Abstract Book:
12\textsuperscript{th} Annual International Conference on Philosophy
22-25 May 2017, Athens, Greece

Edited by
Gregory T. Papanikos
Abstracts
12th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
22-25 May 2017, Athens, Greece

Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos
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Preface

This book includes the abstracts of all the papers presented at the 12th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 22-25 May 2017, organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER). In total 46 papers were submitted by over 50 presenters, coming from 25 different countries (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, UK, and USA). The conference was organized into 19 sessions that included a variety of topic areas such as ethics, metaphysics, political philosophy, existentialism, and more. A full conference program can be found beginning on the next page. In accordance with ATINER’s Publication Policy, the papers presented during this conference will be considered for inclusion in one of ATINER’s many publications.

The purpose of this abstract book is to provide members of ATINER and other academics around the world with a resource through which to discover colleagues and additional research relevant to their own work. This purpose is in congruence with the overall mission of the institute. ATINER was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet to exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study.

It is our hope that through ATINER’s conferences and publications, Athens will become a place where academics and researchers from all over the world regularly meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 400 international conferences and has published nearly 200 books. Academically, the institute is organized into seven research divisions and 38 research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

For each of these events, the involvement of multiple parties is crucial. I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committees, and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference and its subsequent publications together.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
# FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM

**12th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 22-25 May 2017**  
Athens, Greece

**Conference Venue:** The Stanley Hotel, 1 Odiseos Street, Karaiskaki Square,  
Athens, Greece

## PROGRAM

### Conference Venue:
The Stanley Hotel, 1 Odiseos Street, Karaiskaki Square, Athens, Greece

### Monday 22 May 2017

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<td>Registration and Refreshments</td>
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<td>09:00-09:30</td>
<td>Welcome and Opening Address</td>
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<td>09:30-11:00</td>
<td>Session I (Room C-Mezzanine Floor): Epistemology</td>
<td>Session II (Room D-3rd Floor): Philosophy of Religion</td>
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<td>Chair: Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER &amp; Professor, University of Utah, USA.</td>
<td>Chair: William O’Meara, Academic Member, ATINER &amp; Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University, USA.</td>
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1. Marianne Vardalos, Professor, Laurentian University, Canada. Orthotourism: Toward a Philosophical Theory of New Tourism Practice and Neoliberal Doxa. (Monday, morning session)
2. *Atli Hardarson, Associate Professor, University of Iceland, Iceland. Why Realists and Idealists should be Equally Willing to Accept Constructivism.*
3. Robert Koszkaló, Assistant Professor, University of Gdańsk, Poland. Some Recent Discussions of Deontic Internalism.

2. Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Burman University, Canada. The Essence of God and the Identity of God as God.

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<td>Chair: <em>Lin Ma, Associate Professor, Renmin University of China, China.</em></td>
<td>Chair: <em>Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA.</em></td>
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1. Charles Bolyard, Professor, James Madison University, USA. *Hexis* and *Haecceitas*: John Duns Scotus and the Stoics on Unity and Individuation.
2. Martyna Koszkaló, Assistant Professor, University of Gdańsk, Poland. Free Will, Grace and God. The Problem of Predestination of Human Being according to John Duns Scotus.

1. Simon Glynn, Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA. From a Deconstruction of Ethical Foundations to a Non-Foundational Ethics.
2. Tonci Kacic, Assistant Professor, University of Split, Croatia. Designer Babies Project as Possible New Racism.
3. Prasasti Pandit, Assistant Professor, West Bengal Higher Education Department, India. On the Principle of Beneficence: A Comparative Analysis on its Three Fundamental Views.
12:30-14:00 Session V (Room C-Mezzanine Floor): Existentialism

Chair: *Atli Hardarson, Associate Professor, University of Iceland, Iceland.
1. *Lin Ma, Associate Professor, Renmin University of China, China. Heidegger’s Auseinandersetzung with Hegel on Negativity.
2. *Steven Burik, Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University, Singapore. Darkness East and West: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism.
3. *Giuseppe (Joseph) Naimo, Senior Lecturer, University of Notre Dame Australia, Australia. Expression: The Manifestation and Articulation of Being.

12:30-14:00 Session VI (Room D-3rd Floor): Metaphysics I

Chair: Simon Glynn, Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA.
1. Richard Grandy, Professor, Rice University, USA. Emergence by Recursion.
2. Mohamed Almisbkawy, Assistant Professor, British University in Egypt / Fayoum University, Egypt. The Role of Metaphor in Axiomatic System.

14:00-15:00 Lunch

15:00-16:30 Session VII (Room C-Mezzanine Floor): Ancient I

Chair: *Giuseppe (Joseph) Naimo, Senior Lecturer, University of Notre Dame Australia, Australia.
1. Joel Wilcox, Professor, Barry University, USA. Natural Law Theory as Second-Order Voluntarism: Why Religion is not the Basis of Morality.
2. Xiaoping Luo, Assistant Researcher, Peking University, China. Community Governance in Urban China: A One-man Show, a Two-man Actor Symphony?

15:00-16:30 Session VIII (Room D-3rd Floor): Ethics II

Chair: Sandra Fairbanks, Professor, Barry University, USA.
2. *William O’Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA. Marx and the Hypothetical Moral Imperative.
3. *Chin-Tai Kim, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA. Wonder as the Experiential Origin of Philosophy.

16:30-18:30 Session IX (Room C-Mezzanine Floor): A Symposium on Ethics, Economics and Environment

Chair: Panagiotis Petratos, Professor, Department of Computer Information Systems, California State University, Stanislaus, USA.
1. Patricia Hanna, Professor and Interim Chair of Linguistics, University of Utah, USA. Neither Love nor Money: What could save the Environment?
2. Frans P. de Vries, Professor, University of Stirling, U.K. Ethics and Environmental Markets.
3. Timothy M. Young, Professor and Graduate Director, Department of Forestry, Wildlife and Fisheries, Center for Renewable Carbon, The University of Tennessee, USA. Protecting Ethics, Economies, and the Environment in the Era of the Digital Citizen and Exponential Population Growth.
4. Nicolas Abatzoglou, Professor, Department of Chemical & Biotechnological Engineering, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada, Chair Pfizer, PAT in Pharmaceutical Engineering, Director GREEN-TPV and GRTP-C & P. Produce Fuels from Renewable Resources.

For details on the discussion please click here.
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<td>Chair: *Bjorn Freter, Independent Schola, Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Adam Grobler, Professor, University of Opole, Poland. Two Concepts of Knowledge: Towards Unification.</td>
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<td>2. Sonja Weiss, Assistant Professor, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. The Martyrdom that Wasn't: Impassivity of Body and Soul in Hrotswith of Gandersheim.</td>
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<td>Session XI (Room B-Ground Floor): An Educational Urban Walk in Modern and Ancient Athens</td>
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<td>Chair: Gregory Katsas, Vice President of Academic Affairs, ATINER &amp; Associate Professor, The American College of Greece-Deree College, Greece.</td>
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<td>Group Discussion on Ancient and Modern Athens. Visit to the Most Important Historical and Cultural Monuments of the City (be prepared to walk and talk as in the ancient peripatetic school of Aristotle)</td>
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<td>1. Gines Santiago Marco Perles, Dean, Faculty of Philosophy, Catholic University of Valencia, Spain. Loyalty in Political Decisions and Their Crossroads.</td>
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<td>2. Sandra Fairbanks, Professor, Barry University, USA. Challenges to Liberal Democracy.</td>
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<td>11:30-13:00</td>
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<td>Chair: Joel Wilcox, Professor, Barry University, USA.</td>
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<td>1. William O'Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA. A Natural Ethics of Gratitude.</td>
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<td>2. *Luc Bulundwe Lévy, PhD Student, University of Geneva, Switzerland. Ethics and Pseudepigraphy – “Do the Ends Always Justify the Means?”</td>
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<td>Chair: Charles Bolyard, Professor, James Madison University, USA.</td>
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<td>2. *Maria Magoula Adams, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA. Aristotle on Eudaimonia.</td>
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<td>Chair: Yvette Prinsloo Franklin, Instructor, Cultural Studies of Education Program, University of Tennessee Knoxville, USA.</td>
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<td>1. Manuel Amado, Professor, Free University of Colombia, Colombia. The Concept of Education and the Problem of Indoctrination in the Analytical Tradition.</td>
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1. *Carmen Cozma, Professor, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi, Romania.
   - Teaching Moral Philosophy and Learning Some about ‘Ethical Love’ as a Strength in Education for the 21st Century.
2. Yvette Prinsloo Franklin, Instructor, Cultural Studies of Education Program, University of Tennessee Knoxville, USA.
   - Homeschooling: Philosophical Considerations.

1. *Audrey Anton, Assistant Professor, Western Kentucky University, USA.
   - Willing, Unwilling, and Binding Addiction.
   - Human Technological Improvement and non-Therapeutic Body Modifications: An Analysis from Transhumanism.
3. *Fernando Salgueiro Passos Telles, Researcher, National School of Public Health, Brazil & Cassius Schnell Palhano Silva, Researcher, National School of Public Health, Brazil.
   - The Evolution of Human Brain as Justification for Kant’s Natural End Hypothesis.

1. Abduljaleel Alwali, Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, United Arab Emirates University, UAE.
   - Learning Philosophy in the 21st Century. (PHITCH)
2. Cahit Aslan, Associate Professor, Cukurova University, Turkey.
   - Experiences and Approaches of Teachers in Philosophy Teaching in Turkey. (PHITCH)
3. Nikolaj Demjancuk, Associate Professor, University of West Bohemia, Czech Republic.
   - Teaching Philosophy for Students of Technology. (PHITCH)

1. Anna Kawalec, Professor, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland.
   - Agency of Breath – Action and Motion in the Anthropology of Ritual. (PHIRIT)
2. Pawel Kawalec, Professor, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland.
   - Routines in Science as Basic Ontological Units. (PHIRIT)
Maria Magoula Adams
Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA

Aristotle on Eudaimonia

There are two interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of *eudaimonia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: the dominant and the inclusive. According to the dominant view, Aristotle sees *eudaimonia* as a dominant end, which consists of a single good, theoretical activity. The proponents of this view base their arguments on certain passages in the first and tenth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. According to the dominant view all these passages present an intellectualist account of *eudaimonia*. The main difficulty of this view consists in accounting for the role practical virtues play in the best life. On the inclusivist view, the highest human good, *eudaimonia*, is an inclusive end composed of a number of other intrinsic goods, which one should pursue in life. Both of these views have a difficulty reconciling the notion of *eudaimonia* given in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the rest of the work. So many proponents of both views believe that there is an inconsistency between X 7-8 and the preceding material.

In this paper, I shall try to show that Aristotle is consistent throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*. That is to say, Aristotle’s notion of *eudaimonia* in Book X is not different from the one he employs in Book I and the rest of the work. I shall also argue for an inclusivist interpretation of *eudaimonia*. Unlike most inclusivists, I think that the inconsistency between Books I and X is just apparent. One way of showing this is by focusing on the choice-worthiness condition and the *ergon* argument in Book I. I shall argue that both strongly suggest an inclusive account of *eudaimonia*. The choice-worthiness condition shows that Aristotle’s notion of *eudaimonia* does not refer to a single type of activity such as theoretical activity, but it is a composite of number of goods, which are desirable for themselves. Likewise with the *ergon* argument. If one takes the *ergon* of human beings to be a life or activity of the soul in accordance with reason (*kata logon*) and virtue (*kat' areten*)—meaning a life in accordance with virtue under the guidance of reason—then the highest good is the one that promotes this kind of life.

Seen in this light then, *eudaimonia* consists of a life guided by reason in a way that reflects virtue. A life in order to be guided by reason and express virtue must include both theoretical and practical virtues. According to this interpretation *eudaimonia* is exemplified in theoretical activity, but it includes all other goods (that a person is capable of pursuing), which are ends in themselves (such as the moral virtues the exercise of which is the end of political science). I shall discuss next
Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtues (sophia and phronesis) in Book VI and argue that it also suggests an inclusive account of eudaimonia. Finally, I shall return to Book X and try to show that the discussion of eudaimonia there is not inconsistent with what Aristotle says in Book I and in the rest of the work. If I am right, then the two accounts of eudaimonia in Books I and X can be reconciled and they are not as incompatible as they first appear to be.
Mohamed Almisbkawy
Assistant Professor, British University in Egypt/Fayoum University, Egypt

The Role of Metaphor in Axiomatic System

The Leibnitz dream of universal artificial language aimed in principle to break with natural language, in terms of its ambiguity and metaphorical nature. Such dream has inspired many generations of mathematicians and logicians which leads eventually to construct the Axiomatic system. We aim in this paper to discuss three points:

1. To what extent the mechanical inference rules within the axiomatic, as Similization apparatus, could break with a metaphor, in its wide meaning, as meaning generator and interpreter device, in natural language.
2. To what extent the Gödel's proof of incompleteness shows that the metaphor, which plays a major role in natural and literal language, and plays an implicitly essential rule in metaphysics, as Derrida claimed, could emerge formally within Axiomatic Systems.
3. The impact of the above mentioned points on the future of logic and mathematics.
Abduljaleel Alwali  
Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, United Arab Emirates University, UAE

Learning Philosophy in the 21st Century

What do students expect to learn from philosophy teachers in the 21st century?  
I will attempt to answer this question by framing it as follows:

- Based on my teaching philosophy of 33 years in many different universities around the world  
- Based on a survey I will conduct of my UAEU students whom I am currently teaching philosophy

Traditionally, I have taught theoretical philosophy. The idea was that students would not use the philosophy but get knowledge rather than skills. Students needed to know who are the philosophers and what is their philosophy. However, today high school students rarely come to know about philosophy but only after they enter university. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Al-Farabi, John Dewey are attractive names for a past generation of students to know about and appreciate their philosophy.

Why do the students at the past focus on just to get knowledge?  
In the past, there were limited sources to obtain information about philosophy and philosophers. The classes were the main sources to get information and there was a lack of access to information. Historically, there were very few local channels, limited hard copies of newspapers and magazines were also not available for all students; whereas, the classes were expected to be rich sources of information for students. Educated people were also evaluated by their knowledge rather than their skills and philosophy was one of the litmus tests for this. Today, however, the internet has become a dream for students while the smart phone and T.V satellite have added to this plethora of information hubs.

Nowadays, skills have become a new phenomenon and the main goal of learning philosophy is primarily focused on acquiring skills such as critical thinking, creativity, collaboration and problem-solving.

Today, the student of philosophy reads, discusses, and critically examines problems and issues in the field of philosophy and of the cross-disciplinary aspects of philosophy.

This is because today students not only need to know what philosophy really is but also and more importantly students are expected to use philosophy as a handbook of life learning skills. For example, a
business student may study aspects of philosophy in terms of practical application to managing a group of people or a corporation or may study philosophy with a perspective on implementing ethics in the workplace.

To achieve this new direction, we need to consider how to teach philosophy so as to increase the role of digital technology in all philosophy courses and disciplines.

In this paper, I will discuss the changing role and purpose of philosophy in the academy, the current pedagogical concerns described, and the results of the student survey.
Manuel Amado
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The Concept of Education and the Problem of Indoctrination in the Analytical Tradition

In the mid-20th century, thanks to philosophers such as Charles Hardie, Richard Peters and John Wilson, the movement known as Analytic Philosophy of Education emerged. This movement focused on the analysis of the word “education” and the usefulness of such analysis for deciding some fundamental questions in the philosophy of education like how to determine whether a person is well-educated, how to evaluate the legitimacy of presumed educational practices, and what ought to be learned or taught.

The objectives of this paper are: 1) to characterize one of the most influential approaches to the meaning of “education” in the analytic tradition: the conception of education as initiation to a form of life, proposed by Richard Peters. 2) To explain the distinction between education and indoctrination implied by Peters’ conception. Finally, 3) to suggest some solutions to the classic problems this conception faces.

Peters’ analysis has two classic problems: I) the concept of education is dependent on the social context; thus, any general conception of education will be incorrect or, at least, only applicable to a significantly narrowed context. In either case, Peters’ analysis will be unable to account for the fundamental questions in the philosophy of education. II) If Peters’ analysis is true, there is a commitment with the idea that education involves forms of indoctrination in a pejorative sense. Therefore, the concept of education cannot be a (normative) positive concept and cannot be opposed to indoctrination, contrary to the intuitive way in which education is usually conceived.

It will be held that Peters’ analysis is not susceptible to the problems I)-II). First, it will be shown that there is no reason to think that Peters’ analysis is only applicable to a narrow context. Later, it will be argued that Peters’ conception of education does not involve indoctrination in a pejorative sense.
Audrey Anton  
Assistant Professor, Western Kentucky University, USA

Willing, Unwilling, and Binding Addiction

With the advent of Harry Frankfurt’s notion of the willing addict, scholars began to reconsider the roles of control and volition in free action. In this paper, I consider conditions for free action in light of an additional addict: the willingly dry addict. The willingly dry addict is one who has a history of unwilling addiction but has her addiction under control. Given that the willingly dry addict has the will that she wants, she is free exactly in the same way as Frankfurt’s willing addict. However, the method by which she becomes free requires avoiding certain actions she might take while in an intermediary state of irrational and unfree behavior, which she accomplishes through self-manipulation via external influences. I argue that attention to the moral psychology of this addict illuminates why getting what one wants with a minimal causal connection between choice and goal acquisition is sufficient for free action. Given that it is more rational to anticipate irrational moments and manipulate oneself into surviving them than it is to insist that this time will be different, I contend that direct control over behavior is not required for free and rational behavior.
Cahit Aslan  
Associate Professor, Cukurova University, Turkey

Experiences and Approaches of Philosophy Teachers in Turkey

Introduction: That teaching philosophy in Turkey has been fundamentally affected by both historical and cyclical sociopolitical problems is a fact. At the same time, the method used and proficiency of teachers also influence students' attitude towards teaching philosophy.

Aim of the study: The purpose of this study is to investigate the methods used by high school philosophy teachers and the teachers' experiences regarding philosophy teaching. Thus, the problems of teaching philosophy and will be identified and solutions for these problems will be discussed.

Data source and method: the population of this study is high school philosophy teachers in Turkey. Data will be collected through snowball sampling technique using an online questionnaire.

Findings: The results will be obtained based on multivariable analysis.

Results: Results are in the form of problem identification based on findings and solution suggestions.
Charles Bolyard  
Professor, James Madison University, USA

Hexis and Haecceitas: John Duns Scotus and the Stoics on Unity and Individuation

Unity and individuation are central aspects of any coherent philosophical account of material individuals. A principle of unity gives a metaphysically complex entity the necessary coherence to be considered as one item in a strong sense, and a principle of individuation sets that metaphysically complex item apart from all other items. In this paper, I explain John Duns Scotus’s attempts to deal with these issues, and use the less well documented Stoic account of hexis (“tenor”) as a helpful foil by which to understand Scotus’s view.

In his Ordinatio II, d. 3, part 1, qq. 1-6, John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) spends a considerable amount of time arguing against other medieval accounts of individuation, many of which involve the claim that individuating principles are material items. For Scotus, it is what came to be called a haecceitas or “thisness”—a metaphysically simple item—that provides the individuating principle for material things; it individuates what he calls a “common nature”, or to use his terminology, a “real, less-than-numerical unity”, by “contracting” it to an individual item. After examining some of Scotus’s main arguments, I turn to the earlier Stoic notion of hexis or “tenor”, as discussed in such commentators as Plutarch, Simplicius, and Philo of Alexandria. Hexis has possible suitability as a material principle of both unity and individuation, one that meets some of the challenges Scotus raises in his later critique of other medieval accounts, while simultaneously giving a novel explanation of material unity. As I will argue, the dual unifying and individuating roles of the hexis gives it some metaphysical advantages over a Scotistic haecceity, insofar as the latter requires a separate unifying principle, over and above the haecceity itself. If reducing the metaphysical complexity of a material individual is a desideratum, then having one dual-purposed principle seems preferable to having two distinct principles: one meant to unify, and the other meant to individuate.
Abstract Book

Barbara Botter
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No-Existing Beings: Phantasmata in Plato’s Sophists

One of the debated topics about Plato’s Sophist is the distinction between original and image, more precisely, the difference among the original, the true and the false image.

It’s to justify this classification that Plato addresses to the demonstration of not-being and presents, right from the beginning of the Dialogue Sophists, the dualism ‘reality-appearance’.

The aim of the present paper is creating a relationship between the concepts of not-being and appearance, as they are presented in the Sophist, to legitimize the existence of beings that are, although they are not real nor true, the phantasmata.

The term phantasma (φάντασμα) is connected to the verbs phainomai and phantazo. The first verb refers to the appearances, while the second is used to describe the poetic deception and sophistry. In general, the term signifies "what presents itself to observation", but its technical sense is "pretense". In Plato’s Sophists, phantasma has the sense of “misleading appearance” (CENTRONE B., Platone, Sofista. Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento. Torino: Einaudi 2008, p. 91 n63).

The characteristic of phantasma is to appear true without being true and to appear real without to be real (PALUMBO L., Il non essere e l’apparenza. Napoli: Loffredo 1998 and Mimesis. Napoli: Loffredo 2013: 269-279). To determine the ontological status of phantasma Plato first determines the existence of not-being as different (theteron, θάτερον) from being, which looks like (eikos ἐοικός) to being, but is not: it is false (pseudē, ψευδῆ) and puzzling.

These sorts of beings are different from the other kind of image, because they are essentially misleading.
Luc Bulundwe Lévy  
PhD Student, University of Geneva, Switzerland

Ethics and Pseudepigraphy:  
Do the Ends Always Justify the Means?

Popular wisdom recognise, as Machiavelli once said that: «for although the act condemn the doer, the end may justify him». According to Machiavelli’s statement, something wrong per se, can be justified in a specific context: the end. In the New Testament, pseudepigraphical letters – such as 2 Tim or 2 Pet – attest this statement, fictitiously using the apostles’ identities in order to reinterpret their work, thus creating a tradition in a new context. While doing so, despite the fact that they give hope to the first Christian communities after the death of the apostles, they apparently infringe the modern notion of plagiarism. In other words, the authors of pseudonymous epistles have the prerogative to be heralds of God’s Word but they seem to mislead their readers as to their true origin. Based on this observation, how can we explain the use of pseudonymity in the New Testament? The historical context offers a specific field of analysis in this respect. Pseudepigraphical literature appears right after the death of the apostles, in the time opened with the delay of the Parousia. In this specific literature, ethical concepts such as righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) and piety (εὐσέβεια) flourish. They are the sign of a chaotic situation, which needs not only a conversion (μετάνοια), but also rules and clear indications to organise a new era in which the hope of Christ’s return is no longer perceived as imminent. The pseudonymity is then a feature of the transition from charismatic religion to institutional religion. Hence, we aim to demonstrate that the objective of the post-apostolic literature is to create values of early Christian communities after the apostles’ death. Our purpose will be to demonstrate that the period of turmoil of the first communities were a sufficiently destabilizing situation that supported and shaped the use of pseudepigraphical literature in the New Testament.
Steve Burik
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Darkness East and West:
Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism

The light metaphor has always been a favourite for philosophers, both in the East and West. This paper seeks to revaluate the opposite, darkness. I will argue that there are good reasons to favour darkness over light, or at least to not see them as mutually incompatible or in hierarchical fashion. In recent Western philosophy, both Heidegger and Derrida have contemplated and questioned the light metaphor in an effort to show its omnipresence in Western metaphysics. Heidegger’s famous ‘clearing’ is a light in darkness, and his favourite metaphor was therefore the star. Derrida’s ‘White Mythology’ exposes the importance of the light metaphor in maintaining the dualist hierarchical structures present in Western metaphysics. Both argue, in different ways, that what the light metaphor represents is what is objectionable in the history of Western thought. Philosophically, it seems that whenever there is something incomprehensible, something dark, we need to ‘shed light’ on it, and it is this tendency to ‘present’ or make present that has obscured the unwarranted assumptions and the direction of Western metaphysics. In classical Chinese philosophy, we find in Daoism a kind of thinking that seems to not favour the light metaphor. Daoists refer to the dark learning, the dark understanding, the xuanxue. Daoists seem to have the good sense to acknowledge darkness as that limit beyond which thinking should not venture, so they think darkness as a positive contribution to human life at the very least on par with light. I argue that this kind of Western criticism of the light metaphor, and the Daoist different approach to light and darkness, are conducive for a more comprehensive understanding of human knowing in a global context.
Teaching Moral Philosophy and Learning Some about ‘Ethical Love’ as a Strength in Education for the 21st Century

In a larger perspective of a ‘philosophy of love’ we are interested about the ethical orchestration of the concept of ‘love’ and its significant role in education, especially in the context of the “fourth industrial revolution” coming, among incontestable benefits, with serious risks, too - e.g. the potential to ‘robotize’ humanity because the rise of cyber-dependency. It is the appropriate frame to studying Ethics - in its integrator meaning originated in the Ancient Greek ἡθικός / ethicos, respectively ἠθος / ethos –, as Moral Philosophy in the University, mainly in the Departments of Philosophy, by aiming to challenge students to know and comprehend, to interpret and continuously question about the concept of ethical love; no less, to accommodate learning and adopting it as a fundamental issue to reflect upon and to find means to making it alive, to put it in act as a strength in education.

The paper focuses on the attempt to highlight some aspects as regards the meaning of the above mentioned concept, and to examine it on the ground of reference sources as Plato’s Lysis and the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. Starting from these readings and discussing them in the courses and seminars of Ethics/Moral Philosophy, the concept of ethical love doesn’t merely become one of interest but it can effectively enter in our life as a real articulation of personal development both of students and professors; and, consequently, it can be increasingly assumed not only inside the walls of the University but also out, radiating within the community as a master virtue, moral and social alike. Now more than ever, having to deal with a general climate of multilevel crisis – from the economic to the refugee crisis, with serious concerns for environment, social justice, democracy, international security, etc. – we must be aware of the spiritual human potential, to protect and cultivate it; for which the ethical love could be(come) the central force and framework.
Nikolaj Demjancuk
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Teaching Philosophy for Students of Technology

Teaching of philosophy for students of technical faculties is possible to carry out from different positions. We will talk about our experience of teaching of philosophy for non-philosopher at the university of Western Bohemia from 1993 to present time. Courses of philosophy are optional. It was therefore necessary to offer such set of courses that will meet the specific needs and interests of most students.

At the beginning it were general (history and systematic philosophy) and special courses (ethics, philosophy and scientific methodology, philosophy of technology, philosophy and theory of creativity in technology, religion and technology in cultural contexts, nature and technology).

Experience of a few years conducted to reduction of our suggestion, as some courses were written down by less than ten students. Our suggestion narrowed therefore. Presently we offer introduction to philosophy, philosophy of technology, theory of technological creativity, philosophy of religion (religion and technology in cultural history), ethics and technology.

On the example of two courses we will show, what problems we devote attention in our lectures and seminars. Teaching methods and its choice are a continuous creative process. In our presentation we will present a few problems, and their changes in the teaching of the course of philosophy and history of technology.

Now we will introduce one example: technology and culture. The history of the interactions between technology and culture raises the question of why some technological and scientific traditions are better than others in relation to nature. Philosophical reflection of the history of technology allows us to define the role of the social and cultural conditions that enable science and technology to flourish, but also defines the boundaries of creativity in technology.
Dimitrios Dentsoras  
Assistant Professor, University of Manitoba, Canada

Stoics, Skeptics, and the Naturalistic Fallacy

The essay examines the question of whether, and in what way, the Stoics committed what is commonly referred to as the “naturalistic fallacy.” Moral naturalism is a theory that can be assigned to practically all ancient philosophical schools and, for the most part, it seems to go unchallenged. Skeptical attacks by Academics and Pyrrhonians seem to be the only possible exception, and the Stoics were the most responsive to such criticism. Correspondingly, the essay’s primary focus will be on Stoicism and on Sextus Empiricus’ skeptical attacks against it. It begins with a discussion of the arguments Sextus launches against the Stoic account of the good in Against the Ethicists and Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I provide a reading of the arguments that hint at the naturalistic fallacy and examine how Sextus uses the fallacy to promote his skeptical account of the good. I then offer a possible reply, on behalf of the Stoics, that focuses on the distinction between analytical definitions of “the good” or “goodness” and descriptions of the things that are good, such as virtue. Following, I look at how the Stoics connected the two, by examining some important aspects of their theory of moral development, which leads (or should lead) to the proper conception of the good. I close with a discussion of problematic passages where the Stoics seem to blatantly commit the naturalistic fallacy, ending with some remarks about the Stoic version of moral naturalism.
Ivan Faiferri  
Independent Researcher, Italy  
&  
Elisa Ravasio  
Independent Researcher, Italy

In the Labyrinth of the Dialogue

Both *Euthydemus* and *Republic* share the common topic of the *technē basilikê*, the correct government of the city which also allows people to be happy.

In *Euthydemus*, the kingly craft does not appear as the central theme of discussion, but it is the object of one of the final sections of the dialogue: in the end, the content of this art is not found by Clinias and Socrates, and both found themselves «involved in a labyrinth» (291b).

The discussion, however, allowed Socrates to deal with the concepts of “politics” (*politeia*) and “wisdom” (*sophia*), both depicted as guidelines for men’s correct/right behaviour and action (*tou orthôs prattein*): even in this case, no criteria are suggested to define them, so no decision is made about what the aim of politics is and what are the contents of the wisdom of the ruler to improve city and the citizens’ lives.

The virtue of justice described in the *Republic* helps to specify these void of content issues, because of its coordinating role both in the *polis* and in the human soul. Justice is the virtue which organizes the actions of the three classes portrayed and it regulates men’s soul in order to make them happy.

Rulers in the *Republic* are also philosophers: so, defining justice as the criterion by which a city could be governed, Plato gives us the opportunity to understand what is the kind of *technē* the *Euthydemus* was searching for: philosophy which could make a person able to control his soul parts. Moreover, just philosophers can govern the city in a law-abiding way.

Reading the *Republic* and pinpointing the regulating role of justice, Plato finds the left-behind task of politics in the *Euthydemus*, seeing as how Clinias and Socrates describe the ability to govern as the correct rule of the city which makes people happy.

A methodological analysis of these two dialogues shows they must not be read individually, in order to find the correct content of the political craft. They must be considered as a whole, because Platonic discussions examine the same problems from several, different points of view: so, who reads them can reach a more suitable solution of the questions.
Thus, we can conclude maintaining that the main characteristic of Plato’s philosophy is to goad and to encourage the reader to deal with each question from several points of view. Human ethical, political, daily inquiries must be lead by different perspectives to have a more complex and thorough comprehension of life and reality.
Sandra Fairbanks
Professor, Barry University, USA

Challenges to Liberal Democracy

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama dramatically announced the end of history with the triumph of Western liberal democracy as the final stage in the ideological evolution of human political thought. He argued that liberal democracy is the final form of government because there are no viable alternatives to this ideal, and because it has resolved all prior contradictions in political and economic life. The liberal state that emerges at the end of history is a universal homogeneous state where there is no conflict over large issues, and the only significant activity is economic in nature. Fukuyama recognizes that the victory of liberal democracy is an ideological one, in that the truths of liberalism are settled and cannot be improved upon, and yet in many parts of the world liberal democracy is not a reality. However, the incomplete realization of liberal democracy in the world apparently does not refute his claim since, he alleges, the material world will eventually catch up with the realm of ideas.

The end-of-history thesis has generated much controversy within the context of economic globalization and the rise of illiberal democracies in countries such as Argentina, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Romania and Bangladesh. Fareed Zakaria questions the assumption that democracy necessarily spawns liberalism. Other philosophers, including Benjamin Barber, Robert Kaplan, William Boyer and David Rothkopf question whether or not globalized capitalism, the economic expression of liberalism, actually fosters democracy. These philosophers imply that liberal democracy is not the end of history because some other form of social and political organization is evolving that is more compatible with globalization.

This paper explores a different criticism of the end-of-history thesis. As noted earlier, Fukuyama claims that liberal democracy resolves all contradictions. So, the end-of-history thesis is refuted if there are inherent contradictions that are left unresolved within liberal democracy. This paper will argue that there are three such contradictions within liberal democracy that involve: 1) economic class division; 2) the erosion of liberty in a system that champions liberty; and 3) the destruction of nature which undermines prospects for human flourishing.
The Philosophy of "The Dark Side of the Moon" by Pink Floyd: The Teaching of Philosophical Contents, From the Study of a Progressive Rock's Masterpiece

Despite being taken secularly as a sophisticated exercise of scholarship, Philosophy, since its emergence, requires an attitude of perplexity and amazement, that both can manifest through doubts and certainties, as in the form of a discontentment with the established order, that approaches more commonly attributed to the behavior of young people: the rebellion. This may explain why one of the accusations made against the Greek philosopher Socrates has been that he corrupted young people, to encourage them to philosophical debate, rather than accept obediently the impositions of adults. Similarly, the teaching of Philosophy for young people can encounter obstacles, today, when only reproduces the thinking of classical philosophers, without promoting contextualization that can provide students with the timeliness and relevance of philosophical themes. Therefore, this paper presents a work developed at first in class, whose intention was to convey philosophical knowledge present in art and music, more specifically, on the album “The Dark Side of the Moon” (1973), of the english band Pink Floyd.

Is there any relationship between the album “The Dark Side of the Moon” and Philosophy? That is the question which this paper proposes. The texts that gave rise to the project were developed over several years, from 2003 to the present days (2016), during the Philosophy classes for high school students. More than ready to find answers and conclusions, the project sought to present the ideas developed in the way they were worked in the classroom. The themes: life, death, knowledge, ethics, time, madness, money, are studied in the work of many authors such as Plato, Augustine, Kant, Sartre, Foucault, and others, from its relationship with the lyrics of the songs on the album, such as Speak to Me, Breathe, Time, Money, Us and Them, Brain Damage, among others. Even the members of Pink Floyd acknowledged that the album "The Dark Side of the Moon" is an “expression of political, philosophical and humanitarian empathy that was desperate to get out” (Fernandes, 2009).

Therefore, the intention was to approach the high school students of Philosophy from a reality that is nearest – the Rock music – in a more affordable way, but no less rigorous. In conclusion, we infer that the project presented satisfactory results, in that it enabled a fertile dialogue
between Philosophy and the Progressive Rock, allowing students the opportunity to take an interest in Philosophy, from his interest for the Rock music, on the other side, it enabled a more elaborate view of the content of songs that, for many, are just fun and entertainment.
Tolerance, Seriousness and Faith: An Existential-Formal Approach to Tolerance

Facticity, in our terminology, is not to be understood as objective reality, reality as it truly is – whatever that may be – but rather as that which we consider to be reality; that which we – either implicitly or explicitly – assume to be the case. Facticity is thus not purely an ontological or epistemological term, but also a hermeneutic term: facticity deals with reality as a construction, as something that is considered to be real. Existentiality, however, is to be understood as the positing of reality. Existential practice deals with realisation, with the positing of existential facts. In the frame of facticity, we augment reality with existential facts and create, in the midst of factuality, a quasi-factuality, that is: the existentiality. The creation of the existentiality as quasi-facticity means at the same time narrowing the existential range as initially set by the facticity. If it can be shown that we are able to proto-ethically bring existential facts into being, if we are able to demonstrate existentiality as a fundamental pattern in man’s grasp of his existence, if we are able to demonstrate existentiality itself as a kind of transcendental form, the possibility will thus be opened to assume, by referring to the formal identity of all existentiality, the normative equivalence of various world views. While the existential practices may differ in concreto from one another, and may indeed be expressly declared incompatible in terms of their content, every individual person nevertheless retains the possibility of honouring the dignity of the other’s grasp of human existence without betraying their own existentiality.

I am able to recognise the formal identity of another’s existentiality to my own despite material differences. This recognition is to be defined as tolerance, accepting the other in his or her formal existentiality. We are thus also able to define intolerance as well: an intolerant attitude is one that formally places one’s own existentiality above that of another, not accepting the formally identical existentiality of the other. An evaluation of one’s own existentiality as materially superior, however, is not to be considered as intolerance. We are thus able to make good use of the term tolerance in the context of inter-religious conflict: the Christian, for example, who believes in the Bible, is not therefore intolerant of the Koran. While he does not materially recognise the Islamic grasp of existence, he is nevertheless able to recognise the formal grasp of existence as such, which is formally identical to his own grasp of existence. This means: the
Christian can take the Muslim seriously, and vice versa, without betraying his own religious identity. Of particular significance in religious existential practice is the fact that it concerns a specific grasp of existence, an understanding of reality and of oneself within reality through faith. We suspect that faith, however, is to be defined as a specific form of love: To believe in a religious sense means to love, to recognise an ought-to-be and to make it an ought-to-do. And he who does this, even though we perhaps cannot agree with the object of his love, can nevertheless be recognised as my equal simply through this love which is formally identical to my own.

This is certainly a criterion that is difficult to apply to day-to-day questions of religious tolerance, but we suspect that inter-religious dialogue could at least benefit anthropologically, so to speak, from this idea. It seems to us that this dialogue is continually hindered by material differences. But these differences allow virtually no room for discussion, since the individual religious communities are involved in countless internal disputes over so many issues, for example the Christian interpretation of the sacrament. We thus wish to plead for a concentration on existentiality as such.
Simon Glynn
Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA

From a Deconstruction of Ethical Foundations to a Non-Foundational Ethics

My contention, against traditional claims, is that so far from ethics being grounded in a transcendental source, or even in one simply external to the existentially “lived” relationships to which it is applied, ethics is already implicit in these relationships. Thus in the first part of the paper, I examine, and refute the claims that Religion, Conscience, Faith, Intuition, Reason, Empirical Experience etc., can provide a foundation for Ethics. In the second part I proceed to argue that Empathy – which so far from being a merely subjective feeling, is derived precisely from our relations to others (from which subjectivity itself is derivè or emerges) to which it applies – is, when qualified by critical reflection, central to all truly ethical ways of relating.
The concept of emergence is rather clearly defined for a philosophical concept. A property of an object (or a relation between objects) is emergent just in case it depends only on the properties of the parts but is not reducible to those properties. The focus of interest is the alleged emergence of the mental from the physical—the fascinating and very hard case.

This problem will only be solved, in my view, when we understand that there are many intermediate levels of emergent properties and relations. Until we work that out, I suggest a simpler case, which provides a relatively clear example of the relation between physical objects and their atomic and subatomic constituents. What is novel in my suggestion is that we should understand the relation as explicited as a recursive definition. Logic and mathematics offer us examples of properties of sets or numbers or strings that are determined by the properties of their parts but not explicitly definable in those terms.
Two Concepts of Knowledge: Towards Unification

There is a tension between JTB and JTB+ analyses of knowledge and the concept of scientific knowledge which is not strictly true and does not reside in someone’s beliefs. It is indicated that someone’s knowledge, similarly as scientific statements, depends on idealizations and ceteris paribus clause. A uniform account of knowledge is approached. Firstly, it is argued that the truth condition is to be replaced with that of non-falsity in the sense of logic of presuppositions. This move involves telling apart knowledge, its presuppositions, and applications. Secondly, scientific knowledge is construed as potentially testimonial knowledge. Thirdly, the concept of (the degree of) justification of a proposition is linked to that of the scope of applicability of a system the proposition in question is a part of. The analysis employs the concepts erotetic logic. In conclusion, knowledge and justification appear relative to a context determined with the repertoire of problems, background knowledge and its presuppositions.
Atli Hardarson  
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Why Realists and Idealists should be Equally Willing to Accept Constructivism

A number of publications on the methodology of the social sciences (e.g. Creswell, 2013; Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba, 2011) set forth and discuss statements to the effect that:

- Qualitative research requires not only thoroughgoing ontological but also epistemological constructivism.
- Ontological and epistemological constructivism join together as one philosophical outlook that is opposed to realism and in favour of idealism or subjectivism.

Although these two views seem to be widely accepted by qualitative researchers, they are subject to criticism and doubt in some recent books (e.g. Pernecky, 2016; Maxwell, 2012; Searle, 2010). In my paper I use the following definitions:

- Ontological constructivism about a type of entities is the view that such entities exist and are what they are because of what people think or say.
- Epistemological constructivism is the view that our knowledge is composed of concepts, statements, models, and theories that are the way they are because of how people think or what they say.

As “constructivism” is used to designate a great variety of metaphysical and epistemological views, I do not claim that my arguments apply to all philosophical stances described by this term. Granted my two definitions, however:

- There are good reasons to accept both ontological constructivism about social reality (i.e. entities, phenomena, and relations such as money, borders, marriage and driving licences) and epistemological constructivism about scientific theories.
- Ontological and epistemological constructivism are two different theories independent of each other, and we have equally cogent reasons for accepting them whether we are in favour of realism or in favour of idealism.
Finally, the reasons I expound apply to social reality and research regardless of whether we use qualitative methods or quantitative.
Anna Kawalec
Professor, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland

Agency of Breath –
Action and Motion in the Anthropology of Ritual

The presentation will be on the origins of the cosmic and existential dimensions of the ritual in the perspective of anthropology of Karol Wojtyla and Alfred Gell.
Routines in Science as Basic Ontological Units

I introduce the notion of scientific routine in the sense of T. Williamson’s “first-knowledge epistemology” as a broad condition. Its internal aspect is related to representation (theories, laws, explanatory models etc.), while the external one is related to the institutional dimension of the research practice (including the stages of informal social activities). I illustrate this notion with historical survey using a contrasting model of generative vs productive knowledge creation mechanisms in various modern and more recent scientific practices and institutions.
Chin-Tai Kim  
Professor, Case Western Reserve University, USA

**Wonder as the Experiential Origin of Philosophy**

The view that the onset of an awareness of the contingency of all beings and the permeation of all life with suffering originates a quest for salvific practice, or the view that fear of God is the beginning of wisdom does not press us to question how the originating experience explains the process that subsequently unfolds. But the view of Aristotle that philosophy begins in wonder makes us ask what the object of wonder is, what it is to wonder, what type of thinking is prefigured in the experience of wonder. If we take Aristotle’s statement as an interpretation of the nature of philosophy he practices and the legacy he has inherited and appropriates, we should ask how the structural, thematic, theoretical and methodological diversity of philosophy can, if at all, be explained in reference to the same origin. This paper addresses the motive and rationale for a genealogy of philosophy, its promises and its dangers. Philosophy, it will be argued, is not a uniform enterprise but a family of activities having partial affinities and differences, shaped, more than some philosophers would willingly acknowledge, by different sets of historical and cultural circumstances, with different stresses and orientations.
Designer Babies Project as Possible New Racism

This paper claims that human gene editing in embryos selected to be born could be trigger for social stratification based on financial power of their creator or client, forming a new kind of injustice social hierarchy, precisely racism. Moreover, designer baby project could led to emergence of a new biological species within the genus Homo.

In February, British scientists from the The Francis Crick Institute have been granted permission from the HFEA (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority) to genetically modify human embryos for the sake of better understanding of the crucial process of embryo development and possible causes of infertility, miscarriage and some genetic diseases. Also, this can advantage our understanding the genes that are needed for the development of healthy embryo. Opponents to this authorization does not deny possible good from this experiments, but do worry this experiments technologically open doors to designer babies and psychologically prepare society for the era of new social classes of genetically superior and inferior, maybe even disintegration of species within the genus Homo, as Habermas warned in The Future of Human Nature. This experiments challenge a variety of problems: technical, biological, evolutionary, social and in particular ethical – is there and where legitimate limits of genetic intervention.

Leaving aside other problems, this texts made investigation on suspicion of possible new kind racism based on genes, more specifically on genetic editing humankind babies. This new kind of racism could put humans in hierarchical scale relatively to possession of favourable traits and predestined members of social 'castes' based on their genetic traits. This point break down general presumption of individual achievement as measurement of person value, substitute it by amount of money spent in creating and buying a promising genetic equipment (as Gattaca film show). Similarity between ranking of superior and inferior man based on editing genes of embryos and racists evaluating physical features of people into hierarchical type are transformed in sameness.

Furthermore, by this way humanity brake Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative to treat humanity in every person never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.

It seems that the background theory of designer babies include metaphysical assumptions which reduce the right of existence to embryos with selected certain physical, mental, esthetical, health or gender
features. Genes engineering, based on wish of prospect parents to provide their offspring better position in life competencies and society, could lead to disparity between new class of genetically superior man and others with at best, average features, namely – inferior. The new type of social stratification and discrimination may arise in an almost completely collapse of civilization by free or out of hand genetically designed babies: for example, is it not hard to imagine aftermath of the same sex babies flood.
Free Will, Grace, and God: The Problem of Predestination of Human Beings according to John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus discusses the problem of predestination of human beings in the following works: Ordinatio I, d. 40, 41, Lectura I, d. 40, 41 and in the Reportatio IA, d. 39-40, 41.

There are three thesis that can be distinguished in his theory of predestination.

(1) Scotus tries to reconcile the immutability of divine knowledge and freedom of created persons by applying the concept of synchronic contingency, which allows to justify that the knowledge of God is certain and unchanging, but contingent, and thus events (including the acts of will of created persons) are unnecessary and free. This allows Scotus to avoid fatalism.

(2) Redemption is the matter of grace, and thus is a matter of God's will, and His free choice. It is not the consequence of merits of the created persons. On contrary, the condemnation is related to the reasons - God, when He condemns a person, he takes into account the sins and bad use of someone’s free will. Scotus tries thereby to reconcile both God's justice and His mercy. Against the views of St. Augustine, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, Scotus' own position is moderate. In terms of predestination, Thomas Aquinas' position is most voluntaristic while Henry’s of Ghent is least.

(3) Scotus solves the most difficult problem of the impact of grace on the someone’s freedom and choice by using the categories “velle” / “non-velle” / “nolle”. God is non-willing (non-velle) the grace for the sinner but this act does not make the condemned person remain an ultimate sinner. This way, the “non-velle” act does not determine the condemned person to sin.

The research on which this presentation is based has been supported by National Science Centre, Poland, grant: The Philosophical Discussion of the Problem of Determinism from St. Augustine to Alvin Plantinga. Human Freedom and Theistic Hypothesis (2014/15/B/HS1/00406).
Some Recent Discussions of Deontic Internalism

R. Lockie in *Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty* discusses - inspired by L. BonJour and W. Alston - the epistemic poverty objection to the deontological conception of epistemic justification. His arguments were broadly examined by Sh. Elqayam, N. Nottelmann, R. Peels and H. Vahid. In my paper I will discuss some of the points in the discussion and consider how Alston’s arguments contained in *Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation* should affect Lockie’s deontic internalism.
Not Three Gods but One: Why Reductionism Doesn’t Serve our Theological Discourse

The triune nature of God is one of the most complex doctrines of Christianity, and its complexity is further compounded when one considers the incarnation. However, many of the difficulties and paradoxes associated with our idea of the divine arise from our adherence to reductionist ontology. I will argue that in order to move our theological discourse forward, in respect to divine and human nature, a holistic interpretation of our profession of faith is necessary. The challenge of a holistic interpretation is that it questions our ability to make any statement about the genuine, ontological individuation of persons (both divine and human), and in doing so raises the issue of whether we are, ontologically, bound to descend into a form of pan(en)theism. In order to address the “inevitable” slide into pan(en)theism I will examine the impact of two forms of holistic interpretation, Boolean and Non-Boolean, on our concept of personhood. Whilst a Boolean interpretation allows for a greater understanding of the relational nature of the Trinity, it is the Non-Boolean interpretation that has greater ontological significance. A Non-Boolean ontology, grounded in our scientific understanding of the nature of the world, shows our quest for individuation rests not in ontological fact but in epistemic need, and that it is our limited epistemology that drives our need to divide that which is ontologically indivisible. Whilst this ontological shift may be necessary, it raises questions about how divine-human relations are to be understood, and I conclude by examining some possible solutions.
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Interfaith Dialogue in the Modern World: Problems and Prospects

Interfaith relations have always played a significant role in the history of civilizations. Religious motives could act as either uniting or destructive factors in shaping cross-cultural relationships. In the context of globalization and intensification of information interfaith dialogue now becomes more and more relevant and is disclosed in the new supplementary aspects, caused by the significant shifts in public opinion that occurred at the turn of the century.

In Western Christian theology, there has been a trend towards the strengthening of theological orthodoxy, as the opposition to the increasing secularization of a globalizing society. This new movement is non-denominational in nature and is characterized by appeal to Patristic, Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and departure from the Protestant theology of the twentieth century (“Radical Orthodoxy” in England, “New Theology” in France). The similar processes, though less pronounced, also can be viewed both in Islam and in Buddhism. This process has been accompanied by the growing of sectarianism and tension in interfaith relations.

In general, the society is interested in preserving the basic cultural and religious traditions while updating them in interpreting theology, which would maintain social stability, also preserving the cultural and religious identity. The increasing secularization of society, treated by the representatives of the religious community as perhaps the biggest threat, in fact, in the face of multi-confessions and globalization, is less destructive factor for religion. As it was in the Middle Ages modern theology cannot claim to totality, ignoring the other sources of knowledge, particularly scientific ones, playing the role of legislator. Changes in theology are inevitable and their quality will determine the viability of the denominations in the 21st century. New theologians must demonstrate flexibility and a high level of human culture beyond the narrow ethnicity and even confessional frameworks.
As the experience of modern Western theology, the heritage of classics could be completely combined with the modern philosophy and could tolerate a wide range of interpretations, while preserving the doctrinal foundations. As another required condition of the reformation in theology in any denomination becomes the interfaith dialogue. The ability of such a dialogue is an important indicator of the viability of this denomination in a changing world.

The subjects of interfaith dialogue could be not only the representatives of the clergy and theologians, but also the ordinary believers and any persons interested in the discussing issues of interfaith relations. It could be assumed that the peacekeeping, fighting with disease, poverty, drug addiction and other social problems of the modern society could be a field of activity where the representatives of different denominations should interact.

Another field of such interaction should be the joining of efforts to discuss the spiritual foundations of modern civilized society. Of course, the call for interfaith "unity" should not be understood as a desire to link in a whole any doctrinal and liturgical foundations, which, of course, is impossible. But it could and should be unified in understanding the unity of cultural conditions of the spiritual life. This process could not be achieved without coordinated positions of the representatives of all denominations. And this aspect should be the one of the main tasks of interfaith dialogue at the present situation.
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The Meaning of Life: The Major Philosophical Aspects Hidden Behind a Fundamental Question of Human Existence

The question about the meaning of life is one of the most crucial questions that the human mind is able to produce. The way we respond to it determines the way we design and arrange our life and our culture. Leaving this topic to religious authorities for instance results in an irrational approach, but philosophical scholars are not addressing it sufficiently.

So, what exactly do we mean when we talk about the meaning of life? Behind this expression is hiding a set of very diverse philosophical ideas. Analytic philosophy is the tool to bring the hidden philosophical issues to the surface, clarify their content and study the conceptual compatibility between each other. This approach results in a clearer understanding of what ‘the meaning of life’ stands for.

My reflection starts off with 5 categories in which all historical philosophically relevant answers to the meaningfulness of our existence can be inserted. From those overall conceptions can be extracted the material, i.e. the hidden philosophical ideas, that allows us to construct a relevant semantic network which brings a great deal of clarification and the possibility to find more precise common grounds for discussion about this highly abstract question. A conceptual and linguistic analysis is applied to a number of concepts and issues contained in this semantic network such as the moralistic fallacy, the eudaimonistic issue, the concept of ‘meaning’ itself etc.

The results of this analysis are used to produce a personal outlook on the validity claim of former and future theories about the meaning of life. My paper concludes that the question about life's meaning should not only be placed in a non-religious, non-teleological and intersubjective narrative for normative purposes, but gains a large amount of clarity by doing so.
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Community Governance in Urban China:
A One-Man Show, a Two-Man Actor Symphony?

Over the past three decades since the Reform and Opening Policy in China, there has been much more confusion and debate challenging the approach that the urbanization acceleration took on tackling the new community life across China. Coupled with this debate, questioning an alternative style of community governance was discussed. Under this background this paper provides an empirical discussion on the emerging new forms of community governance in big cities.

Some confusion arises from the fact that empowerment at this level has three related but distinct dimensions:

1) Nation and community governance – A one-man show? Community was ruled by local government, including representation, voice and advocacy, deliberation, and execution.

2) Local NGO service of government purchase -- A Two-man Act? Government is a driving force behind the public service and the social organization is the babysitter in the front including joined-up administration and citizen involvement.

3) The Self-rule of civic life. It is a Symphony. All the residents joined together to deal with their own public affairs, local association, mutuality, community infrastructure and organization.

This paper draws on our research and experience in different modes with areas around in Chinese big cities like Beijing, Guangzhou and Hangzhou, presenting focused recommendations for how neighbourhood governance can help to underpin the wider system of country's management in future.
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Heidegger’s *Auseinandersetzung* with Hegel on Negativity

In this article, I explore Heidegger’s discussion and criticism of Hegel concerning the notion of negativity on the basis of a reading of Heidegger’s “Die Negativität. Ein Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel aus dem Ansatz der Negativität” written around the 1940’s. According to Heidegger, in Hegel’s idealistic system, negativity provides the moving force for the absolute idea to accomplish itself. However, Hegel has neither inquired about negativity itself, nor traced the origin of negativity. In employing a Davidsonian principle of charity and with reference to Heidegger’s other writings around the time of the focused text, I construct a more or less consistent discourse about an originary negativity that accords with Heidegger’s thinking. The origin of negativity refers to the opening up of the abysmal Lichtung. That negativity is originary entails the idea that Seyn is without ground. It is precisely this groundlessness that constitutes the essence of Seyn.
Religion and Life Conduct: Some Affinities between Max Weber and Greek Skepticism

This article is intended to carry out a comparison between the ideas of Max Weber and Greek skeptics about the foundations of religious beliefs and their relationship to human behavior. The aim is to show that there are some significant similarities between these postulations of thought so far away in time from each other and inserted in so different intellectual contexts. On the one hand, it will be showed that the problem of the relationship between faith and reason occupied a prominent place in both the history of skepticism and in the work of Weber. Greek skeptics questioned the possibility of a rational inquiry to achieve a secure knowledge of the divine, showing, as a rule, how the acceptance of a "religious truth" to some extent requires submitting one's reasoning to unprovable beliefs. The same concern with the conflict between the grounds of religious ideas and the purely rational knowledge is present in Weber, revealing in this respect, a line of continuity between his outlook and the one traditionally associated with skepticism.

On the other hand, the purpose of living in accordance with phenomena led Greek skeptics to a kind of practical accommodation to traditional religious rituals and to the recognition of religion's influence on conduct, as a supplier of ethical standards, regardless of the unsustainability of their ultimate statements when submitted to rigorous rational criticism. In this, one can see another affinity with Max Weber once one of his greatest contributions in the field of religious studies was precisely his emphasis on the concept of religious ethics, which allowed him to study the role of religious beliefs in the conduct of practical life. The analysis of the original sources will demonstrate that, apart from the specific intellectual problems in which Weber and Greek skeptics were involved, there are, at least, two common features in their reflections: the recognition of the impossibility of faith resting upon any rational evidence and the emphasis on practical effects of belief.
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Loyalty in Political Decisions and Their Crossroads

This paper pretends to analyze the role of loyalty in political decisions: first, drawing an attempt to define the concept of "loyalty" to join the many references that are extracted from the literature; secondly, revealing the scope and limits of the concept of loyalty; thirdly, entering the dilemma of whether we are referring to loyalty as a first principle or, rather, it is an ultimate goal of any relationship between political actors and citizens; and, fourthly, providing a set of guidelines for political leaders in order to understand the actual place of loyalty in political action. At all times is assumed as an axiom that loyalty is an intangible asset that underlies the essence of political communication and the subsequent processes of communication between political actors and citizens.

The reason for this choice lies in the need to find solid basis, which only the Moral and Political Philosophy can provide, and which become urgent in times like the present, characterized by pragmatism and utilitarianism, in which is not important the objective of communicative actions of a political nature but only to the consequences thereof, translatables into profit, maintenance or decrease of the number of votes, the only thing that is taken into consideration; definitely; increasing, conservation or loss of power.

The methodology developed in this research is identified with critical hermeneutics, involving interpretation and understanding of factual circumstances, which consequences go beyond its initial protagonists.

The results obtained in this research intend to answer the following questions: Are we able to define a comprehensive framework of loyalty? How can we strengthen loyalty to political messages? And how political actors can become creditors of loyalty?
Expression: The Manifestation and Articulation of Being

The concept and associated concepts embodied by the term ‘expression’ do an extraordinary amount of work in terms of linguistic scope, given the manifold uses. Seemingly there is an endless range of ways the term is employed across many fields of enquiry. One might say metaphorically that life is expression, the realisation of otherwise potential inexistence. This metaphoric use discloses something much more fundamental however. A summary of general dictionary definitions depict the term ‘expression’ as an ‘action making known one’s inner thoughts and feelings’. By extension one’s facial countenance biophysically conveys an expression as such. Additionally, the physical nature of the concept of expression finds its most prominent root within science by the process involved in the quantification of all units of measure, irrespective of which unit of measure, all, as such, are reducible to five or a combination of these five expressions: length, temperature, charge, mass, and time. Examining the physical dimensions furthermore, to include the genetic appearance of a phenotype characteristic or effect attributed to the expression of a particular gene (predisposed), illustrates a potential state, its actualisation rendered through the process of gene expression transforming an otherwise potential state into an actual state. In this paper I argue that expression is so fundamental that phenomenologically it is disclosed as the process of actualisation. If that is the case, then all life and all art are forms of expression. So what is the ontology of expression?
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Marx and the Hypothetical Moral Imperative

Whereas Kant offers his categorical imperative as an unconditional command based on abstract reason apart from any concept of human nature and its needs, Marx offers his fundamental moral imperative as a conditional command based on his concept of human nature and its needs. Human nature evolved the abilities of rationality and freedom through the development of labor, social relationships, and language. However, human nature comprises not only these capacities of rationality and freedom but also the need to develop those capacities. For at the dawn of human evolution for Marx, consciousness and freedom are quite limited by nature and social others since consciousness appears here as instinctive consciousness or herd consciousness. The need to develop consciousness and freedom arises dialectically as human labor, language, and social relationships become more complex.

In our time, the laboring and social relationships of capitalism do not by themselves give us the task of freeing ourselves from their domination. We give ourselves that hypothetical moral imperative by interpreting capitalism from the viewpoint of the needs of the proletariat for the development of rationality and freedom in and through labor and social relationships. When we dedicate ourselves whether individually or as members of a revolutionary group to fulfill these needs, then we give to ourselves the moral vocation and task of living in accord with the fundamental moral imperative that the freedom of each is the condition for the free development of all by looking upon ourselves as members of the universal society of persons whose rationality and freedom need to develop in mutually enhancing ways through labor and social relationships.

My paper will explore Carol Gould’s affirmation that the self-realization of self and community in mutually enhancing ways involves the moral concept of justice in which all individuals have an equal right to self-realization as positive freedom. In mutually enhancing relationships, individuals not only respect each other as ends in themselves but also positively recognize and respect each other’s concrete projects for developing rationality and freedom. Such mutuality involves assisting each other to fulfill their human needs.

Finally, my paper will discuss how Stojanovich’s or Aronovitch’s grasp of the Marxian concept of human nature and its potentials affects Gould’s interpretation of Marx.
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A Natural Ethics of Gratitude

Cicero has affirmed that gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues but the parent of them all. Following Cicero, this paper will explore how we can find gratitude at the center of the virtues of faith, hope and love.

The theologian, Richard McBrien, has identified three models of ethics that have influenced Christian ethics, the teleological model of Aristotle, the deontological model of Kant, and the personalism model of Catholic moral theology through most of the 20th and 21st century. We will follow McBrien in exploring the personalism model and also use his point that recent moral theologians have gone beyond the traditional distinction between the theological virtues of faith, hope and love by which we relate to God and the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and fortitude by which we relate to humanity. Some theologians have adopted a distinction between general virtues, such as faith, hope and love, applicable in all our moral life and special virtues, such as a good sense of humor, applicable only in some aspects of our life.

When we are born, we do not have any general or specific virtues well developed that form our character, but we learn good actions and consequent good habits primarily, Aristotle points out, from others. This paper argues that we develop our general virtues of faith, hope and love through a three step process:

Faith
A Grace from Others: Others first teach me to believe in my own self-worth, most especially in the power of my own understanding of the world and others and in the efficacy of my own will to be creative.
A Grace from Myself: As a high school student, as a college student, as a person striving for excellence in my own field of study, I choose to believe in the efficacy of my own intellect and my own creative will even when I encounter teachers who do not understand me or appreciate me.
A Grace for Others: I choose to believe in the power of the intellect of my students and in the efficacy of their own creative wills. (From deep within me, Jesus believes in others as I choose to believe in these others.)

Hope
A Grace from Others: Others first teach me to hope in my future and
our mutual future. When I do not see a future for myself, when I am all knotted-up in my own failures and my own despair, others trust in me, helping me to envision a new future and encouraging me to work for that new future.

A Grace from Myself: Even when I may have fallen into despair, even so, something deep within me may rise up and teach me to see a new future, to hope for that new vision, and to work for that.

A Grace for Others: Even though others may be trapped in profound despair or depression, I choose to believe in the power of the intellect of others and in the efficacy of their own creative wills. (From deep within me, Jesus hopes in others as I choose to hope in these others).

Love

A Grace from Others: Others first teach me to love myself and others, to affirm the dignity of self and others, and to forgive myself and others when we fail.

A Grace from Myself: Even when I fail myself and others, I can love myself, forgive myself, and start anew.

A Grace for Others: I choose to treasure others, to forgive them even though they may have injured me, and to affirm their worth as persons.

Conclusion

In deep gratitude to others (1) for their faith in the dignity of my person, (2) for their hope for the continued dignity of my person, and (3) for their love of me for my own sake, then for their gift of faith, hope, and love in my person, I can choose to live in deep gratitude with faith, hope, and love in the dignity of all persons for their own sake as the central virtue of my life.

The paper will also explore whether or not the three-fold process of (1) a grace from others, (2) a grace from myself, and (3) a grace for others can be found in the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice.
On the Principle of Beneficence: A Comparative Analysis on its Three Fundamental Views

Moral philosophy is the study of right and good. Moral philosophy plays an essential role in formulating ethical theories. This is an inquiry among rules, principles, and virtues which can be morally established. Among them the principle of beneficence is an established one. The principle of beneficence is an indispensable moral principle in many current studies such as, in economics it is a chief determinant to measure financial profits, however, here we only focus on the moral foundation of the principle of beneficence which is an expedient principle in various streams of applied ethics such as it is an important determinant in medical ethics, bioethics, public health care and business ethics. Generally the term beneficence connotes acts of mercy, kindness, and charity. Although the concept of beneficence seems same as doing charity or showing pity to others, it is far more than that. In the field of ethics the principle of beneficence evokes some normative meanings, i.e. some moral obligation to act for the others' benefit, helping them by promoting collective welfare and often by preventing or removing possible harms.

In this article, I want to critically explore the foundation of beneficence through a comparative study between three major classical ethical theories of Aristotle, Mill and Kant. While critically analyzing these three ethical theories, I confronted with some ethical quarries, such as: Whether beneficence towards other inspired by self-beneficence or self-love? And how much i.e. to what extent and which sense self-love is morally permissible? Whether the principle of beneficence can be practiced in its ideal sense? Whether beneficence can be done purely for duty purpose? On the issue of beneficence whether there are any converging points of the two confronting theories i.e. teleological and deontological. The whole purpose of this study is to confer those arising questions on the principle of beneficence from the view of its foundation.
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Human Technological Improvement and non-Therapeutic Body Modifications: An Analysis from Transhumanism

Within transhumanism and posthumanism, it analyzed the role of technology and the direct influence it has on the human condition. This is done through the category of human technological improvement (or simply: human enhancement). Lots of texts in reference to nanotechnology, genetic modifications, the brain-computer interface or uploading, to name some is done. Although "In one sense, all technology can be viewed as an enhancement of our native human capacities, enabling us to achieve certain effects that would otherwise require more effort or be all together beyond our power." (Savulescu & Bostrom, 2008, pp.2).

Despite this, rarely body-no therapeutic modifications and non-corrective cosmetic changes are taken into consideration, as they are seen as something cosmetic, superfluous or elements that do not improve humanity as a whole, but only modify individual aspects and in a relative manner, which according to the criteria of authors like Nick Bostrom, is not the purpose of human improvement.

In fact, Bostrom introduced into the philosophical debate categories relative advantages and intrinsic benefits (or net positive externalities), where the therapeutic-no body modifications are not in a broad sense, the kind of changes that will allow us reach a posthuman state or at least, transhuman. Bostrom (2003) believes that human enhancement, should be a consideration regarding the benefits obtained and what kind of improvements should be promoted by the transhumanist movement. For this purpose, we should consider the difference, "... Between enhancements that offer only positional advantages (eg. an Increase in height), which are only insofar advantages as others lack them, and enhancements that provide either intrinsic benefits or net positive externalities (Such as a better immune system or improvement of cognitive functioning). "(pp.19). In this sense the changes that truly contribute improving the human condition are those amendments which involve intrinsic benefits or net positive externalities such as abolishing the suffering of these diseases (through neuro-technology, for example), slow down the process of old age or the prolongation of life. Positional advantages (eg. non-corrective cosmetic changes) do not pose benefits rather than from an individual and subjective view. Thus only from a
comparative point of view casuistry that could be considered beneficial for someone and not generally for the human species.

Well, the purpose of this paper is to show by an analysis from the philosophy that non-corrective cosmetic changes and non-therapeutic body modifications (in a broad sense) are relevant to the improvement and human empowerment, under they open new spaces of material and symbolic interpretation for human improvement in aspects of identity, personality or individuality. Similarly, these alterations or changes generate questions to biological-normative normality from reflection sex-gender system. Including therapeutic-no body modifications pose interesting challenges to the traditional concept of health (part of a biomedical approach) because it broadens the horizon on boundary between when a treatment or procedure is considered as medical or therapeutic. However, one of the most interesting aspects is that these changes redefine or extend the statute itself improvement and human empowerment.
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Homeschooling: Philosophical Considerations

Ancient writers have said, “Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable – if anything is excellent or praiseworthy – think about such things.” Is there a case to be made for the ideal of homeschooling as a location for the cultivation of such thinking? The majority of European, South American, Middle Eastern, and African countries have either laws against homeschooling or very low numbers as compared to the homeschooling movement in North America and Australia. If one were to briefly suspend ideology and geography would one find something of enduring philosophical value that should be allowed to spread and bloom in our global societies, this new iteration of education re-localized to the home? Or is this an axiological impossibility? Can we trust families to impart individual values and a community cultural ethos? Who do children belong to? Are they members of Plato’s Republic, belonging to the collective? Or are children Rousseau’s Emile, individuals on their own journey’s of self-discovery?

Possibly children are Dewey’s community members, epistemologically experimenting and building knowledge together? Or are they members of the human species that is able to reproduce itself biologically and, if permitted, culturally through formal education. This paper seeks to reflectively consider whether philosophers have grounds to recommend homeschooling as a potential source of educational matrix that can impart what is true, noble, right, pure, lovely, admirable, excellent and praiseworthy to the next generation. The author will first consider the definition and role of home education and then consider, through the lens of a selection of major philosophies, if homeschooling has merit as an educational modality. She will also point out some of the difficulties with homeschooling and suggest a both/and approach to educational choice.
The Evolution of the Human Brain as Justification for Kant’s Natural End Hypothesis

This article aims to establish a nexus between the theories of Harry Jerison, which links the emergence of symbolic language to a kind of sensorimotor evolutionary sophistication of the human brain, and Kant, which explain the genesis of harmony between Understanding and Reason as dependent of a process developed by the Faculty of Imagination. For Jerison, with the development of the neocortex came also the symbolic language as a resource needed to a new way to organize and save the motor responses to stimuli. These are also generated by memory. Kant, in the third criticism, seeks to demonstrate the existence of harmony between the Faculties of Understanding and Reason promoted by aesthetic judgments. These allow a free agreement between Understanding and Reason, without which no determination arises, either in practical or speculative interest. Nevertheless, to the German philosopher this power of aesthetic judgment depends on the acceptance that there is a purpose in nature, which should also be justified. If biological evolution happens by nature pressures, then we can seek justification for the concept of Kant’s Natural End in Jerison’s thesis.
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The Essence of God and the Identity of God as God

What people believe about God does not establish any specificity that would identify God as God. Yet without identification we cannot identify God as God, should God show up. Apriority, analyticity and necessity of God cannot establish identity. If what we know about God cannot identify God as God, then we can only establish what apriority, analyticity and necessity establishes regarding the essence of God without any identification. Everything that exists, exists with specificity or better, nothing exists without specificity or identity (Kripke). If God exists, God too exists with identity, but we do not have any clue of what that identity is or might be. Without any clue as to what the identity of God might be, we can only put emphasis on why we choose to believe in God and not what we believe about God. In this paper an attempt is made to show that if all the arguments for God cannot establish any identity for God—then the search for empirical proof amounts to nothing. If what we believe about God cannot provide identity then we must extrapolate the essence of God from why we choose to believe in God. If the sacred texts cannot provide any visible traits that can identify God for the believers; if Pascal’s wager for ‘what we stand to gain’ by believing in God, cannot identify God for the wagers; if Calvin’s sensus devinitatis cannot not give believers any specifics that can identity God as God; if Descartes logical necessity, Swinburne’s factual necessity and Plantinga’s metaphysical necessity of God cannot establish any identifiable essence, then the essence of God derived from apriority, analyticity and necessity simply impinges on the relevance of the questions (Leibniz) that purports such beliefs. The significance of this research is to point out that if identification of God is not a given then we cannot be fundamental or dogmatic about the essence of God. Here Epicurus advice becomes relevant, when he argues “an impious person is not one who rejects the beliefs of many but attaches to gods the beliefs of many.”
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Orthotourism: Toward a Philosophical Theory of New Tourism Practice and Neoliberal Doxa

This original study advances an analytic and philosophical theory of orthotourism, which unifies production and consumption into a single field of domination within which the tourist subject is configured. The theory of orthotourism has been developed at a level of theoretical abstraction that attempts to explain the emergence of the majority of new tourism practices within the context of changing modes of cultural domination. The theory is intended to provide a sense of understanding of the ideology, goal, objectives, discourses, and the role of the agent associated with the industry. In doing so, it argues that the possibility of travelling ethically and sustainably is anathema to the industry’s primary economic objective of maximizing profit, and secondary, cultural objective, of intensifying domination via establishment of the desirability and inevitability of the globalization of capitalism. The theory is meant to encompass the industry’s role in domination, by incorporating the broad and complex interdependency of the claims/proclamations of production, the motives/desires of consumption, and the broader social force of (capital) globalization, which encourage and require the production of new desires to serve its own expansion. The theory is also intended to address not only practices that seek to distinguish themselves from old tourism, but also the problematic relationships among new consumer tastes, new political movements, and the requirements of new economic arrangements, specifically, the post-Fordist mode of production/consumption.
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The Survival of Persons:
A Reply to Parfit’s Reductionism

Reductionists about personal identity contend that there is nothing more to our survival than a series of causally related experiences and/or bodily continuities. Our belief in a separately existing self or subject of experiences is held to unjustified, and we are recommended to reduce the conception of our identity by jettisoning that belief. Despite the very real ingenuity that reductionists have shown in defending their position, I shall argue not only that they are committed to accepting a view of our survival that is a version of the very theory which they are seeking to overthrow, but that, on the evidence available, such a theory ought to be accepted as the most defensible account of our continued existence. More particularly, I shall contend that we need to distinguish between persons (as continuing subjects of experience) and any related series of experience (their lives); and in such a way that persons can justifiably be held to survive the ending of any of their lives. This position is defended in the first section. In the second, I examine a number of objections to the conception of persons that is defended in the first section, including the following two objections: first, that in distinguishing persons from their lives, I must be turning each person into an abstract entity; and, second, that I cannot allow for significant personality changes to occur during the lives of person.
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The Martyrdom that Wasn’t:  
Impassivity of Body and Soul in Hrotswith of Gandersheim

This paper focuses the figure of the tortured virgin in the works of Hrotswith of Gandersheim, and its religious and philosophical background. It is well known (and admitted by Hrotswith herself) that some of her works were influenced by apocryphal writings. The present paper converges on less palpable evidence of this, which manifests itself in her almost inhuman portrait of the virgin martyr, particularly in her dramatic works. These influences are traced back to the Late Antique controversy between the orthodox Christians and adherents of some of the Gnostic sects, with regard to the meaning of Christ’s bodily existence, the indestructability and resurrection of the body and, consequently, the weight and validity of martyrdom. Hrotswith’s figures of martyred virgins have been inspired by numerous Ancient and Medieval martyr legends, which leave the martyr ideal unchallenged.

On the other hand, these accounts of martyrdom proclaim another ideal, that of the impassivity not only of the soul, but to a certain extent also of the body. In the process, which at some points reminds us of the alchemistic “torture” of the matter, the martyr’s body is either transformed and, in a sense, perfected, or firmly resists the physical suffering and violation, while the spirit remains equally unperturbed in both cases. It is this unruffled, laughing spirit that shows a resemblance to the spiritual counterpart, which is often found in the Gnostic descriptions not only of the Passion of Christ, but more particularly of the ordeals of some feminine Gnostic figures who, by separating the spiritual from the corporeal and abandoning the latter, avoided all affliction and desecration. Eventually, the body of the martyr is destroyed (often by fire), but this is necessary for the liberation of the soul, reaching for its final reward.
Natural Law Theory as Second-Order Voluntarism:
Why Religion is not the Basis of Morality

The claim that morality is based on religion must assume one of two moral theories. One is known as the Divine Command theory, according to which what is right is what God (or the gods) command. The other is known as Natural Law theory, according to which certain features of the natural world somehow represent, suggest, or even create moral norms.

As is common knowledge, Socrates' arguments in Plato's *Euthyphro* invalidate Divine Command theory, or voluntarism, as a possible basis for morality. They do this by highlighting the arbitrary, thus vacuous, quality of any moral norm that is taken to be justified solely by divine preference. In addition, critics of Divine Command theory have pointed out that the view absurdly reduces statements such as "God is good" to tautologies such as "God does what God does."

However, many philosophers continue to believe that Natural Law theory shows that morality is grounded on religion. This belief is mistaken, since Natural Law theory turns out to be voluntaristic in principle. This is so because any version of Natural Law theory (there are many) must ground moral norms on contingent features of the natural world. Since those features are contingent, they must be taken both to exist, and to be as they are, due to the will of a putative creator. But then it follows that the makeup of the world itself, including in particular those of its features that allegedly ground moral norms, must be the product of an exercise of voluntarism. Thus, Natural Law theory turns out to be voluntaristic in principle, and as such it is subject to conclusive objections of the same sort as those alleged by Socrates against voluntarism. Since the voluntaristic nature of Natural Law theory is, so to speak, disguised, and since it pertains to the physical constitution of the world, rather than (as in Divine Command theory) to moral propositions, it seems appropriate to view natural law theory as second-order voluntarism.