Philosophy Abstracts
Tenth Annual International Conference on Philosophy
25-28 May 2015, Athens, Greece

Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos

THE ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
Philosophy Abstracts
10th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
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Preface

This abstract book includes all the abstracts of the papers presented at the 10th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 25-28 May 2015, organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. In total there were 62 papers and presenters, coming from 27 different countries (Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Spain, The Netherlands, Turkey, UK and USA). The conference was organized into 24 sessions that included areas of Philosophy. As it is the publication policy of the Institute, the papers presented in this conference will be considered for publication in one of the books and/or journals of ATINER.

The Institute was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet in Athens and exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study. Our mission is to make ATHENS a place where academics and researchers from all over the world meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. To serve this purpose, conferences are organized along the lines of well established and well defined scientific disciplines. In addition, interdisciplinary conferences are also organized because they serve the mission statement of the Institute. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 150 international conferences and has published over 100 books. Academically, the Institute is organized into four research divisions and nineteen research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committee and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference together.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
### Organizing and Scientific Committee

1. Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
2. Dr. George Poulos, Vice-President of Research, ATINER & Emeritus Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.
3. Dr. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.
4. Dr. Donald V. Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.
5. Ms. Olga Gkounta, Researcher, ATINER.

### Administration

Stavroula Kyritsi, Konstantinos Manolidis, Katerina Maraki & Kostas Spiropoulos

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### Monday 25 May 2015

(all sessions include 10 minutes break)

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### 08:00-08:30 Registration and Refreshments

**08:30-09:00 (ROOM B-10TH FLOOR) Welcome & Opening Remarks**

- Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
- Dr. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

### Connections between Seneca and Platonism in Epistulae ad Lucilium 58.

2. Damon Boria, Assistant Professor, Our Lady of the Lake College, USA. Creating the Anthropocene: Existential Social Philosophy and Our Bleak Future.


### 10:30-12:00 Session IV (ROOM B-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** *Sander Wilkens, Privatdozent PD, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany.

1. Barbara Botter, Professor, UFES-Federal University of Vitoria, Brazil. Scientific Knowledge in Aristotle’s Biology.

2. *Abir Igamberdiev, Professor, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada. Relational Universe of Leibniz: Implications for Modern Physics and Biology.

3. Monika Walczak, Associate Professor, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Classical Notion of Knowledge and Interdisciplinarity of Science.

### 10:30-12:00 Session V (ROOM C-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** Damon Boria, Assistant Professor, Our Lady of the Lake College, USA.

1. Natasza Szutta, Assistant Professor, University of Gdansk, Poland. Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Social Psychology.

2. *Chrysoula Gitsoulis, Adjunct Assistant Professor, City University of New York, USA. The Role of Reason in Grounding Moral Standards.

3. Tsarina Doyle, Lecturer, National University of Ireland, Ireland. Hume on the Epistemology and Metaphysics of Value.

### 12:00-13:30 Session VI (ROOM B-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** *Abir Igamberdiev, Professor, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada.

1. Javier Gracia Calandin, Associate Professor, Universidadd De Valencia, Spain. The Concept of Moral from the Different Contributions of the Practical

### 12:00-13:30 Session VII (ROOM C-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** Tsarina Doyle, Lecturer, National University of Ireland, Ireland.

1. J. Noel Hubler, Professor, Lebanon Valley College, USA. Machiavelli’s Adaptation of Aristotle’s Best Regime.

2. Joanne Yamaguchi, Lecturer, Benazir Bhutto Shaheed University, Karachi, Pakistan. Ideology of Governance – A Qualitative Analysis of the Right to Rule and
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<td>1. *Anna Olejarczyk, Assistant Professor, University of Wroclaw, Poland. Plato’s Conception of Language.</td>
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### 16:00-17:30 Session XII (ROOM B-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** *William O’Meara*, Professor, James Madison University, USA.

1. *Peter Boltuc*, Endowment Professor, University of Illinois, USA. Fichte May Help with a Deflationary Non-Reductive View on Consciousness.
2. Tennyson Samraj, Professor, Canadian University College, Canada. Carbon Based Brain, Consciousness and Choice: A Phenomenological Update on the Concept and Reality of Free Will as an Existential Mode of Existence Exhibited in Human Praxis.

### 16:00-17:30 Session XIII (ROOM C-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** *Marco Lauri*, Adjunct Professor, University of Macerata, Italy.

2. Donald Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA. Quality and Abstraction: A Critique of Scientism.

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**21:00-23:00 Greek Night and Dinner (Details during registration)**

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### Tuesday 26 May 2015

#### 08:00-09:30 Session XIV (ROOM B-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** *Anupam Yadav*, Assistant Professor, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, India.

2. *Maria Adamos*, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA. Are Desires, Cognitions and Emotions Logically Related? (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015)

#### 08:00-09:30 Session XV (ROOM C-10TH FLOOR): Panel

**Chair:** Malcolm Keating, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale-NUS College, Singapore.

1. Elisa Freschi, Research Leader, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria & Malcolm Keating, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale-NUS College, Singapore. How Do We Gather Knowledge through Language? Introduction to the Panel.
2. Monika Nowakowska, Assistant Professor, University of Warsaw, Poland. Truthfulness and Credibility in an

#### 08:00-09:30 Session XVI (ROOM D-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** Dr. Donald V. Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.

1. Gregory Bassham, Professor, King’s College (Pennsylvania), USA. A Critique of C. S. Lewis’s Argument from Desire.
2. Adina Preda, Lecturer, University of Limerick, Ireland. Can there be Positive Human Rights? (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015)
3. Vito Limone, Ph.D. Student, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Italy. The ὁ οἷος in Origen’s Commentary on John about the
1. Andrew Alwood, Assistant Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA. Personal Well-Being.
2. Hanoch Ben-Pazi, Assistant Professor, Bar Ilan University, Israel. Emmanuel Levinas: Witnessing, Reconciliation and Responsibility.
3. Tonci Kokic, Assistant Professor, University of Split, Croatia. Is the Origin of First Life Scientifically Solvable?

1. Malcolm Keating, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale-NUS College, Singapore. Indication as Verbal Postulation. (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015, panel)
2. Daniele Cuneo, Lecturer, University of Leiden, The Netherlands. Affective Knowledge as the Aim of Poetic Language. Crossings among Sanskrit Aesthetics, Western Hermeneutics and Contemporary Psychology. (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015, panel)
3. Marzenna Jakubczak, Associate Professor, Pedagogical University of Cracow, Poland. What Cognitive Benefits May Arise from the Collision Between Language and Metaphysics? Sāṅkhya-Yoga Perspective. (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015, panel)

1. Angela Maria Michelis, Professor, University of Turin, Italy. The New Challenges and the Role of Philosophy as Hans Jonas.
2. Evgenia Cherkasova, Associate Professor, Suffolk University, USA. Open Dynamic Educational Project (ODEP): Teaching Strategies for the ‘Big Questions’ Philosophy Courses.
3. Aldo Frigerio, Assistant Professor, Catholic University of Sacred Heart of Milan, Italy. Cannot Abstract Objects Really Evolve? On the Ontology of Biological Species. (Tuesday)
### Session XX (ROOM B-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** Gleisson Schmidt, Professor, Universidade Tecnologica Federal do Parana, Brazil.


2. **Alexey Lyzlov,** Associate Professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia. Concepts of Sensation, Feeling and Belief in F.H. Jacobi’s Philosophy.

### Panel

1. **Alessandro Graheli,** Project Assistant, University of Vienna, Austria. Epistemology of Verbal and Written Testimony. (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015, panel)

2. **Akane Saito,** Ph.D. Student, Kyushu University, Japan. Internalization of Speech: Perception and Understanding of the Word. (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015, panel)

3. **Tiziana Pontillo,** Senior Lecturer, University of Cagliari, Italy. Does Dissymmetric Signification Rely on Conventional Rules? Two Ancient Indian Answers. (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015, panel)

### Session XXI (ROOM C-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** Malcolm Keating, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale-NUS College, Singapore.

1. **Secil Turkoz,** Instructor, Abant Izzet Baysal University, Turkey. Rethinking the Concept of Suggestion within Suggestopaedia. (A Panel on Philosophy of Education) (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015)

2. **Matti Itkonen,** Senior Lecturer, University of Jyvaskyla, Finland. The Essence of Kalastajatorppa Revisited. A Cinematographic Journey into Time and Space.

3. **Ian Cantley,** Lecturer, Queen’s University Belfast, U.K. A Quantum Framework for Educational Measurement. (A Panel on Philosophy of Education)

### Session XXII (ROOM D-10TH FLOOR)

**Chair:** Aristotelis Santas, Professor of Philosophy, Valdosta State University, USA.

1. **Valeria Melis,** Ph.D., University of Turin - University of Cagliari, Italy. Does Dissymmetric Signification Rely on Conventional Rules? Two Ancient Greek Answers. (Tuesday, 26th of May 2015, panel)

2. *Marco Lauri,* Adjunct Professor, University of Macerata, Italy. “I’ve told a Story in Order to Make a Case for the Truth” Storytelling, Knowledge and Social Agency in some Medieval Arabic
3. Elisa Freschi, Research Leader, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria & Malcolm Keating, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale-NUS College, Singapore. How do we gather knowledge through language? Roundtable Discussion.

14:00-15:00 Lunch

18:00-20:30 Urban Walk (Details during registration)

20:30-22:00 Dinner (Details during registration)

Wednesday 27 May 2015
Cruise: (Details during registration)

Thursday 28 May 2015
Delphi Visit: (Details during registration)
Maria Adamos  
Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA  

Are Desires, Cognitions and Emotions Logically Related?  

Although most scholars of emotions agree that emotions involve cognitive evaluative states such as beliefs and judgments, as well as bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions, only a few pay close enough attention to the desiderative states (i.e. desires and wishes) and their relation to emotions. In this essay I shall argue that emotions and desires are conceptually connected, because the cognitive evaluations, which are required for emotions, are also logically related to desires. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine someone to be afraid and not have the desire to avoid the danger, be in love and not have the desire to be with the beloved, or be angry and not have the desire to retaliate in some way. I shall attempt to show through these and other cases of emotions that the conceptual relation between emotions and desires is that of logical presupposition, in the sense that an emotion conceptually presupposes some type of desiderative state. However, the reverse is not the case, as it is certainly possible for one to have a desire specific to an emotion, without having the emotion. For instance, although the desire for revenge presupposes that one believes that one has been wronged, it does not necessarily show that one is angry. This is so, because a cognitive evaluative state does not necessarily entail an emotion, and by logical implication, a desiderative state does not necessitate an emotion either.
Rana Ahmad  
University of British Columbia and Langara College, Canada

Morality, Trust and Epistemic Risk

Ethical issues concerning practical or applied problems often entail elements of risk. Standard accounts assume risk to be an objective state of affairs, which is quantifiable. Thus, it makes sense to act one way when the risks are low and another when they are high. For instance, the recent outbreak of the Ebola virus in Africa caused people in other countries to fear for their safety despite the extremely low risk of exposure. On the standard view of risk where risk is an objective fact about the world, such reactions are seen as irrational or simply the result of being poorly informed. The solution then is to launch more effective education efforts. Others have argued that risk is epistemic in nature, which incorporates the values of the risk-perceiver. What they judge to be a risk is often influenced by what they judge to be of value. On this view, to call something a risk can sometimes be both to describe events in the world and to say that some action ought to be taken if one wants to avoid possible threats to what one values. However, when risk is understood to be epistemic rather than ontological, merely educating the public about the actual risks, is unlikely to have much effect.

Risk can be understood as having both objective (descriptive) and subjective or normative (prescriptive) properties. Rather than assuming that people are simply incapable of understanding measures of objective risk, or that they are simply irrational, I argue that one of the connections between objective and subjective risk could lie in the notion of trust. If this is the case, then it might be possible to anticipate those instances where people are more likely to reject knowledge based on what their actual risks is in favour some other view. Risk might then have a more nuanced understanding as involving objective measures, threats to what one values, and trust in those who report and supposedly protect us from harm.
Andrew Alwood  
Assistant Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University, USA

**Personal Well-Being**

Your well-being is what is in your self-interest – what is *good for you*. We want to know what is in a subject’s interests, and also *why* that is so. Hedonists are often thought to have an easier time in explaining why something improves well-being, since it seems obvious that a subject’s own pleasures are good for her. But this has recently been challenged (independently by Chris Heathwood and Dale Dorsey) on the grounds that a subject’s pleasures need not *resonate* with her in the right way. It even seems possible to be *alienated* from one’s own pleasure and enjoyment. This challenges the fundamental rationale supporting a hedonistic account of well-being, and appears to give an advantage to subjective accounts which claim that a subject’s attitudes (e.g. her desires) determine her interests. However, I argue that hedonists can defend their account and that, in fact, they have superior explanations of how improvements in a subject’s well-being must resonate with her. Hedonists can substantiate the objective (attitude-independent) value in pleasure for the one who is pleased.


The Question of Consciousness

The (hard) problem
Consciousness has been defined as awareness, the ability to experience or to feel etc. Since Descartes, Philosophers have struggled to comprehend the nature of consciousness and more recently it has become a significant topic of research in several scientific branches. The main problem mostly discussed in the relevant literature is whether or not consciousness can be reduced to causality as any other natural phenomenon. Based on the works of Husserl and Hegel we start by saying that there is no object without subject, the two being linked by a knowledge process. In that perspective, the postulate of objectivity on which today-science resides must be called into question. An important consequence of such a statement is that a theory of consciousness must explain both the experience of subjectivity and the objective world that Physics addresses.

The Theory of Consciousness
The Theory of consciousness starts from the following definition of consciousness:
- knowledge of itself
- knowledge of being and existing
- knowledge of something else

Therefore consciousness is defined as a property of knowledge (or awareness). This leads to taking into account the so-called knowledge function C(X) by which the object X is known. The conditions to which the function C(X) must comply are expressed and called the Fundamental relations. The theory is composed of three books, briefly presented below.

1) Theory of knowledge
Our theory goes much further than the Hegel system because the Fundamental relations are developed mathematically and it is shown that the basic laws of modern physics (Quantum Mechanics and Relativity) can be derived from the Fundamental relations. This yields a new paradigm in physics. This new vision comes from the fact that the postulate of objectivity has been called into question.

2) The Subject universe
A philosophical presentation and interpretation of the theory. It is shown that the basic characteristics of subjectivity as we experienced it can be derived from the knowledge process.

3) Conscious systems
A conscious system is a system which implements the Fundamental relations. The mechanisms by which brain gives rise to consciousness and the corresponding architectures are derived.
Ana Bajzelj
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Polonsky Academy, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Israel

Causality in Jain Ontology:
The Question of Time

After listing the substances of medium of motion, medium of rest, and space as instrumental causes (*nimitta*) of motion, rest, and spatial immersion, respectively, Kundakunda describes the substance of time (*kāla*) as the cause (*kāraṇa*) of change (*parivartana*) in substances in *Niyamasāra* 33. He adds that these four substances have only inherent (*svabhāva*) qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*), meaning, as he explains in *Niyamasāra* 28, that the modal modification of their attributes occurs independently of any external factors. In this respect they differ from the living and material substances the modal modification of which may be externally influenced. However, be it independent or dependent, modal modification is always present and happens momentarily in all of the substances, substantial modes continually arising and decaying as Kundakunda points out in *Pravacanasāra* II.4 and II.10. Time being the cause of change, this continuity of modification is causally conditioned by it. Furthermore, since it is itself a substance, time by definition also undergoes modal modification as Kundakunda emphasizes in *Pravacanasāra* II.51, all of its modes arising independently. This paper will explore the nature of the causality of time in the texts of Kundakunda, first looking at how it functions as a cause in relation to the modal change occurring in other substances and second at how it functions as a cause in relation to its own modal change.
A Critique of C. S. Lewis’s Argument from Desire

In various places, the popular Christian writer C. S. Lewis offers an argument for the existence of God that has come to be known as the argument from desire. In a nutshell, the argument is as follows: Every innate, natural desire has an object that can satisfy it. Our desire for God and eternal happiness is an innate, natural desire. So, our desire for God and eternal happiness has an object (God) that can satisfy it. Lewis’s argument has been widely criticized, most notably by John Beversluis in *C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion*. In recent years, however, a number of well-known philosophers have come to Lewis’s defense. In this paper I argue that none of these defenses are successful and that Lewis’s argument is unsound.
Is it possible to call the second part of the twentieth century “the Age of Testimony?” In light of historical and political circumstances, we may say that the idea of Testimony, or bearing witness, became an essential part of our cultural discourse. The validity of testimony and the importance of witnesses are crucial to the memory of the Holocaust. Testimonies were an essential practice in South Africa's politics after the age of apartheid, as we can see in the “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.”

The importance of testimony as the constitutive basis of political narrative is widely recognized. This unique political and semi-juridical experiment has many parallels, and has had a far-reaching influence in other places in the world that have experienced societal and civil conflicts. The existence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions was made possible by attributing paramount importance to the very act of giving testimony. The establishment of those Commissions envisioned the act of testifying and the very fact of witnesses’ appearing, victims and perpetrators together, openly relating to the acts of separation and discrimination, humiliation, or cruelty, as a way of catalyzing social and political processes of justice and reconciliation.

The use of the terms “testimony” and “witnesses” is widespread. It can be found in such disparate fields as literature, art, and historiography. We might think that this can be considered a metaphorical way of writing, an artistic use of explanation. Using phenomenological inquiry, we can establish a new perspective on testimony and witnessing. The witness sees him/herself as a third party, but a phenomenological perspective enables us to see that the witness is himself a participant in the event. The witness must take responsibility for that which he witnessed. Bearing witness and testifying means affirming and giving evidence to something. The person who testifies has to take responsibility for his mode of giving testimony, by word or by deed. However, there are different ways to take on the task of being witness and to fulfil the witness’s responsibility. Giving testimony establishes an event, one in which the person wants to speak in order to motivate other people by his testimony.

Does a witness have any moral responsibility? Levinas’ response is sharp: one who hears a voice is, by that very fact, responsible to that voice. To be a witness means to know another, and to know the otherness of the other, meaning to bear responsibility toward that otherness. Albert Camus’ answer moves within a range between responsibility and guilt. The witness’s first responsibility is to bear witness. His second
responsibility lies at the border of guilt, with his being a witness and not an involved subject. Susan Sontag comes down even harder on us when she points out the influence of the existence of witnesses to acts of atrocity committed for those very witnesses, such as the atrocities shown to us on the television screen.

To what extent does the witness bear responsibility for what his eyes have seen? How much responsibility does he have for what his ears have heard? This question becomes a moral question in interpersonal relations and carries a political and ethical charge, toward society near to or far from the subject, whether he sees himself as belonging to it or whether he sees that society as foreign to him.

In this presentation, I would like to offer a Levinasian look at the question of witnessing and the absolute responsibility placed on witnesses, and on witnesses to their testimony. And concomitantly, we dare to ask about the involvement and responsibility of the witness regarding events that he himself did not bring out.
Peter Boltuc
Endowment Professor, University of Illinois, USA

Fichte May Help with a Deflationary Non-Reductive View on Consciousness

Fichte (in his theory of knowledge) and Husserl (in his Ideas) have introduced the notion of epistemic subject that is not an object. This pure subject is only the subject-side of the epistemologically primary subject/object relationship. Such a notion may help us create a deflationary yet non-reductive theory of first-person consciousness. The theory is much needed in contemporary analytic philosophy because it provides the best way of defending non-reductive physicalism. The main former advocates of non-reductive physicalism rejected this view: Some, like Frank Jakcson, moved to the reductive camp years ago, but a more surprising is the move of major philosophers towards panpsychism. A few years ago David Chalmers endorsed dualism (in it’s panpsychic form) and rejected his early methodological approach of keeping an equal level of commitment to panpsychism and non-reductive physicalism. In his 2012 book Thomas Nagel, the main defender of non-reductive materialism in the past, endorsed panpsychic dualism as well. It seems that the reasons for this shift, visible especially well in Nagel’s recent book, originate from the very robust notion of conscious subject. A deflationary view of non-reducible subject provides the best way to avoid this extreme.
Damon Boria  
Assistant Professor, Our Lady of the Lake College, USA

Creating the Anthropocene:  
Existential Social Philosophy and Our Bleak Future

About three decades ago, scientists began debating use of the term “Anthropocene” to capture the arrival of an age in which humans are having a distinct and potentially catastrophic effect on the earth’s ecosystems. The popularization of the term has been advanced by writers such as Elizabeth Kolbert, who featured it in two decidedly bleak works of science journalism—Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and Climate Change (2006) and The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History (2014). The term has also found its way into philosophy, with perhaps its most notable appearance being Dale Jamieson’s Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle to Stop Climate Change Failed—and What It Means for Our Future (2014). Jamieson’s book is novel for arguing that understanding how we got here (the Anthropocene) requires descriptions of not only the usual suspects—politics and economics—but also psychological and philosophical challenges. Regarding the latter, he points out that “climate change has the structure of the world’s largest collective action problem. Each of us acting on our own desires contributes to outcomes that we neither desire nor intend.”

Few philosophers have thought as rigorously about the problem of collective action as the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. He coined a term—“seriality”—to capture the social condition in which each individual is acting on their own desires and another term—“counter-finality”—to capture the phenomenon of reshaping the world in unintended ways. In this paper I argue, first, that Sartre’s conceptual tools help us better understand the problem of collective action and, second, that this better understanding allows us to fully appreciate the challenges of diverting the march towards the Anthropocene. In the end I argue that our obligation to resist the Anthropocene must rest on rejecting complicity rather than anticipating success.
Barbara Botter
Professor, UFES-Federal University of Vitoria, Brazil

Scientific Knowledge in Aristotle’s Biology

Aristotle was the first thinker to articulate a taxonomy of scientific knowledge, which he set out in *Posterior Analytics*. In these treatises, the philosopher details the criteria that knowledge must meet to be considered “science” (*episteme*). Furthermore, the “special sciences”, i.e., biology, zoology and the natural sciences in general, originated with Aristotle. A classical question is whether the geometric-style model of demonstration proposed by the Stagirite in the *Analytics* is independent of the special sciences. If so, Aristotle would have been unable to match the natural sciences with the scientific patterns he established in the *Analytics*. In this paper, I reject this pessimistic approach towards the scientific value of natural sciences. Even though the main concern of *Analytics* is to deduce the necessity of an attribute belonging *per se* to a subject through a syllogistic structure in the mode Barbara, I believe that Aristotle’s theory of science is not a monolithic model of demonstration, but is compatible with the natural science’s investigations. Moreover, Aristotle’s theory of the Syllogism is clearly not intended to be read as an abstract method for the ideal organisation of knowledge itself. Because the Stagirite’s most valuable contributions to the scientific framework were provided in his discussion of zoology and biology, it is unreasonable to claim that the theorisation of demonstrative science is incompatible with natural inquiries.

Furthermore, I argue that, for a lack of chronological clarity, it is better to unify Aristotle’s model of scientific research, which includes *Analytics* and the natural sciences together.
Ian Cantley  
Lecturer, Queen’s University Belfast, U.K.

A Quantum Framework for Educational Measurement

The outcomes of educational assessments undoubtedly impact considerably upon students, teachers, schools and education in the widest sense. Results of assessments are, for example, used to award qualifications that determine future educational or vocational pathways of students. The results obtained by students in assessments are also used to make judgements about individual teacher quality, to hold schools to account for the standards achieved by their students, and to compare international education systems. Given the current high-stakes nature of educational assessment, it is imperative that the measurement practices involved have stable philosophical foundations. However, this paper casts doubt on the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary educational measurement models. Aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum theory are used to argue that a quantum theoretical rather than a Newtonian paradigm is appropriate for educational measurement, and the implications of such a paradigm shift for the concept of validity are discussed. Whilst it is acknowledged that the transition to a quantum theoretical framework would not lead to the demise of educational assessment, it is argued that, where feasible, current high-stakes assessments should be reformed to become as ‘low-stakes’ as possible. The paper also undermines some of the pro high-stakes testing rhetoric that has a tendency to afflict education.
Open Dynamic Educational Project (ODEP): Teaching Strategies for the ‘Big Questions’ Philosophy Courses

This presentation focuses on innovative approaches to designing and teaching a reading-intensive, interdisciplinary, cross-cultural philosophy course. The presenter discusses the following pedagogical challenges:

1) Vastness of material: How do we organize a single-semester course whose subject matter has no distinct disciplinary or chronological parameters? Which structure and/or progression could best orient the audience?

2) Diversity of content: Big Questions courses comprise diverse disciplines, traditions, and historical periods. How do we avoid a superficial survey approach and do justice to the depth and complexity of ideas? Will there be room for deep learning? Will the students have opportunities to revisit and apply what they will have studied?

3) Personal, introspective dimension: the Big Questions courses often deal with sensitive issues which may resonate strongly with students (e.g. death, loss of meaning, suicide). How do we approach emotionally charged topics in a classroom? Which activities could foster students’ self-reflective, caring attitude?

4) Students’ attitudes and study habits: Some students tend to study only what they think they will be tested on. In a Big Questions course such tendencies go directly against the spirit of the course. How do we help students discover the pleasures of self-directed inquiry?

The presenter proposes a multimedia educational model as a holistic response to these challenges. The proposed Open Dynamic Educational Project (ODEP) creates a space—physical and digital—for students to think deeply and creatively about the Big Questions as well as contribute to the project’s development over time. Digital technologies—such as a website and a computer game—help expand course content, stimulate deep contextual learning, and foster an intellectual community beyond the group of students currently enrolled in the course. The paper contains a conceptual definition of ODEP and discusses its key components.

The model is based on personal observations and lessons learned while designing and teaching the Meaning of Life (MoL) course supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities. The paper will also touch on the educational benefits of the so-called “serious games”and feature a philosophical computer game—one of the digital components of ODEP.
Volkan Cifteci  
Ph.D. Candidate, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

Kant’s Theory of the Self:  
Its Inseparable Relation to Time

This talk targets two objectives. The first is to give an account of Kant’s theory of the self, the second is to show its inseparable relation to time. It is true that Kant never wrote a book in which he deals specifically with the problem of self-consciousness or that of the self. That is, we do not have a mature doctrine of the self developed by Kant to which we can easily refer. However, in the first Critique, Kant attempts to find an answer to the question: what and in what way can we know? That is, he investigates the scope and the limits of human knowledge. Given this, by investigating this scope and the limits, we can, hopefully, possess knowledge concerning Kant’s account of the self.

Without a doubt, Kant had an extensive knowledge of empiricists’ and rationalists’ conceptions of the self. In the first Critique, he both criticizes his predecessors’ accounts and attempts to solve the problems he attributed to them. It is quite certain that the empiricist philosopher he is criticizing is David Hume; while the rationalist one is René Descartes. In this talk, I will try to focus on Kant’s criticism of Cartesian/Substantial self, by paying attention to the reason why he rejects this view. I will also shed particular light on Humean fictitious (illusory) self, by attempting to show the reason why, on Kant’s account, Hume failed to capture the self. I think, after carefully examining Kant’s criticism of these two notions, we can get an insight into what Kant’s notion of the self is.

Kant’s notion of (transcendental) self is considerably more complicated than those of his predecessors. In fact, its being complicated depends entirely upon the fact that it has three layers. In trying to give an account of Kant’s theory of the self, however, commentators usually limit their investigation only to two notions, i.e., inner sense and apperception. Unlike them, I will investigate three elements, all of which together constitute the self. In the absence of these elements, i.e., inner sense, imagination and apperception, knowledge can never arise. My strategy, thus, consists in trying to capture Kant’s account of the self by pursuing these three elements which are taken to be responsible for the objective knowledge. In discussing three aspects of consciousness separately, my main aim, in the first place, is to show in what form we encounter the self in each aspect and moreover, to understand the essential role time plays therein. Then, my intention is to reveal the centrality of time in Kant’s account of the self and to establish the strong relation between these two notions at issue.
Gadamer’s Relation to Hegel and Idealism

The purpose of this paper is to chart and critically assess the reception of Hegel’s philosophy within Gadamer’s project of developing a philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Hegel and his subsequent philosophical idealism are for Gadamer, both a source of great inspiration and a matter of deep rejection.

In the first part of my paper I try to illustrate Gadamer’s reception of Hegel by integrating it into the broader context of Hegelianism in the 20th century. I explore, for example, the similarities and the differences between the reactions to Hegel’s philosophy in France, Germany, Great Britain or USA, in the mid-twentieth century. I argue that philosophers belonging to the german tradition are inclined to focus on Hegel’s Logic (the metaphysical and methodological part of his philosophy), rather than his Phenomenology (the social and epistemological aspect of his philosophy). I also concentrate on the influences exerted over Gadamer by the readings of Martin Heidegger or Nicolai Hartmann and on the various autobiographical remarks made by Gadamer himself regarding the role that philosophical idealism played during his intellectual development.

I than try to discern the main points in which Gadamer takes Hegel to have anticipated his own philosophical insights, for example Hegel’s critique of Kantian formalism, his rejection of the philosophies of the beyond, his appropriation of the ancient dialectic or his proposal of thinking subjectivity as situated.

In the last part of the paper I intend to explore the meaning of what I consider to be Gadamer’s main criticism towards Hegel and the idealist tradition, namely what he calls the primacy of self-consciousness. Gadamer’s claim is that the task of the newly born hermeneutic approach to philosophical investigation is to overcome the primacy of self-consciousness which he also sees as being the cornerstone of idealisms. He goes on to argue that he can achieve this goal by theorizing a concept of understanding (or more precisely self-understanding) that involves both a subjective and objective dimension.
Affective Knowledge as the Aim of Poetic Language. Crossings among Sanskrit Aesthetics, Western Hermeneutics and Contemporary Psychology

A common maxim in the Sanskrit literary culture runs like this: “one should behave like Rāma (the mythical and morally unfailing hero of the epic called Rāmāyaṇa) and not like Rāvaṇa (the mythical, evil villain of the same work)”. In the knowledge system of alamkāraśāstra (Sanskrit aesthetics), this dictum is framed in a sophisticated theory embracing the definitions of poetry, aesthetic experience and its moral aims. Poetic language, paradigmatically, brings forth a pleasurable, emotional experience (rasa) brought about by the fictional world created by art. This experience offers direct insight into what it is to be like to be in a specific emotional situation, what one might call ‘affective knowledge’. Moreover, this knowledge conveyed by poetry is aimed at educating to the right choice to be made among a fixed range of emotive possibilities that have be ‘felt’ and acted upon in front of any situational context to be coped with—basically, Rāma’s behaviour. In short, poetry develops our emotional competence and sensibility. In such an understanding of the concept of rasa as a cognitive, emotional as well as moral Erlebnis elicited by poetic language, a particular interpretation of the ethical field is necessarily implicit: morally meaningful choices coincide with the emotional responses to any given situation. Consequently, emotions are moral acts, liable to moral judgments and evaluations. This entanglement among poetic language, emotions and moral knowledge will be examined through texts from Sanskrit aesthetics interpreted in the light of the Western hermeneutical and existentialist traditions and reinforced by the contemporary strand of psychological thought that understands emotions in cognitive, and often linguistic, terms (‘appraisal theories’) and as the very backbone of our ethical capacity.
Laurent Dessberg
Senior Lecturer, Canterbury Christ Church University, U.K.

Johann F. Herbart: Morality and Pedagogy of Teaching

Johann F. Herbart’s conception of pedagogy has often been dismissed because of the way it deals with the construct of individual autonomy: Herbartian pedagogy is based on the idea of educational instruction and its precedence over the formation of character. In Herbart’s view, pupils are perceived as dependent or passive because they do not possess the intellectual equipment necessary for the expression of genuine autonomy of thought. They reach higher levels of consciousness through the development of interests (empirical and speculative) and the process of apperception (assimilative/reflective power). To achieve this goal Herbart uses the concept of interest that is thought to result from the interaction of ideas and is not connected with any feeling or innate impulse. Meanwhile, Herbart does not focus on the superiority of the teacher as the more educated, which is supported by his primacy of representations and knowledge, but on the lending and supportive capacity of the teacher. In developing this point, the paper highlights the sympathetic aspects of Herbart’s philosophy of education in the teacher-student relationship and their involvement in the development of a moral culture.
Omar Di Paola  
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Connections between Seneca and Platonism in  
*Epistulae ad Lucilium* 58

Goal of this paper is to highlight the close connections between the philosophy of Seneca and Platonism. In this sense, the present essay focuses his attention on the *Letter LVIII* of *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales*, which describes a hierarchical division of beings, belonging to Platonic tradition. This letter shows a sort of “betraying” of Seneca towards the Stoicism, since he refuses the Stoic hierarchy, that places the *Quid* on the top of hierarchy, for the Platonic solution, that instead places the *Quod Est* on the top of hierarchy, removing completely the *Quid*. As we said, at the top of this hierarchy it is placed the *Quod Est*, it is a sort of liminal concept that gives meaning at all the other things. Just below this, there is God, he is the being “par excellencia”, who “is prominent and stands out above everything else”. The next step is occupied by Ideas, that are the Platonic Ideas. While in the fourth step there are the *Ides*, namely the Aristotelian forms. Below these, in the fifth step, there are the “existing things”, which represent all real things. Finally, in the last step there are the “quasi-existing things”, such as the void and time. However, what is more striking of this whole theory is that, it is not a mere corollary to an essentially Stoic philosophy, but represents the ontological backbone of all Senecan philosophy. In fact, every step of this hierarchy has a perfect match in the corpus of Seneca, and this demonstrates how deep are the connections with Plato and the Platonic tradition.
Tsarina Doyle  
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**Hume on the Epistemology and Metaphysics of Value**

This paper examines Hume’s challenge to the cognitivist and realist intuitions informing our experience of value with a view to safeguarding those intuitions. In so doing, the paper focuses on two claims that Hume makes about the epistemology and metaphysics of value. The first is his claim that moral and evaluative distinctions are the offspring of sentiment rather than reason. The second pertains to his argument that the metaphysical status of values is the same as that of mind-dependent secondary qualities that reside not in objects but only in the mind. In so doing, Hume challenges the cognitivist and realist intuitions informing our ordinary experience of value by making values and evaluations irreducibly phenomenal and by separating facts from values.

However, despite these challenges, I argue that the key to safeguarding our cognitivist and realist intuitions lies in Hume’s own account, which points, contrary to the initial argument about the irreducibly phenomenal aspects of value experience, to the motivational role of reason and to the identification of values, not with mind-dependent feelings, but with mind-independent dispositions in the object. In addition to the significant departure of these conclusions from Hume’s metaphysical indifference to the irreality of value properties, understanding values as dispositions in the object also serves to undermine the fact-value distinction to which his identification of values with mind-dependent feelings gives rise. An examination of the modality of dispositions will show that values occupy a space on the fact side of Hume’s fact-value divide, thus dissolving the divide. It will be concluded that rather than offering an occult account of value, the appeal to values as dispositions, along with the argument for the centrality of judgement in evaluative discernment, ultimately protects, contrary to Hume, the cognitivist and realist presuppositions of our ordinary experience of value by subjecting our value judgements to an external – realist – constraint.
Quine and Levinas on Ethics and Ontology

The fact that Emmanuel Levinas and W. V. Quine are each regarded as monumentally important and influential twentieth century philosophers is a real testimony to the diversity of philosophy. For the former, ethics is first philosophy. For the latter, ethics is “methodologically infirm” and there is no first philosophy. In one sense, then, the views of Levinas and Quine on these matters could not be further apart. Given Levinas’ methodological heritage in phenomenology and his frequent theologizing of the Other, Levinas’ ethics would seem to be in direct contradiction to Quine’s naturalism according to which empirical science alone tells us all that there is to know about what exists. The opposition is softened, however, when it is taken into account that Levinas’ phenomenological description of the ethical occurs on the “hither side” of ontology and thus makes no claim to say what there is. Levinas does attempt to open up a vantage point from which it is possible to engage in ethics as first philosophy, but since it is not a first philosophy aimed at grounding science on some foundation firmer than science itself or in any other way interfering with the aims of descriptive science or adding to its ontology, Levinas’ ethical phenomenology is not clearly subject to Quine’s critique of first philosophy. Yet, still in regard to the proper situation of ethics in relation to science, a residual opposition remains. For Quine, it is not enough that ethics is consistent with science, but it must also derive its legitimacy from it. On this score, Levinas’ phenomenology of ethics as first philosophy parts company with Quine’s own rudimentary development of ethics in both form and content. It also demonstrates itself as a unique and persuasive point of resistance to Quine’s naturalization program, which aims generally to narrow the diversity of philosophy to the point of being continuous with natural science.
Conveying Prescriptions: The Mīmāṃsā Understanding of How Prescriptive Texts Function

The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy has at its primary focus the exegesis of Sacred Texts (called Vedas), and more specifically of their prescriptive portions, the Brāhmaṇas.

In order to fulfill this hermeneutical task, Mīmāṃsā thinkers developed interpretative rules which should guide a reader or listener through a prescriptive text and enable his or her understanding of the text. Such rules have the key purpose to enable the understanding of a text without resorting to the intention of the speaker (either because he or she is distant in time or space or because, as in the case of the Vedas, the text has an autonomous epistemic value). Some of these basic principles are:

1) Each prescription must be construed as prescribing a new element. Seeming repetitions must have a deeper, different meaning, e.g., enhancing the value of the sacrifice to be performed.

2) Each prescriptive text, which may entail several prescriptions is construed around a principal action to be done.

3) Only what is intended (vivakṣita) is part of the prescription. For instance, in sentences such as "Take your bag, we need to go", the singular number in "bag" is not intended. What is prescribed is to take one's bag or bags, and not the fact that one must take one bag only. By contrast, the singular number is intended in "You must take one pill per day", meaning that one has to swallow exactly one pill per day. Whether something is intended or not is determined through its link with the sentence's principal duty.

The present talk will focus on some of these rules and on the way they can make a text into an epistemic instrument conveying information concerning what one ought to do.
Elisa Freschi  
Research Leader, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria  
&  
Malcolm Keating  
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale-NUS College, Singapore

How Do We Gather Knowledge through Language?

How do we gather knowledge through language? We suggest at least three possibilities:  
(1) descriptive statements  
(2) prescriptions  
(3) poetic language

(The list does not exhaust all instances of linguistically conveyed knowledge. There might be residual cases, such as instances in which perlocutionary speech acts additionally also convey knowledge. Furthermore, the list assumes that poetic language is more than just metaphoric language, in the sense that the latter can (at least in principle) be eliminated from (1) and (2) with no harm to the knowledge-content being communicated.)

In case (1), one comes to know that X through a linguistic expression provided that some basic presuppositions are fulfilled. Authors disagree as to what they are, but they usually discuss:  
— competence of the speaker (highlighted in India in the Nyāya and in the Pramāṇavāda tradition)  
— competence of the hearer  
— content which is communicated (state of affairs, commands…)  
— way of communication (direct statement, implication…)  

and express them in terms of  
— truthfulness (of the speaker)  
— expertise  
— ability to trust  
— desire to communicate (discussed in India and only a few cases in the West)  
— truth (of the content)  

But what do "competence" and "truthfulness" in the various cases exactly entail? And what roles do speaker and hearer fulfill in the various cases? We would like to discuss these questions together with more specific ones, such as the epistemological difference between spoken and written language.

The papers in this section focus on different authors and areas, and we invite speakers to dare to question their ideas and cross geographic
boundaries. Let us then discuss philosophically, though with different schools, authors, and backgrounds.
Aldo Frigerio  
Assistant Professor, Catholic University of Sacred Heart of Milan, Italy

**Cannot Abstract Objects Really Evolve?**  
**On the Ontology of Biological Species**

One of the most relevant ontological dispute in philosophy of biology concerns the ontology of biological species. Two main paradigms compete on this subject: according to the first one (Putnam 1970, Kitts & Kitts 1979, Caplan 1980, Mallet 1995), biological species are abstract objects of which organisms are instances; according to the second one (Ghiselin 1966, 1974; Hull 1976, 1978; Eldredge 1985), species are individuals of which organisms are parts. The main argument in favor of the second paradigm is that species evolve. It is argued that, since individuals can change, while abstract objects cannot, evolving species must be individuals.

In this talk I would like to show that this argument is in fact very weak because there exist particularly complex abstract objects that change. I will consider languages in particular, but also theories will do. Languages have many points of contact with species (Darwin 1871, I, 59-61 has already noticed this, cf. Stamos 2003 for an accurate scrutinizing of the similarities between languages and species). Languages come into existence and go extinct, evolve, can “split” into other languages (it is possible to reconstruct genealogical trees of languages similar to genealogical trees of species), have dialects as species have varieties. It is often difficult to understand if two idioms are dialects of the same language or two different languages as well as it is often difficult to understand if two populations are varieties of the same species or two different species. Sometimes there are spatial regions where two languages shade one into the other and the same happens to species. This list of affinities could continue.

Even though languages evolve, it is almost unanimous opinion of linguists that languages are abstract objects (they are sets of types plus grammatical rules). To understand how an abstract object like a language can evolve can cast light on the evolution of biological species as abstract objects. My main purpose is to show how abstract objects such as species and languages can change and evolve.
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The Role of Reason in Grounding Moral Standards

We expect reliable moral judgments to be based on sound moral standards (principles/rules) - standards that are unambiguous and can withstand close scrutiny and rational criticism. But what, precisely, makes a moral standard sound or acceptable? Who decides this? How are moral standards constructed? Or, more importantly, how should they be constructed?

For moral realists like Russell Shafer-Landau (2004), this question is misleading, because moral standards are not constructed; instead, they are discovered. There are moral truths not of our own making; they are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These truths would exist even if there were no human beings around to discern them. On this view, certain practices are by their very nature wrong, and human beings discover their wrongness in the same way that they make other discoveries about the world.

My essay is divided into three parts. In Part I, I try to show that the brand of moral realism defended by Shafer-Landau faces grave challenges. Briefly, two key problems are the following:

1) Metaphysical problem: The standards for what counts as a correct application of moral terms like ‘just’, ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, would have to issue their requirements independently and in advance of human verdicts for an open-ended range of situations. But how can they ‘reach ahead of us’, so to speak, and determine of themselves their every actual and counterfactual application?

2) Epistemological problem: How can we account for our ability to be appropriately sensitive to the requirements that they demand if they are mind-independent standards?

If moral standards are not discovered, in the way Shafer-Landau and other moral realists claim, but instead created, how are they created, or rather, how should they be created? This question is addressed in Part II of my essay. There, I examine some common ways in which people derive, or claim to derive, moral principles:

1) the law,  
2) religious codes,  
3) conscience,  
4) intuition,  
5) majority opinion

and point to inadequacies with each of these means of grounding them.
Finally, in Part III of my essay, I defend an alternative means of grounding moral standards. This alternative makes use of a procedure which, in contemporary literature, is referred to as the “method of reflective equilibrium.” The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth between our moral judgments about particular instances/cases and the moral principles/rules/standards that we believe govern them, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them. Equilibrium is achieved when we arrive at an acceptable coherence among these elements. In the process, we may modify prior beliefs, or add new ones. In practical contexts, this kind of deliberation may help us arrive at a conclusion (which I will refer to as a “considered moral belief”) over some moral dilemma that we are caught in. Considered moral beliefs are arrived at “coolly, rationally, impartially, with conceptual clarity, and with as much relevant information as we can reasonably acquire.” They are beliefs that are based on critical reflection, rational scrutiny, dialogue, and debate – all the ideals of Socratic cross examination (elenchus). When moral beliefs about a specific situation are rationally grounded in this way, we may regard them as provisionally established, in the sense that they have the highest degree of acceptability or credibility for us.
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The Concept of Moral from the Different Contributions of the Practical Neurophilosophy

In this paper I propose to revise the concept of morality in the light of the latest research on practical neurophilosophy. What can philosophers learn from neuroscientific evidences?

First we stop at Joshua Greene's article "From Neural 'Is' to Moral 'Ought'. What are the Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology? "(2007). I consider whether according to Greene the information provided by neuroscience has to require a re-evaluation of our moral values and our moral conceptions. This involves rethinking some questions: do the principles of natural science provide basis for normative ethics? Can we find facts based on neuroscience about what is morally right or wrong? Is ethics a continuum of natural science (Casebeer 2003)? Should we then speak of “naturalized ethics”? All of these questions lead us to reconsider the extent to which scientific facts can have profound moral implications, in order to pay more attention to neuroscientists than has been traditionally done by philosophers.

Therefore, the key question to be asked from the moral neuropsychology is: Do moral obligations reflect a deliberate acceptance and understanding of the structure of moral obligation or rather to the way our brains are made taking into account the evolutionary approach?

From my point of view, although it is important to study how (in fact) our brain is made, however unlike Greene I think that the realm of moral (and more specifically the moral obligations) is not limited to these descriptions of neuronal nature. In this regard I introduce helpful distinctions such as "neural basis" and "moral reasoning or foundation"; "Ethics of motives" and “Ethics of purposes”. In this sense I argue against the neuroscientist reductionism which consists in saying that moral judgment is always an emotional and intuitive issue and that any moral validity is dissolved in a neural predisposition to generate a perceptual phenomenology.
Alessandro Graheli  
Project Assistant, University of Vienna, Austria  

Epistemology of Verbal and Written Testimony  

Most philosophers are convinced that Plato's writings were originally meant to aid philosophical conversation, rather than autonomously read and studied. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates warns that one should not rely exclusively on books or take them as authoritative, because they are rather means to recall philosophical discussions already occurred: “He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks that written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written” (*Phaedrus*, 275c-e). In other words, knowledge must be already present for the writings to be effective. Plato's writings were meant for those who belonged to the Academy.  

Schleiermacher drew inspiration from Plato's dialogues to found his hermeneutics, in which writings are means for bringing the ignorant to knowledge and have the general aim of instruction and formation. This interpretation of Plato's ideas was criticized by Nietzsche, and later by Gadamer, who both insisted that for Plato the aim of books was not instruction and formation, but rather recollection of previously obtained knowledge, thus bringing new dimensions to the concept of hermeneutic circle.  

The intense practice of rhetoric and dialectics, an awareness of hermeneutic circularity, the importance of the teacher-disciple relation, the dialogic style of philosophical treaties, the limitation of writing to a mere aid for recollection, and the centrality of verbal testimony in epistemology, eminently in its oral form, are all elements found in the ancient South Asian tradition of Nyāya that will be here discussed and compared, particularly from the perspective of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (9th c. CE). The importance of orality in this tradition clearly emerges from the very foundation of verbal testimony, namely the authoritativeness of the instructor, as well as from the performative aspects of the textual transmission.
Guang Guo  
Independent Researcher, China

Things Being Known in Reality:  
A Definite Answer to Zeno’s Achilles and Tortoise and the Logic Gap in Gödel’s 1931 Proof

Kurt Gödel’s proof on ‘Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems’, commonly known by the public as the Incompleteness Theorem in his famous 1931 paper had unequivocally handed down a sober sentence upon the axiomatic approach in the study of Arithmetic, an elemental subject in Mathematics. The view of the proof being a singularity in the study of Mathematical Logic, overlaid with the feeling about its clarity as a No answer known in reality to a proposal intended for rigorous as well as aesthetic efforts of critical cognition by mankind, hints significantly an action to respond due in time.

In this article, we take steps to uncover the logic issues in Gödel’s 1931 proof of the Incompleteness Theorem. First, we provide a definite answer to Achilles and Tortoise, a time-enduring inquiry due to Zeno of Elea back to 2,500 years ago, to provide intuition onto our general approach of investigating logic issues in the proof of propositions and theorems. We then reintroduce two basic notions, retaining the meaning of letter throughout a given context and the Function and Argument components of a definition of function, in Logic postulated by Gottlob Frege in his Begriffsschrift as critical concepts we would utilize in our analysis of the logic issues in Gödel’s 1931 proof of the Incompleteness Theorem. Finally, we show the gap in logic in the sketched and formal version of Gödel’s proof and conclude our findings in the end.

By explicating the logic gap in Gödel’s proof as such, we suggest that the Incompleteness of a formal system as things being known in reality, a fundamental topic in Analytic Philosophy, is to be decided yet.
Machiavelli’s Adaptation of Aristotle’s Best Regime

In *The Machiavellian Moment*, John Pocock places Machiavelli in the tradition of the advocates for mixed government going back to Aristotle and Polybius. Quentin Skinner responds that Machiavelli more properly belongs to a neo-Roman Republican tradition that emphasizes liberty. Eric Nelson furthers the contest between Greek and Roman influence by focusing on the role of property rights in the Roman tradition, in contrast to the Greek tradition. Both sides in the debate are hampered by an overly simplistic view of the traditions in general, and more specifically of the intricacies of Aristotle’s *Politics*. Machiavelli’s thought shows a similar complexity as reflected in the apparently conflicting teachings of the *Prince* and *Discourses*.

Aristotle makes numerous claims about the best regime. What has yet to be recognized is that the *Politics* is organized around a *pros hen* analogous use of the term best, much as the *Metaphysics* is structured around being, understood as a *pros hen* analogy (1005 b 13–18). As a *pros hen* analogy, there is a core sense of the best regime and various derived senses, adapted to circumstances in different ways. The core sense is instantiated in the “City of Our Prayers” that combines the best features of polity and aristocracy. Although we see it as an oligarchy because Aristotle excludes so many from citizenship, in Aristotle’s terms is both a polity because citizens take turns ruling and being ruled and also an aristocracy because the virtuous rule.

Aristotle also discusses numerous derivative best regimes, adapted to circumstances. In archaic times, where there was a paucity of the virtuous, Aristotle takes monarchy as the best. In a polarized city where there is a large number of the poor and few wealthy, Aristotle suggests a mixed regime, combing elements of oligarchy and democracy. Finally, Aristotle describes the middle regime as a second best, appropriate for cities with a large middle class.

Although, Machiavelli does not use the technical features of a *pros hen* analogy, he well understands the circumstantial nature of Aristotle’s theory and adopts it for his own purposes. Like the archaic city, Machiavelli advocates the rule of a prince where the people are corrupt and there is inequality. As in the polarized city, Machiavelli favors a mixed regime to balance competing interests. In the city where there is equality, Machiavelli hopes for a republic, akin to Aristotle’s middle regime. Machiavelli’s creative adaptation of Aristotle’s distinctions makes simple classification in either Greek and Roman tradition impossible.
Abir Igamberdiev  
Professor, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada

Relational Universe of Leibniz:  
Implications for Modern Physics and Biology

The ideas of G.W. Leibniz can be traced to the principle which Plato attributed to Parmenides (“the existing one should be many”) and to the statement of Anaxagoras on the multiplicity of homoiomeri (particles having the same nature as the whole). In Leibniz philosophy the multiplicity of the world is represented by the infinite set of ideal essences called monads. Monad can be considered as a logical basis for the physical world and represents as an embodied logical machine. Each monad computes its own program and performs its own mathematical transformations of its qualities, independently of all other monads. Monads are self-powered: the power that causes the changes is due to the internal logical structure or, more precise, to the perpetual solution of the semantic paradox. We can say following Leibniz that the primary substance is not a number but it is the activity that introduces number. Leibniz considered space as a relational order of co-existences and time as a relational order of sequences. This approach came in physics with the new type of mechanics after two centuries from Leibniz (the special theory of relativity). However, this relational concept of space-time was again partially displaced by the modernized framework of substantial space-time in the general theory of relativity and in modern models of Universe evolution. In biology Robert Rosen was the follower of Leibniz’s methodology. To understand the nature of living systems, we need to analyze the problem of self. Generally, the “self” can be attributed to a unit (a kind of Leibniz monad) that has spontaneous activity and introduces computation. The physical nature of self is quantum mechanical, i.e., it is a state beyond quantum reduction, which generates emergent events by applying quantum reduction externally and observing it. The action of the self generates its framed output located in the external space. Inside the decision-making system, its internal volition-based and implying quantum reduction behavior occurs in the way that the external observer describes via probability (wave) function. The cause of such behavior always arises to a non-computable decision of the controlling system (monad) preceding the control. When we formalize the decision-making (i.e., living) system, we transform it into a program for a macroscopic computer without any internal point of view and freedom of will. The approach to see the world as a consistent history can be followed to Leibniz and to his unpublished logic at his time: the existence is related to the events that are consistent with more events than other possible events. According to Leibniz, a change is less a transformation than an
ordered revelation of the entity and the creation stands outside the
temporal order. In this approach, the objectivity of space-time is relational.
The Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics works in the isolated
relational domains but not between the domains, and the individual
biological systems can be taken as separate domains. The reality of
superposition of the wave function is limited by the single monad and
does not expand outside it, and in this sense “monads do not have
windows”, as originally proposed by Leibniz.
Matti Itkonen  
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The Essence of Kalastajatorppa Revisited.  
A Cinematographic Journey into Time and Space

A space can open or close. In so doing a space may, through its own opening, close itself. Or, indeed, the reverse is possible: a closed space may appear as an open space. It is here that a person comes face to face with the poetry of lived space. When a particular place feels snug and cosy or like home, the space has allowed that person to step into its essence. Then the person also arrives alongside himself, close to himself. He does not think or feel that he owns the space: his existence is not about owning but about being. When a person then forgets the being way of being, his worldly fulfilment has to do with owning. Simultaneously he becomes a vagrant, a beggar, in the midst of being in the world. Perhaps then he also stops actually being.

Helsinki, Munkkiniemi, the Kalastajatorppa restaurant and the film Kuollut mies kummittelee (The Ghost of a Dead Man) directed by Jorma Nortimo: a wind of internationalism blows across Finland. The war is over and a period of vigorous reconstruction begins. The beautiful Armi Kuusela is crowned Miss Finland and Miss Universe. The long awaited and anticipated Helsinki Summer Olympics take place. The year is 1952. Why does narrative use the present tense and not the past? The answer is simple: because I, the philosophical time-traveller, am reporting things and the sequence of events from here, on the spot. As a narrator, then, am I reliable or unreliable? I am at least unashamedly omniscient. There is nothing that escapes me. So I am very attentive and observant. But in my own inconspicuous way. This is something my audience should bear in mind. At this point I have nothing further to say.
Anar Jafarov  
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Searle on the Intentional Content of Visual Experiences

There is no unique idea regarding the form of the specification of (Intentional) content part of the visual experience. The philosophers' approaches diverge as to whether the content of visual experience is equivalent to a proposition or not. Some of them (mainly philosophers from the phenomenological tradition) consider that one must use a proposition for the specification of the content only when the subject, while having a visual experience, exercise a concept or judge. For the other cases, which can be called simple seeing, a noun phrase is preferable. I argue that, holding that the specification of Intentional content of the visual experience should be in the form of a proposition, John Searle gives up the first-person Intentionality and therefore bypasses the first-person important distinction between simple seeing and judgmental seeing. The specification of the content only in the form of the proposition does not allow to make such a distinction on the level of description.

Then I argue that the feature of the causal self-referentiality of the visual experience belongs to its psychological mode but not, as Searle holds, to the Intentional content of the visual experience.
Marzena Jakubczak
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What Cognitive Benefits May Arise from the Collision Between Language and Metaphysics?
Sāṅkhya-Yoga Perspective

When considering the question posed in the title I will focus mostly on the texts of the classical Indian Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition. On this basis the concept of linguistically conditioned perception will be discussed. The process of imposing the grammatical structures, ‘verbal conventions’ (saṃketa) and ‘[language based] fantasy’ (vikalpa), inevitably disturbs our knowledge. As far as it concerns the objective reality, the linguistic obstacles may be overcome. The subjective reality seems to remain beyond the grasp by definition. However, the incapability of grasping discursively the nature of the self (puruṣa), ultimately turns out to be a factor favorable to the growth of self-understanding. Here, the limitations of my self-knowledge—or inability to capture ‘subjectivity’ in the objective discourse—appear to be quite a beneficial and motivating factor on the way to change the mode of one’s perception, action and evaluation of one’s own deeds. In this sense, language plays in regard to self-knowledge either ---as in the case of Buddhist Pramāṇavāda--- the role of an hindrance, insofar at is projects erroneous conceptions on one’s self, or ---as in the case of Sāṅkhya-Yoga--- self-knowledge is a domain which is completely precluded to linguistical knowledge.
Malcolm Keating  
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**Indication as Verbal Postulation**

Suppose I say, “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.” According to the Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy, to make sense of the sentence, my hearer would fill in that he eats at night. They argue that this insertion of a meaning beyond the strictly literal is achieved through an epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) known as śrūtārthāpatti, or verbal postulation. In the ninth century, an Indian philosopher named Mukulabhaṭṭa, whose work resists easy identification with any single tradition, took the unusual step of identifying this as both a paradigm case of verbal postulation and a case of lakṣaṇā, or indication. Indication is a linguistic capacity which enables hearers to understand the non-literal meanings conveyed by speakers. Ordinarily, indication was thought to repair a lack of sentence-internal semantic compatibility (yogyatā), as in sentences like “The peasant is an ox”, since we cannot literally identify a peasant with an ox. However, Mukula expands indication’s scope, pointing out that we can have apparent inconsistencies between multiple factors: speaker, expression meanings, utterance meanings, place, time, and circumstances, as in the Fat Devadatta sentence, where incompatibility rests with Devadatta’s fatness and that he is not observed eating.

I argue that Mukula’s identification of indication and verbal postulation in this particular case is correct. I also argue that other instances of indication can be understood as verbal postulation due to the shared structure of the two epistemic instruments. Both are triggered by apparent incompatibility between a piece of background knowledge and a new bit of testimonial knowledge. Both rely upon tacitly held principles or axioms to postulate a conclusion which would remove the incompatibility. If Mukula is correct, this is a challenge to the distinction commonly found in the Indian pramāṇa system between indication (as part of the pramāṇa of testimony) and verbal postulation.
Tonci Kokic
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Is the Origin of First Life Scientifically Solvable?

It seems that all natural phenomena have to obey scientific methodology. Contrary to that belief, the phenomenon of the origin of first life (OFL) is persistently resisting to be solvable by acceptable scientific theory which could be confirmed by successful experimental test of recurring the OFL from abiotic components. Because of this, it is reasonable to think that at least in relation to covering law model (D-N or similar) it is possible to claim that OFL is not explainable by acceptable scientific theory and its experimental prove. The resolution of the doubt suggests that possible explanation of the OFL have to be found in uniqueness of that phenomenon. If so, knowledge and the purview of scientific method is limited and the origin of first life could be highly improbable lucky accident.
Marco Lauri
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“I’ve told a Story in Order to Make a Case for the Truth”
Storytelling, Knowledge and Social Agency in some Medieval Arabic Texts

The paper will explore the complex relationship between storytelling and philosophical discourse in some Medieval Arabic texts. What happens to language when a story is told “in order to make a case for truth” (Chiang)?

In the Republic, Plato argued that fabricated myths could serve to support truth at the social level, while conceding that they would be technically lies. In his Commentary to the Republic, Ibn Rušd scoffed at this approach, dismissing the cognitive value of fiction. The Republic calls for a radical change in society, which Ibn Rušd endorses.

In his philosophical tale Risālat Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, the twelfth century philosopher Ibn Ṭufayl seems to suggest that truth should be conveyed through a story, as other linguistic resources would fall short of the task. In the Arabian Nights, Šahrazād uses storytelling to turn the madman tyrant Šahriyar into an adequate ruler. Is truth the “same” when argued for through a tale or an argument?

It may be possible to say that in these cases, storytelling is used to turn truth into social agency. The paper will examine this possibility, discussing whether we can locate an Arabic 'tradition' in these discussions and how it relates to other philosophical traditions. I will argue that in some traditions of Arabic Medieval thought, inspired by a reading of Plato, storytelling could have a philosophical value, albeit this was not generally recognised. The knowledge embedded in storytelling might be characterized by a dialogic element that enables it to operate at a social level. Some remarks on the possibility of transcultural 'comparison' will also be offered, addressing whether similar questions are presented by 'western' (Christian) and Indian thought.
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Sustainable Wasteland: Ecological Humanism, Cadaver Cosmetics, and the Desirable Future

In this paper, I’ll argue that a vital component of a defensible ecological ethic is the potential for an *aesthetic experience* whose value is exemplified in those actions, individual and collective, that tend to foster active respect for biodiversity and contribute to ecological stability. Such an ethic must be “self-critically anthropocentric” or *human-centered* in the sense that its agents take seriously what it means to occupy specific existential and epistemic situations, and where “take seriously” implies taking responsibility for actions whose consequences we can know in ways unlikely to be (as) possible for other species of creature. In short, intellectual wherewithal implies not merely “power,” but responsibility for the *future* that its exercise entails. Such a disposition, I suggest, has significant consequences for our current understanding of ecological sustainability. It’s easy to imagine a future *merely sustainable*—but only a future *desirable to the creatures who can imagine it and know the difference* can elicit the creative labor or *praxis* required to realize it as an ethic *worth the effort*.

It’s one thing, for example, to act to mitigate climate change within the systems responsible for its anthropogenic contribution; from this point of view, sustainability is just a fashionable term for “reform.” It’s quite another to re-imagine a future beyond mere reform, one in which notions like “restoration,” “reclamation,” and the fostering of genuine biodiversity are meaningful. Following John Dewey, I’ll argue that “meaningful” is essentially an aesthetic concepts in that such an imagined future must be able to solicit the possibility of *aesthetic* experience. From this perspective, human centeredness implies not the short-sighted and exploitive chauvinism of the “human, all too human” past, but responsibility taken for the future by the only creatures (at least on this planet) whose epistemic situation makes this possible: *homo Sapiens*.
Vito Limone  
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The οὐσία in Origen’s Commentary on John about the Theological Interpretation of a Philosophical Concept

The aim of this paper is to briefly examine the quotations of the term οὐσία in Origen’s Commentary on John (= Clo) and, particularly, to point out that he translates this philosophical concept into the theological relationship between God-Father and the Son-Wisdom. In de orat. 27,8 – which was written in 233-234, within the redactions of the first and the second parts of the Commentary on John – Origen distinguishes two main meanings of the term οὐσία: firstly, according to Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, it means the individual existence, properly the ὑπόστασις; secondly, according to the Stoics, it means the common and generic substance which is participated by many beings, properly the ὑπόμενον or προηγουμένη οὐσία. In the exegesis of John Origen resorts this conceptual and philosophical difference in order to explain the theological relation among the Father and the Son. The paper will concentrate on two main occurrences of οὐσία in the Commentary. The first is Clo 2,23,149: while commenting Jo. 1,4 and comparing it with 1 Jo. 1,5, Origen argues with the Monarchians and says that, as the light of 1 Jo. 1,5 which has no relation with the darkness is different from the light of Jo. 1,4 which is in relation with the darkness, so God-Father is different from the Son-Wisdom in terms of οὐσία. Here Origen seems to suggest that the term οὐσία is used in terms of ὑπόστασις, i.e. individual existence, and then there are two οὐσίαι of the Father and the Son. The second main occurrence of the term is Clo 10,37,246: Origen criticizes the Monarchians who point out that God-Father and the Son-Wisdom are the same not only in terms of οὐσία, but also in terms of ὑπόστασις and ὑποκείμενον. Actually Origen insists on the fact that the Father and the Son are different in terms of their individual existences, i.e. τῇ ὑπόστασις or ὑποκειμένῳ, but they are the same because of their common substance, i.e. τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Here Origen seems to use the Stoic meaning of οὐσία as τῷ ὑπομένῳ or προηγουμένῃ οὐσίᾳ. In conclusion, in his Commentary on John Origen uses the two philosophical meanings of οὐσία which he clearly summarizes in de orat. 27,8, in order to explain the theological and divine relation among the Father and the Son.
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Vulnerability as Strength in Nietzsche´s Zarathustra

Gianni Vattimo affirms that every reading of Nietzsche implies an interpretation of two central concepts: the Eternal Recurrence and the Übermensch. In this work we will show how the main interpretations of this concepts fail to seize the complexity of Nietzsche´s definitions. First we will discuss Heidegger´s interpretation. In his *Nietzsche* the author presents the Eternal Recurrence as inevitable. The Ubermensch is doomed to an existence trapped in the takeover of life by technology. We will read the same paragraph as Heidegger –On Redemption– but with opposite conclusions. Our argument is that the figure of the handicapped ciphers the answer of Zarathustra regarding Eternal Recurrence. In their fragility resides their own force. Eternal Recurrence is then thought as a transit from pain to love. In this sense we will also discuss Deleuze, regarding his idea of Will to Power as only a positive force. In our reading neither positivity nor negativity are transcended, but maintained as forces in tension.
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Concepts of Sensation, Feeling and Belief  
in F.H. Jacobi’s Philosophy

F. H Jacobi’s philosophy, such as a philosophy of the circle of thinkers to which he belonged (J. G. Hamann, F. Hemsterhuis), may seem a peripheral phenomenon in the philosophy of the last quarter of XVIII – first quarter of XIX century. But a closer acquaintance with his philosophy urges to think that F. H. Jacobi (1743-1819) often goes ahead of his time in the way he poses philosophical problems. One of the most important examples of it is the development of problem of scientific (“proofed”) knowledge as rooted in the pre-scientific experience (“knowledge without proof”). (This “knowledge without proof” F. H. Jacobi calls "belief").

Problem of the relationship of experience and scientific knowledge was raised, of course, in the XVIII century by the British empiricists, philosophers of the French Enlightenment, and by I. Kant, but all these thinkers suppose, that the field of knowledge is homogeneous; they don’t see any qualitative difference between the scientific knowledge and the knowledge of world in the pre-scientific experience. F. H. Jacobi, on the contrary, seeks to show the qualitative and systematic difference between the scientific knowledge and the knowledge in the pre-scientific experience: pre-scientific knowledge, "knowledge without proof," "necessarily precedes knowledge, obtained by proof, justifies it, and constantly sway over it." This way of thinking makes F. H. Jacobi close to the phenomenological philosophy of the XX century, as well as to the philosophy of one of its predecessors – W. Dilthey, and to M. Heidegger’s philosophy. The ground of the the pre-scientific knowledge is for F. G. Jacobi perceptual experience. This brings him close both to the sensualists of XVIII century and to the phenomenologists of XX century, in particular, M. Merleau-Ponty. But, unlike the sensualists, F. H. Jacobi argues that along with such form of receptivity as sensation there is another, qualitatively different from it form of receptivity, which he calls “feeling”. According to Jacobi, feeling is reception of ideas in Plato’s sense, and this form of receptivity is inherent to the reason. In such a consideration of the feeling Jacobi makes a move from Kant to Plato, removing Kant’s denial of the intellectual intuition. This move allows him to reveal some important aspects of human perception. What are these aspects we’ll try to show in our report, tracing the interrelations between sensation, feeling and belief in the F. H. Jacobi’s philosophy.
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Does Dissymmetric Signification Rely on Conventional Rules? Two Ancient Greek Answers

Textual evidence of the pre-Socratic age, albeit fragmentary, allows us to quite easily follow the development of Greek reflection on language, from its more occasional forms to the more systematic ones. The speculation about dissymmetry between word-forms and the relevant denoted objects - mainly exemplified by synonymy or polysemy - definitely fits in this iter.

My paper aims to demonstrate that pre-Socratic thought tackled the problem of word-object dissymmetry through two different approaches, which are surprisingly parallel to those recorded in analogous Indian grammarians and thinkers' reflections:

1) There is a one-to-one and well established relation between words and objects, so that dissymmetry is only apparent.

2) The word-object relation is a mere convention: therefore, a well-established and naturally one-to-one correspondence between word and object does not exist.

More in detail, and looking at the two approaches in a historical perspective, in the earliest phase, dissymmetry is considered as a deviation from a one-to-one word-object relation - intuitively perceived as natural - so that some thinkers try to justify it. For instance, Pherecydes of Syros explains that Xθοβινη changed her name into Γη because Zeus offered the earth to her (fr. 7 B 1 DK), while Heraclitus suggests that Dyonysus and Ade, as names of the same god, actually refer to two different religious domains (fr. 22 B 15 DK).

The subsequent crack in faith in the stability of reality, which had just begun with the heraclitean principle of πάντα ρεῖ, brings thinkers, such as Parmenides (fr. 28 B 8 DK) and Empedocles (fr. 56 Bollack), to recognize the conventional status of words and the instability of the meaning-form relation. Gorgias develops this thought by asserting that it is not possible to know reality by means of words, because they are both of a completely different nature (fr. 82 B 3 DK).
Angela Maria Michelis
Professor, University of Turin, Italy

The New Challenges and the Role of Philosophy as Hans Jonas

Philosophy cannot remain indifferent to the challenges of contemporary history, because philosophy is exactly the kind of knowledge we need today. Philosophy enables us to interpret individual experience from a wider perspective, going beyond the immediate and forging essential connections between the various voices in order to find common solutions we can use to design and create a better world for everyone. This is where the power of human thinking lies, the power that has given rise to the civilizations that value life. Much has been done in history, sometimes too much, and it is now necessary to restore some balance, first and foremost by taking responsibility for life – the force common to both the human race and the whole of nature, and work to ensure its continuation.

The challenges of the third millennium, such as the globalization of the markets without the globalization of rights, religious struggles for cultural supremacy, and the environmental crisis, to name but a few of the main ones, cannot be solved – as it presently appears - purely by applying the vision that reduces the world and human beings to their exchange value, to a question of money.

Faced with this situation it appears that we need to return to a vision of politics based on serving the common good and fortify the political arena with the awareness that the destiny of the individual cannot be regarded as separate from that of the society he or she lives in, the nation and, today, the international context; above all, it cannot be separated from the health of the planet we inhabit.

"In spite of everything, my hope ultimately rests on human reason”, Hans Jonas has written. He never lost faith in the sublime notion of humans sharing a common sentiment, perception, rationale and love, the signs of a shared human experience which expresses itself in the universality of logos. Individual experience and universal aspiration come together in the “concept”, which uses words to express what is encountered in the living. The fact that we can share this reminds us of the profound meaning of brotherhood, equality and creativity. Furthermore, Jonas attempts to highlight the links between matter and spirit, body and soul, and the participatory relationship between man and nature, renewing the image of man’s most fitting role – that of wise, sage custodian of the entity that we are all part of.
Monika Nowakowska
Assistant Professor, University of Warsaw, Poland

Truthfulness and Credibility in an Indian Hermeneutical Context

Truthfulness and credibility were important topics for discussion in the context of an ancient Indian hermeneutical tradition, the (pūrva-)-mīmāṃsā, that was focused on proving the validity of the Veda (the Indian Sacred Text) and on the correct interpretation of the ritualistic rules it embodies. The main interest of mīmāṃsā is the language par excellence, i.e. the Word of the Veda, as the only source of knowledge of and guidance to the other, imperceptible, realm (svarga – an elusive sort of heaven). By definition, the Veda is truthful and its validity is not derivative from any higher authority of a super qualified author (like God), but independent and even strengthened by the absence of such a person (since an author would be a possible source of untruth). Thus, the Veda is authorless and the justification of its authority stops with the Veda itself. The fundamental content of the Veda, according to mīmāṃsā followers, is ritualistic commands with their performative value. The Vedic message and its language is, however, received and used by people. It thus requires competency in the correct interpretation and that is governed by strict rules and undertaken by competent performers. On the other hand that very same language serves to communicate in the realm of perceptibility (mīmāṃsā did not accept extrasensory perception). It names and expresses what is being learnt about the world, and it is thus indispensable on everyday basis.

This paper reviews the above perspective of early mīmāṃsā on language as a tool of acquiring and conveying knowledge, making it understandable to an audience of scholars of Western philosophy and referring mainly to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s tradition (7th century), and then to its comprehensive discussions in the 9th century Sanskrit nyāya treatise titled Nyāyamañjarī by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (who has been proved by Kei Kataoka to be in many cases the first and even more often the most reliable interpreter of Kumārila).
Ibrahim Noorani
Lecturer, Benazir Bhutto Shaheed University, Karachi, Pakistan

Ideology of Governance – A Qualitative Analysis of the Right to Rule and the Ideal Rule

As eyes, despite having the ability of sight, require light to see anything, so does the intellect require guidance from the enlightened in order to realize one’s self. Without proper governance human beings are no different from animals. Therefore, it is necessary that the person who is to be ruling possesses such enlightenment. This paper attempts to identify four main components that give an individual the right to rule, this includes: succession, rights, spirituality and politics. Contrary to this, any other rule will only result in despotism, repression and injustice.

In this study, my main focus will be on the identification of as to who should be the rightful ruler, whose governance can only be justified and none else.
Anna Olejarczyk  
Assistant Professor, University of Wroclaw, Poland

Plato’s Conception of Language

I attempt to reconstruct the Plato’s philosophy of language using the whole Corpus Platonicum as the source for such reconstruction.

The Cratylus – the only dialogue in which the questions about language are asked openly – is the starting point of reconstruction, but I use some quotations from Gorgias, Politeia, Parmenides, Sophist, Theaetetus, Timaeus, Philebus and VII Letter as the clues. I argue that Plato’s philosophy of language is coherent with his ontology which I will try to prove while exploring the importance of proper measure. My paper consists of three parts - each one is concluded from an attentive lecture of Cratylus in the context of all Corpus Platonicum: (I) The source of names; (II) The proper way of thinking and recognition; (III) The source of images.

From my point of view, the main problem given for consideration in Cratylus is the problem of proper names. The question of truth does not depend on a true sentence yet (the truth is shown as dependant of structure of sentence in Sophist); in Cratylus the truth of speech depends on a proper name. Proper name is the name which is in right relation to the things and to other names.

The proper name depends on proper relations and the knowledge of the right relation depends on the proper images. This topic is presented as crucial in [Respublica 534a1-9] where the similarities, analogies and differences between several types of recognition and knowledge are discussed: doxa, episteme, pisteis, phantasias, eikasia and noesis. There are three sources of images (therefore there are three sources of names): phantasias, eikasia and noesis, but only noesis is the source of proper images and proper names.
William O’Meara  
Professor, James Madison University, USA

Camus and Descartes: 
The Absurd and the Methodic Doubt

This paper will explore an in depth comparison between Camus and Descartes on the Absurd and the Methodic Doubt. Camus himself has suggested the comparison.

All the while that Descartes consciously raises doubts about the former opinions, Descartes has believed it is possible for him to break out of the method doubt precisely because all these modes of consciousness, perception, dreaming, mathematical reasoning and hyperbolic doubt about the evil genius were all modes of thinking. At any time, he could have said, “I think, therefore I am.” Descartes, to be absolutely honest in his commitment to truth, however, lives through the doubt until he has examined all the consequences of his method of doubting. So also Camus pursues his awareness of and confrontation with the absurd with absolute honesty in The Myth of Sisyphus. However, he can break out of the absurd at any time he chooses, just as Descartes can break of the methodic doubt anytime he would choose [The Rebel, 18]. For, as Camus explains, the absurd: “is contradictory in its content because, in wanting to uphold life, it excludes all value judgments, when to live is, in itself, a value judgment [The Rebel, 8].”

Once Camus chooses lucid consciousness as his primary value, it is contradictory for him to deny lucid consciousness as primary to any other human: it is contradictory for him to affirm that all is absurd and then to draw logical consequences of the absurd: it is contradictory for him to say that life is absurd and then act out something (being a Don Juan) which is consequence of the absurd. Camus sums up the contradictoriness of the absurd: “The absurd, considered as a rule of life, is therefore contradictory . . . .”
Jorge Pacheco  
Professor, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Colombia  
&  
Sandra Elizabeth Forero  
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Colombia  

Philosophy and Paranoia of Genius:  
Un-Veiled of Real?

This exhibition is the result of a research on relationship between and philosophy, psychoanalysis. It is known that many philosophers presented to philosophy not only as a field of knowledge, but also as a particular lifestyle. A psychoanalytic view of philosophical activity, allows us to understand the nature of philosophical genius. From the use and application of some categories that Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan clinically interpreted the constitution opinion of some formalities of the social bond. According to this perspective, one can say that the philosophical task involves a particular type of estrangement (alienation) of the world to have a more complex and complete view of the world that is moving away. From to this view of philosophy, the philosopher is an "another" that is located in a close perspective to what in philosophy called "externalism", "the perspective of God's eye" or, in terms of Jacques Lacan: "An approach to Réal".
Tiziana Pontillo  
Senior Lecturer, University of Cagliari, Italy 
&  
Valeria Melis  
Ph.D., University of Turin - University of Cagliari, Italy

**Does Dissymmetric Signification Rely on Conventional Rules? Two Ancient Indian Answers**

The topic of dissymmetry between the semantic and the phonomorphological levels of language emerges very early in Indian technical and speculative reflections as it also does in pre-Socratic Greek thought. Such a linguistic phenomenon is generally considered as a problematic exception of the one-to-one principle of correspondence between words and the objects they denoted. This well established relation seems to have been presupposed for each analysis of the signification long before its earliest statement - which to the best of my knowledge dates back to a couple of Kātyāyana’s vārttikas (3rd c. BCE), i.e. aphorisms commenting on a quarter of the grammatical rules enunciated by Pāṇini (5th c. BCE).

The present paper aims at shedding light on two different patterns of tackling the mentioned problem, which are already testified in some Brāhmaṇa- and Upaniṣad-passages attributed to the 9th-6th c. BCE, and later developed in more thoroughly philosophical or linguistic works (5th-2nd c. BCE). In short, the first approach sees dissymmetry as an exception to the regular correspondence between language and reality, whereas the second approach considers language in itself, as a conceptualisation which does not faithfully represent reality. In the latter case, dissymmetry is no longer an exception, but the rule.

More in detail, the former (Nir. 1.12-14) consists in maintaining that no rule can govern the supposed ‘natural’ ability entailed by some single word-forms of conveying more than one meaning (polysemy) or, viceversa, of co-existing with other word-forms that can convey a comparable meaning (synonymy).

The latter approach - which is involved in both some Upaniṣad-passages, such as ChUp 6.1.3.4; 4;1 ff., and some well-known Buddhist explanations, such as Mil. 25-6 (ed. Trenckner) - focuses on the dissymmetry of the objects which are exclusively perceptible in their parts, while their existence as wholes is warranted as a pure linguistic convention. Thus, śabdadėnapāṇa, i.e. ‘language as a means of conveying knowledge’ automatically loses its reliability and no word actually matches its object.
Donald Poochigian  
Professor, University of North Dakota, USA

Quality and Abstraction:  
A Critique of Scientism

Developing a unified science founded on a unified cognitive science will be incomplete because cognitive science is not self-identifying. Science concerns quality because intersubjectively verifiable, and not abstraction because not intersubjectively verifiable. But extended in time and/or space, quality is inherently ambiguous. Unextended in time or space, abstraction is inherently unambiguous. Quality being inherently ambiguous and abstraction not, quality is rendered unambiguous only when identified by abstraction. Quality being temporally and/or spatially extended and abstraction not, how can abstraction identify quality? Exhibited is the normative character of scientific reality. This is especially exhibited in application of the conventional formulation of quantum mechanics, which is impossible without external observation. Here objects which are constituent of the observed system are distinguishable from objects which are part of the observer’s apparatus only arbitrarily.
Can there be Positive Human Rights?

This paper challenges a common objection to the idea that positive rights, such as socio-economic or welfare rights, can be general or pre-institutional, i.e. held by all persons against all others. According to the ‘claimability’ objection put forward by Onora O’Neill positive rights cannot be general because they cannot have correlative duties since positive duties cannot be general.

First, I argue both against some views that reject positive human rights for the wrong reasons (e.g. Sreenivasan) and views that purport to answer this objection but do not do so convincingly in my view (e.g. Ashford). Second, I examine Onora O’Neill’s argument in depth. This maintains that positive rights cannot be general because 1.) rights must correlate with perfect duties and 2.) general perfect duties cannot be positive; they must be either negative or special. I accept the first assumption but challenge the second.

To this end, I first clarify what ‘held by all against all’ means and I suggest that it is best interpreted as ‘held against all collectively’. Next, I explain that the claimability objection, if levelled once again against this interpretation, confuses claimability with enforceability. In other words, the fact that violators of human rights may be difficult to identify and perhaps held responsible does not make rights un-claimable. There is thus no reason why there cannot be human rights to socio-economic goods although this paper does not establish that there are any.
Bruno Pusic
Junior Research Fellow, University of Zagreb, Croatia

A Survey of Biologists on the Species Problem

My PhD dissertation is on the species problem in the philosophy of biology. In order to determine the attitudes of active biologists on the key assumptions, concepts and positions of the species problem, I conducted a broad survey on members of over 150 departments of biology at universities and institutes across the world. More specifically, the survey was designed to check the validity of the following claims that are often made in the literature on the species problem:

1. The species concept is a fundamental concept in biology.
2. The species is the fundamental unit of evolution.
3. The species problem is of great importance in biology.
4. Biologists think that species are real entities.
5. Species as individuals is a dominant position on the ontological status of the species.
6. Species as individuals position implies that species really exist.
7. Species essentialism is not a plausible position in modern biology.
8. Species monism implies that species really exist.
9. Species pluralism implies that species do not really exist.
10. Most biologists use biological species concept in their research.

This type of survey has not been performed before, and the results are quite surprising. On this conference I would present the methodology and the results of my survey on the species problem for the first time, followed by some comments.
Internalization of Speech: Perception and Understanding of the Word

The definition of the word (śabda) was established by the Grammarian Patanjali (2 B.C.) in the Mahābhāṣya (MBh). Bhartrhari (5 A.D.), who followed and developed the discussions of MBh in his Vākyapadīya (VP), talks about different aspects of the word: the external word manifested by sounds and the internal word existing in our consciousness. The process of the understanding of meaning is the internalization of the external word which has been pronounced by the speaker. Here we have to be careful about the distinction between understanding of the meaning and perception of the word. The philosopher Maṇḍanamiśra (8c.) has examined the process of the manifestation of sphoṭa which is the single indivisible meaning-bearing unit of language in his Sphoṭasiddhi. In other words, here he shows the process of perception of the word, relating Bhartrhari’s language theory to the epistemology of the Vedānta school of Indian philosophy. The concept of sphoṭa, which was introduced by Patanjali and refined by Bhartrhari, is interpreted by Maṇḍanamiśra clearly as that of the word in the external world. However, Maṇḍanamiśra does not have much to say about the internal word, while Bhartrhari clearly distinguishes the internal and the external, as we can see in his use of the terms nāda and dhvani for these two respectively, terms which elsewhere are used synonymously to mean sound of any kind. The understanding of meaning is necessarily related to our consciousness. That is, at some point the word exists in our minds. Nonetheless, scholars have not yet understood how Maṇḍanamiśra accounted for the process of the internalization of the word.

In this presentation, therefore, I will consider:
1) what exactly the difference is between the external word and the internal word for Bhartrhari and Maṇḍanamiśra, and
2) how the Grammarians’ theory of language explains the process of the internalization of the word.
The intent of this paper is to give a phenomenological update on the understanding of the concept and reality of freedom. How do we continue the debate on free will given the following: (1) the contingency of consciousness to a neural brain (2) the established correlates between mental and neural states, (3) Libet’s claim that ‘readiness potential’ precedes ‘conscious choice’ and (4) the persistent claim for existential ‘free will’ exhibited in human praxis. We continue the debate because there is no reason for the debate to end. Can we locate consciousness or free will? We know that consciousness is contingent or related to the physical brain, but until we can establish what role non-neural elements (temperature, pressure, neural oscillations and sleep) play in making consciousness possible, the debate will continue to define, detect or locate consciousness.

(George Ward) We know that consciousness is related to the physical brain but we do not know whether consciousness is a fundamental property of the physical universe or how it is related to the laws of physics. We know that consciousness is contingent to the physical brain but we do not know whether it is physical (as Dennett claims), whether it is non-physical (as Chalmers claims) or whether it is irreducible (as Searle claims) because consciousness/’free will’ is an existential mode of being, hence only existentially knowable though we can detect the difference between conscious/cognitive states from unconscious/non-cognitive states by brain imaging techniques. Does Libet’s time gap experiment between “readiness potential” and ‘conscious choice’ imply that ‘free will’ is an illusion? Current research suggests that the brain is a “decision making organ” (Herbert Gintis). The question is, who or what is making the decisions? If it is not the ‘conscious you’ then it has to be the ‘neural you’ that is making the decisions (Paul Bloom). Neuroscience tells us that if the brain is damaged the decision making capacity of the brain is diminished. This implies that it is the brain that makes the decisions which the mind is aware of. According to Sam Harris this implies that ‘free choice’ is an illusion because our choices are the result of brain activities Harris concludes that humans are “biochemical puppets”. Brain imaging maps clearly indicate that our mental lives can be observed in the activity of our neurons. But does it follow that consciousness and free will are reducible or detectable realities. Is it possible to argue that the ‘neural you’ and the ‘genetic you’ are the foundation for the ‘conscious you’ and the
‘phenomenal you’ (Paul Bloom). Instead of seeing both the neural ‘I’ and the conscious ‘I’ as being mutually exclusive it is important to see them being the same thing. Where ever humans exist ‘free will’ exits. ‘Free will’ is an ontological parasite and like all existential truth it is an either/or matter. We can choose to live believing or choose to live disbelieving that we have ‘free will’. We always choose in the context of constraints— the awareness of the determining forces at work and the awareness that we can always exercise ‘conscious veto’ (Libet seems to suggest we can veto what neurons do or decide). When we choose being aware of the determining forces (be it neural, genetic, the omniscience of the sacred or societal powers) in the context of ‘conscious veto’, ‘free will’ is real. When we choose to live knowing well that we can choose to die then to choose to live is to choose to live making choices/ to choose to die is to choose to end making choices.
Gleisson Schmidt
Professor, Universidade Tecnologica Federal do Parana, Brazil

Merleau-Ponty, from the Overcoming of the Epistemological Dichotomy to the Recognition of the Ontological Diplopia

Between 1956 and 1960, Maurice Merleau-Ponty decided to devote his Thursday classes at the Collège de France to the theme of Nature. The leading problem at that time was the relation between the concept of Nature and the ontology's general theme. In such analysis, the study of the Nature was an introduction to its definition via the indirect ontology that characterizes the philosopher's final thought. Merleau-Ponty identifies in the history of Western philosophy an oscillating movement between a positivist thought and a negativistic thought, the latter reversing the prospects of the former without being able to eliminate it. Such ambiguity, inherent to the history of philosophy, consists in an ontological diplopia "from which cannot be expected no rational reduction after so many philosophical efforts, and about what interests us only to take possession entirely, as the sight takes possession of monocular images to make them one single vision" (Résumés de Cours, Collège de France, 1952-1960. Paris: Gallimard, 1968, p. 127). This way, the philosophies' ebb and flow between each one of these ontological perspectives is neither inaccuracy nor an indication of inconsistency, but rather "justified and founded in the Being" (id, ibid.). In face of them one could only expect that the philosopher recognizes this oscillating movement characteristic of modern philosophy and reflect about it in order to develop some concept of Being capable of sheltering the contradictions without simply accepting or overcoming them, nor alternately occupying these two self-exclusionary - and curiously interdependent - ontological positions.

From the initial project of the refoundation of "certain psychological and philosophical notions in use" about perception (Projet de travail sur la nature de la perception, 1933), passing through the philosophical effort aiming to overcome the dichotomy between idealism and realism as seen in the Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), we find, in the late 1950s, Merleau-Ponty's appeal not to the reduction of diplopia, but to its recognition. We aim in this work to show how such approach oriented Merleau-Ponty's last philosophy towards the philosophy of flesh that appears in his final works.
In this paper, I consider what Socrates means by an “examined life” and why he thinks it is the best possible human life. My answer presupposes that this kind of life is precisely the activity Socrates promotes among his fellow-citizens. Accordingly, I focus first on how he presents his teaching and how he tries to persuade the Athenians to care for themselves and for virtue, if they want to be really happy (Apology). Then, I examine the relation between knowledge and happiness in the Euthydemus and, finally, I try to show that the knowledge that leads to happiness essentially involves self-knowledge (Alcibiades I). This analysis provides a good explanation of what the nature of an examined life is and why this way of life is, as Socrates states, the greatest human good.
Natasza Szutta  
Assistant Professor, University of Gdansk, Poland

**Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Social Psychology**

With its long history reaching antiquity, virtue ethics, especially after its revival in the second half of the 20th century, is currently one of the most influential ethical approaches. It also finds a wide variety of applications: in social ethics, political philosophy, education, bioethics, or medical ethics. It is still attractive to a growing number of both, academics as well as regular people.

The basic assumption of virtue ethics is a conviction that morally good action results from a morally good character of an agent. Morally good character, in turn, may be achieved by perfecting ethical virtues – acquired and stable dispositions to a morally good action such as benevolence, honesty, justice, readiness to help, etc.

Just when virtue ethics seemed to have reached high popularity, it became an object of heavy criticism from such ethicists as Doris, Harman, Merritt, Vranas, who, inspired by the research within contemporary social and cognitive psychology. In their opinion the empirical results show that there is no such thing as moral character or virtue, and the decisive factors shaping human behavior are situational, not personological. Referring to a vast empirical material, experiments (Millgram, Zimbardo, Darley & Batson, Bargh), they claim that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate, because it is based on moral psychology that finds no confirmation in empirical research.

In my presentation I am going to do the following: First, analyze the concept of ethical virtue. I will try to show analogy between virtue and practical skills, including the way one acquires these skills. I will draw attention to the fact of automaticity in virtuous action and actions of experts in practical skills on the one hand, and reflectiveness on the other. Second, I will consider why nobody questions expert practical skills, by the reference to the contemporary psychological research, while questioning ethical virtues as signs of a morally perfect agent.
Mar Rosas Tosas
Research Coordinator, University Ramon Llull, Spain

Arendt, Agamben and Derrida.
Rethinking Educational Leadership

The aim of this paper is to explore how certain aspects of the thought of Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben can contribute to the field of educational leadership.

We will discuss together Magrini’s (2013) reading of Hannah’s Arendt notion of education –learning as an interruption of the flow of history-, Tyson E. Lewis’s (2013) application of Agamben’s notion of (im)potentiality –a potency which is never in act-, and Jacques Derrida’s (1997) description of hospitality as an aporetic concept -for hospitality to be authentic one needs not know in advance that somebody is coming, and therefore, since there is no preparation, hospitality is never complete -in order to complement, expand, and correct previous views on educational leadership.

In short, we aim at redefining educational leadership by arguing that, unlike what rather conventional models of educational leadership (…………) modeled on the leading corporate executives propound, we believe that education leadership’s success cannot and should not depend on reaching pre-established goals, reproducing a certain model thanks to a great organizational effectiveness (Yukl 2008), managing budgets so that without great costs students achieve good results in exterior tests, but should be defined precisely by its ability to host the unexpected and open up unanticipated paths and ideas.
Secil Turkoz  
Instructor, Abant Izzet Baysal University, Turkey

**Rethinking the Concept of Suggestion within Suggestopaedia**

This study aims to examine the concept of suggestion within Suggestopaedia. Developed by the Bulgarian scientist Georgi Lozanov as a method of teaching and learning, Suggestopaedia draws attention to the role and significance of suggestion in the process of education. Suggestopaedia is composed of two words, suggesto, which is related to the Latin verb suggero, suggest, suggestum, or suggest, and paedia, which is connected with matters of teaching, learning and education, that is, pedagogy. The term suggestion has been defined in different ways by different scholars according to their particular interpretation and point of view. On the other hand, the word is used in different languages with more or less negative connotations. It has been associated with hypnosis by some researchers. Yet, Lozanov’s understanding of suggestion in Suggestopaedia, which is influenced by his long term research in this field, is entirely different from other definitions of the term. In Suggestopaedia, suggestion comes to mean “to offer, to propose” a meaning away from negative associations. Thus, it is the student’s free will to choose or reject it. From his point of view, suggestion is a communicative event that shows its influence in every sphere of life. Since classrooms are rich communicative contexts, in Suggestopaedia, suggestion is presented in an organized and deliberate fashion in order to tap enormous potential capacities for accelerated harmonious development, capacities that are locked within us. To sum up, in this study the term suggestion will be investigated in terms of Suggestopaedia and how Lozanov came to his own definition of suggestion, the suggestion with a capital “S” and finally how this understanding of Suggestion has paved the way for a new philosophy of education.
Maria de Lourdes Valdivia Dounce  
Professor, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico

Frege’s Categories and Their Problems

Frege held that concept words refer to concepts not to objects and that singular terms refer to objects not to concepts. I argue that from these claims it follows three related difficulties for Frege’s semantic theory: (1) that there is no way to say of a concept F that it is a concept, (2) neither can tell of a function that it is identical to itself and finally that (3) there is no universal quantification over objects and functions. These three problems arise from two assumptions: that the distinctions between object and concept and between function words and proper names are exhaustive and exclusive philosophical categories and the assumption that language reflects the way objects and concepts metaphysically are. The upshot being: Frege’s perfect language ends up with ineffability about its own essential categories. In a recent paper Textor argues for only one of these difficulties arising from what he calls the mirror principle that I will discuss in this paper. My aim here is to show that Textor’s claim is more modest than mine.
Monika Walczak  
Associate Professor, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland

The Classical Notion of Knowledge and Interdisciplinarity of Science

The main concern of the paper is situated between analytical epistemology (theory of knowledge) and philosophy of science. The notion of knowledge is considered in terms of its usefulness to characterize the interdisciplinarity of science. The main question concerns the kind of the notion of knowledge that might be useful when discussing the interdisciplinarity of knowledge, especially the interdisciplinarity of scientific knowledge. Other issues addressed in the paper include the following: Does the classical notion of knowledge, used in analytical epistemology, suffice to address the problem of interdisciplinarity of (scientific) knowledge? What aspects of knowledge are relevant in this context and should be reflected in the notion of knowledge? How to transform the classical notion of knowledge so that it can serve as a conceptual tool to discuss the interdisciplinarity of scientific knowledge?

The notion of interdisciplinarity has recently become a crucial category in the philosophy of science. However, it is not used in the context of analytical epistemology (theory of knowledge). While nobody denies that science is today the most prominent domain of knowledge, the analysis of knowledge in analytical epistemology, generated by the classical notion of knowledge, passes over the issue of interdisciplinarity of knowledge. Since the most fundamental way of understanding science in its epistemological dimension is science as a kind of knowledge, epistemology should provide an analysis of knowledge in such terms that can be useful when describing and interpreting contemporary science in its important aspects such as interdisciplinarity. In the paper it is argued that the classical, epistemological notion of knowledge as justified, true belief is not sufficient to discuss the interdisciplinarity of (scientific) knowledge because it ignores some important aspects of knowledge such as its selectiveness, inadequacy/ incompleteness as well as its systemic, linguistic, and social character. My thesis is that such transformation of the notion of knowledge that expands it by taking into consideration the aspects enumerated above, will make it possible to analyze and discuss the problem of interdisciplinarity of scientific knowledge.
Mark Wells  
Professor, Montreat College, USA  
&  
Brad Faircloth  
Assistant Professor, Montreat College, USA

The Psychology of the Eternal in Kierkegaard’s  
_Sickness Unto Death_

In _The Sickness Unto Death_ Soren Kierkegaard opens his short psychological exposition with a description of the self as a relation of the self relating to itself. If the self is essentially a relation, then the malady of the self/spirit (psychological sickness) would occur when the relation is out of balance or one-sided. Kierkegaard describes this sickness of the self as despair. He further describes despair as a condition with which it appears everyone is stricken. Kierkegaard employs three paradoxes in order to explain the nature of despair. The key to understanding despair seems to be in making careful distinctions between possibility and necessity, the infinite and the finite, and the eternal and the temporal. When the appropriate synthesis or tension in these paradoxical relations is not maintained a person falls into despair. This paper will examine Kierkegaard’s psychological category of despair with special attention to the tension between the temporal and eternal in a person. Kierkegaard’s ontology will be explored especially with regard to the categories of the temporal and eternal as mental/spiritual faculties of the self. Since the famed 20th century psychologist Abraham Maslow admits an existential influence in his own work, in _Toward a Psychology of Being_, the connections between Kierkegaard’s concept of despair and Maslow’s ideas about being will be explored. Co-authored by a Kierkegaardian scholar and a teacher of Maslow, this study will attempt to explain how Kierkegaard’s psychological instincts may be consistent with Abraham Maslow’s understanding of psychological health.
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Circuit(s) versus Counter-Circuit(s), a Challenge of the Mind and an Implication of Philosophical Explication

Concerning concept formation and its outcome, succinct terminology, cycle and circle are more or less well-defined concepts of philosophy and, roughly included, other sciences. This is not the case with the circuit and its proper opposite, the counter-circuit. One reason is the overlapping meaning or extension with the circle and counter-circle or correspondingly cycle. The other reason is that circuits seem more artificial, complex, and beyond the classical ‘compound’. Entries, however, are enough, as, p.e., the manifestation of life is an open cycle against absolute or idealistic time, the orbit is bound to a circle, neurons behave within complex circuits and, again, syllogisms are forming a cycle, which, upon confusing the latent presupposition(s) within the conclusion, becomes a circle (or petitio). The circuit therefore must be something else, in particular with its regular opposite.

The argumentative means are the difference from double negation and the loop (non-conclusivity), further the affinity of circuits to polarity and the polar opposition (p.e. circuits in neurology). The textual basis is primarily Quine by reason of his succinct reasoning on reference, ambiguity and modality.
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**Alternative Epistemologies and Normative Directionality**

The revisions of the concepts of truth, reality and knowledge, in anti-foundational, anti-representational fervor, in both analytic and continental traditions, have attacked all epistemic binaries upon which the disciplines of Philosophy and Science enjoyed their uninterrupted privilege for many centuries. The contemporary discourse, as a result, asserts a shift from the absolute, antecedent truth to history, experience to language, rationalism to anarchism, knowledge to hope. This horizontal post-modernist, pragmatist shift invests faith in man’s freedom to the utopia of liberal democracy which, however, suffers a critical fate for surrendering to the European coercive rational will; hence, the deconstruction of the self and the primacy of the ethical over the cognitive. The present epistemological bivalence between philosophy (epistemology) or no-philosophy (history), however, experiences an impasse around the ‘loss of meaning’, retrieved in salvaging self’s unity in hermeneutic efforts and relating rationality to the search for a meaningful life. The integrality of morality to the self-identity (selfhood) and revisiting of the humanistic concepts like sensus communis, bildung etc. for social solidarity, in this regard, are the normative directions that epistemology turns toward. The paper articulates the theoretical underpinnings of alternative epistemologies and the reasons for the normative directions that human rationality steps forward.
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**Hobbes and Rousseau Duke It Out....Refereed by Axiom Ferret**

This paper deals with the question of whether Hobbes or Rousseau was more correct in their respective views of the place of violence in human nature. In *Leviathan* (1651), Thomas Hobbes sets forth three principle causes of quarrel in the nature of man: “First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third for Reputation.” (Retrieved from URL: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0008)

All three principles “use Violence”, according to Hobbes. The excerpt comes from Ch XIII of *Leviathan*, “Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind”. Hobbes regarded this violence in man to be a natural law, a law that was balanced by another natural law, the law of self-preservation. Reason comes into play in order to strategize several more laws of nature involving contracts, covenants, and their implementation made workable by threat of punishment.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *A Discourse Upon the Origin and the Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind* (1754) famously disagreed with the notion that man is “naturally cruel, and requires a regular system of police to be reclaimed; whereas nothing can be more gentle than he in his primitive state, when placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes...” (Retrieved from URL: http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11136/pg11136.html) Rousseau felt that laws actually produced the ‘mischief’ they purportedly had been created to stop.

Who is the “winner”? Assuming that ‘human nature’ has roughly the same characteristics as it did a few centuries ago, would the Hobbesian or the Rousseauean interpretation of it be the better fit today? According to Steven Pinker, (*The Better Angels of Our Nature_Why Violence Has Declined*, Viking, USA, 2011) violence has declined over the past several centuries. Pinker is not asking whether violence has declined. He cites an impressive panoply of statistical evidence to establish that it has declined. He then proceeds to his primary question: why it has declined.

This paper will examine Pinker’s interpretations of the ‘evidence’, and offer counter interpretations. These are some of the considerations:
- Defining Violence Metric: Does ‘fewer beheadings’ translate into ‘less violence’? Does ‘less painful’ (and ‘painful’ for whom?) equate to ‘less violence’?
- Proxy Violence: Is proxy violence less violent? Are proxies that are used to mitigate direct contact with ‘violence’ a growth industry?

The analysis does not necessarily involve a denial of “the better angels of our nature”. Factors emerge, the nature of which suggest a possible replacement of the ‘violence’ port of human nature by some other concept. If ‘violence’ becomes obsolete, what may define the *homo sapien*? Or *sapiens* in general?