Abstract Book
13th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
28-31 May 2018, Athens, Greece

Edited by
Gregory T. Papanikos

2018
Abstracts
13th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
28-31 May 2018
Athens, Greece

Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos
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Preface

This book includes the abstracts of all the papers presented at the 13th Annual International Conference on Philosophy (28-31 May 2018), organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER).

In total 29 papers were submitted by 36 presenters, coming from 17 different countries (Austria, Canada, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Guatemala, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, UK and USA). The conference was organized into 12 sessions that included a variety of topic areas such as determinism, logic, religious philosophy and more. A full conference program can be found before the relevant abstracts. In accordance with ATINER’s Publication Policy, the papers presented during this conference will be considered for inclusion in one of ATINER’s many publications.

The purpose of this abstract book is to provide members of ATINER and other academics around the world with a resource through which to discover colleagues and additional research relevant to their own work. This purpose is in congruence with the overall mission of the association. ATINER was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet to exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study.

It is our hope that through ATINER’s conferences and publications, Athens will become a place where academics and researchers from all over the world regularly meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 400 international conferences and has published nearly 200 books. Academically, the institute is organized into seven research divisions and 37 research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

For each of these events, the involvement of multiple parties is crucial. I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committees, and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference and its subsequent publications together. Specific individuals are listed on the following page.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
ATINER’s conferences are small events which serve the mission of the association under the guidance of its Academic Committee which sets the policies. In addition, each conference has its own academic committee. Members of the committee include all those who have evaluated the abstract-paper submissions and have chaired the sessions of the conference. The members of the academic committee of the 13th Annual International Conference on Philosophy were the following:

1. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
2. Nicholas Pappas, Vice President of Academic Membership, ATINER & Professor of History, Sam Houston University, USA.
3. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.
4. Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA.
5. Gary Fuller, Professor, Central Michigan University, USA.
6. Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Burman University, Canada.
7. Cecilia Echeverria, Professor and Academic Counselor, Universidad del Istmo, Guatemala.
8. Maria Magoula Adamos, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.
9. Robert Bishop, Associate Professor, Wheaton College, USA.
10. Laima Geikina, Professor, University of Latvia, Latvia.
11. Miguel Lopez-Astorga, Associate Professor, University of Talca, Chile.
12. Maitreyee Sharma, Associate Professor, Pandu College, India.
13. Stephen Milford, Minister in Church, Baptist Union of Great Britain, UK.

The organizing committee of the conference included the following:

1. Olga Gkounta, Researcher, ATINER.
2. Hannah Howard, Research Assistant, ATINER.
3. Despina Katzoli, Researcher, ATINER.
4. Eirini Lentzou, Administrative Assistant, ATINER.
5. Konstantinos Manolidis, Administrator, ATINER.
6. Vassilis Skianis, Research Associate, ATINER.
7. Kostas Spyropoulos, Administrator, ATINER.
# FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM

## 13th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 28-31 May 2018, Athens, Greece

### PROGRAM

Conference Venue: Titania Hotel, 52 Panepistimiou Street, 10678 Athens, Greece

#### Monday 28 May 2018

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<td>1. Hanoch Ben-Pazi, Associate Professor, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. Religion, Ethics, and the Ethical Danger of Religion.</td>
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<td>2. Sokthan Yeng, Associate Professor, Adelphi University, USA. Spirits Speaking Female: Luce Irigaray and Theravadin Buddhist Women.</td>
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<td>Virgilijus Petuska, PhD Candidate, Vilnius University, Lithuania. Aristotle on the Separation of Forms and Numbers.</td>
<td>3. Vinicio Busacchi, Associate Professor, University of Cagliari, Italy. On Daisaku Ikeda’s Buddhist Conception of Human Being.</td>
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12:30-14:00 Session V (Room C - 10th Floor):
Chair: Miguel Lopez-Astorga, Associate Professor, University of Talca, Chile.
1. Robert Bishop, Associate Professor, Wheaton College, USA. Determinism as a Contextual Feature of Reality.

14:00-15:00 Lunch

15:00-16:30 Session VI (Room C - 10th Floor)
Chair: Robert Bishop, Associate Professor, Wheaton College, USA.
1. Leyla Danae Torres Bravo, Professor, Universidad de Talca, Chile. Social Darwinism and Eugenics: An Analysis from Feminism.
2. Evgenia Cherkasova, Associate Professor, Suffolk University in Boston, USA. Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard on Truth, Subjectivity, and Existential Responsibility.
3. Ryan Quandt, Graduate Instructor, University of South Florida, USA. Leibniz’s Translation of the Phaedo.

16:30-18:30 (Room C - 10th Floor) ATINER’s 2018 Series of Academic Dialogues: A Symposium Discussion on the Challenges of Teaching at Higher Education Institutes in a Globalized World
Chair: Nicholas Pappas, Vice President of Academic Membership, ATINER & Professor of History, Sam Houston University, USA & Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.
Invited Speakers:
1. Robin Root, Professor, City University of New York, USA. "Teaching Global: Meanings and Methods”.
2. Peter Siska, Professor, University of St. Cyril and Methodius, Slovakia. "Spatial and Temporal Comparative Analyses of Teaching Effectiveness and its Future in Higher Education".
3. Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Burman University, Canada. "The Challenges Involved in Teaching Post-Modern Minds”.
4. Changming Duan, Professor, University of Kansas, USA. "How to Integrate a True International Perspective in Teaching Psychology?”
5. Mark Ludorf, Professor, Stephen F. Austin State University, USA. "Addressing Student Heterogeneity in the Classroom”.

21:00-23:00 Greek Night and Dinner

Tuesday 29 May 2018
07:45-11:00 Session VII: An Educational Urban Walk in Modern and Ancient Athens
Chair: Gregory A. Katsas, Vice President of Academic Affairs, ATINER & Associate Professor, The American College of Greece-Deree College, Greece.
Group Discussion on Ancient and Modern Athens. Visit to the Most Important Historical and Cultural Monuments of the City (be prepared to walk and talk as in the ancient peripatetic school of Aristotle)
### 11:15-13:00 Session VIII (Room C - 10th Floor)

**Chair:** Gary Fuller, Professor, Central Michigan University, USA.

1. Fred Adams, Professor, University of Delaware, USA. Global Aphasia and the Language of Thought (L.O.T).
2. Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA. Philosophy and Truth.
3. Vishnulok Bihari Srivastava, Associate Professor, Veer Kunwar Singh University, India & Arti Kumari, Associate Professor, Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, India. Problem of Meaning in India and Western Criticism.

### 11:15-13:00 Session IX (Room D - 10th Floor)

**Chair:** Laima Geikina, Professor, University of Latvia, Latvia.

1. Magdel Le Roux, Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa. The Battle at Hazor and Jael’s Deadly Hospitality.
2. Steven Kepenes, Professor, Colgate University, USA. Scriptural Reasoning and Jewish, Christian, Muslim Dialogue.
3. Stephen Milford, Minister in Church, Baptist Union of Great Britain, UK. The Problem with Sandra the Orangutan: The Unfortunate Consequences of Ontological Relational Thinking.

### 13:00-14:00 Lunch

### 14:00-15:30 Session X (Room C - 10th Floor)

**Chair:** Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA.

1. Gary Fuller, Professor, Central Michigan University, USA. Wiggins on Personal Identity.
2. Ken-ichi Hara, PhD Candidate, Hokkaido University, Japan. Bergson’s Theory of Temporal Perception.

### 14:00-15:30 Session XI (Room D - 10th Floor)

**Chair:** Stephen Milford, Minister in Church, Baptist Union of Great Britain, UK.

1. Laima Geikina, Professor, University of Latvia, Latvia. Interreligious Dialogue and Sustainable Development in the Context of Contemporary Education.
2. Yvette Prinsloo Franklin, Adjunct Faculty, University of Tennessee, USA. The Ought and the Caring Teacher: A Philosophical Exercise in Praxis.

### 15:30-17:00 Session XII (Room C - 10th Floor)

**Chair:** Maria Magoula Adams, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.

1. Jennifer Ang, Associate Professor and Head of Common Curriculum, Singapore University of Social Sciences, Singapore. Bad Faith and Self-Forgiveness.
2. Bjorn Freter, Independent Scholar, Germany. Dangerous Thought. On Western Thinking and the Need to Decolonise through Desuperiorisation.

### 20:00-21:30 Dinner

**Wednesday 30 May 2018**
Mycenae and Island of Poros Visit

**Thursday 31 May 2018**
Delphi Visit

**Friday 1 June 2018**
Ancient Corinth and Cape Sounion
Fred Adams
Professor, University of Delaware, USA

Global Aphasia and the Language of Thought (L.O.T)

In 1975 Jerry Fodor proposed that there must be a Language of Thought (L.O.T. in his book of that title). In 1987 he re-iterated his claim that there is a language of thought. His arguments are largely theoretical based upon inference to the best explanation for our productive and systematic cognitive abilities. However, is there any independent empirical evidence for the existence of a language of thought? Recent studies of persons with global aphasia might well be empirical support for Fodor’s claims. I will present some data from the work of Rosemary Varley who studies the cognitive abilities of persons with global aphasia. I will give her criteria for what she calls "agrammaticism" which define what she deems a loss of significant linguistic capacity. Then I will explain the kinds of cognitive capacity demonstrated by individuals with global aphasia. Varley’s own conclusions are that there are two separate systems at work in the human mind—a linguistic system and a cognitive system. She explains that she believes these two systems come apart in subjects with global aphasia. In these subjects, their cognitive systems take over and allow them to perform as well as anyone on many cognitive tasks. If she is right, her work may supply important empirical support for the existence of a language of thought (LÔT).
Mohamed Almisbkawy
Assistant Professor, British University in Egypt and Fayoum University, Egypt

The Mythical Foundation of Logic and its Fundamental Role in Establishing and Dominating the Metaphysics of Exclusion

Exclusion is the very foundation of western metaphysics. Metaphysics as science of being qua being is founded upon concept of exclusion. Thus, to be is to be an excluding and excluded. Thus, being is a mutual exclusionary relationship between two opposites. Accordingly, exclusion is the most fundamental principle upon which the western metaphysical and logical system is based. Indeed all other concepts, which are claimed as the most fundamental principles for classic western metaphysics, were founded upon such concept of exclusion. Such power of exclusion could be traced to the very beginning of western civilization, namely, Greek Creation Myth. In the beginning there was chaos by next came systematic organized world, thus spoke Greek myth. But the question which has to be raised, upon what principle are that system and such organization founded. We will initially appeal to Ovidian metamorphosis as the Greek creation mythology reveals its implicit principle, whereas the main principle of organized world is exclusion namely the power of exclusion between opposites and the role of Zeus is to activate such power.

In this paper, we aim to explore the impact of the mythical origin of exclusion power, which is expressed through most fundamental principles of metaphysics and logic, namely, non-contradiction and excluded middle, on the history of philosophy. We also explore to what extent such power dominates all aspects of the history of western civilization.
Jennifer Ang  
Associate Professor and Head of Common Curriculum, Singapore  
University of Social Sciences, Singapore  

Bad Faith and Self-Forgiveness  

Primo Levi’s ‘grey zone’ describes situations of moral compromises, complicity, and collaboration that blur the line between victims and persecutors, masters and servants, simple prisoners and privileged ones. He points out that in a totalitarian system where there is concurrent guilt on the part of the collaborators, we not only need to recognize that it is difficult to pass a moral judgment but also remember that no one who did not live through the experience is authorized to judge them. Giving serious consideration to Levi’s argument, this paper investigates the phenomenon of self-forgiveness and unforgiveness as responses from morally tainted individuals who were complicit in the activities or made moral compromises through the phenomenological structure of shame and guilt by Jean-Paul Sartre.
C. S. Lewis’s “The Abolition of Man”:
The Philosophical Background

In *The Abolition of Man*, C. S. Lewis offers a forceful critique of a subjectivist view of evaluative language, and defends a traditional natural-law approach to values. The book, published by Oxford University Press in 1943, originated as a series of lectures that Lewis delivered at the University of Durham in late February, 1943. In this paper, I explore the philosophical climate that provided the backdrop for Lewis’s argument.
Religion, Ethics, and the Ethical Danger of Religion

In a fascinating article that engendered debate, the sociologist Charles Liebman argued that extreme views should be seen as the religious norm and not as the taking to an extreme of the religious norm, which is itself “moderate.” With that, Liebman added his voice to the philosophical tradition that has expressed concern about the destructive and violent power of religions. The history of the Western world provides a great deal of evidence to support that argument, both in the relationship of religion to its adherents and in its attitude toward other religions and their adherents.

In his polemical book about religion, Sam Harris described belief in this way: “A belief is a lever that, once pulled, moves almost everything else in a person’s life.... There seems, however, to be a problem with some of our most cherished beliefs about the world: they are leading us, inexorably, to kill one another.” (Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, 12).

Most of the modern philosophers that attempted to relate to religion faced this challenge. And it seems that that rules laid down by Kant in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason are worthy of serving any philosophical discussion on the topic of religion.

I would like to offer, in this lecture, two possible models for establishing religion as a basis for tolerance. One, building on Moses Mendelssohn’s response to Kant, sees the variety of hues as evidence of God’s revelation and God’s goodness, and thus also of the tolerance taught by religion. The other model, building on Emmanuel Levinas, sees religion as being required to withstand the text of atheism. Religion is a definition of ethical responsibility as the human being faces the infinite: “the concept of God [as] possessed by the believers of positive religions” (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, transl. Alphonso Lingis, 77). In positive terms, he writes, “To relate to the absolute as an atheist is to welcome the absolute purified of the violence of the sacred” (ibid.). He adds in this context that the meaning of atheism encompasses the possibility of liberation from relationship with the other: “Only an atheist being can relate himself to the other and already absolve himself from this relation” (ibid.).
Determinism as a Contextual Feature of Reality

We are used to thinking of determinism as being a characteristic of reality (e.g., the supposed physical determinism of macroscopic physics or metaphysical determinism in free will debates). I will discuss some reasons to think that physical determinism actually depends on contextual conditions (i.e., it emerges through a set of conditions in specific contexts) and some possible implications for how we think about free will.
On Daisaku Ikeda’s Buddhist Conception of Human Being

Non-substantialist philosophical perspectives on the human being, as Paul Ricoeur’s theory of the capable human being, suggest that human identity is a process. We are born as an individual, and to be a person we have to become that. The specific case of Ricoeur’s philosophy underlines the conflictual/dialectical character of this process – a process that essentially is hermeneutical and historical-narrative. The continuous search for meaning through reflection, study and dialogue, the continuous process of interpreting yourself, the continuous telling and reinterpreting personal experience transform the life in a journey... readdress all personal experiences, even those which feel painful or uncomfortable. However, which is the ontological root of such a philosophical anthropology? Is there any ‘root’? Does the conception of the Christian philosopher (as Ricoeur is) reveal a certain orientation towards relativism? It is true that in his book Oneself as Another (1990) he reinterprets the idea of identity as a process actualizing the Aristotelian conception of Being as a Power/Act dynamic. For Ricoeur, the first factor that describes the self is to act. This, essentially, defines the primacy of the ontological dialectic of Power/Act as a dialectical of expression and not of power. Nevertheless, this dynamic conception of ‘substance’ raises doubts about the spiritual source of the process, because Aristotle’s conception is naturalistic.

A different non-substantialist perspective is developed by the Buddhist philosopher Daisaku Ikeda. Ikeda’s doctrinal, theoretical and practical research and work mirrors the specific ‘logic’ of the Lotus Sutra interpretation realises by the thirteenth-century Japanese monk Nichiren Daishonin (1222-1282). It is the ‘view’ of a humanistic religion in action, of an active humanism that conceives human emancipation by transforming sufferings, developing inner power and perfecting society. Nichiren said: “You must never think that any of the eighty thousand sacred teachings of Shakyamuni’s lifetime or any of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas of the ten directions and three existences are outside yourself. Your practice of the Buddhist teachings will not relieve you of the sufferings of birth and death in the least unless you perceive the true nature of your own life” (The Writings of Nichiren Daishonin, vol. I, p. 3). Clearly, this is a vision of self-empowerment and emancipation that recognises the character of ‘process’ in becoming a person (a person who is freed from sufferings and illusions and freed form selfishness). However, which is the ontological/metaphysical root

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of such a conception? Is there any way to put in parallel Ricoeur and Ikeda’s views?

The author will analyses whether or not a philosophical-theoretical productive connection can be established between the two models. At the same time, it will offer some reflection concerning the practical and pragmatic consequences of a non-substantialist and anti-relativistic perspective on the human being.
Evgenia Cherkasova  
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Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard on Truth, Subjectivity, and Existential Responsibility

Both Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard spoke at length about a certain kind of truth that goes beyond empirical evidence and rational speculation: the inner truth which is “sustained in the existing individual’s committed, passionate relation to it.” Like Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky is convinced that existential truth is not about accepting certain facts or ideas as true but of existing in a certain way. And also like Kierkegaard, he makes his reader question the very dichotomy between the objective truth and the allegedly unreliable “mere subjectivity.” This paper uncovers strong parallels between Kierkegaard’s notions of “subjective truth” and “passionate inwardness” and Dostoevsky’s artistic depiction of the interplay between objectivity and subjectivity in his crowning novel, The Brothers Karamazov.
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The Transformation of Self in a Secularized Culture: A Discussion on Pannenberg’s Position

The time frame of this reflection is the secularization historical process, which begins with the Protestant Reformation. The topic under consideration is the change in the human self understanding and its relationship with God in the modern age that comes from the religious division and produces the postmodern comprehension of the autonomous self. Post modernity adopts essential elements of the so-called “modernity project”, but also implies a dialectical attitude toward the project. It criticizes modernity and at the same time it undertakes it essence—emancipation. According to Pannenberg, a contemporary thinker of great rational strength, the impact of the Modern ideas (s. XVII-XVIII) over the concept of the self has been great. One of his main concerns is the phenomena of secularization and contemporary atheism, which is an apparently unidirectional process that has modified the humankind vision and the cultural conscience inspired by Christianity.

The author highlights the fact that some of Pannenberg’s arguments are contradictory, because his logic about God does not go beyond the rational sphere, for him the problem of atheism and secularization lies in God inaccessibility, not in man’s will.

The author poses some questions which underline the ambiguities of secularization—Is Christianity found in a secular society as a "hidden city" or rather as an aspect that makes modern life possible? Is the Christian heritage still present as a fundamental element in the life of western post modernity? For Pannenberg contemporary postmodern world still keeps certain values, ideas and attitudes from the Christian environment. The paper also describes the pathway of historical events after the Reformation until our days.

Even if man thinks that religion belongs to an outpaced age, when he is placed in front of the sacred, he feels surpassed and overwhelmed. He looks for that being that God wanted to be his image. However, God’s image is still in progress. Man does not stop being a job for himself. Only by rising to the religious subject is when freedom gets its true meaning, ethics reaches its pure content, and interpersonal relationships become stronger.
Dangerous Thought: On Western Thinking and the Need to Decolonise through Desuperiorisation

African thought is continuing the process of freeing itself from colonial usurpation, however Western thought has never consciously release African thought. Western thought did not itself recognise its own injustice, and, even worse, it did not want to recognise this injustice as an injustice. This is a strange testimonial for Western thought. Was it not this thought that brought forth the Enlightenment, the idea of human rights, equality before the law, and so much more? How could the Western thinkers fail so hard?

Western thought, as I will try to show, is infused with a permanent tacit assumption of superiority, a diffuse conviction of being the one and only thought that truly counts. It is from this assumption of superiority, entirely in accordance with Western textbook dialectics, that the idea of inferiorisation directly and necessarily emanates. When one entity is considered superior, others must be considered inferior. Anyone who thinks in this manner has good conceptual reason to make the leap from one to the other. However, it is extremely important, on the one hand, to note that we are speaking here of the conceptual and not of the phenomenal. This thought shows only that the plain and arbitrary positing of one’s own greatness simultaneously means the positing of the other, i.e. the one which is not great. We must take note of the fact that the conceptual necessity tells us virtually nothing about the phenomenon to which it is applied.

He who superiorises also inferiorises, he who superiorises that which is his own inferiorises all that is not his own, the other. And this goes further still: when someone superiorises but is not right about his own superiority, he inferiorises nevertheless, he still becomes active as one who inferiorises! He who superiorises can be mistaken, but he nevertheless brings this thought into the world.

And here comes that which I believe fundamentally characterises Western thought just as much as its rationality or logic: Western thought is contemptuous. I define contempt as a normative inferiorisation of the other because this other is not the same as oneself, not the same as that which is considered one’s own, simply because it is different.

In my view, Western thought, to this day, has not sufficiently recognised this dangerous contempt as the danger that it is! When we take a look around in contemporary contexts this danger remains real. The foreign, the other, is (re)stigmatised. Western thought is and remains dangerous. We must finally take this seriously and critically evaluate our value as a normative authority.
We Western thinkers must understand that our central task must be the desuperiorisation of our thought. Desuperiorisation is our part of the process of decolonisation and our response to globalization. The first step in this direction lies in the development of elative ethics. The term elative is used from the perspective of grammatical functionality: the elative is an absolute superlative, and not a relative superlative that expresses greatness in comparison, but rather one that refers to greatness in absolute terms. When we say, for example, that there is the most beautiful weather today, we are referring to this beauty with an absolute superlative, without needing to relate this beauty to something less beautiful: we celebrate this beauty as beauty sui generis. Comparisons are completely irrelevant here.

We must understand that it is possible to value ourselves, even to the greatest extent, without devaluing others. We Western thinkers must fight this superiorisation, we must desuperiorise ourselves. The desuperiorisation must be the West’s project that flanks the decolonisation of Africa.
The British philosopher David Wiggins has thought and written on issues of identity for over fifty years. Out of respect for this work I have decided to talk today on Wiggins’ account of personal identity. Oversimplifying, Wiggins’ general view here is that the concept *person* is similar to a natural kind concept and that persons turn out to be human beings. Moreover, unlike the case of artifacts, the identity conditions associated with natural-kind concepts are partly determined by law-like principles, including laws of characteristic development for members of the kind, in the case of *person* the laws of development for human beings. Wiggins’ applies this general view to various philosophical puzzles cases (and other philosophers’ claims about them), including brain switching, brain splitting, teletransportation, the human zygote, animal minds, and Martians.

My talk will be divided into two parts. In the first part I shall describe Wiggins’ theory in some depth, highlighting some of the central reasons he favors it over competitors. In the second part I shall focus in on a few of the more important puzzle cases and critically examine Wiggins’ treatment of them.
Interreligious Dialogue and Sustainable Development in the Context of Contemporary Education

We live in a world complicated by globalization, pressure of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), plurality of worldviews and post-secular times. As UNESCO mentioned education for sustainable development provide learning and teaching environment where “individuals are encouraged to be responsible actors who resolve challenges, respect cultural diversity and contribute to creating a more sustainable world”. Religion as an integral part of intercultural education or education in general is not disputable in this context. This mean a need to promote religious competence of students and to engage students in a critical dialogue with the participants from other religious or non-religious groups and to decide on their own religious or spiritual commitment. It will open a space for intercultural dialogue as this is defined in The White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue (Council of Europe) “an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals, groups with differed ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on mutual understanding and respect”. Only if an open dialogue between the students from the diverse religious and non-religious backgrounds occurs, students can learn to become more aware of the diversity amidst them and grow in a greater understanding of a world.

Latvia will implement the new national curriculum (NC) for primary and secondary education on 1 September 2018. NC development provided a unique opportunity to integrate religious competence and religion and religions as content in all grades for the first time in Latvia. The main task of the religious component is to provide basis for understanding religious and cultural diversity and diversity of society in general. This will help “to live together” in the community of diverse individuals who will grow with a more coherent vision and aspirations grounded in their particular worldview. This vision become a source for sustainability of social and civic developments in a society.
Ken-ichi Hara  
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Bergson’s Theory of Temporal Perception  

The relation between perceptual experience and matter can be shown as follows. On the one hand, the material world is seen as three-dimensional extension without any conscious properties. On the other hand, we have consciousness, which gives us phenomenal properties (the unity, indivisibility and qualitative heterogeneity etc). Realism and Idealism have disputed what the relation between the material world and consciousness is. Realists start from the material world, and deduce from it perceptual consciousness. They thus deny the reality of the latter. Idealists start from perceptual experience, and deduce from it the material world. By adopting this starting point, Idealists deny the certain order of material world, and cannot explain the success of the physics. 

As an alternative, Bergson affirms that “science and consciousness would then coincide in the instantaneous.” In other words, in addition to admitting consciousness’ existence, Bergson also admits a certain order of the material world. Hence, Bergson tries to construct a metaphysical system which can justify both the success of physics and the reality of consciousness. 

The aim of this presentation is to see how he tried to pursue this theory. According to Bergson, “questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than of space.” To summarize, Bergson substitutes the relation between subject and object with that of subject, object and time. He introduces temporal experience into the content of perception to reconcile Realism and Idealism. Bergson, from the very beginning, repeatedly emphasized the importance of the concept of “Duration.” At the end of this presentation, I try to show that this Bergson’s primitive philosophical intuition is effective in solving some problems in the philosophy of mind.
In this paper, I aim to introduce Scriptural Reasoning (SR) as a form of interfaith dialogue and assess its successes and limitations. SR is a practice of group reading of the scriptures of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam that aims to build sociality among its practitioners and release sources of reason, compassion, and divine spirit for healing separate communities and for repair of the world. Thus, SR theory aims at a scripturally reasoned triadic response to the problems of the world that is motivated and sustained by the healing and divine spirit of scripture. Participants in SR practice come to it as both representatives of academic institutions and particular “houses” (churches, mosques, synagogues) of worship. SR has been practiced in England, the US, Israel, and Turkey. Its successes include bringing not only academics but laity together in conversation. It is limited however to traditions where scripture is highly valued. It, however, remains a highly promising new avenue for interfaith dialogue.
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**Philosophy and Truth**

Historical statements and scientific theories meant to be such, if falsified by evidence, must cease to interest the historical and scientific communities though the researchers may be interested in finding a way to avoid the kinds of errors that caused the false beliefs. The situation involving philosophy seems drastically different. Not only is it difficult to say that one of the competing epistemological theories, rationalism, transcendental idealism, and empiricism, is true and the rest false but even the appropriateness of the question which is true rings problematic. Since epistemology determines the concept of knowledge and the norms for knowledge claims to satisfy, either it determines its own truth or there is no independent criterion of truth it can appeal to for self-verification. This paper asks: Is truth a property philosophy must have to be worthy of pursuit? If not, is truth a desideratum? Whether or not it is a desideratum, what makes philosophical activity worthy of pursuit? No uniform answer is readily forthcoming. Philosophy is a determinable idea to be further determined by a species of decision.
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The Battle at Hazor and Jael’s Deadly Hospitality

The story of the fourth judge (Judges 4 & 5) is full of surprises, just like the previous stories (Judges 1-3). In the dominant body ideology related to good order, an Israelite man without any blemish was the epitome of a pure, ideal or whole body. Contrary to the “expected literary depiction”, it is again the “unwhole, different-functioning bodies” which are depicted as “producing survival for the corporate body” (Van der Merwe & Coetzee 2009). Deborah, an Israelite lawgiver and prophetess, and Jael, a Kenite woman, are used in an unexpected way. The juxtaposition of different-functioning bodies serves as a counterculture rhetoric in the form of a hidden polemic. Much attention has been paid to the roles of Deborah and Barak in the battle against Hazor, but Jael’s role has elicited limited reflection by scholars and has been overshadowed by her “questionable” hospitality. A socio-rhetorical approach will make it possible to identify rhetorical techniques that the writer uses to highlight social relations, regulations and ideologies in the text (Van der Merwe & Coetzee 2009:678). Archaeological excavations at Hazor the last 25 years provide valuable background information to this battle.
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The Moral Responsibility of Intellectuals and Their Choice in  
the Period of Revolution: Lessons of the Russian Revolution  
of 1917

The problem of moral responsibility of Russian intellectuals for the actions pointed on overthrowing the existing Government, but also threaten the security and existence of the country, was formulated by the Russian philosophers, even before the events of the 1917. The reason for this discussion was the revolution of 1905, which ended with the defeat of the most radical forces and the political reaction. The situation after the defeat of the revolutionary intelligentsia (including the Bolsheviks) made some social thinkers and intellectuals to look at spiritual reasons that made possible such critical development of situation in the country.

In the collected papers “Vehi” (“The Milestones”), published in 1909, was given the merciless self-critical analysis of the spiritual worldview of the revolutionary Russian intelligentsia, it’s devastating impact on the foundations of folk culture and religion. Conclusions reached by the authors in many ways proved to be prophetic and accurately described the processes that led to the events of February 1917, and then to November.

Authors, noticing the overwhelming influence of Socialist ideas on the ideology of revolutionary Russian intellectuals, indicated that it was entirely uncritically taken from the West ideology. The roots of the peculiar form of Socialist ideas, which were formed in Russia in the early 20th century, could be traced in the individualist rationalism of the 18th century, as well as the philosophy of a reactionary romanticism created by the conceptual disappointment of the French Revolution’s outcome. The doctrine of Marx became the prevailing formulation of socialism in Russia. In the authors’ opinion, this doctrine lacked any philosophical and ethical justification. The conclusion was made: from the unproductive, anti-cultural nihilistic moralism, Russian intelligentsia must move to the creative religious humanism, shaping the culture.

The denial of the Russian people's religious faith as something backward, retrograde one, however, as the authors pointed out, did not lead the Bolsheviks to the necessity of the deeper development of a truly scientific knowledge. In fact, it was just a “substitution” of the religious faith by the atheistic doctrine.

The Bolsheviks, however, considered the religion and the Church as the most important ideological opponents. As A. Solzhenitsyn noted, the prophetic depth of the articles of “Vehi” found no sympathy in Russian cultural circles, nor had an influence on the development of the Russian
revolution. However, in this book, according to Solzhenitsyn, were pointed out “the ulcers of not only the last historical period, but, in many ways, nowadays situation”.

The analysis of the modern crisis indicates that the problem of moral responsibility of the intellectuals for theirs nation continues to be the relevant one even today. The scale of the global changes, that are the result of separate revolutions in some countries, is steadily increasing and cease to be national domestic issue. The lessons of the Russian revolution of 1917, are significant not only for Russia but for the whole world.
Seven Interpretations of Disjunction and Their Logical Forms

In classical logic, it is usually thought that a disjunction can refer to just two possible interpretations: it can be inclusive or exclusive. However, in this paper, based on a methodology of analysis coming from the mental models theory, and hence from the concept of iconic representation proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce, I try to show that at least five more interpretations are possible. Thus, I firstly review the different semantic possibilities sets that can correspond to a sentence expressed as a disjunction, and then, taking the truth tables of classical logic into account, I identify the logical forms that can be linked to such possibilities sets. The conclusion is, in this way, that pragmatics and semantics can cause disjunction to have seven different deep syntactic structures as a minimum.
Reform Science: Its Logic and Structure

The proper interpretation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* in modern terms has shown it to be actually the Systems Theory long sought for, *an intuitive logical program* suitable for *a systemic reorganization* of any field of modern science or any body of knowledge with a potential systemic structure, the program generating a new science – *a reform science*. Its method, *‘systemic intuition’*, is based on dialectical logic; every stage of research consisting of two phases – *an analytical speculation* about the current stage of research and *the statement of the concept* intuitively suggested by the above speculation and opening the next stage of research. Reform science is a thoroughly *theoretical* science: it cannot be developed or verified experimentally; on the other hand, it takes into account all achievements and the whole experimental base of modern science and can provide a valid explanation to every experimental fact; reform science realizes the goals that modern science has been unable to achieve. Reform science is actually its unique research; its progress being characterized by *its state* in every particular field. Reform science consists of three parts named *Medium*, *Population* and *Associations*, each with a different logic, that of *transition*, *reflection* and *evolution*, respectively. Reform science has a *structure* common for all branches of science, which allows us to introduce *a classification of concepts*, thus purifying, perfecting and organizing the whole science.

The structure of the reform science is represented by three tables of concepts corresponding to the respective parts of research. Reform science is able to sort out the existing concepts, right and generalize them, find the proper meaning to them and when necessary introduce new concepts. Application of the reform science method in the field of particle physics has resulted in the reform of that field, making it possible to solve actually all its cardinal problems, such as the existence of ether, the origin of matter, the essence of nuclear interaction, the nuclear structure of the atom, etc. Application of the same method in the field of politics has generated the framework of a new science – *the reform politics*, which makes it possible to understand the true essence of the past and the present, recommend the true solutions to national, international and global crises, elucidate the true sense of formerly unclear concepts and predict the future of civilization.

Application of the same method to economics has made it possible to complete in rough the work initiated by Karl Marx, thus creating a new science – *the reform economics*. The latter depicts the structure of the global economy as a system consisting of two *dual global centers* with different ideologies, *commercial-social and social-commercial*, as well as a *neutral center*, competing with each other and in that process streamlining production,
reducing prices and adapting to each other, thus presenting an increasingly perfect realization of the ideal market system and transforming the market economy into a global communal economy, with the commercial interests becoming increasingly social and the social interests commercial.
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The Problem with Sandra the Orangutan:
The Unfortunate Consequences of Ontological Relational Thinking

Sandra the orangutan from Buenos Aires Zoo has been granted ‘non-human person’ status along with associated rights. In a similar move, the town council of Trigueros del Valle (Spain), voted to grant cats and dogs the status of ‘non-human residents’ for the same purpose. These two incidents are prime examples of the practical consequences of recent shifts toward relational ontology (Barth, Grenz, Shults). Nowhere is this recent shift evident than in the highly critically acclaimed theological anthropology: Eccentric Existence (2009). Here the post-liberal Yale theologian David Kelsey attempts to radically challenge the classificatory and evaluative use of the term ‘person’ so as to argue that it is personal that comes before person (cf. Zizioulas). Kelsey contends that it is God who personalises human beings by personally relating to them, thereby creating persons out of non-persons. Members of the class person (classificatory force) are deemed to have unqualified dignity and respect (evaluative force). He therefore urges us to speak of “personal identities” rather than “identities of person.”

Although there are theological upshots to this move, some of the consequences are troubling. In particular, the challenge of innate personhood. In Kelsey’s construction persons are secondary creations: the result of distinctive relationships not substantive entities. As such persons may be created, and consequently, destroyed through relation. While Kelsey contends that such personalising relations are fundamentally theological, Sandra is evidence of a worrying anthropological use of such ontological relation.

This paper will explore the implications of relational ontology, particularly as it relates to Kelsey’s construction of personhood. The paper will critique personalising relationships, demonstrating both the advantages and the challenges. Ultimately, the paper will ask if any limit can be placed on ontological relations and if so, what guidelines can be used to help direct these limits.
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**Aristotle on the Separation of Forms and Numbers**

The paper deals with the concept of separation (*khōrismos*) and its criticism in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, book M. More specifically, the paper explores Aristotle’s arguments against the separation of Forms from sensible particulars, as well as his arguments against the notion of numbers existing apart from objects of sense. The main thesis of the paper is that Aristotle’s comments regarding separation (both against separation of numbers and separation of Forms) constitute a two-pronged attack on Plato’s metaphysics. On the one hand, by criticizing the separation of Forms, Aristotle tries to show that Forms, if understood as universals, cannot be the substances of particular things (for substance, according to Aristotle, is particular, not universal). On the other hand, by criticizing the separation of numbers, by denying mathematical objects a special ontological status akin to that of the Forms, Aristotle tries to show that an attempt to move from the notion of “pure” (i.e. existing separately) numbers to the notion of “pure” Forms (or substances) is misguided – since numbers, according to Aristotle, exist by abstraction (*eks aphaireseōs*) from sensible things. This means that they do not point to some otherworldly, noetic realm which could serve as a basis for postulating universal substances that exist separately from their particular instances.

It should be stressed that Aristotle, just like Plato and the Pythagoreans before him, ultimately based his specific understanding of mathematical objects on an “intuitive” notion of number (*arithmos*). According to this original understanding, number is inextricably linked with counting different sensible things and at the end stating that “there is a so-and-so number of these things”. The number Three gives the collection of counted things its numerical identity (as a collection), but at the same time it cannot be exclusively equated with this collection of things in particular. The process of counting can be repeated infinitely, each time singling out a different collection of things according to some feature common to them all.

In this sense, it becomes more clear why Plato (i.e. in the *Republic*) stressed the connection between the study of the Forms and the study of “pure” mathematical objects – if number is a non-sensible object that expresses the numerical identity of various collections of things, perhaps there are objects that could express and constitute the generic identity of things? Aristotle’s claims that Plato separated not only numbers, but also definitions and universals (in contrast to the Pythagoreans and Socrates, respectively), can be seen as connected in this specific sense. However, according to Aristotle, just like we do not posit some separate entity
“white” when we say that a man is white, so it is with numbers – *qua* objects of a science, they are investigated in abstraction from any sensible qualities, but do not exist separately from sensible particulars. So, by denying a separate being of mathematical objects and elaborating their peculiar mode of being, Aristotle at the same time denies Plato the possibility of extrapolating a separate existence of Forms from the allegedly “pure” and “separate” being of the numbers.

Before discussing Aristotle’s criticism of the concept of *khōrismos* proper, a connection needs to be established between the two before mentioned aspects of Plato’s metaphysics. The statement that there is a connection between the being of numbers and Forms (in contrast to the being of sensible particulars), and that Plato possibly attempted to move from postulating the noetic being of the former to establishing the independent, “pure” existence of the latter, is most clearly exemplified in *Republic* VII, where Plato discusses the education of the future rulers of the ideal city. Here, Plato makes the important distinction between the “pure” and “applied” mathematical sciences, and the “pure” mathematical sciences are supposed to serve as a necessary step towards investigating Forms proper (via the “science” of dialectic).

Of note here is the break with the Pythagorean notion of number as the principle of things (Aristotle constantly stresses that Pythagoreans did not separate numbers from sensible things) – in contrast to such figures as Archytas of Tarentum and Philolaus of Croton, by opening up the possibility of studying numbers separately, in their “pure” noetic existence, Plato at the same time points towards a “pure” understanding not just of the mathematical realm, but also of reality as a whole. It should also be stressed that (as shown by Jacob Klein’s study on the Greek concept of number (1968)) both Plato and the Pythagoreans ultimately based their specific understanding of mathematical objects the before mentioned “intuitive” understanding of the notion of *arithmos*, but developed it in different ways.

Regarding Aristotle’s criticism of the concept of *khōrismos*, Gail Fine (2003) has convincingly shown that throughout his critiques of the concept of separation in the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle mostly had in mind separation as *independent existence*, i.e. the claim that a Form A can exist without, independently, of A sensible particulars. Throughout *Metaphysics* M, he seems to be criticizing both the separation of Forms and the separation of mathematical objects in this sense. On the one hand, Forms cannot be the substances of things if they are universals (as Plato thought, expressing the generic identity of a group of things), since universals do not exist apart from sensible particulars. On the other hand, while Aristotle denies the separate existence of mathematical objects in a similar vein, he is also careful to distinguish the peculiar status of mathematical objects as objects of scientific inquiry. As he makes it clear in *Metaphysics*
M, the tendency to think of number as some *one* thing which unifies the things that are counted and is separate from them, is misguided – when we speak of number as some *one* thing, in actuality we are still talking about more than *one* thing: “Some things are one in contact, some by intermixture, some by position; none of which relations can belong to the units of which the 2 or 3 consists”. This argument mirrors the criticism of the separation of Forms, which states that not all things which are prior in formula (logoi) are prior in substance.
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The Ought and the Caring Teacher: A Philosophical Exercise in Praxis

Care, an often nebulous concept that has an ethical, ontological, phenomenological, epistemological, and language analysis ripple effect, is by no means a new topic to those involved in philosophy of education. In this paper the author draws on the work of five contemporary philosophers to explore the connection between teaching and care to (re)focus our understanding of why we care, the process that brings us to caring action, and how we care, to enhance normative practices of in the classroom. Using the framework developed by German philosopher Björn Freter, the author points out that, despite normative uncertainties, teachers process their concern, volition, and practice to care so that what ought to be for students can be sought. In the light her concern with the intersection of social justice concerns and education, the author engages in an exercise of praxis in an attempt to foster teaching that promotes things as they ought to be through Freter’s conceptual work regarding the “existential experience of and the existential need to exercise care.”

This theoretical exploration of caring is extrapolated into classroom practice through the vehicle of Nicholas Burbules and Susanne Rice’s concept of communicative virtues, Nel Noddings’ work on caring as a relational dialogue, and Barbara Thayer-Bacon and Bacon’s philosophical investigation into a model of caring educator. First, Burbules and Rice offer a way to consider what traits foster teacher engagement in Freter’s progression of appeal, concern, will, and action and posits that these “virtues” (“tolerance, patience, respect for differences, a willingness to listen, the inclination that one might be mistaken, the ability to reinterpret or translate one’s own concerns in a way that makes them comprehensible to others, the self-imposition of restraint in order that others may ‘have a turn’ to speak, and the disposition to express one’s self honestly and sincerely”) are something that can be acquired and practiced, an important consideration for teacher education.

Nel Noddings’ application of care to the school space is harnessed and reinforces the movement through attentiveness, listening to the expressed needs (as opposed to assumed needs) of students, and after listening and reflecting, responding. Thayer-Bacon and Bacon bring caring into sharper focus with a model of caring educators that suggests that caring can be practically enacted when the whole student is taken into account. Echoing the relational and dialogical nature of care, Thayer-Bacon and Bacon suggest teachers are accepting, trusting, receptive, approachable, welcoming, offer engaged learning, and foster supportive learning environments. They
propose that caring teachers focus on promoting classroom dialogue, student-centered pedagogy, acknowledge the fallibility of student and teacher, allow for student input into curriculum, and promote student control in the learning process. The author concludes with her own empirical fieldwork and philosophical conceptualization of personal experiences with pedagogical practices of care as an educator in primary, secondary, and tertiary educational settings.
Leibniz’s Translation of the Phaedo

In the “Discours de métaphysique,” Leibniz inserted a large passage from the Phaedo, lines 97b-99c. It is intended to support Leibniz’s criticisms of the overly materialistic philosophies of his contemporaries. The intelligence exhibited in the world requires ontological concepts, like perfection and final causes. Read in the middle of the ‘Discours’, the passage sounds Leibnizian—misleadingly so. It is, in fact, Leibniz’s translation, so it is not surprising the text seems slanted. In my presentation, I take up the philological task of analyzing Leibniz’ French with the original Greek, which, to my knowledge, has not been done. It is illuminating in a few ways. First, it clarifies how Leibniz interpreted Plato with respect to his contemporaries (why does Leibniz cite Plato as a corrective, for example?). Second, it offers another avenue for interpreting the ‘Discours’—an excessively dense and concise text. And, third, Plato’s dialogue challenges Leibniz’s metaphysics during this time, which become apparent in the tension between the original Greek and Leibniz’ translation.
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The Freemasons and the Roman Catholic Church in the 18th Century: the Beginning of a Conflicting Relationship Marked by Misunderstandings, Conspiracy Theories and Campaigns of Defamation

“…Condemnatio Societatis, seu conventicularum vulgo De liberi muratori, aut Des franc masons, sub poena excommunicationis ipso facto incurrenda, eius absolutione, excepto mortis articulo, summon Pontifici reservata …” With these words Pope Clement XII condemned the Freemason in the papal bull “In eminenti apostolatus specula” of 28th April 1738. He threatened anyone belonging to this association with excommunication regardless of their social ranking. Despite this the freemasons enjoyed a large increase of their numbers through enlightened thinkers, including even the clergy. 21 years after the foundation of the Great Lodge in London in 1717 and the declared beliefs to the “Old Charges”, formulated by Andersson, the misunderstandings had become insurmountable. From the very beginning the Freemasons were challenged with conspiracy theories and defamation campaigns. Direct, ubiquitous attacks, hundreds died after painful questioning by the Inquisition. Tolerance and human understanding – above all the latter concept- should have had some meaning in the Christian conscience, and a society which set its goals towards attaining these concepts should surely be spiritually supported. Did not Christian charity mean love one’s neighbour, whether friend or foe, to forgive one another and to support one another in times of difficulty?

Freemasonry was never conceived as a religion. It never stood to oppose the Christian community, on the contrary the Freemason alliance obliged all its members to attend church regularly; as for example, written down in the Draskovich Observance, a freemason document from the second half of the 18th century in Croatia. However the point about its secretiveness caused an uproar and opposition and led to huge suspicions about them. In the following 250 years the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards the Freemasons never changed. Only in the last few years after the Lichtenauer Manifesto has the wall began to crumble.
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Understanding Euthanasia in the Context of Capital Crimes: Unusual, but not Cruel

Understanding euthanasia in the context of capital crimes necessitates the need to rewrite the rules of punishment. *Lex talionis* posits that incapacitation removes the criminal from society and puts an end to criminal behavior. Incapacitation, be it jail term or capital punishment are good examples to demonstrate how the state is determined to put an end to criminal behavior. People find themselves incarcerated or handed death sentences when the state realizes that they cannot succeed in stopping criminal behavior. If the object of capital punishment or life-imprisonment is to put an end to criminal behavior, then incarceration concurrent with euthanasia gives the criminal the option to choose death by choice (euthanasia) than accept penalty by death (capital punishment). However since euthanasia cannot be considered as a punishment, we must first replace capital punishment with life-imprisonment concurrent with euthanasia. Life-imprisonment concurrent with euthanasia gives the criminal the option to exit life if to exist is solitary confinement is unbearable. Incapacitation, not retribution should be the basis of the state to remove and stop criminal behavior. Current laws related to the laws of punishment (*lex talionis*) stipulates that only the state can administer criminal punishment. However, *lex talionis* also states that punishment cannot be cruel or involve torture.

This paper posits both capital punishment and life-imprisonment as cruel options, in that one involves physical torture, and the other involves mental torture. Incarceration must include the option to end the criminal’s life if life-imprisonment is unbearable. Many argue that the ‘right to die’ is a ‘human right’ (Minelli, 2007). It is necessary to rewrite the rules of punishment and look at the possibility of allowing the criminal to chastise himself or herself. This suggestion would make sense when it comes to capital punishment or life imprisonment. No one should ‘be killed’ if they want to live or ‘be forced to live’ if they want to die. Euthanasia is an unusual option but not a cruel choice.
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Religious Conflict and Possibility of Dialogue:  
An Indian Philosophical Perspective

Religion primarily announces equal essence of mankind and strives to bring social harmony. However, in the long history of human civilization, the term religion is not consistently associated with peace, harmony and understanding. From ancient period to the recent times one can witness numbers of conflicts and violence in the name of religion. Such instances of conflict contradict the core philosophy of religion. A true religion is essentially humanistic in approach. Religion has its relevance for the human race not merely in principles, but in practice.

Diversity of religion is a natural aspect of civilization and promoting peace and harmony is essential aspect of religion. The concept of harmony in diversity is found in the Vedas – the earliest authoritative texts of Indian philosophy. The famous Vedic quote “ekam sat vipra bahudha vadanti” implies that truth is one and sages call it by various names. The same philosophy has been echoed in many different religious traditions of India.

In the age old tradition of Indian philosophy, it is believed that concord alone is the correct way and attitude. The present time demands the necessity to go into the core beliefs and practices of religion with a rational and analytical approach.

The present paper attempts to examine the elements responsible for disharmony and conflicts, and discuss the inherent possibility of interfaith dialogue from the Indian philosophical perspective.
Problem of Meaning in India and Western Criticism

Indian and western criticisms are two entirely different streams of thought originating from widely different sources and hardly touching upon each other’s periphery. The basic premises of Indian and western criticisms are different and this apart there is a difference in their culture and mode of thinking. Despite this there are certain issues on which they seem to have reached an understanding or have developed identical opinions problem of meaning in one such issue on which they are closely associated. there is striking similarity between Ananda Vardhana theory of Dhvani, Kuntaka’s theory of vakrokti, Kshemendra’s theory of auchitya and Richard’s theory of dichotomy of meaning, Emson’s theory of ambiguity, and American now critics life Allen Tette’s theory of tension, Ranson’s theory of structure texture, Cleanth Brook’s theory of paradox, and Blackmurr’s theory of language as gesture.

All of them appeared to have pioneered the same propositions some way on the other. A cursory glance over the critical theories propounded by India rhetoricians of the past reveals that they paid utmost need to the language and style of poetry. This is what Epsom does in seven types of Ambiguity. His way of analyzing poems and exploring the nuances of meaning is reminiscent of critical method of Anandavardhana and Kuntaka. What Kuntaka has tried to establish with the propositions like Bhangi Bhaniti (curved expression) and Baniti Vaichitrya (Strifingness of meaning) is closely allied to Empson’s views on ambiguity which he calls interaction of diversity of meaning. I.A.Richards too is one of his letters has agreed to have studied Ananda vardhana’s Davnyaloka and its commentary by Abhinavagupta.

I.A. Richards in his seminal treaties principal of literary criticism has discussed the function of meaning i.e, emotion meaning and scientific meaning which he further elaborated his epoch making words speculative Instruments and The philosophy of Rhetoria, whereas the former is used in the realm of poetry the latter is strictly confined to intellectual discourse. Prof Richards had to suffer stiff opposition from his diehard opponents, the Chicago school of critics like R.S.Crane, Elder Alson, H.R.Keast and Bernard Winsberg who rule of the possibility of any watertight compartment like emotive and scientific meaning and reposal faith in continuity of meaning.
Anandavardhana has also discussed these categories of meaning i.e., Abidha (bald on apparent meaning) lakshana (metaphorical meaning) and Vyanjana (suggestive meaning or pratiyamana).

The Sentence gangaram Ghosha can be interpreted in three different ways: the literal and apparent meaning speaks of a house inside the river Ganges whereas the metaphorical meaning suggests them the house is erected by side of river Ganges. The suggestive meaning on the contrary implies that since the house is erected near the Ganges purity must be intact to it. Although the word pure is nowhere visible in the sentence emerges out of the suggestive meaning which he calls by implication Dhvnyartha.

Epson too emphasizes that a word is impregnated with multiple shades of meaning which depend upon its content and purport. Allan Tate too rules that there is a tension between the word which is placed before and after a word which gives final shape to its meaning. The inclination of the Indian critics towards linguistic triparny in poetry speak in Volumes of their Commitment to explore the possibility of plurality of meaning which brings them to the equal footing of modern western critics.
Social Darwinism and Eugenics: An Analysis from Feminism

This presentation firstly seeks to explore the main debates on women and the female condition underlying the philosophical, medical and political speeches related to social Darwinism and eugenics. To do that, I review some of the dominant acceptance and rejection discourses present in Mediterranean countries of Europe and their reception in Latin America from the late nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century. Secondly, I analyze the possible philosophical –epistemological and ethical-connections that open the discussion and controversy in a broader sense, that is, within the political culture linked to the construction of citizenship and social progress, which is considered as something referring to civilizing models of the local elite that, in short, seek exclusion and extermination of otherness.
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Spirits Speaking Female: Luce Irigaray and Theravadin Buddhist Women

Tensions around Buddhist Feminism remain because Asian Buddhist women often lack a voice in the conversation. Efforts to create a space for female leadership, especially in Theravadin communities, are sometimes cast as another form of Western colonialism. Despite these roadblocks, Buddhist women have successfully used spirit possession as a means to gain agency. Although this tactic does not fit well with the goal of liberal feminists who aim at gaining equality through the reinstitution of Buddhist nuns, I suggest that Luce Irigaray’s approach allows us to understand how Buddhist women successfully use mimesis to challenge patriarchy. In this paper, I will explore multiple ways Theravadin women play with female stereotypes and use them to challenge matrimonial hierarchy, patriarchy within Buddhism, and narratives of cultural imperialism.