, since the culture of war, intended as a system of values in which war had a positive and central role, was a typical trait of aristocracy at that time, it is reasonable to suppose that that system of values entered the monastery of Passignano together with those aristocratic monks.

On the other side, there is no difficulty in supposing that, between the late eleventh and mid thirteenth century, Camaldoli’s priors were not aristocrats, and thus not inclined to promote military style violence. In this case too, we only know the first name of the twelfth and thirteenth century monks and priors, so there is no way to trace their families, but it is an acknowledged fact that, although with some remarkable exceptions, during the thirteenth century the Italian aristocracy lost interest in monastic career (Sergi, 1983, 96-97). The reason for this has to be sought in the fact that by the late twelfth century, the monasteries had lost the social, economic and political role they had in the Carolingian and post-Carolingian age. In the late twelfth and thirteenth century north and central Italy, the driving forces of political reorganization and economic growth resided in the cities.

I have wondered whether the Camaldolite priors’ attitude could be the consequence of a particular religiosity, that is a strict adherence to the evangelic precept of non violence. But in the end I have concluded that, without positive evidence, it would be imprudent to suppose that a purely religious factor could determine social practices. It is safer to assume that monks brought the culture and values of the social environment they came from into the ecclesiastical institution they entered.

Passignano’s case demonstrates that local notables who could afford to maintain a horse and military equipment were willing to serve as armed retainers, and they probably did it in view of achieving aristocratic status. Surely this was not the only reason why they fought for the abbot, but it was surely one of the reasons. Not all of them succeeded: indeed only one family within the abbot’s armed retinue had reached aristocratic status by the fourth decade of the thirteenth century (Plesner, 1979, 87-90, 98-103, 112-13, 130-141; Gasparri, 1992, 124-25; De Rosa, 1995, 47-48).

There are other cases in which such an aspiration can be observed. In his study on the eleventh and twelfth century Casentino, Chris Wickham mentioned a family whose members, namely Rolandino and his son Gibello, about 1160 harassed and raided the tenants of the monastery of Prataglia, not far from Camaldoli. They were obviously trying to establish their local power in the area, but their violent behaviour was itself a part of their attempt at reaching aristocratic standing. In a context in which no legal definition of aristocracy existed, acting like an aristocrat was a fundamental step on order to be perceived as an aristocrat. Violence was part of the aristocratic social identity Rolandino and Gibello wanted to assume. But that family did not succeed in establishing a lordship and this failure compromised their strategy. They remained local notables, never being considered aristocrats. It is worth noting that Rolandino and Gibello were connected to the Ubertini, a major aristocratic family of the Aretine diocese, and held a share of the castle of Partina, in the Casentino (Wickham, 1997, 344-47). This means that, when
they tried to establish their own lordship, they were members of the military retinue of the Ubertini and had absorbed that culture of war that was a basic component of aristocratic life.

Just like the monasteries, there were rural communities capable of military action and communities that were not. In the early thirteenth century, around 1210, the men of Poggialvento, the small castle near Passignano, carried out violent actions against some neighbours, most probably in the interest of the lord of Poggialvento, namely the abbot of Passignano. The man of Poggialvento proved capable of military style action. But not all communities were capable of acting in that way. That leads us to a very interesting case, which is worth illustrating at some length. It regards the castle of Frassineta, in the Casentino valley, on the Apennines.

In April 1269, the bishop of Arezzo, Guglielmo degli Ubertini, gifted the prior of Camaldoli with the monastery of Prataglia and all the monastery’s assets and rights, including the castle of Frassineta, which was subject to the monastery’s seigniorial power. There was a strong similarity between the demographic and social structure of Frassineta and that of Poggialvento: according to my genealogical reconstruction, both castles had indeed a small population – less than thirty families for Poggialvento and about twenty for Frassineta, the word ‘family’ meaning here a patrilineal line of descent – and there were no aristocrats residing in those castles or their districts. It is most likely that all inhabitants of Frassineta were monastery’s tenants. The monks of Prataglia were not at all happy with being placed under the authority of the prior of Camaldoli, and the abbot of Prataglia resigned immediately. The following day, the monks elected a new abbot, Benedetto, but the prior of Camaldoli appointed another, starting a schism which was to last about a year (Belli, 1998, 107-12).

Once the hermitage had received entitlement to the seigniorial rights over Frassineta, the next step was to have them recognized by the population of the castle, and in July an agreement was drawn up between the hermitage and the Frassineta castle community. The community acknowledged the hermitage’s rights and agreed to pay rents and take fealty to the prior. On the other side, the community obtained considerable advantages: the hermitage pledged not to raise rents, allowed the hermitage’s tenants almost complete freedom of action.

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1 Archivio di Stato di Firenze (hereafter ASF), Diplomatico, Passignano, S. Michele e S. Biagio (hereafter Dipl.Pass.), 16 Nov. 1211.
2 As for Poggialvento, see the census ordered by the commune of Florence in 1233 (current style): Dipl.Pass., 16 Mar. 1232 [1]. A similar operation was carried out shortly after also for the castellany of Passignano: Dipl.Pass., 4 May 1233. Both documents were published by Santini (1895, 402-06). The lists of the men of Poggialvento who swore to obey the officials appointed by the abbot of Passignano confirm that the figures of the population of the castle and district should not have varied significantly throughout the thirteenth century: see Dipl.Pass., 17 Jan. 1268 [1] and [2], 23 Jan. 1271, 1 Dec. 1273, 17 Jan. 1274, 6 Jan. 1277 [4], 13 Feb. 1305 [1]. As for Frassineta, see the lists in Archivio di Camaldoli, Diplomatico, Camaldoli (hereafter AC.Dipl.Cam.), 217 (4 Feb. 1254), 288 (7 Mar. 1266), 312 (1 Jan. 1272), and ASF, Diplomatico, Camaldoli, S. Salvatore (hereafter Dipl.Cam.SS.), 15 Apr. 1270 [3] and 9 Sept. 1270.
3 Archivio di Camaldoli, MS Camaldoli 262 (hereafter AC.C.262), fos 163r.-65v. (6 Jul. 1269).
in transferring the land they held from the hermitage itself, established that the castle’s chief magistrate must be elected jointly by the prior and community, and that the statutes of the castle would be drawn up by the community in total autonomy, without any interference from the hermitage, on condition that the hermitage’s rights were preserved. For the inhabitants of the castle, this represented a significant improvement: indeed, under the lordship of the monastery of Prataglia, its tenants were formally forbidden to transfer monastery’s land (Belli, 1998, 131), the potestas, that is the chief magistrate of the castle, was apparently appointed by the abbot alone, and the monastery had an active role in compiling the community’s statutes.

The sources regarding the relations between Frassineta and the hermitage in 1269 reveal that the community had a firm leadership, whose most prominent members were Brunaccio di Benintendi, Ranuccio di Bonagiunta, Baccio di Vita, Iacopo and Amico. Brunaccio was the community’s proxy during the negotiations with the hermitage, while the other four appear in the 1269 agreement as people expressing their consent, even though they apparently did not hold any office in the community’s institutional organisation. This leading group seems relatively new: among its members, it seems that only Brunaccio had held a prominent position in the community for some time, since he was one of the men who gave their consent to the appointment of the Frassineta church rector in 1257, and the castle inhabitants elected him proxy to represent the community before the magistrates of Arezzo in 1266. Also Baccio’s father had had a public role in the community: undoubtedly he was that same Vita who was elected proxy by the castle councillors in 1242, he was again proxy of Frassineta in 1249 and his name appears also in the 1257 ecclesiastical election deed. On the other side, the five councillors of Frassineta documented in 1242 cannot in any way be connected with the men who represented the castle in the 1269 agreement with Camaldoli. In any case, the leading group of 1269 is clearly identifiable.

At this point, one would expect the hermitage’s control over the castle to be definitively established. Quite the contrary, by early December 1269 the abbot of Prataglia, Benedetto, after receiving fealty from the monastery’s tenants living in the villages of Freggina and Ventrina (in August) and in the castle of Serravalle (in November) together with a commitment to the military defence of those places (Belli, 1998, 133-34), had occupied Frassineta, taken up residence in the castle and appointed a man of his own choice as the castle’s chief magistrate. The inhabitants of Frassineta were not able to organize an effective armed resistance. The hermitage protested, but in vain. Surely the

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2 Dipl.Cam.SS., 18 Dec. 1255.
3 AC.C.262, fo. 163r.
4 Dipl.Cam.SS., 16 Mar. 1257, and AC.Dipl.Cam., 288 (7 Mar. 1266).
5 AC.Dipl.Cam., 156 (11 Oct. 1242), 199 (5 Feb. 1249), and Dipl.Cam.SS., 16 Mar. 1257.
6 AC.Dipl.Cam., 156 (11 Oct. 1242).
7 Dipl.Cam.SS., 17 Dec. 1269.
men of the castle were anything but pleased at the return of their previous lord: in April 1270 a subaltern official of the potestas appointed by Benedetto fined twenty three castle inhabitants for refusing to swear obedience to the potestas.1 Nonetheless, Benedetto maintained the control of the castle, and this surely played a major role in the hermitage’s decision to recognize him as abbot: the Camaldolites were unable to get rid of him, and his perseverance surely encouraged the monks who refused the abbot appointed by the prior. Camaldoli’s conflict with the monastery ended the following month, May 1270, when the prior of Camaldoli agreed to recognize the abbot elected by the monks. The monastery’s authority over Frassineta was fully restored, and after 1270 there is no trace of opposition to the abbot of Prataglia.

How could Abbot Benedetto take the castle and hold it? The first factor to be considered is that the commune of Arezzo kept out of the dispute, intervening only to secure its own political supremacy over the area and supporting whichever side held the upper hand.2 At any rate, it still remains to be seen how Benedetto managed to occupy the castle. One possibility is that the abbot promised the community even better conditions than those established by the agreement with the hermitage and then, once in the castle, tightened his grip on the community. However, there is a much simpler explanation, which is consistent with information provided by extant sources, namely, the use of force. It is indeed quite plausible that the abbot assembled a group of armed men, not necessarily to carry out acts of violence, but merely to pose a threat to the castle inhabitants. It is worth noting that Abbot Benedetto, before he was elected abbot of Prataglia, was the prior of the church of San Giovanni of Ricò, in Romagna (Belli, 1998, 108-09). This church belonged to the monastery and was situated in an area where the latter had numerous estates and tenants. Some of those tenants were surely recruited by Benedetto and one of them, Ranieri di Zaulo, was appointed chief magistrate of Frassineta by Benedetto in late 1269.3 We also know that some members of the abbot’s retinue in Frassineta were from Bagno di Romagna,4 a district subject to the Guidi counts and situated in an area in which military service for the counts was still performed in the second half of the thirteenth century (Nelli, 1995; Ragazzini, 1921, 55-76; Brentani, 1930, 75-85). Thus a good part of the area’s population probably had some military experience, and they could have been hired as mercenaries, providing the staff personnel for the abbot’s armed retinue.

A document from 1277 may provide indirect evidence to support this reconstruction. It records the delivery of a letter sent by the chief notary (primicerius) of the Aretine church to the archpriest of Galeata, less than twenty kilometres north of Bagno di Romagna. The letter informed the archpriest that the abbot of Prataglia had complained that several people from Galeata had attacked and plundered the castle of Frassineta. Therefore the chief

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3 AC.Dipl.Cam., 243 (1257).
4 Dipl.Cam.SS., 9 Dec. 1269.
notary ordered the archpriest to have an announcement made in all the churches of the Galeata baptismal church district to the effect that the authors of those misdeeds had fifteen days to pay compensation to the monastery for the damage they had inflicted.\(^1\) Thus a band of robbers from Romagna plundered Frassineta only a few years after the events of 1269-70, and it is worth noting that Galeata is situated on the same road that links Ricò, Bagno and Prataglia. Perhaps this is not a coincidence at all. Perhaps the members of the abbot’s armed retinue, the people who had followed him from Romagna to Frassineta, once returned at home told of their adventure, spreading precise information on Frassineta’s badly defended castle and its unwarlike and vulnerable population.

We can now draw some conclusions. Frassineta’s case is illuminating. First of all, it confirms that the Camaldolites were absolutely unwilling to resort to the force of arms, even in front of an armed enemy. But the way the monks of Prataglia acted in this circumstance demonstrates that being foreign to that system of values did not represent an absolute impossibility. In the twelfth century the monks of Prataglia did not react against the laymen that, together with Rolandino and Gibello, harassed their tenants, while in the thirteenth century, confronted with the danger of losing the castle of Frassineta, they promoted a military action. But they were only able to do that because they had the right man at hand, that is Benedetto, who had the qualities of a military leader. By the way, we cannot exclude that Benedetto belonged to an aristocratic family, like other middle rank clerics like him (Casini, 2011, 192-94).

The inhabitants of Frassineta revealed themselves incapable of military action, although they were in a much favourable position to defend their castle. So, why were Poggialvento’s inhabitants different? We can suppose that those violent actions I have mentioned before were carried out by Poggialvento’s men under the leadership of members of the abbot’s military retinue living in the nearby Passignano castle.

How can we summarize all that? Ability to exercise or promote organised collective violence can mostly be explained as the result of aristocratic leadership or attempt at assuming an aristocratic social identity, in some cases after acculturation in an aristocratic retinue. While some non aristocratic families appear capable of shifting to military style violence and some unwarlike monastic communities showed themselves capable of promoting it, provided that a suitable – and maybe aristocratic – leader was available, rural communities needed input coming from outside or from members of the community with some military experience. It is evident that the origins of this incapacity on the part of rural communities must be sought in social dynamics: the low degree of cooperation in everyday agricultural activity probably hindered self defence collective actions.

If a true military organization was not established in a rural community, if military services going far beyond guard duties were not performed repeatedly by the majority of the adult males within the community, only men used to work together with some form of coordination could be capable of acting as an armed body, because they would have been already accustomed to some form of collective discipline. A firm local political leadership was not sufficient to set up an armed defence, and participation to community institutions, like voting in the elections of community representatives and chief magistrates, or even serving as councillors, are not the same thing as fighting. The individualistic agrarian structures of high and late medieval

\(^1\) Dipl.Cam.SS., 21 May 1277.
Tuscany did not prepare peasants to fight together, not even for the defence of their own interests.

It is also worth noting that, compared with the countryside, Italian city communes appear to have been much more militarized communities. Although the use of mercenaries was already widespread by the end of the thirteenth century, at that time citizens were still required to perform service in the communal army, and in the second half of the century the political organization of the middle and lower strata (the *Populus*) had its own armed units, composed by its members (Grillo, 2008, 109-27, 139-46). Citizens had experienced military leaders and at least some military experience. The inhabitants of the countryside could be in a very different situation, and in an age in which armed violence had such a basic role in social and political life, they could find themselves at a great disadvantage.

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