

2013

Philosophy Abstracts

Eighth Annual International
Conference on Philosophy
27-30 May 2013, Athens, Greece

Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos

THE ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH



Philosophy Abstracts
8th Annual International
Conference on Philosophy
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Greece

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Preface

This abstract book includes all the abstracts of the papers presented at the 8th *Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 27-30 May 2013*, organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. In total there were 38 papers and 43 presenters, coming from 21 different countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Cyprus, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA). The conference was organized into 14 sessions that included areas of Philosophy of Science, Phenomenology, Ethics, Philosophy of Language and other related fields. As it is the publication policy of the Institute, the papers presented in this conference will be considered for publication in one of the books of ATINER.

The Institute was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet in Athens and exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study. Our mission is to make ATHENS a place where academics and researchers from all over the world meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. To serve this purpose, conferences are organized along the lines of well established and well defined scientific disciplines. In addition, interdisciplinary conferences are also organized because they serve the mission statement of the Institute. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 150 international conferences and has published over 100 books. Academically, the Institute is organized into four research divisions and nineteen research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committee and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference together.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President

FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM
8th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 27-30 May 2013,
Athens, Greece
PROGRAM

**Conference Venue: [St George Lycabettus](#), 2 Kleomenous Street, 106
75 Kolonaki, Athens, Greece**

ORGANIZING AND SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

ORGANIZING AND SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

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4. Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President Academic, ATINER & Professor, Sam Houston University, USA.
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6. Dr. Mechthild Nagel, Professor, SUNY Cortland, USA.
7. Dr. Michael Paraskos, Provost, Cornaro Institute, Cyprus.
8. Dr. Kiriake Xerohemona, Lecturer, Florida International University, USA.
9. Dr. Michael Aristidou, Assistant Professor, Barry University, USA.
10. Dr. Chrysoula Gitsoulis, Adjunct Lecturer, City College, City University of New York, USA.
11. Dr. Gregory A. Katsas, Head, Sociology Research Unit, ATINER & Associate Professor, The American College of Greece-Deree College, Greece.
12. Ms. Lila Skountridaki, Researcher, ATINER & Ph.D. Student, University of Strathclyde, U.K.
13. Mr. Vasilis Charalampopoulos, Researcher, ATINER & Ph.D. Student, University of Stirling, U.K.

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Fani Balaska, Stavroula Kiritsi, Eirini Lentzou, Konstantinos Manolidis, Katerina Maraki & Celia Sakka

C O N F E R E N C E P R O G R A M

Monday 27 May 2013

08:00-08:30 Registration

08:30-09:00 Welcome and Opening Remarks

- Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
- Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President of Academics, ATINER & Professor, Sam Houston University, USA..
- Dr. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

<p>09:00-10:30 Session I (Room A): Phenomenology Chair: Dr. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Steven Burik, Lecturer, Sim University, Singapore. Polemos and Dao: Conflict and Harmony in Heidegger and Zhuangzi. 2. *Giuseppe (Joseph) Naimo, Lecturer, University of Notre Dame, Australia. Temporal Being and the Authentic Self. 3. Raluca Badoi, Ph.D. Student, Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Levinasian Insomnia: Between Ontology and Ethics. 	<p>09:00-10:30 Session II (Room B): Epistemology Chair: Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President Academic, ATINER & Professor, Sam Houston University, USA.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. John Williams, Associate Professor, Singapore Management University, Singapore. Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox. 2. Nevin Climenhaga, Ph.D. Student, University of Notre Dame, USA. Cartesianism and Epistemic Normativity 3. M. Alipour, Assistant Professor, Institute of Social Sciences and Islamic Studies, Iran. Does Epistemic Justification Come in Degrees?
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<p>10:30-12:00 Session III (Room A): Philosophy of Science Chair: *Giuseppe (Joseph) Naimo, Lecturer, University of Notre Dame, Australia</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. *Donald Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA. Bohm's Paradox and the Conscious Observer. 2. Joseph Thompson, Associate Professor, University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA. Two Dogmas of Reductionism: On the Irreducibility of Self-Consciousness and the Impossibility of Neurophilosophy. 3. Elena Popa, Ph.D. Student, Central European University, Hungary. Causation and Scientific Inquiry: Lewis versus Woodward. 	<p>10:30-12:00 Session IV (Room B): Philosophy of Religion & Value Theory Chair: John Williams, Associate Professor, Singapore Management University, Singapore.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Paul Lewis, Professor and Chair of Department of Philosophy, Bethel College, USA. On the Philosophical Possibilities for a Constructive Theology of Self. 2. Bettina Muller, Ph.D. Student, University of Duesseldorf, Germany. What is Good.
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<p>12:00-13:30 Session V (Room A): Ancient I Chair: *Donald Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.</p>	<p>12:00-13:30 Session VI (Room B): Aesthetics Chair: Paul Lewis, Professor and Chair of Department of Philosophy, Bethel College, USA.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aristotelis Santas, Professor, Valdosta State University, USA. Aristotelian Ethics and Biophilia. 2. Ioannis Christodoulou, Lecturer, University of Cyprus, Cyprus. Nous and Phantasia in Aristotle's On the Soul. 3. Pritika Nehra, Researcher, Indian Institute of Technology, India. Moral Explanation in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ewa Bobrowska, Assistant Professor, Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw, Poland. Paraesthetics: Irvine School of Aesthetic Theory and Criticism. 2. Daniel Gustafsson, Ph.D. Student, University of York, UK. The Love of Art.

14:00-15:00 Lunch (details during registration)

<p>15:00-16:30 Session VII (Room A): Ethics Chair: Aristotelis Santas, Professor, Valdosta State University, USA.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arul Raj Madalai Muthu, Ph.D. Student, KU Leuven, Belgium. The Ambivalence of Gift-Giving. 2. *Antoine Panaïoti, Lecturer, McGill University, Canada. No-self and Altruism: What is the Relation? 3. Trina Mamoon, Associate Professor, University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA. Russian Modernism or Mysticism? Vladimir Solovyev as Philosopher.

<p>17:00-19:30 Session VIII (Room A): Philosophy of Religion Chair: *Antoine Panaïoti, Lecturer, McGill University, Canada.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Drago Djuric, Associate Professor, University of Belgrade, Serbia. Al-Kindi's and W. L. Craig's Cosmological Arguments. 2. *Saladdin Ahmed, PhD Candidate, University of Ottawa, Canada. Re-introducing Philosophy to the Critique of Religion. 3. Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu, Assistant Professor, Istanbul Sehir University, Turkey. The Token Condition and the Possibility of Consciousness without Self-Consciousness. 4. Sander Wilkens, Privatdozent, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany. Amendments to the Theory of Recognition. 5. Sri Poedjiastoeti, PhD Student, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia. Harmony without Conformity.

21:00-23:00 Greek Night (Details during registration)

Tuesday 28 May 2013

08:30-10:00 Session IX (Room A): Philosophy of Mind

Chair: Roderick Long, Professor, Auburn University, USA.

1. Edouard Asseo, France. Theory of Consciousness.
2. Tae-Kyung Kim, Ph.D. Student, University of York, UK. Colour Perception and Conceptual Contents: Is the Content of Colour Experience Entirely Determined by the Physical Property?
3. Takuya Niikawa, Ph.D. Student, Hokkaido University, Japan. The Disagreement on Naïve Realism and its Analysis.

**10:15-11:45 Session XI (Room A):
Existentialism**

Chair: *Rafael Lucas, Professor, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil.

1. Roderick Long, Professor, Auburn University, USA. Shakespeare, Godwin, Kafka, and the Political Problem of Other Minds.
2. William O'Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA. Kierkegaard and Moral Guilt.

**10:15-11:45 Session XIII (Room B):
Phenomenology**

Chair: *Maria Adamos, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.

1. Cristian Tiple, PhD Student, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Crisis and Ideology.

**12:00-13:30 Session X (Room A):
Ancient II**

Chair: William O'Meara, Professor, James Madison University, USA.

1. Anastasia Gritsenko, Researcher, University of London, UK. On Buddhist Happiness and Aristotle's eudemonia: A Paradoxical Account?
2. Ilse Somavilla, Researcher, University of Innsbruck, Austria. Thaumazein in Ancient Greek Philosophy and Wonder in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
3. *Maria Adamos, Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA. The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism. (Tuesday 28 May 2013)

**12:00-13:30 Session XIV (Room A):
Ethics & Political Philosophy**

Chair: Dr. Patricia Hanna, Head, Philosophy Research Unit of ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

1. Michelle Cieurria, Ph.D. Student, York University, Canada. The Standard of the Reasonable Person: An Avoidability Approach. (Tuesday 28 May 2013)
2. *Rafael Lucas, Professor, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil. On Individual and State in Bentham and Mill's Utilitarianism.

13:30-14:30 Lunch (Details during registration)

14:30-16:00 Session XV (Room A): Open Session

Chair: *Stephen Steinberg, Lecturer in Philosophy and Advisor to the President, University of Pennsylvania, USA.

1. Dale Jacquette, Professor, University of Bern, Switzerland. Semantic Intentionality and Intending to Act.
2. Jaya Ray, Assistant Professor, Delhi University, India. Scope of Semantic Innocence.
3. Kam Ming Yip, Associate Professor, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China. A Critical Survey of Classification of Fallacies.

17:30-20:30 Urban Walk (Details during registration)

21:00-22:00 Dinner (Details during registration)

Wednesday 29 May 2013

Cruise: (Details during registration)

Thursday 30 June 2013

Delphi Visit: (Details during registration)

Maria Adamos

Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA

The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism

Section III of part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise entitled "Of the ancient philosophy" has been virtually ignored by most Hume scholars. Although philosophers seem to concentrate on sections II and VI of part IV and pay little or no attention to section III, the latter section is paramount in showing how serious Hume's skepticism is, and how Hume's philosophy, contrary to his intention, is far removed from "the sentiments of the vulgar".

In this paper I shall first explore Hume's view on ancient philosophy as it is presented in section III, and I shall particularly focus on his discussion of *identity* and *simplicity* of bodies. Second, I shall argue that Hume's account of identity and simplicity in terms of qualities is at best unsatisfactory. Finally, I shall try to show that Hume's advice to hold a "moderate" skepticism cannot be taken seriously. On the contrary, Hume seems to hold an "extravagant" skepticism, since he claims that there is a contradiction between our most fundamental natural beliefs, as well as between our natural beliefs and philosophical reasoning.

Saladdin Ahmed

PhD Candidate, University of Ottawa, Canada

Re-introducing Philosophy to the Critique of Religion

I argue that under the global influence of liberal multiculturalism, philosophy has withdrawn from the critique of religion, and that it is of crucial importance for philosophy to vigorously re-engage in that domain. Beginning with the debate between Feuerbach and Marx regarding the critique of religion, I will explain why Marx considers the critique of religion to be foundational for all criticisms. To Marx, religion is the embodiment of human alienation in a history that is essentially inhuman. Thus, to understand this alienation, it is important not to dismiss religion as an illusion, but to grasp the historical and social conditions that led to the creation and sustainment of religions as real, existing, illusions. I argue that philosophy cannot afford to take an indifferent position towards religion because religion functions in areas that are necessarily philosophical. Religion's essential prerequisite is faith, which consists of rationally unjustifiable metaphysical assumptions. However, by relying on faith-based premises religion makes claims (whether implicitly or explicitly) about the meaning of life, ontology, metaphysics, ethics, and social relations. Moreover, in its history-making religion relies on pre-supposing a crucial connection between some form of redemption and truth, while religion itself is a byproduct of life conditions in which the historical and metaphysical separate. Philosophy too, I argue by again relying on Marx, could not exist independent of the material conditions of life, but philosophy is essentially more than a historical symptom or a promise of an ahistorical world where humans can find justice at last. Rather, Marxian philosophies themselves are examples of philosophies that are not only premised on the historicity of truth, but also aim to create history with a central awareness of the determinate human role in that process. I conclude with the argument that these bases offer critical criteria for classifying different types of philosophy.

M. Alipour

Assistant Professor, Institute of Social Sciences and Islamic Studies, Iran

Does Epistemic Justification Come in Degrees?

Epistemologists such as Chisholm and Alston believe that the concept of justification as deployed in the classic "JTB" analysis of knowledge is, unlike truth, capable of coming in degrees. This means that we may imagine different degrees of justification which are related to the different levels of evidence that we may have regarding the truth of a belief or a proposition. I object to this view on the grounds that it faces at least two problems. First, it is incompatible with the definition of knowledge as JTB and, second, it conflicts with Alston's and Chisholm's own criteria for the justification of beliefs (such as having sufficient or adequate evidence). It seems, further, that these epistemologists have mixed up the "ordinary" application of justification (OAJ) with its "epistemic" application of justification (EAJ). The concept of justification is capable of degrees in the former sense, but not in the latter. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that, epistemologically, the concept of being justified, like that of truth, is not capable of coming in degrees. In ordinary language we do commonly say that a given attitude or belief may be more reasonable or justified than another. This application of justification is very natural since, in ordinary language, one also speaks of knowing different things to different degrees of knowledge. Thus, some items of knowledge can possess higher and some lower degrees of evidence. Nevertheless, it is important not to fall into the trap of seeing the ordinary application of justification as interchangeable with the epistemic application. This is because the concept of justification is capable of coming in degrees only in its non-epistemic sense, and not in the epistemic sense.

Edouard Asseo

France

Theory of Consciousness

The Hegel system

The Theory of Consciousness is essentially a mathematical reformulation of the Hegel system. As such it gives a vision of the universe as an all-inclusive whole comprising the subjective world and the objective world that Physics addresses.

The starting points

1) Consciousness is defined from the concept of knowledge formulated as a mathematical function.

Science is based on the postulate of objectivity, by definition a postulate can be called into question. If we succeed, we would come up with a comprehensive theory encompassing both the experience of subjectivity and the objective world, that physics addresses.

2) Calling into question the postulate of objectivity is our second starting point.

This leads to taking into account the so-called knowledge function $C(X)$ by which the object X is known. The conditions to which the function $C(X)$ must comply are expressed and called the Fundamental relations.

The theory is composed of three books, briefly presented below.

1) Theory of knowledge

Our theory goes much further than the Hegel system because the Fundamental relations are developed mathematically and it is shown that the basic laws of modern physics (Quantum Mechanics and Relativity) can be derived from the Fundamental relations. This yields a new paradigm in physics.

2) The Subject universe

A philosophical presentation and interpretation of the theory

3) Conscious systems

A conscious system is a system which implements the Fundamental relations. The main characteristics of human subjectivity have been connected to the Fundamental relations; the principle of the brain and the corresponding architectures are derived.

Raluca Badoi

Ph.D. Student, Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Levinasian Insomnia: Between Ontology and Ethics

Emmanuel Levinas has been associated with so called religious turn in phenomenology but also with the ethical turn in contemporary philosophy given to the priority that he gives to Ethics as First Philosophy. Nevertheless, Levinas remains even today hard to understand. Philosophy has always been in search of the truth. The truth is, in Levinas' opinion, a problem of the Being. But, what can we find under this concept of Being? Starting with this question, the Levinasian meditations browse through multiple roads always arriving at the meeting of some keys concepts such as: *Il y a*- There is, this absolute absence of the subject, this impersonality identified with the Being in general, *The Call* which disturbs the ego, which causes a rupture at the level of the subject, the *Other* which makes from the self the exception as being *for the other*, *The Face* which is *the other in the same* and finally *the ethics* which is not a branch of Philosophy, but the First Philosophy. The guiding line of these concepts seems to be Insomnia. Insomnia is developed on three levels of reading in Levinas' philosophy: : insomnia denotes a state of vigilance earlier then intentionality, beyond consciousness which is not the vigilance of self consciousness or attention given to an object, but the vigilance of an anonymous being - the first reading and/ or the awakening of *the same for the other* - the second reading. Assuming of insomnia, being awake, this constant vigil, this otherwise than being means the urgency to annul the forgetting of the Other, is the urgency to respond to the Other, to make the leap beyond ontology into the ethic level - the third reading. The ontological vigil is not the same as the ethical one - the vigil or insomnia of the Being is a continuous existential level, whereas the ethical vigil or insomnia is constant, hospitable and an epiphany of awakening. This paper is an interpretation of the Levinasian philosophy understood as a leap from ontology to ethics through the notion of insomnia. The presentation will be structured on three reading levels - a mirror for the constitution of the responsible subject.

Ewa Bobrowska
Professor, Warsaw University, Poland

Paraesthetics: Irvine School of Aesthetic Theory and Criticism

This paper will focus on David Carroll's concept of paraesthetics. This term should be regarded in the light of the philosophical investigations of the Critical Theory Institute at the University of California in Irvine. Paraesthetics was a term coined in the 1980s as a result of collaborative research of such distinguished philosophers as: Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Fredric Jameson, J. Hillis Miller, Jean-Luc Nancy, Murray Krieger. The main assumption characteristic of this school concerns the postulate of exceeding the existing critical modes in order to designate a new territory open to an unconstrained interdisciplinary dialogue between theorists and practitioners of art. As defined by Carroll in *Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida* and in his introduction to *The States of "Theory": History, Art, and Critical Discourse*, the term paraesthetics describes a new concept of aesthetic theory that promotes "the dynamic relation between the aesthetic and the theoretical." It also undermines the traditional Kantian model of aesthetic autonomy. In other words, it is a strategy of exceeding the boundaries between art and its theory. Thus, paraesthetics begins with the recognition of the aporiatic self-reflexive nature of both discourses: the visual and the philosophical.

According to Carroll, in the postmodern times, art - as a paradigm that was radically destabilized in the 20th century - has become a discursive phenomenon or a rhetorical trope. On the other hand, writing on art has become an important (para)artistic strategy. In *Discours, figure*: Lyotard claims that painting poses a certain potential for formulating critical statements, at the same time, in the theoretical discourse there are some traces of the visual.

Therefore, paraesthetics should take the place of a frame parallel to a work of art, an inner *parergon*, to refer to Derrida's terminology. It is a "constant play between the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic."

Paraesthetic strategies in Carroll's reading of Derrida, are accounted for by the term "theoretical jetties." In a conflictual process, jetties compete for the dominant interpretation.

Moreover, paraesthetics should be regarded with respect to the recent emergence of "theory" as a "purely North American artifact". Derrida, following Jonathan Culler, locates the development of theory in the context of American departments of literature. Furthermore, the postmodern turn towards theory in the United States may be, in his opinion, due to the exhaustion of American empiricist and pragmatist traditions.

Steven Burik

Lecturer, Sim University, Singapore

Polemos and Dao: Conflict and Harmony in Heidegger and Zhuangzi

Using Heidegger's reinterpretation of Heraclitus' *polemos* and Zhuangzi's ideas of *dao*, struggle and sorting of differences, I will argue for a reinterpretation of notions of conflict and harmony in the two thinkers. Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* (con-frontation) and Zhuangzi's famous 'sorting which evens things out', the seminal second chapter of the book *Zhuangzi*, suggest that harmony lies not in overcoming differences, but exactly in making difference and diversity central. I start with an exposition of how Heidegger understands *logos* and *polemos* in radically different ways from their 'normal' or 'traditional' meanings, and how he attaches great importance to both terms. I then proceed to analyse Zhuangzi's understanding of the world in terms of the *yin-yang* dichotomous forces, and argue how a comparison of both thinkers can show us a new understanding of ideas of difference, conflict and harmony. It will be shown how harmony in Daoism is not to be understood as a dialectical resolution to conflict, but more as a situating within the different forces, and a certain form of responding to conflict and diversity. Heidegger's differential thought will be employed to show a similar approach to difference, where in contradistinction to a Hegelian resolution or sublimation of the difference, Heidegger shows how difference is not to be overcome, but to be acknowledged as fundamental to being. Such responses carry a form of great responsibility, since they might be perceived as random and spontaneous. Yet I will argue that they are anything but random, and that both Heidegger and Zhuangzi seek to engage diversity, struggle and conflict in a most objective and disinterested manner. Such an engagement will then be shown to have ethical implications beyond the philosophical worlds of Heidegger and Zhuangzi.

Ioannis Christodoulou
Lecturer, University of Cyprus, Cyprus

Nous and Phantasia in Aristotle's On the Soul

Aristotle's *On the Soul*, is one of the most intriguing philosophical treatises in the history of Western Philosophy. Despite Aristotle's well known capacity in dealing with difficult philosophical problems, one cannot help but realise that Aristotle's original ideas on the subject matter of imagination, cause more philosophical problems, than the ones Aristotle is expected to solve with his treatise.

In the present paper, I am trying to clarify what kind of meaning, if any, is expected to be found in imagination, according to Aristotle's handling of the subject. In *De Anima*, there are several definitions of imagination, which, in certain occasions, do not seem to be fitting each other.

When Aristotle first mentions "noein" in *De Anima*, he correlates noein with imagination. He states that noein is either a kind of imagination or it couldn't exist without imagination. In the first case, one may come to the conclusion that there are different kinds of imagination. In the second case, we are not supposed to think that nous does not exist without imagination, since there is not a single kind of imagination alone.

On the other side, Aristotle might be using the word "phantasia" with the meaning of "image". In that case, the "noein" could be supposed to exist as an image or not without some image. If this is so, then we might be obliged to accept that the image in question brings with it some kind of meaning. The question is: what kind of meaning is this? Is it a meaning accompanied by an image, or an image with a certain meaning?

I am giving an answer to this question by making use of Aristotle's several mentions of imagination in *De Anima*. At the end, I am coming to the conclusion that imagination may have a wider sense than Aristotle scholars, along with Aristotle himself, are willing to admit.

Michelle Ciurria

Ph.D. Student, York University, Canada

The Standard of the Reasonable Person: An Avoidability Approach

The standard of the reasonable person is the method normally used to determine culpable negligence in criminal and tort law in Canadian, American and European legal systems. However, there are competing interpretations of how this standard ought to be understood and applied. The three dominant theories are the indifference view, the customary view, and the avoidability view. Legal scholar M. Moran (2003) argues that the indifference view should be adopted because it is the only approach that singles out and condemns normative failings per se, and thus it avoids unfairly persecuting political minorities such as women and people with intellectual disabilities. In my presentation, I shall dispute this, and argue that the avoidability view – which defines liability in terms of whether a defendant had, when she acted, the capacities required to comply with the law, and a fair opportunity to exercise those capacities – does not have the persecutory implications that Moran suggests.

Furthermore, this view avoids two practical problems that beset the indifference theory – indeed, the very problems that the standard of the reasonable person was originally designed to avoid in O. W. Holmes' famous tome, *"The Common Law"* (1881). Thus, the avoidability interpretation should be favoured as a method for assessing liability in criminal and tort law. This account does not only resonate within the law, but has broader implications in terms of how we conceptualize responsibility and legitimate excuses in political, social, and moral contexts, including our interactions with other people in day-to-day life.

Nevin Climenhaga

Ph.D. Student, University of Notre Dame, USA

Cartesian Foundationalism and Epistemic Normativity

In this paper I defend a theory of rational normativity, and apply it to traditional debates in normative epistemology. First, I outline my theory, according to which norms that state rational requirements all apply to some kind of agential behavior – believing, acting, hoping, intending, etc. These behaviors represent their objects as having certain features, and this representational content determines the behaviors' function. This function in turn determines the norms governing the behaviors. Since believing that P represents P as true, the function of belief is to track truth. From this, I argue, it follows that "Believe only what is true" is a correct epistemic norm.

Second, I consider "ought implies can." I argue that this principle is false it means that we must exert voluntary control over a behavior. For example, we do not have voluntary control of our intentions, and yet these are still normatively appraisable. Instead, what is common about behaviors that are normatively appraisable is that they are all *reasons responsive* – we are able to affect the behavior by reflection and deliberation on our reasons. This suggests an alternate interpretation of "ought implies can." On this interpretation, N's being a correct norm requires that insofar as an agent is rational, she is able to regulate her behavior in accordance with N – not by *choosing* to follow N, but by reflecting on her reasons to follow N.

Third, I argue that the norm to believe only truths, combined with the above interpretation of "ought implies can," allows us to derive the Cartesian thesis that we ought to believe all and only those propositions which are certain for us. In brief, my argument is that we can only rationally conform our doxastic attitudes to that norm if we do not believe any propositions that even *might* be false.

Drago Djuric

Associate Professor, University of Belgrade, Serbia

Al-Kindi's and W. L. Craig's Cosmological Arguments

In this paper, we shall consider similarities and differences in cosmological argumentation on the existence of God between the 9th-century Muslim philosopher al-Kindi and contemporary Christian philosopher William Lane Craig. Our focus here will not be on the value and soundness of their argumentation, but only on the structure and type of their arguments. The merit of this argumentation's reappearance in the modern thought belongs to Craig, who referred to it, above all, in his book *Kalam Cosmological Argument* (1979). The basic elements of their general form of argument can be found in the works of the 6th-century Christian theoretician John Philoponus. All major steps of Craig *kalam* cosmological argumentation can be found in al-Kindi's works. Having in mind his large opus on the *kalam* cosmological argument, it is unexpected to see Craig writing that this argument is "extremely simple", and has the form as follows: 1. Everything that begins to exist has its cause. 2. The world began to exist. 3. Therefore, the world has its cause. Generally considered we think that a better way to express this argumentation should follow three major steps: 1. First, it has to be proved that the world is not eternal, or that it began to exist. 2. Second, that world does not come to exist by itself, but that it has a cause of its beginning. 3. Third, that cause of the beginning of its existence is orthodoxly conceived monotheistic God. Philoponus gives his arguments only for the first two steps of this argumentation. Al-Kindi presents his arguments for all three steps. Craig, in essence, repeats al-Kindi's arguments, but adds some convergent arguments that are based on two contemporary scientific theories, unknown during Philoponus and al-Kindi's times: Big Bang cosmological theory and the second law of thermodynamics.

Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu

Assistant Professor, Istanbul Sehir University, Turkey

Consciousness and Peripheral Self Awareness

Is self-consciousness required for consciousness? It seems that the answer is no. We do not think that for a person to have a conscious perception of a tree, she needs to be aware of herself perceiving the tree. However, Kriegel (2004) has argued that a failure to take note of the distinction between two forms of self-consciousness gives way to the idea that consciousness is possible without self-consciousness. He further contends that all forms of consciousness depend on one particular form of self-consciousness, viz. intransitive state self-consciousness which consists in the peripheral awareness of oneself as the subject of one's mental state.

I refer to the view that self-consciousness is required for consciousness, in the sense that the latter is not possible in the absence of the former, the *requirement thesis* and my purpose is to undermine it. I contend that two properties of consciousness motivate the requirement thesis. The first property consists in the non-inferential access a subject has to her conscious mental states. After Kriegel (2004, p.197) I call this *the first-person knowable property*. The second property consists in the subject's awareness of her conscious mental states as *hers*, which I call *the property of ownership*. I further contend that a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things also motivates the requirement thesis.

In order to undermine the requirement thesis I argue that the property of ownership does not have to be a property of all conscious mental states. I also reject the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then I critically examine Kriegel's (2004) arguments for the requirement thesis based on the first-person knowable property of mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.

Anastasia Gritsenko

Researcher, University of London, UK

On Buddhist Happiness and Aristotle's eudemonia: A Paradoxical Account?

It seems that as soon as someone asks the innocent question 'what is happiness?' one is ensconced by linguistic confusion. Instead, it appears wiser and healthier to swerve into territory that entails appreciating the constituent factors of happiness, keeping the bewitchment of language at bay.

However that is not the problematic under discussion. Rather the problem that I would like to consider is the question of happiness in light of Buddhist philosophy as scant scholarly attention has been devoted to this important issue. In order to gain a better grasp of the task at hand, reference will be made to Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia as an entry-point into the Buddhist milieu. Aristotle was the first Western thinker to consider systematically the question of 'happiness', whereby no such systematic appraisal appears in the Buddhist literatures, despite many references being made to happiness and its objects.

The goal of the paper is to try to develop a Buddhist philosophical analysis of happiness. Thus I will draw some comparisons between the two philosophical systems under consideration, noting certain apparent paradoxes of happiness that are inherent in both such accounts. To scale the topic down to manageable size, broad structural characteristics of the two will be identified without the inspection of details which would necessitate a monographic treatment.

As Buddhism constitutes a very rich philosophical tradition I will narrow the discussion by selecting certain suttas from the Pali Canon. By contrast, when considering Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics will be my main reference text.

I believe such an approach will yield an interesting contribution to the overall philosophical analysis of happiness. This is especially so because not much ink has been spilt seeking to articulate a systematic Buddhist stance on the subject of happiness, which is the focal aim of the paper.

Daniel Gustafsson

Ph.D. Student, University of York, UK

The Love of Art

I propose to give a substantial and multifaceted account of the love of art.

An artwork should always be loved – as it should always be judged – primarily as ‘an end in itself’, for the intrinsic values of the thing that it is and the experience it offers. At the same time, however, just as it is in the nature of a work of art to accommodate an infinite variety of perspectives, so too the love of the artwork will both draw on other attachments and open out to embrace other values. The love of the *particular* that is the work of art may thus fruitfully be exercised within, informed by and contributing to, more *general* ends of love.

I would identify two such: *oikophilia* and *philokalia*. The former denotes a cultural love of home; the latter a theological love of beauty. Another candidate, love of the excellent and the Good as developed by Robert Adams, will also be discussed, but found wanting.

Oikophilia is a concept used to great effect by Roger Scruton in seeking to characterise a proper care for the natural and human environment; and it is a concept that I think wonderfully suited to embrace our love of art. On this view, the work of art would be loved for its capacity to render the world emotionally and spiritually our home, a place of culture, shaped by human hands and enduring human values.

Philokalia adds further force to, and provides a grander arena still, for such attitudes and attachments. In my treatment of beauty, I invoke the theological aesthetics of David Bentley Hart and others, predominantly from an Eastern Orthodox tradition, in seeing beauty as an attribute and a gift of God. Such a theological account of beauty is not only, to my mind, the most metaphysically compelling, it is also gives the most commanding reasons to see beauty – and the beautiful work of art – as an object of *love*.

Dale Jacquette

Professor, University of Bern, Switzerland

Semantic Intentionality and Intending to Act

This essay considers the question of whether there is a relation between action-serving and meaning-serving intentions. There appears to be a difference between the intentionality of reference and the intentionality of action. When I *act*, then I intend to do something, but I do not always, it would seem, at least superficially, refer to any intended object. Similarly, when I *refer* to an object, such as the Parthenon or the abstract irrational number π , then I semantically intend the object, but I do not always do anything distinctive or characteristic with respect to the intended object. The idea that these two categories of intendings are only nominally designated as 'intentionalities' does not guarantee any logical or conceptual connections between the intentionality of referring or engaging in other speech acts, and the intentionality of doing, typified by overtly physical actions, but also including such doings as referring and expressing propositional thoughts. John R. Searle has accordingly referred to the use of the cognate words 'intend', 'intending', 'intention' and 'intentionality' in both of categories related respectively to action and meaning as a 'pun' or play on words, providing the basis for equivocation that can promote philosophical misunderstanding. After criticizing efforts to totally separate these concepts, and rejecting the proposal that the two only partially overlap in the case of language use as an action that favors the inclusion of meaning-serving intentions in action-serving intentions, the remaining alternative of including action-serving intentions in meaning-serving intentions is defended as offering the most cogent account of how the intentionality of doing relates more specifically to the intentionality of referring.

Tae-Kyung Kim

Ph.D. Student, University of York, UK

Colour Perception and Conceptual Contents: Is the Content of Colour Experience Entirely Determined by the Physical Property?

Colour physicalism currently holds a dominant position in defining the colours of objects. According to the physicalism, it is a physical property of colour, the surface spectral reflectance (SSR), which concretely defines the colour of objects. Physicalists like Byrne and Hilbert believe that the physical property of colour is *necessarily* related to the content of colour experience. This account might prompt two claims. First, colours are mind-independent properties of material objects. Second, the physical property of colour is directly engaged in composing the content of colour experience. If these claims are correct, then the physicalism provides strong evidence to the non-conceptualists' claim that the content of colour experience is sometimes non-conceptual.

I critically examine and raise an objection to this. First, I consider whether the content of colour experience is entirely defined by its physical property (SSR) with regard to the problem of colour variation and the opponent theory of vision. Then, I discuss whether it has to be explained on a contextual level, not the physical level. Regarding this, I show that we perceive colours without depending on SSR using the example of hologram.

Lastly, I claim that our content of colour experience are not directly reflected as physical properties of colours, they are more close to categorized contents having concepts.

Paul Lewis

Professor and Chair of Department of Philosophy, Bethel College, USA

On the Philosophical Possibilities for a Constructive Theology of Self

The major argument of this presentation is that the most theologically and philosophically useful way to conceive of the self within a constructive theology is self as material spirit. The argument has part of its foundation in Process Philosophy (e.g., Alfred North Whitehead, 1929) and more specifically in Constructive Theology (e.g., Gordon D. Kaufman, 1993). The force of the argument depends on establishing the necessity of a number of interrelated conditions – the biological, in particular studies in brain and nervous system; the psychological, especially studies in cognition, development, language, and personality; the sociological, specifically research in self and society; and the historical, through the tracing of the tension between individual and collective dominated eras – for the dual arising of the phenomenon and its representation. The argument is essentially divided into four parts, bordered by a prologue and an epilogue. After a brief prologue clarifying the importance of the relationship of self to a theologically-based community of care, the first two parts are concerned with the lessons of modernity and post-modernity relating to the self, including a brief postmodern critique of modernity. The third proposes a way to go beyond post-modernity without sacrificing either its virtues or those of modernity. Finally, in the fourth part the heuristic value of this putative conception of self will be illustrated through the venue of meditation (ala' Rene Descartes, 1641) by demonstrating how the self as material spirit may provide a mind and body interactive context for the emergence of metaphor and the development of the soul concept. The epilogue serves to provide a philosophically critical context of the entire enterprise, focusing on the essentials of its ontogeny and ontology.

Rodering Long
Professor, Auburn University, USA

Shakespeare, Godwin, Kafka, and the Political Problem of Other Minds

Colin McGinn, in *Shakespeare's Philosophy: Discovering the Meaning Behind the Plays*, maintains that *Othello* is about the problem of other minds. But *Othello's* version of the problem – the inaccessibility of particular others in particular respects, not of other minds *per se* – might seem to lack the generality needed to count as philosophical. Drawing on examples from *Othello*, William Godwin's *Caleb Williams*, and Franz Kafka's *Amerika*, I argue that *Othello's* problem, while distinct from the traditional problem of other minds, is indeed a genuine philosophical problem, but one produced and sustained by alterable features of human society (specifically, race, gender, and class distinctions) rather than by unalterable features of cognition as such.

Rafael Lucas

Professor, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil

On Individual and State in Bentham and Mill's Utilitarianism

My scope in this paper is to show a few considerations about what has constituted the object of my doctoral research: the role of the Individual and of the State in the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. According to Jeremy Bentham, father of the utilitarian ethics, this ethical doctrine aims to promote the happiness of the greatest number of people “by the hands of reason and law”. The ethical and political implications of this doctrine seem to be very vast and are far from being exhaustively discussed. Even amongst the classical utilitarian thinkers, such as Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the focus of the analysis is generally on the utilitarian doctrine itself and its possible problems and objections, not, for instance, on the role and the characteristics of the objective actors involved in the achievement of actions guided by the greatest happiness principle, or on the conditions under which would be possible to make effective that principle. I do not think it is necessarily a problem in their exposition and discussion, but this lack does not allow us to realize clearly the whole implications of the utilitarianism to the human life, and also makes difficult the acceptance of that ethical and political doctrine. As we can see in Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, the principle of utility must be made effective not only by the members of the community, but also by the members of the government. My thesis is that this implies the existence of two spheres on which fall that principle and that are directly responsible for the promotion of the greatest happiness – the individual and the State. I will try to shed light on those two spheres and highlight their importance to the practical success of the utilitarian doctrine.

Trina Mamoon

Associate Professor, University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA

Russian Modernism or Mysticism? Vladimir Solovyev as Philosopher

The place of Russian philosophers has always been problematic within the Western philosophical tradition: the two most highly acclaimed thinkers in Russia, Vladimir Solovyev and Nikolai Berdyaev, are primarily philosophers of religion, and so in the West they are not considered to be fully philosophers in their own right. Western philosophy and religion have been divided into two autonomous disciplines, while in Russia the fields are closely related with little demarcation between them. The interconnectedness between philosophy, religious thought, and literature in Russian culture may be seen in the writings of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, both known not only for their literary masterpieces, but for the philosophical and ethical dimensions of their work and thought.

Widespread amongst Russian cultural theorists is the view that the period of Russian Modernism (1880s-1920s) produced several philosophers, chiefly Solovyev and Berdyaev. While both thinkers have written extensively on topics concerning metaphysics, eschatology, and ethics, their arguments and premises are fundamentally grounded in Christianity, a tendency shared by almost all thinkers of Russian Modernism. None of the Russian Modernist philosophers were able to make a comprehensive break with religion and mysticism, a prerequisite for modern philosophy in the Western post-Kantian sense of the word. Those thinkers who made no recourse to religion and in fact rejected it—Georgii Plekhanov, Mikhail Bakunin, and Leon Trotsky, among others—were materialists whose work forms the core of Soviet Marxist philosophy.

While Solovyev may be only a *philosophe*, and not a philosopher proper from the Western standpoint, I will argue that under a broader interpretation of what philosophy is, his work must be considered primarily philosophical and not just “mystical,” a designation which carries negative connotations in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, but which represents no objection from a Russian point of view.

Bettina Muller

Ph.D. Student, University of Duesseldorf, Germany

What is Good

Arul Raj Madalai Muthu
Ph.D. Student, KU Leuven, Belgium

The Ambivalence of Gift-Giving

The French Anthropologist Marcel Mauss argues that all human societies are governed by the logic of gift-exchange. This involves a triple obligation. People are obliged to give, to receive and to reciprocate. The universality of this claim has been contested by Maurice Godelier and others. They argue that societies define themselves by what is implicated to the domain of what can be exchanged, i.e. by the line dividing the sacred from the profane. Moreover the ethical meaning of Mauss's logic of the gift has been contested. Is this genuine altruism or genuine solidarity? Mary Douglas and Pierre Bourdieu dismiss this kind of criticism. They point at the ambiguity of gift-giving: it is at the same time free and compulsory; also it is often at the same time an expression of solidarity and of superiority. In my presentation I will discuss the intricacies of Mauss's logic of the gift and I will defend its importance for the development of social ethics.

Giuseppe (Joseph) Naimo

Lecturer, University of Notre Dame, Australia

Answers for Heidegger: Temporal Being

The central concern of this project is to supply conceptually plausible answers to Heidegger's concluding unanswered questions regarding the temporality of Being, which he raised at the very end of *Being and Time*. Situated methodologically within Process Philosophy, it is from this perspective that the overall project draws attention to the role of human agency in which individuals are construed in terms of Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) entities. In previous publications I have established the ontological basis for this schema. Against this background an analysis is made of Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* exploring the sense of authentic being contrasted against the 'they-self' (*Das-man*). This analysis draws on Heidegger's conceptualisation of the 'understanding' construed relative to some state-of-mind, a process inclusive of the temporality of state-of-mind and the temporality of being. Heidegger's examination explores the modes-of-being to establish that existentially 'being-thrown' (thrownness) means finding oneself in some state-of-mind or other. The spatio-temporal nature of one's life involves Being-in-the-world, as an engaged participant and for Heidegger it is through this engagement that one may come to recognise one's own authentic self.

Pritika Nehra

Researcher, Indian Institute of Technology, India

Moral Explanation in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics

The aim of moral theories is to present a justification of their philosophical views. I argue that in this sense, Aristotle's moral particularism does not present a moral or political theory to judge whether an act is right or wrong since there is no convincing justification available rather his concepts and the hierarchies within them exist as unquestioned premises to regard correctness to an already right conduct by appealing to his system of virtues. It specifically emerges from a certain system of values that socially condition us into performing certain acts regarded as correct or incorrect. But Aristotle's approach has no relevance in judging actions especially those actions that are outside the purview of values that society ingrains in us through moral education. I shall substantiate my argument by presenting a critique of Aristotle's concept of 'virtue' and the problems associated with the hierarchy within Aristotle's conceptualization of *praxis* versus *poesis*, and *phronesis* versus *Sophia* and the connection between ethics and politics in 'The Nichomachean Ethics'. In answer to my enquiry that what type of explanations the domain of ethics is susceptible to I argue that moral explanation need not appeal to unchallenged premises.

Takuya Niikawa

Ph.D. Student, Hokkaido University, Japan

The Disagreement on Naïve Realism and its Analysis

In recent year there has been renewal of interest in naïve realism in philosophy of perception. Naïve realism is supposed to have three theoretical advantages: phenomenological, semantical and epistemological. However, there are crucial disagreements on the presence or absence of such advantages. The aim of this presentation is to clarify the exact point where the disagreements arise.

I think that there are two different stages where the disagreements are able to be located. The first stage is how to characterize the phenomenology of perceptual experience. It seems that proponents of naïve realism generally posit that the phenomenological aspect of perceptual experience is constituted by things which we are aware of in having the experience (William Fish, 2009, *Perception, Hallucination and Illusion*). A type of intentionalists, however, might deny this assumption and insist that theories of being aware of objects in experience and theories of the phenomenology of experience are independent (Adam Pautz, 2007, "Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence").

The second stage is what functions or roles should be recognized of the phenomenological aspects of perceptual experience. Naïve realist usually confers various cognitive roles on the phenomenological aspect of perceptual experience and takes advantage of the cognitive roles to support naïve realism. For example, John Campbell claims that the phenomenological aspect of perceptual experience has to play an essential role to demonstratively think about ordinary objects such as apples (John Campbell, 2002, *Reference and Consciousness*). However, opponents of naïve realism might insist that the capacity to demonstratively think is irrelevant to the phenomenological aspect of perceptual experience. If the opponents were correct, the supposed support for naïve realism would disappear.

In conclusion, I suggest an analysis of two stages of the disagreements is a key to evaluate the plausibility of naïve realism.

William O'Meara

Professor, James Madison University, USA

Kierkegaard and Moral Guilt

From both a Christian perspective and a Kantian perspective, Kierkegaard assumes that ethics deals with the attainment of perfection. He relies upon the verse from Mathew 5:18: 'Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect,' and in *The Concept of Anxiety* he relies upon Kant in holding that ethics is like the law, demanding absolute obedience to the command of perfection, but which is an impossibility. However, Kierkegaard himself points out in that same book that Aristotelian ethics does not aim at an impossible perfection in its definition of virtue. Consequently, the purpose of this paper will be to offer an Aristotelian and Existentialist approach to ethics which avoids both perfectionism and moral guilt which cannot be forgiven by the ethical sphere of existence.

Firstly, the paper will briefly draw upon two well-known scripture scholars to argue that 'Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect,' is better understood as 'Be compassionate as your Father is compassionate,' and that this compassion is achievable in human behavior and attitude. One scholar points out that '*Compassion* comes from the [Aramaic] word for "womb,"' and a second scholar further illuminates divine compassion to be like a mother moved by concern for the children of her womb

Secondly, against the Kantian demand for perfection in ethical behavior, the paper will analyze Aristotle's concept of the virtue of friendship. When two friends act for the good of themselves and each other, they have certainly transcended selfishness and have a true compassion for each other, like that of a mother for the child of her womb, emphasizes Aristotle in Book IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The ideals of the best kind of friendship are not an impossible ethics for Aristotle.

Thirdly, the paper will analyze and evaluate the existentialist foundation of ethics for Kierkegaard.

Antoine Panaïoti

Lecturer, McGill University, Canada

No-self and Altruism: What is the Relation?

One particularly tenacious problem concerning the normative implications of the metaphysics of personal identity turns on the relationship between the existence (or non-existence) of an abiding self as the person's unchanging core and the justification of egoism. This paper will argue that though it might not be possible successfully to establish (*à la* Parfit) a relationship of rational entailment between the 'is (not)' of no-self and the 'ought' of altruism, there might nevertheless be a *psychological* relationship between accepting (and internalizing) the truth of no-self and the loosening of egoistic dispositions in favor of altruistic dispositions. Admittedly, this would no longer be a matter of deriving normative implications from the metaphysics of personal identity, but it may nevertheless have important implications in the domain of ethics and of moral psychology in particular. Seeing as it has overall been neglected in contemporary philosophical discussion so far, then, such a *psychological* relation between no-self and altruism requires elucidation. Accordingly, this paper is separated into three sections. Section 1 will argue for a firm distinction between two very different claims which have not been sufficiently distinguished in the literature on the ethical implications of the personal identity, namely (A) the theoretical claim that no-self renders the classical formulation of rational egoism indefensible, with the implications that this might have on the rationality of non-derivative altruistic concern, and (B) the psychological claim that a deep realization of the truth of no-self, properly construed, makes one less egoistic and more altruistic. Only under the shallowest and most naïve rationalism, shall it be argued, can (B) be reduced to considerations relating to (A) alone. Section 2 will critically assess (A), and ultimately reject it as untenable. Section 3, finally, will explore (B) and its theoretical underpinnings. Here a dialogue will be initiated between Western philosophy and Buddhist thought, which contains a number of relevant insights on the metaphysics and psychology of personal identity and its relationship to character and behavior.

Elena Popa

Ph.D. Student, Central European University, Hungary

Causation and Scientific Inquiry: Lewis versus Woodward

In *Making Things Happen* (2003), James Woodward presents his theory of causation as manipulability. According to this theory, C causes E if under a range of interventions on C, E would change. Because Woodward takes into account actual, as well as potential interventions, his theory is a counterfactual theory. Upon comparing his account to David Lewis's counterfactual account – causation seen as counterfactual dependence – Woodward stresses that one of the advantages of his theory is that it relates better to scientists' work when determining causal relations between variables. While in his book, Woodward compares his account to Lewis's initial theory, little is said about Lewis's later approach, from 'Causation as Influence'.

In this paper, I aim to compare Woodward's manipulability idea with Lewis's influence account. My main claim would be that although Woodward can deal with counterexamples better than Lewis's similarity metric, the analogy with scientific use of causes and causal inference is also available to Lewis. I will concentrate on the problem of causal relata (events vs. variables), the idea of making a difference, influence patterns, and the problem of including probability in the picture of causation. A further point would be that some of the advantages of Woodward's theory are due to the compatibility with Pearl's (2000) computational account to causal inference. Showing that Pearl's considerations are not entirely incompatible with the specifications of Lewis's theory would make a case for the claim that the theories of Woodward and Lewis are not so far apart.

Donald Poochigian

Professor, University of North Dakota, USA

Bohm's Paradox and the Conscious Observer

David Bohm identifies a paradox within quantum theory. Assumed by quantum theory is an observer who is both a distinguishable constituent of an indistinguishable world, and an indistinguishable constituent of a distinguishable world. Without a distinguishable observer, a distinguishable quantum world is impossible. Within a distinguishable quantum world, a distinguishable observer is impossible. Thus, a quantum world appears self-contradictory. Content in relation composes a quantum world. A distinguishable and indistinguishable quantum world having the same content and different relation, content is not paradoxical and relation is paradoxical.

Non-quantum and quantum worlds being ontologically incompatible, relational identity is an inherent operational and functional constituent of the quantum world. Component of relation are the operators one and zero, and the functions injection, surjection, and bijection. Integrating the minds of distinct scientific observers is the relativistic bijective assumption of common experiential content and uncommon experiential form. Quantum operational functions smoothly transitioning quantum states from one into another, contradictory states occur consecutively, not concurrently. Doing so resolves Bohm's paradox.

Sri Poedjiastoeti

PhD Student, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia

Harmony without Conformity

Multicultural is a necessity in Indonesia. Indonesia's cultural diversity is something that can not be denied its existence. The existence of such cultural diversity makes Indonesia as one of the state's high cultural diversity.

Indonesia's cultural diversity is an advantage possessed by the nation of Indonesia. It means Indonesia has complete culture and highly variable. In the course of the history of Indonesia is very diverse cultures can co-exist and respect each other. Intercultural life can be intertwined in a frame *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* or Unity in Diversity.

Besides being known as a multicultural country, Indonesia was told as a wealthy nation, religious, humanist, tolerant and willing to sacrifice. Indonesian people are also known as a nation that always put such a shame, working together, and uphold the unity and integrity. But the image of Indonesia as such is now beginning to change and replaced by the opposite image. Indonesia is known as the nation who behaves anarchist, angry and corrupt.

Various examples can be expressed as follows, increased violence or terror in the name of religion in recent years. The occurrence conflict both horizontally and vertically. As a result of the conflict caused fear, insecurity and trauma for ethnic many of them overseas exodus to find a safe and comfortable environment for their safety. Also conflicts leave victims, traumatic, displacement and prolonged suffering.

Such conditions would not be occurred immediately but related to the human condition as a culprit so that actions took tend to be more on *actus hominis* than *actus humanus*. It thus can not be separated from human nature also tend egocentric. Egocentric is important for the safety of themselves and encouraging people's lives become more dynamic. However, egocentric should not be excessive because it will result in problems in social life.

Jaya Ray

Assistant Professor, Delhi University, India

Scope of Semantic Innocence

The principle of semantic innocence demands that a particular linguistic expression or utterance should have the same semantic value irrespective of the linguistic contexts in which it appears. In contemporary semantic literature, the notion of *semantic innocence* is credited to Donald Davidson, specifically in the context of Frege's theory. Frege, by postulating a two-tier theory of meaning for the same word, seems to have violated semantic innocence. But why did Frege do so? An attempt to answer this question reflects that propositional attitude ascribing contexts, specially belief contexts, pose a serious threat to the principle of semantic innocence by breaking another very important principle of language – the principle of substitutivity. According to this principle, two co-referential terms are substitutable *salva veritate*. But the principle of substitutivity seems to disappear in belief contexts. In belief contexts, if a term is substituted by another co-referential term, the truth value of the sentence might change, which shows that the two co-referential terms make different semantic contributions to the sentences in which they occur and that is a clear violation of the principle of semantic innocence.

To face this challenge I have tried to analyse the logical form of belief sentences, since semantic interpretations are largely attached to the level of logical form. My analysis of belief sentences reveals that the problem is not really a problem with *de-re* beliefs, but only with *de-dicto* beliefs. A two-tier Fregean conception of semantics violating the condition of innocence may definitely apply, if at all, in propositional attitudes concerning belief ascribing sentences in *de-dicto* (logical) form. The rest of the language seems to be covered by referential semantic innocence.

Aristotelis Santas

Professor, Valdosta State University, USA

Aristotelian Ethics and Biophilia

Contemporary ethics has been preoccupied with a search for an Environmental Ethic, partly in response to the world-wide ecological crises, and partly due to the impasse between the two major paradigms in the modern era. Utilitarian and deontological theorists have attempted to approach environmental concerns, from animal rights to the protection of ecosystems. These attempts have produced deep disagreements on justification, even when there has been agreement on basic practice. Other theorists, like J. Baird Callicott, seeing the limitations of both rights-based and goods based approaches have tried to work outside of (or beyond) these traditional paradigms and offer an ethical theory that is ecocentric (non-anthropogenic and non-individualistic). Callicott, in particular, turns to the early modern philosophy of David Hume to give a theoretical basis for a requisite prescription for inter-species moral obligation. While this approach has merit, it is the contention of this author that a viable foundation can be found in the ancient Greek tradition. Aristotle's work in ethics is generally ignored by environmental ethicists, perhaps largely because it is anthropocentric, but also I think because it is dismissed and misunderstood. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is generally not read in its entirety and is usually discussed in a perfunctory manner, with a focus on "virtue-based ethics." Aristotle's discussion of friendship, however, holds a key to the much sought-after theory of interspecies obligation. *Philia*, Aristotle's term for friendship, is described by him as a feeling of good will towards another self. During his discussion of *philia*, he makes it clear that one can create a theory of obligation based on friendship. We owe things to our friends by virtue of the reciprocally exchanged good wills and deeds. Although his focus in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is human relations, he makes it clear that this sentiment can be felt towards other living beings. I entitle that generalized good will Aristotelian Biophilia and undertake to outline the idea here.

Ilse Somavilla

Researcher, University of Innsbruck, Austria

Thaumazein in Ancient Greek Philosophy and Wonder in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein

In his writings, Wittgenstein several times speaks of “wonder” – in connection with his understanding of ethics, his criticism of science and his preoccupation with aspects, aspect-seeing and change of aspects in his *Philosophical Investigations*.

In my paper I am going to analyse the role and meaning of wonder in Wittgenstein’s philosophising – in the way of his regarding both the phenomenal world and the world “outside the world of facts”, and in particular in his attitude towards ethics and the limits of language. In his *Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein mentions the experience of “wonder at the existence of the world” as his first and foremost example – his “experience par excellence” –for his understanding of ethics.

In the following, I am going to distinguish between wonder as admiration and wonder as astonishment and questioning, thus between wonder as silent admiration of the world on the one hand and a dynamic preoccupation with the manifold and ever-changing aspects of every object of philosophising on the other. Moreover, I am going to research in how far the dimension of wonder in Wittgenstein’s works can be compared to the Ancient Greeks’ “thaumazein” and to Plato’s and Aristotle’s remarks about wonder as the beginnings of philosophy.

Cristian Tiple

PhD Student, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Crisis and Ideology

At the heart of our paper lies a concern about a lack of responsibility, from the individual, to the State, and the transnational corporations. The paper examines the relationship between the current financial crisis as generated by the ideology of market fundamentalism, the problem of responsibility, and the lack of social hope theorized by Richard Rorty, generated by a lack of effective mythology in contemporary Western society.

The first part touches the concept of globalization and argues that a globalized world needs individuals with a much wider perspective than the traditional frameworks of identity formation, a frame that would enable it to maintain a healthy identity, protected by the corrosion of nihilism, but in the same time by the obvious resurgence of nationalist chauvinism.

The second part focuses on the financial crisis, taking into consideration a keynesian approach, as the crisis of market fundametalism made those who put their hopes in the blessings of globalization to become more skeptical regarding the benefits, as the effects of the current crisis worsen and spread over the entire Western society.

The third part deals with an aspect in which the economists' analysis are not yet helpful - that of social hope. For changes to take place, not necessarily the social utopian idealism, but at least the hope of a better and just world, a minimal degree of meliorism is always required. Postmodernism, with the declared distrust of great narratives (Lyotard), does not come helpful in this regard, if any prospect of a radical collective emancipation has ended. The end of any absolute ontological ground of thinking will not be able to become a collective experience because the awareness of the absence of absolute grounds increases the anxiety due to uncertainty, therefore a weak form of Enlightenment should absolutize some fundamental rules of coexistence.

Joseph Thompson

Associate Professor, University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA

Two Dogmas of Reductionism: On the Irreducibility of Self-Consciousness and the Impossibility of Neurophilosophy

Two fundamental assumptions are becoming enshrined into dogma in contemporary philosophy of consciousness: (1) that neuroscience is the appropriate method for achieving philosophical understanding of self-consciousness, and (2) that self-consciousness can be reduced to (and explained in terms of) neural activity. But this reductionist approach fails to account adequately for the subjective self-awareness of consciousness, and it cannot explain the externalized productions and expressions of consciousness (for which “neural activity” is not an adequate description). I develop a critique of so-called “neurophilosophy” from the standpoint of Hegelian ontology and Heideggerian phenomenology, according to which this trend toward reductionism represents a significant turn in the wrong direction. What gets “reduced” (and thereby impoverished) along with consciousness is philosophy itself, which would also supposedly be explicable in terms of neural activity.

Philosophy as understood and practiced comprehensively by Hegel and Heidegger must be able to account for itself, in terms that are ontologically adequate to itself. The philosophical self-understanding of consciousness is thus profoundly and ineluctably *reflexive*. Lacking this reflexivity, the neuroscientific approach cannot possibly address whole branches of substantive and foundational philosophical questions.

We are not neurons accounting for themselves as neurons; brain cells neither ask nor answer questions—*persons* do. The dogmas of reductionism leave no room or allowance for persons, the requisite unit for philosophical analysis; this presents serious objections to the entire approach, and severely limits its explanatory range and power. The inherent subjectivity of individual experience requires a *self* of some kind, however “epiphenomenal”; and whatever we choose to call this self—ego, subject, person, mind, *Geist*, *Dasein*, bundle of perceptions, transcendental unity of apperception, “narrative center of gravity”—it remains the indispensable precondition for experience, intentionality, deliberation, knowledge, scientific understanding itself. In the neurophilosophical reduction of self-consciousness, no self remains, so no self-account is possible.

Sander Wilkens

Privatdozent, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany.

Amendments to the Theory of Recognition

The philosophy of Kant is well suited to incorporate novel branches of interpretation. The recent one since about a decade concerns the opposition between nonconceptual and conceptual [re]cognition. Several authors from McDowell, Hanna, Allais to Williams take position for or against the possibility to conceive the world in terms of intuition, i.e. without the assistance or salient influence of concepts, in particular the categories. Concerning Kant and his mature doctrine, it should be clear that immediate perception of the world does not count as recognition (Erkenntnis), elaborated later in his further distinction between judgment(s) of perception (Wahrnehmungsurteil) against judgment(s) of experience (Erfahrungsurteil). Hence spatial or temporal content of consciousness, where both the forms of intuition and empirical objects of the world are represented, at least geometrically, are not accountable as experience and/or recognition. Seen from the historical aftermath, further crucial problems concern the question if it is right to pronounce nonconceptual content as properly 'intentional' and if Kant is right to rely strictly on exclusive Euclidian geometrical terms when designing the laws of intuition – without even reference to natural projection and mathematical projectivity.

When trying to resolve these issues, the first acknowledgement relates to the fundamental directional opposition the consciousness is steadily dependent upon. Even if affection and impression are responsible for having any experience, i.e. recognition, its (non-)conceptual orientation is diametrically opposed to the application of concepts, especially pure concepts rooted in reason. Introducing the workings of the schemata or 'Einbildungskraft' does not solve this problem because it underlies the dictate of assuming a nature to align to the requirements of the mind and/or reason: Kant did not investigate into the possibility to shift the origin of transcendental logic, i.e. the subordination of intuition(s) under the mind (concepts), into the relationships of the faculties. Once opened, there should result (i) a common rationale where sensation *determinates* the intellect in order to evoke or form concepts; (ii) an understanding of conceptual content where sensation is dominant (determinative) in order to imply performances of the mind, i.e. the first impulse of notional formation and/or the immediate interference of concepts already formatted. In any case, determination, without ambivalence (or unrestricted) fusion, will allow an at least and basically two-fold instead of one-fold explication according to the interaction of sensation and intellect.

Literature and Proper research:

Immanuel Kant, De Mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principii, in: AA Band II, S.385-420.

Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in: AA Band III/IV, zit. als A/B.

Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, in : AA, Band IV, S.253-384

John Williams

Associate Professor, Singapore Management University, Singapore

Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox

John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes 'G.E. Moore's view' that omissive assertions such as 'It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining' are 'inherently "absurd"', that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of Ellie is Di, a dialetheist who asserts or believes that

The Russell set includes itself but I believe that it is not the case that the Russell set includes itself.

Since any adequate explanation of Moore's paradox must handle commissive assertions and beliefs as well as omissive ones, it must deal with Di as well as engage Ellie. I give such an explanation. I argue that neither Ellie's assertion nor her belief is irrational yet both are absurd. Likewise neither Di's assertion nor her belief is irrational yet in contrast neither is absurd. I conclude that not all Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs are irrational and that the syntax of Moore's examples is neither necessary nor sufficient for Moore-paradoxicality.

Kam Ming Yip

Associate Professor, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,
China

A Critical Survey of Classification of Fallacies

This paper aims to develop a classification framework for identifying fallacious reasoning. When people consult reference books or internet websites to expand their understanding of fallacies, they will find numerous examples. The best method to understand these examples is to group them into categories. However, the classification of fallacies itself is a controversial matter. Since the time of Aristotle, logicians have proposed different fallacy classifications which have varied greatly in length, but none has gained general acceptance.

It is a matter of fact that the history of human race suggests a nearly unlimited number of ways that people can be fooled into accepting poor arguments. Surprisingly, Aristotle thinks that there are twelve ways and only twelve ways by which fallacies can appear to be persuasive. These twelve categories may not be good enough to cover all the fallacious reasoning, however, it is the first and systematic way we have known for classifying fallacious reasoning. I.M. Copi and Howard Kahane are prominent logicians; they have proposed different classifications of fallacies in their popular textbooks, namely *Introduction to Logic* and *The Use of Reason in Everyday Life*, which have published more than ten editions respectively.

Our project will conduct a critical survey on some representative classifications, ranging from ancient times to contemporary thought, such as those provided by Aristotle, I.M. Copi, and Howard Kahane. Based on close scrutiny of the selected classifications, an appropriate classification framework will be constructed.