Philosophy Abstracts
Seventh Annual International Conference on Philosophy
28-31 May 2012, Athens, Greece
Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos

THE ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
Philosophy Abstracts
7th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
28-31 May 2012, Athens, Greece

Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(In Alphabetical Order by Author’s Family name)

Preface
Conference Program
1. Aristotle on the Ontological State of the Active Intellect
   Noushin Abdi Savejian
2. Kolachala Mallinatha’s Contribution to Nyaya-Vaisesika Literature
   Sampathkumar Acharyulu
3. Demarcation, Definition, Art
   Thomas Adajian
4. Is Perception Representational? Tyler Burge on Perceptual Functions
   Bernardo Aguilera
5. Demonstrative Thoughts, Object Dependency and Redundancy
   Manuel Alejandro Amado
6. Limits on Global Conscience: The Responsibility to Protect
   Jennifer Mei Sze Ang
7. Epistemic Feelings and Transparency
   Santiago Arango Munoz
8. Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy
   Michael Aristidou
9. Consciousness of the Self and Higher-Order Thought
   James Bachmann
10. Complexity and Contextual Emergence
    Robert Bishop
11. Free Will and Providence in St. Augustine’s Account on His Conversion
    Elisabeth Blum
12. Anthropology of Slavery—A Hermeneutics of First Person Narratives
    Paul Richard Blum
13. In The Name Of Sinn: Representation, Reference and Semantic Content
    Kieran Cashell
14. Kant’s Treatment of the Modality of Judgments. (An Examination of Lovejoy’s Critique of Kant)
    Dipanwita Chakrabarti
15. The Building of Languages about Reality and the Call to Experience
    Dan Chitoiu
16. Arrogance, Humility, and Self-Respect: A Kantian Analysis of Vice and Virtue
| 17. | Basic Evidence in Psychotherapy            | Edward Erwin |
| 18. | Root Of All Evil - Plutarch’s Double Cosmic Soul | Iva. |
| 19. | Re: Liberty                                | J.O         |
| 20. | Why Tell Stories?                         | Gary Fuller |
| 21. | The Reconfiguration of Philosophy         | Sara Fumagalli |
| 22. | Fact, Fiction and Pretense                | Dimitria Electra Gatzia & Eric Sotnak |
| 23. | Universal Interpretation                  | Simon Glynn |
| 24. | How a Priori Is Anselm’s Unum Argumentum? A Reconstruction of Proslogion 2 In The Light of Its Theological Context and Relevance | Christian Gobel |
| 25. | The Role of Mimesis in Aristotle’s Poetics: A Fundamental Cognitive System | Mariagrazia Granatella |
| 26. | On Genuine Biological Autonomy            | Attila Grandpierre |
| 27. | Cicero’s Timaeus Scepticus                | Christina Hoenig |
| 29. | Bare Life: Biopolitics of Foucault and Agamben | Hande Kesgin |
| 30. | The Identity, the Integration in the our Global era. Education by the Intercultural Communication | Agim Leka |
| 31. | The Infinite In The Real: Plato’s Influence on Surrealism. | Barbara Lekatsas |
| 32. | Informed Consent: Reasons to Prefer Consent-as-Relational-Autonomy to Consent-as-Grant-of-Authority | Pamela Jean Lomelino |
| 33. | Whither Kuhn’s Evolutionary Philosophy of Science? | James A. Marcum |
| 34. | Self-Forgiveness and Quality of Will      | Per-Erik Milam |
| 35. | An Ubuntu Ethic of Punishment             | Mechthild Nagel |
| 36. | Antichristian Christlichkeit and Athleticism in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Life | Achim Oberst |
| 37. | Kant and the Categorial Imperative        |           |
38. Embodiment, Lived Body and Empathy. Crossover for the Aesthetic Experience  
   Marge Paas

39. Axiomatic and Correspondence Truth as Mutually Verifying  
   Donald V. Po

40. Retrieving Plato: the Dialogical Method in Nussbaum and Williams' Readings  
   Elisa Ravasio

41. On Identity and Indiscernibility: Against any Ontological Reduction  
   Rossana Raviola

42. Experience and Expression: A Phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy of Mind and Intersubjectivity  
   Ilaria Resto

43. Peirce's Theory of Continuity and the Vindication of Universals against Nominalism  
   Paniel Reyes Cardenas

44. The Darwinian Theories of Instinct: From Lamarckism to Selection  
   Thomas Robert

45. The Paradoxes of Time Travel  
   Mohammad Saeedimehr

46. How to Resolve the Partiality- Impartiality Puzzle Using a Love-Centered Account of Virtue Ethics  
   Eric Silverman

47. Science of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science  
   Chandra Prakash Trivedi & Sengar Manisha

48. Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self  
   Andrew Ward

49. The Wisdom of the Many and Fichte’s “We”  
   Sander Wilkens

50. The Segregation of Applied Arts from Fine Arts and the Status of Fashion  
   M. Mirahan Zedan

51. A Concept of Images of Man  
   Michael Zichy
Preface

This abstract book includes all the abstracts of the papers presented at the 7th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 28-31 May 2012, organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. In total there were 51 papers and 54 presenters, coming from 20 different countries (Albania, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, India, Iran, Ireland, Kuwait, Nigeria, Romania, Singapore, Switzerland, UK and USA). The conference was organized into 12 sessions that included areas of Philosophy of Science, Phenomenology, Ethics, Philosophy of Language and other related fields. As it is the publication policy of the Institute, the papers presented in this conference will be considered for publication in one of the books of ATINER.

The Institute was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet in Athens and exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study. Our mission is to make ATHENS a place where academics and researchers from all over the world meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. To serve this purpose, conferences are organized along the lines of well established and well defined scientific disciplines. In addition, interdisciplinary conferences are also organized because they serve the mission statement of the Institute. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 150 international conferences and has published over 100 books. Academically, the Institute is organized into four research divisions and nineteen research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committee and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference together.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 28-31 May, Athens, Greece: Abstract Book
FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM

7th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 28-31 May 2012,
Athens, Greece

PROGRAM

Conference Venue: Metropolitan Hotel of Athens, 385 Syngrou Ave., 175 64,
Athens, Greece

ORGANIZING AND SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

1. Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
2. Dr. Patricia Hanna, Professor, University of Utah, USA.
3. Dr. George Poulos, Vice-President of Research, ATINER & Emeritus
   Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.
4. Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President Academic, ATINER & Professor, Sam
   Houston University, USA.
5. Dr. Donald V. Poochigian, Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.
6. Dr. Mechthild Nagel, Professor, SUNY Cortland, USA.
7. Dr. Michael Paraskos, Provost, Cornaro Institute, Cyprus.
8. Dr. Kiriakos Xerosemou, Lecturer, Florida International University, USA.
9. Dr. Michael Aristidou, Assistant Professor, Barry University, USA.
10. Dr. Chrysoula Gitsoulis, Adjunct Lecturer, City College, City University of
    New York, USA.
11. Dr. Gregory A. Katsas, Head, Sociology Research Unit, ATINER &
    Associate Professor, The American College of Greece-Deree College,
    Greece.
12. Dr. Margarita Kefalaki, Director of Communication, ATINER.
13. Ms. Lila Skountridaki, Researcher, ATINER & Ph.D. Student, University of
    Strathclyde, U.K.
14. Mr. Vasilis Charalampopoulos, Researcher, ATINER & Ph.D. Student,
    University of Strathclyde, U.K

Administration: Fani Balaska, Stavroula Kiritsi, Eirini Lentzou, Konstantinos
Manolidis, Katerina Maraki & Celia Sakka

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Monday 28 May 2012
07:30-08:00 Registration
08:00-08:15 Welcome and Opening Remarks
- Dr. George Poulos, Vice-President of Research, ATINER & Emeritus Professor,
  University of South Africa, South Africa.
- Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
- Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President of Academics, ATINER & Professor, Sam
  Houston University, USA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session I (Room A): Phenomenology</th>
<th>Chair: Poulos, G., Vice-President of Research, ATINER &amp; Emeritus Professor, University of South Africa, South Africa.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:15</td>
<td>1. Blum, P.R., Professor, Loyola University Maryland, USA. Anthropology of Slavery – A Hermeneutics of First Person Narratives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>09:30</td>
<td>2. Kesgin, H., PhD Student, Villanova University, USA. Bare Life: Biopolitics of Foucault and Agamben.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>3. Oberst, J., Lecturer, University of New Mexico, USA. Antichristian Christlictigkeit and Athleticism in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Life.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>10:00-12:00 Session II (Room A): Ethics I</th>
<th>10:00-12:00 Session III (Room B): 19th Century Chair: Kefalaki, M., Director of Communication, ATINER.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: Pappas, N., Vice-President of Academics, ATINER &amp; Professor, Sam Houston University, USA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ang, J.M.S., Head, Singapore Institute of Management University, Singapore. Limits on Global Conscience: The Responsibility to Protect.</td>
<td>1. Chakrabarti, D., Associate Professor, Vidyasagar College, India. Kant’s Treatment of the Modality of Judgments. (An Examination of Lovejoy’s Critique of Kant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Leka, A., Lecturer, University Alexander Xhuvani Elbasan, Albania. The Identity, the Integration in the our Global era. Education by the Intercultural Communication.</td>
<td>2. Dillon, R.S., Professor, Lehigh University, USA. Arrogance, Humility, and Self-Respect: A Kantian Analysis of Vice and Virtue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nagel, M., Professor, SUNY Cortland, USA. An Ubuntu Ethic of Punishment.</td>
<td>3. O’Meara, W., Professor, James Madison University, USA. Kant and the Categorical Imperative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Silverman, E., Assistant Professor, Christopher Newport University, USA. How to Resolve the Partiality-Impartiality Puzzle Using a Love-Centered Account of Virtue Ethics.</td>
<td>4. Wilkens, S., Technique University, Germany. The Wisdom of the Many and Fichte’s “We”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session IV (Room A): Philosophy of Language I</th>
<th>Session V (Room B): Philosophy of Science Chair: O’Meara, W., Professor, James Madison University, USA.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:15</td>
<td>Chair: Ang, J.M.S., Head, Singapore Institute of Management University, Singapore.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15</td>
<td>2. Chitoiu, D., Associate Professor, Romanian Academy, Romania. The Building of Languages about Reality and the Call to Experience.</td>
<td>2. Jeler, C., Researcher, Al. I. Cuza University of Iasi, Romania. What Does Multi-level Selection Tell us about the Causal Nature of Natural Selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>3. Glynn, S., Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA. Universal Interpretation.</td>
<td>3. Marcum, J., Professor, Baylor University, USA. Whither Kuhn’s Evolutionary Philosophy of Science?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45</td>
<td>4. Silverman, E., Assistant Professor, Christopher Newport University, USA. How to Resolve the Partiality-Impartiality Puzzle Using a Love-Centered Account of Virtue Ethics.</td>
<td>4. Robert, T., PhD Student, University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 14:30-15:15 Lunch (details during registration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15:15-17:00 Session VI (Room A): Philosophy Issues</th>
<th>15:15-17:00 Session VII (Room B): 20th Century</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: <em>Gatzia, D.E., Assistant Professor, The University of Akron Wayne College, USA</em></td>
<td>Chair: Fuller, G., Professor, Central Michigan University, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Acharyulu, S., Associate Professor, Rastriya Sanskrit University, India. Kolachala Mallinatha’s Contribution to Nyaya-Vaisesika Literature.</td>
<td>1. Trivedi C.P. Former Principal and Professor, MJS College, Bhind India &amp; Sengar Manisha, Assistant Professor, Delhi University, Deshbandhu College, India. Science of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Abdi Savejian, N., Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University, Iran. Aristotle on the Ontological State of the Active Intellect.</td>
<td>3. Reyes Cardenas, P., PhD Student, The University of Sheffield, UK. Peirce’s Theory of Continuity and the Vindication of Universals against Nominalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fumagalli, S., PhD Student, Albert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg, Germany &amp; State University of Milan, Italy. The Reconfiguration of Philosophy.</td>
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</tbody>
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### 17:15-18:45 Session VIII (Room A): Philosophy of Mind I

Chair: Grandy, R., Professor and Chair of Department, Rice University, USA.

| 1. Fuller, G., Professor, Central Michigan University, USA. Why Tell Stories? |
| 2. *Gatzia, D.E., Assistant Professor, The University of Akron Wayne College, USA & Sotnak, E., Assistant Professor, The University of Akron Wayne College, USA. Fact, Fiction and Pretense. |
| 3. Zichy, M., Assistant Professor, University of Salzburg, Austria. A Concept of Images of Man. |

### 20:30–22:30 Greek Night (Details during registration)

**Tuesday 29 May 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>08:00-09:30 Session X (Room A): Ancient II</th>
<th>08:30-09:30 Session XI (Room B): Medieval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: <em>Grandpierre, A., Researcher, Konkoly Observatory of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary.</em></td>
<td>Chair: <em>Famakinwa, J.O., Lecturer, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Granatella, M., Ph.D. Student, University of Pisa, Italy and University of Paris-Est, France. The Role of Mimesis in Aristotle’s Poetics: A Fundamental Cognitive System.</td>
<td>1. Blum, E., Instructor, Loyola University Maryland, USA. Free Will and Providence in St. Augustine’s Account on His Conversion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hoenig, C., PhD Student, Cambridge University, UK. Cicero’s Timaeus Scepticus.</td>
<td>2. Gobel, C., Assistant Professor, Assumption College, USA. How a Priori Is Anselm’s Unum Argumentum? A Reconstruction of Proslogion 2 In The Light of Its Theological Context and Relevance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Faiferri, L., Researcher, Italy. Root Of All Evil - Plutarch’s Double Cosmic Soul.</td>
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<td>Time</td>
<td>Session XII (Room A): Philosophy Issues</td>
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<td>09:45-11:15</td>
<td>Chair: Milam, P.E., PhD Student, University of California, USA.</td>
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<td>2. Amado, M.A., PhD Student, University National of Colombia, Colombia. Demonstrative Thoughts, Object Dependency and Redundancy.</td>
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<td>3. Raviola, R., Ph.D. Student, University of Pavia, Italy. On Identity and Indiscernibility: Against any Ontological Reduction.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session XIII (Room B): Philosophy of Mind II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:30-13:00</td>
<td>Chair: Bishop, R., Associate Professor, Wheaton College, USA.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Ravasio, E., PhD Student, University of the State of Pavia, Italy. Recovering Plato: The Dialogical Method as a Democratic Interplay.</td>
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<td>2. Lekatsas, B., Professor, Hofstra University, USA. The Infinite In The Real: Plato’s Influence on Surrealism.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session XIV (Room A): Ancient III</th>
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<tr>
<td>11:30-13:00</td>
<td>Chair: Bishop, R., Associate Professor, Wheaton College, USA.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. Poochigian, D., Professor, University of North Dakota, USA. Axiomatic and Correspondence Truth as Mutually Verifying.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Aristidou, M., Assistant Professor, American University of Kuwait, Kuwait. Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy. (Tuesday, 29th of May, 2012, morning)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Saeedimehr, M., Professor, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran. The Paradoxes of Time Travel.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session XVI (Room A): Ethics II</th>
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<tr>
<td>13:00-14:00</td>
<td>Chair: Poochigian, D., Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.</td>
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<td>3. Milam, P.E., PhD Student, University of California, USA. Self-Forgiveness and Quality of Will.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session XVII (Room B): Philosophy of Mind III</th>
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<tr>
<td>14:00-15:30</td>
<td>Chair: Aristidou, M., Assistant Professor, American University of Kuwait, Kuwait.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Erwin, E., Professor, University of Miami, USA. Basic Evidence in Psychotherapy. (Tuesday, 29 May 2012)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Arango Munoz, S., PhD Student, Ruhr University, Germany. Epistemic Feelings and Transparency.</td>
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</table>
17:00-20:00 Urban Walk (Details during registration)
20:00-21:00 Dinner (Details during registration)

**Wednesday 30 May 2012**
Cruise: (Details during registration)

**Thursday 31 May 2012**
Delphi Visit: (Details during registration)
Noushin Abdi Savejian  
Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University, Iran

Aristotle on the Ontological State of the Active Intellect

Considering the characteristics of thought, Aristotle inclines in his On the Soul toward accepting the reality of a kind of intellect which is almost called "active intellect". His vague terminology and short statements concerning the ontological state of this intellect, however, has leaded to different, and in some cases, contradictory commentaries. In this paper, adopting a rigorous analytical approach to the issue along with appealing to Aristotle's own philosophical principles and texts, we propose a new interpretation according to which Aristotle believes in three kinds of intellect; an external active intellect (outside the human soul), an internal active intellect (inside the human soul) and a passive intellect so that the second and third are actually the same and consist in the actual and potential aspects of the single human intellect. As it is shown, this interpretation could be justified with several textual evidents and put an end to an old historical dispute.
Sampathkumar Acharyulu
Associate Professor, Rastriya Sanskrit University, India

Kolachala Mallinatha’s Contribution to Nyaya-Vaisesika Literature

Kolacala Mallinatha Śērin (1450 A.D.) is not only a well-known commentator on the five Mahakavya-s of Sanskrit literature, but also a great scholar of Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy. His contribution to the field of Nyaya-Vaisesika is remarkable. But it is less known to the scholarly world. By the titles Mahamahopadhyaya, Padanakyaprama, aparavaraparśa, he is identified as a sound scholar. As well as the Pancmahakavya-s, he has in fact also commented on the Praṣastapadabhaṇya on the Vaiṣṇavasṭra of Kaṇada and Tarkikarakā on Vāradasara (1150 A.D.). These commentaries are called by names Tanikaṇa Niṇakaṭaka respectively.

Varadaraja the son of Sri Ramadeva Mishra is famous as Bodhanikara. He is the early commentator on Udayana’s Nyayakusumajjali. He also has composed an independent Nyaya treatise called Tarkikarakā (in 1616 verses) along with an auto-commentary by name Sarasvatiṣṭra, defending the Nyaya theory from the attack of Buddhists, jains and other Philosophers. This text has received a great attention of the scholars and more than thirteen people have commented, among which Mallinatha’s commentary also noteworthy. The others are: Jñanapūraṇa, Nidhinatha, Balabhadra, Činnubhaṭṭa, Ramapūraṇa, Sarasvatīṣṭra, Hariharadēkāta, Vinayakabhaṭṭa, Nāsiśaṭhakkura, Sundararaja, and the son of Annam bhatta. Among all these commentaries, Tarkikarakā, has been edited first with the commentaries of Mallinatha and Jñanapurna, by Sri Vindhyesvariprasada dvivedi from Pandit series, Varanasi, in 1900. Secondly with the commentaries of Chennu Bhatta and Ramesvara by Kishorenatha Jha, from Sri Kameshvarasimha Darbhaga Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, in 2001. Thirdly it is edited and published by Dr. PTGY.Sampathkumaracharyulu, from Tirupati, with the commentary Vivṛti of Harihara Dikshita, in 2004.

Mallinatha’s approach and the style of his commentary is unique. He decides the text with perfect readings and supports with several quotations of earlier. Here I would like present the views of Mallinatha from his commentary on Tarkikarakā.
Demarcation, Definition, Art

Much philosophical energy has been spent on demarcation questions - in philosophy of science, most notoriously, but also in philosophy of logic, and aesthetics. The question of how to demarcate science from pseudo-science, once regarded as central, commands relatively little attention today. In the philosophy of logic, by contrast, the problem of demarcating the logical constants is far less skeptically regarded. In aesthetics, where the problem is how to demarcate art from non-art, the question as to whether the problem is a real one or a pseudo-problem also continues to be debated. The hypothesis that the demarcation questions in these three areas are parallel, or at least similar enough to be interesting, is discussed. Some arguments for the conclusion that the demarcation problem is a pseudo-problem are considered, as are some demarcation proposals of a deflationist or minimalist sort. Particular attention is paid to the case of art.
Bernardo Aguilera  
PhD Student, The University of Sheffield, UK  

Is Perception Representational? Tyler Burge on Perceptual Functions

A philosophical issue raised by perception is whether some perceptual states have representational content. Dominant approaches to cognition explain perceptual systems in information-processing terms and often include representational states in their explanations, yet controversy remains as to where precisely representations begin and even whether they originate at the level of perception at all.

Burge (2010) has recently defended the claim that perception is representational. Based on a teleological notion of perceptual systems, he argues that perceptual systems have the function of accurately representing certain basic environmental attributes. However, he departs from mainstream teleological theories that rely on a biological notion of function (e.g. Millikan, 1989; Papineau, 1987) and offers an alternative account of perceptual functions that he calls ‘representational functions’.

In this paper I explore Burge’s account of representational functions and discuss two problems that it might present. First, that his critique of biological functions is not compelling and thus weakens one important motivation for his alternative account of perceptual functions; and, second, that his overall picture of how representational functions intertwine with other biological functions of the organism is problematic, in particular for the case of the determination of representational content.
According to The Object Dependency of Demonstrative Thought (ODT), if the object of a demonstrative thought does not exist then the thought is not available to be entertained or expressed. ODT is an anti-Cartesian doctrine that is a consequence of distinct and influential theories about the nature and structure of singular thought: neo-Russellian theories as well as neo-Fregean theories of singular thought are committed to ODT.

On the one hand, neo-Russellians hold that the object the thought is about is itself a constituent of the thought. As a result if the object does not exist, the thought will not be complete and will not be available to be entertained or expressed. On the other hand, neo-Fregean theorists (notably Evans and McDowell) maintain that, even though the object is not a thought constituent, demonstrative content is such that it cannot be expressed or entertained if its object does not exist.

However, according to some critics, there is a powerful argument which shows that any attempt to defend ODT will fail. This argument is called the psychological redundancy argument. If it is a good argument, then it shows that the attribution of object-dependent demonstrative thoughts is unnecessary to explain action. Thus, not only ODT, but all the distinct and incompatible theories that imply ODT would be false. The main objective of this paper is to show that the psychological redundancy argument is not a good argument. First, I will argue that the conventional attacks on the redundancy argument are not successful. Later, I will present my own criticism of the argument. Even if the redundancy argument is valid, I will show that some of its premises are not sustainable. Finally, I will defend some of the consequences that follow from the reply given here to the redundancy argument.
Jennifer Mei Sze Ang  
Head, Singapore Institute of Management University, Singapore

**Limits on Global Conscience: The Responsibility to Protect**

After several failed humanitarian interventions through the 1990s; civil war in Somalia in 1993, Rwandan genocide in 1994, and ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica in 1995; the norms of international law shifted towards the endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ in 2005. While the 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq may have had an enormous negative impact on the ‘RtoP’, the recent Nato-led intervention in Libya has raised calls for similar intervention in Yemen and Bahrain.

This formalization of ‘RtoP’ effectively transformed an imperfect obligation to a perfect duty, assumes equal duties to compatriots and foreigners in other countries alike, and justifies military means towards humanitarian ends. This paper sketches the philosophical basis of ‘RtoP’ as a type of moral obligation to the human-community-at-large by drawing upon Kant’s idea of conscience and cosmopolitan law. We can universally imagine this obligation to others through our conscience because conscience is “not something that can be acquired” but “an unavoidable fact” because “every human being, as a moral being, has a conscience with him originally”. And under Kant’s “cosmopolitan law”, every individual must be conceived as an end-in-itself and entitled to rights as “citizens of the earth” such that every human being is obliged not to violate these rights. Several issues are apparent. Assuming that Kant is right that we have imperfect duties towards foreigners in other countries, how do they ‘transform’ from imperfect into perfect duties? What are these duties and the obligatory character of these duties? Further, would the fulfillment of these duties justify the use of force?
Epistemic Feelings and Transparency

According to the Transparency Thesis, self-ascriptions of all mental states derive from an ascent routine in which the subject takes the perceptual content of her experience at face value and self-attributes that content: if the subject has the experience of seeing that P, then she forms the self-ascription “I see that P”. In sections 1 and 2 of this paper, I will present some argument against the Transparency Thesis. The main argument is that it cannot account for a considerable range of self-ascriptions where the object of the attitude is not transparent, e.g. the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, the feeling of forgetting, the feeling of knowing, and others. A metacognitive model that links epistemic feelings with a mindreading capacity will be proposed in section 3 to fill this gap. The metacognitive model claims that in the cases where the object is not transparent two elements are at play: some epistemic feelings (such as the feeling of knowing, the tip-of-the-tongue or the feeling of forgetting) and the mindreading mechanism that interprets the feelings according to their valence and the context. The paper ends with a discussion about the epistemic rules involved in mental action and the formation of self-ascriptions.
Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy

Donald Davidson in his account of intentional interpretation argues that people are mostly rational. Several psychological experiments, though, reveal that human beings demonstrate a high degree of deviation from the normative standards of rationality. One of the most popular experiments is the Conjunction Fallacy. In that experiment irrationality has been associated with an error in reasoning. Was that justified? What is the relation between probabilistic error and irrationality? In this paper, I argue that the probability model used to infer irrationality is not appropriate and I suggest an approach based on fuzzy reasoning models. The objective is to experiment with new ways of looking at irrationality and raise discussion regarding the relation among irrationality, reasoning errors, and logical models that are used as a framework to study irrationality.
Consciousness of the Self and Higher-Order Thought

One of the issues that arises in connection with the topic of consciousness is the question of how and when we are conscious of ourselves. David Rosenthal argues that a mental state is conscious when "one is aware of oneself as being in the state" via a higher-order thought, taking the position that conscious awareness includes awareness of the self. (Rosenthal, David M. (2010) "How to Think about Mental Qualities" Philosophical Issues, 20, Philosophy of Mind at 382) I will argue that contrary to Rosenthal's position, we are not conscious of ourselves whenever we are consciously aware, but rather we are only conscious of ourselves when we introspect. I draw on support from child development research showing that the ability to introspect arises around the same age as theory of mind and argue that it is not until the acquisition of theory of mind that children develop a concept of self in the relevant sense.

If consciousness of self occurs at the level of introspection, this presents a serious challenge to Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness. According to the higher-order thought theory, introspection makes the higher-order thought itself conscious, but this is problematic if, as I will argue, the higher-order thought does not contain a concept of self. Having argued that consciousness of self occurs at the level of introspection and that the higher-order thought theory can not accommodate this, I will suggest a modification of the theory, which I call higher-order output (HOO) theory.
Complexity and Contextual Emergence

There is a lengthy philosophical literature on reductionism and emergentism, and contemporary interest in such topics seems as strong as ever. On the other hand, complexity is also a topic of intense interest, reaching almost buzz-word status. Complex phenomena arise in the natural sciences as well as in social systems. Such complexity is rich with metaphysical and epistemological implications but is only recently receiving sustained philosophical analysis. Moreover, while the reduction and emergence literature interacts with complexity to some degree, there has been too little sustained analysis of how causation or laws in complex systems challenge typical accounts of reduction and emergence. Contextual emergence is a framework allowing for more detailed metaphysical and epistemological analysis of complexity while taking the scientific developments seriously. After providing some pertinent background on nonlinear dynamics and complexity, I will describe the contextual emergence framework focusing particularly on the importance of stability conditions. Then I will illustrate contextual emergence through some physical examples and extract some lessons for further philosophical reflection on top-down constraint and causation relevant for reduction-emergence debates. The bottom line is that philosophers may have a lot more to learn from dynamics that can inform us about subtleties in reduction and emergence than is generally realized.
Elisabeth Blum  
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Free Will and Providence in St. Augustine’s Account on His Conversion

Augustine’s conversion to chastity is arguably the most famous passage of his Confessions. Tortured by his moral weakness Augustine recurs to an oracle, thus committing the decision on his future conduct to divine intervention. Oracles are acts of faith: the unforeseeable or coincidental outcome of a ritual procedure is interpreted as the divine answer to the initial question. In Augustine’s case we have a multi-layered oracle that involves a sequence of „coincidences“.

The first stage corresponds to the oracle known in ancient Greece as „Hermes of the market-place“. The person seeking enlightenment would seal his ears and walk a given distance. The first words heard upon removing the seal were the divine message, especially if uttered by a child or madman (a higher grade of coincidence for their inability to answer the question intentionally). We easily recognize this structure in Augustine’s near unconsciousness, his flight from the house to the garden, and the childish voice he hears chanting. Despite Augustine’s denial of knowing any game it belongs to, the song itself points to another, most primitive oracle children use to divide their treasures since the dawn of times: one hides the objects in his fists or under a cover, the other chooses blindly. „Tolle-lege“, here, means „lift and chose“. But Augustine interprets the words in another possible sense, „pick up and read“, and employs a book-oracle as the ultimate stage of this complex structure of divination.

The oracle-seeking man is not exclusively a passive receiver of the divine message: he creates the conditions of the divination, and on receiving the message he interprets it. The scene in the garden contains Augustine’s view on divine providence and human free will in a nutshell: God is the author of life, man its interpreter.
Anthropology of Slavery – A Hermeneutics of First Person Narratives

"What does it mean to be human in the face of slavery?" the answer is manifold.

I will examine a number of autobiographical documents from African-American slaves of the 18th/19th century. These documents have been studied for sociological, political, literary, and several other purposes. My take on the sources is to raise the lead question: do they allow for new insight into anthropology? Classical anthropology is dominated by the traditional definition of human beings as rational and social ‘animals’. Existentialism and structuralism have added new perspectives by either arguing from the Western educated point of view or by deviating into ethnological studies of ‘primitive’ non-western cultures. The master/slave dialectics between African people and slave owners of European formation suggests a different anthropology. On the basis of the first person narratives it may be stated that humans are able to define their kin as non-kin. Slaves are able to be human in the face of physical and ideological denial of home, name, history, etc. Humans can separate their bodily conditions from their self. This applies to suffering as well as to inflicting pain, to the sexual exploitation of slaves, and to the survival of physical humiliations. Humans can turn physical properties, like race distinction, into spiritual properties, for good or for ill. Humans are social animals to the effect that they can exclude other humans as mere animals. Solidarity or altruism, apparently a genuine human impulse, can turn against classes of humans. The human quest for transcendence (religion) can separate from the community of believers or re-integrate into the same community. The outcry of slaves was successful for the cause of abolitionism. However, it also allows for a philosophical view on what it means to be human.
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In the Name of Sinn: Representation, Reference and Semantic Content  

Conceptual analysis of the problem of representation must account for the crucial role semantic content plays in determining reference. According to Frege’s classic Sinn-Bedeutung distinction, the mode of (re)presentation (the means by which a sentence truth-functionally expresses a proposition) differs crucially to that same proposition’s reference. This, inter alia, explains why sentences expressing false propositions can nevertheless say something meaningful. “Santa Claus is coming down the chimney” may be obviously false but it is clearly not unintelligible (it is not just a jumble of syntax or otherwise semantically vacuous) and arguably this is because even if the proposition expressed by the sentence doesn’t have reference (because its subject does not refer to something independent of its mode of presentation) the sentence nevertheless possesses content by virtue of which we know what would have to be case if what it represented were true. This paper argues that just because a representational vehicle is itself external this does not entail that the content represented by that vehicle represents some external object. A representation is neither equivalent to nor does it confer ontological status on that which it represents. Statements predicating properties of fictional subjects, for instance, invariably express non-veridical propositions because the content of such statements fails to represent something that exists beyond that content. Propositions that predicate properties of non-existent subjects therefore cannot satisfy truth conditions because such subjects include the concept of their fictional status a priori (thus anything predicated of them is strictly subsidiary to the fact that no referent exists that uniquely satisfies the properties their content predicates of them). Sentences involving reference to fictional entities by way of their content therefore may satisfy public criteria for the expression of meaningful propositions, may, in fact, purport to represent some independently existent object, and yet still fail to refer. In such cases the content of the proposition is about a singular concept that satisfies certain objective predicates that constitute public criteria for re-presenting that concept. But it does not follow that the concept in question exists in a mode independent of this or that specific representation.
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Kant’s Treatment of the Modality of Judgments.
(An Examination of Lovejoy’s Critique of Kant)

Immanuel Kant’s notion of modality and his classification of judgments with respect to modality have been vehemently criticized by Lovejoy in his paper titled ‘Kant’s Classification of the Forms of Judgment’ in ‘Kant: Disputed questions’. Lovejoy claimed that Kant’s categorization of modal judgments as problematic, assertoric and apodeictic coincides largely with the earlier classification of Lambert of these judgments as possible, actual and necessary, respectively. According to Lovejoy, Kant’s innovation lies only in the introduction of new terminologies. Describing the definition as ambiguous and incoherent, Lovejoy argued that the ambiguities obfuscate a significant logical distinction that his predecessors had clearly drawn. He suggested that Kant’s interpretation of modality led to two distinct and incompatible concepts one of which seems to introduce a subjectivism in the doctrine of objective categories and the other appear to reduce the categories of relation to those of modality. Lovejoy however clarified that apodeictic judgment is an exception here as it does not fit into the same scheme as problematic and assertoric.

The present work attempts to review Lovejoy’s objections to Kant’s treatment of the Modality of Judgments. Arguments are put forward to suggest that Kant’s originality with respect to classification of the modal judgments cannot be denied and his principle of classification is completely different from that of Lambert. Kant classified modal judgments by considering the logical status of the whole judgment in relation to the subject. According to him, the modality of a judgment concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general. It does not follow, contrary to Lovejoy’s contention, that modality consists in the subjective degree of confidence with which a judgment is affirmed. The consequences of Lovejoy’s other contention that Kant’s interpretation reduces the categories of relation to those of modality is also discussed in this work.
Dan Chitoiu
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The Building of Languages about Reality and the Call to Experience

The Being was described according to several perspectives from Greek philosophy to this day. The Existence has received different names due to different understandings and different interests. The Greeks, during their first philosophies, have used the name of Kosmos, believing that what characterizes the being is essentially a specific order according to certain rationality. Since then and until now, in the medieval period and in that of modernity, other names had preponderance. Metaphysics, following the direction opened by the Scholastics, preferred the terminology built around the concept of essence. According to this understanding, the true knowledge about the world is provided by reason: reason must identify what is really stable and constant, which is beyond sense data, what is essence. But second part of last century record a dissatisfaction with the assumptions that have driven the speeches about what exists, this being due to the new discoveries of science (quantum mechanics, in particular) and the emergence of a new philosophical directions, phenomenology. Science imposed the renunciation to terminologies built on the assumption of a direct access of a rational type to knowledge of the world. Phenomenology also confirmed this requirement. Discourse about what exists is centered today on the concept of reality. In my communication I will analyze the steps that caused this change of perspective and the consequences involved.
Robin S. Dillon
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Arrogance, Humility, and Self-Respect: A Kantian Analysis of Vice and Virtue

Although Kant’s ethics is traditionally understood as focused on action, recent scholars emphasize the centrality of character to his overall moral theory. Most of those discussions treat his account of good character in general or concentrate on a few virtues. But little attention has been paid to Kantian vices, even though his concentration on them in The Metaphysics of Morals makes clear their critical importance to his ethics.

Arrogance is the most significant of the Kantian vices. It is the severest violation of the core moral duties to respect both other persons and ourselves and is the chief impediment in moral life, inasmuch as it deforms character, subverts rational judgment, warps motivation, and distorts moral agency.

Humility has traditionally been regarded as a preeminent virtue, the proper orientation to self and others that opposes and prevents arrogance. Yet while Kant says some positive things about humility, he writes neither as much nor as strongly as might be expected about the reputed chief foe of the chief flaw.

I argue that this divergence from tradition is not surprising, given the centrality of self-respect to Kant’s account of the morally good person living a morally good life. For humility, traditionally understood as a low opinion of oneself, is in tension, if not at odds, with self-respect, which involves having the highest regard for one’s worth as a person and valuing oneself equally with others.

More significantly, for Kant, humility as traditionally understood is not only not the virtue opposing arrogance, it is just another form of the competitive, comparative mode of self-valuing that begets arrogance in the first place. The virtue Kant opposes to both arrogance and traditional humility is the appropriate self-regard that is self-respect. The humility Kant faintly praises differs from traditional humility and it plays a different role in the moral life, a humble, limited, and subsidiary role, constrained by self-respect.
Edward Erwin  
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Basic Evidence in Psychotherapy

What, if anything, counts as evidence per se, i.e. as evidence in and of itself? The list of kinds of basic evidence proposed by philosophers and social scientists include: empirical observations, intuition, meaning connections, testimony, inferences to the best explanation, and simplicity. Those who endorse the idea of evidence per se, or basic evidence, generally hold that merely because something is evidence per se in one set of circumstances is no guarantee that it is in all.

I might believe that my seeing a coin on my desk is evidence all by itself that there is a coin on my desk, but agree that if I were looking at a coin a great distance from me, my seeing, or seeming to see, it might not be evidence by itself that what I am looking at is really a coin.

In this paper, I do not challenge the idea that there is such a thing as basic evidence, but I try to demonstrate that most of the items on the above list are counterfeit.
Ivan Faiferri
Researcher, Italy

Root of All Evil - Plutarch’s Double Cosmic Soul

In a passage of the tenth book of the Laws (896a-897b), Plato seems to state the existence of «not less than two» souls: the former good, ordered and rational, the latter cause of all that is evil, disordered, irrational. Few Platonist accepted this hypothesis as true, structuring their philosophy on a dualistic metaphysics. Among them, Plutarch is one of the most authoritative, and the one whose works are better preserved. His herodox interpretation allows him to combine the divine perfection with human freedom. In this way, he can give an account of the reality closer both to the everyday experience and to the traditional religion, showing also in this case his inclination to present a philosophy suitable for his times.
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Revisiting the Radical Communitarian Defense of Liberty

The whole idea of communitarian liberty sounds paradoxical. Ordinarily, communitarianism, as a political philosophy, supports the moral supremacy of the cultural or political community. The community is (not liberty) a good ought to be salvaged in all circumstances. In the case of a moral conflict between the community and liberty, the community ought to be respected. This is the crux of radical communitarian primacy thesis found in Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair Maclntyre. Radical communitarianism advocates the irrelevance of rights within the structure of an intimate and harmonious community. The liberal rights are superfluous in a community regulated by shared values, love and mutual friendships. Is radical or utopian communitarianism compatible with liberty? Today, the whole communitarian theory witnesses a major and radical shift both in methodology and substantive issues, due to the moral need to reconcile theory and practice.

Moderate communitarians like Amitai Etzioni, Kwame Gyekye, Robert Bellah and others balance rights and responsibilities. Most members of Responsive Community reject radical communitarian non-recognition of liberties. Moderate communitarianism advocates the moral compatibility of liberal and communitarian values.

This paper aims at reinforcing the current arguments for the compatibility of radical communitarianism with liberty. Contrary to the general view in communitarian scholarship, it is argued that radical communitarianism is, like moderate communitarianism, compatible with liberty. Under certain conditions, a radical communitarian could prefer liberty to community. The major radical communitarian values of love and mutual friendships imply, in a way, the primacy of liberty. Second, it is possible for a radical communitarian community to, collectively, embrace liberty as a shared value. The method of philosophical analysis of key issues and concepts is adopted.

This paper concludes that radical or utopian communitarianism is also compatible with liberty like the new communitarianism canvassed by members of Responsive Community.
Gary Fuller  
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Why Tell Stories?

Narratives, or stories, are found in many disciplines, including history, the social sciences, evolutionary biology and psychology, and of course the writing of literary fictions. They can even be found in parts of the physical sciences. But why tell stories? There are many reasons, one of the most important of which is that stories often explain why their conclusions occurred: they give narrative why-explanations of their conclusions. Further, these narrative explanations often have more explanatory strength than any standard why-explanation of the conclusion that we can come up with. In that sense, narrative explanations are often irreplaceable. Why tell stories, then? Because they provide us with why-explanations that we cannot get in any other way.

My talk will proceed as follows. I shall begin with a number of examples of stories from various disciplines. Then, after giving a brief background of the many kinds of knowledge that stories can give us, I shall focus in on the knowledge that stories often provide of why the conclusion of the story occurred. I shall give a detailed account of the structure of these narrative why-explanations and contrast them to what I shall call standard why-explanations. I shall then develop a useful notion of explanatory strength and argue that narrative why-explanations are often not replaceable by standard explanations of equal explanatory strength. I shall conclude the talk by raising and replying to some objections, as well as suggesting some interesting ramifications of my thesis.
The Reconfiguration of Philosophy

In this paper I would like to present the relationships between philosophy and metaphysics through some questions presented by Heidegger, Hegel and Husserl. What emerges at the end of the analysis is a new intrinsic necessity for the philosophy: his reconfiguration, as Leo Lugarini in his book *Filosofia e Metafisica* underlines.

From an historical point of view the idea of philosophy was associated for centuries with those of metaphysics in the strictly sense of ontology: in other words the philosophy was thought as a research on the essence itself.

However, already from the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* of Hegel, the philosophy reconfigures itself as a “science of the experience of consciousness” and moreover, proceeding along this way, Husserl delineates a phenomenology of the *Lebenswelt*.

What remains then of metaphysics?

Is it metaphysics to exceed, as Heidegger suggested?

Surely his disappointing question: “Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?” (*What is Metaphysics?* 1929) is an alarm of a necessary change of perspective: the focus is not a prior essence but the being itself which enables the possibility of the essence. But Heidegger too, at the end, builds a metaphysical thought: the next step, taken by Hegel and clarified then by Husserl, is bringing at the middle of philosophy the question of the human acting, of what happens in *inteiore homine*.

This is the reconfiguration of philosophy that I would like to suggest in this paper and this new perspective in the history of philosophy can be considered as one of the greatest achievement of the phenomenological method.
Fact, Fiction and Pretense

Anyone who has read Jane Austin's Pride and Prejudice would agree that at some point in the story Mr. Darcy asks Elizabeth to marry him. The statement 'Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth' seems to be true in the story despite the fact that it does not actually appear in the text. So what makes such statements true in the fiction? Gregory Currie (1986, 1990) maintains that to say that some statement P is fictionally true is to say that it is part of some story F. To say, for example, that 'Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth' is fictionally true is to say that 'It is part of Jane Austin's story Pride and Prejudice that Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth', or something along those lines. Determining what statements are fictionally true, according to Currie, requires providing truth conditions for statements of the form 'In F, P'. Since any analysis of truth in fiction hinges on an account of make-believe, the aim of this paper is to twofold: to provide an account of make-believe and then use that to propose an alternative analysis of truth in fiction that is immune to the problems faced by other rivals.
Simon Glynn  
Professor, Florida Atlantic University, USA

Universal Interpretation

Like Hermes, the wing messenger of the gods, Hermeneutics was concerned that meaning should be correctly interpreted, and thus truly understood. And although Heidegger traces hermeneutic practice back, via Plato, to Parmenides and Heraclitus, it is with the Reformation, and Biblical exegesis that hermeneutics enters modern thought. Thus while Fundamentalists claim that the supposedly literal meaning of the scriptures is immediately evident, others have turned to hermeneutic interpretation in an attempt to clarify apparent incoherencies and resolve apparent contradictions within and between scriptures. Further, as with the scriptures, so too with the classical works of antiquity, not to mention legal texts and political constitutions etc., and indeed even cultural and artistic artifacts and performances (such as paintings, plays and the like) also, all of which, it is argued, can only be understood by contextual interpretation. And while some maintain, apparently to the contrary, that artists’ or authors’ intentions are ultimately authoritative in this regard, often such intentions are only derivable hermeneutically, from the context within which they arise or arose.

Moreover, regardless of whether or not authorial intentions exhaust the meaning or significance of literary, artistic and other cultural artifacts and performances etc., Dilthey -- arguing that the supposedly objective epistemologies, quantitative methodologies and causal explanations, supposedly characteristic of the natural sciences, were singularly inappropriate for the study of human subjects and societies -- insisted that a hermeneutic understanding of human intentions was indispensible to an understanding (and where appropriate, prediction) of human behavior or actions, socio-cultural interactions, relations, organizations and institutions etc., and thus to the human and social sciences.

Finally, in light of the cognitive experiments of the Gestalt psychologists and of Ames and his school, which empirically demonstrate that, as Kant insisted, the sensible is inextricably intertwined with the intelligible; it is evident that even our most basic empirical perceptions or observations are always already the result of interpretations in light of our conceptions and/or preconceptions. In which case insofar as the natural sciences claim to be grounded upon just such empirical perceptions and observations, they too also ultimately appear to be, as Heidegger insisted, hermeneutic.
Christian Gobel  
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How a Priori Is Anselm’s Unum Argumentum? A Reconstruction of Prosligion 2 In The Light of Its Theo-Logical Context and Relevance

In this paper, I am suggesting reconstructions of the central arguments of both the Proslogion and the Cur Deus Homo by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), thus highlighting the connection between his ontology and soteriology.

By pointing out the various experiential (a posteriori) dimensions in the conceptual genesis of Anselm’s philosophical theology which culminates in the idea of God as the unsurpassably great, or greatest conceivable, being (*id quo maius cogitari nequit*), the paper proposes a cosmological (rather than ontological) reconstruction of his famed argument for God’s existence in *Proslogion 2 and 3*. This reconstruction provides us, at the same time, with a new hermeneutical key to better understand the inconsistencies in Anselm’s – highly controversial – atonement theory (Cur Deus Homo). For, Anselm’s satisfaction theory is not just a ‘commercial theory’ of atonement (as has often been said), rooted in the ill-conceived idea of a monstrous God, but it is the result of a heightened philosophical awareness of God’s absolute being (i.e. the *id quo maius cogitari nequit*) and of the categorically problematic relationship of this being with the world. Anselm’s solution, however, remains aporetic for different reasons, mainly because, in his soteriology, he fails to see the intrinsic ‘relational’ possibilities offered by the cosmological argument (and the concept of God it employs, i.e. the idea of a necessary being, as opposed to the contingent being of the world) which Anselm himself uses, for instance, in the *Monologion* and which also constitutes the conceptual framework for the Proslogion-argument.

Thus, Anselm sees (e.g.) that God’s justice has to be thought in correspondence to his being, according to the idea of unsurpassable greatness – and yet he envisions God involved in a human justice of *do ut des* (his satisfaction theory only suggests a formal superlative of the human idea of penal justice in order to call it ‘divine’ and ‘greatest’ justice). The reason for Anselm’s failure in this regard is not his inability to look beyond a specific medieval system of penal law (as is frequently said) but his more general inability to transcend an all-to-human understanding of justice, almighty power, absoluteness and similar attributes of God.
Mariagrazia Granatella
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The Role of Mimesis in Aristotle’s Poetics: A Fundamental Cognitive System

This paper will describe and evaluate the role played by the notion of mimesis in Aristotle’s Poetics. The importance of the Poetics in the current philosophical debate has constituted the starting point of this study. The aim of my argument is to demonstrate that a philosophical theory of human cognition lies at the core of the Poetics. This point of view will be explained using an “unusual” analysis of the notion of mimesis.

In the first place, it will be examined the Aristotle’s quotation: «mimetic activity is instinctive to humans from childhood onward, and they differ from other animals by being thoroughly mimetic and by developing their earliest understanding through mimesis» (Poet.1448b 6-9). These words direct our attention on a fundamental question: Aristotle identifies mimesis as feature of human nature that he takes to explain the existence of poetry. Here, it can see, as clearly as anywhere, that the Aristotelian conception of mimesis is inherently anthropological and psychological. According to S. Halliwell: «Aristotle regards mimesis as a means by which people explore their own distinctively human world through hypothetical simulation and enactment of some of its possibilities». The natural mimetic competence is able to modeling particular media so as to creating “sources” (an object or a form of behavior) of world’s images. These images (mimemata) have the power to take us beyond the images themselves, providing an opening access to knowledge. It will be argued the proposed hypothesis by analyzing some important passages taken from the Corpus. In conclusion, in this paper the problem of mimesis in the Poetics will be examined in detail as a specific part inside the Aristotelian biology. Consequently, Mimesis will not be a mere imitation but a natural action that in the human being becomes a fundamental cognitive system, making the other human actions be unique and specific.
Attila Grandpierre
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On Genuine Biological Autonomy

Although biological autonomy is widely discussed, its description in scientific terms remains elusive. Nowadays, it seems that the only acceptable ground to account for any natural phenomena, including biological autonomy, is physics. But if this were the case, then arguably there would be no way to account for genuine biological autonomy. The way out of such a situation is to build up an exact theoretical biology, and one of the first steps is to clarify the basic concepts of biology, among them biological aim, function and autonomy. In this talk we illustrate the necessity to grasp the depth of these biological concepts by a series of fundamental scientific facts. We found a physical mechanism to realize biological autonomy, namely, vacuum fluctuations. Analyzing the ten fundamental biological facts, we found that such vacuum fluctuations assisting biological aims can be accompanied by a type of internal quantum measurements we call quantum biological interventions. Instead of considering sporadic and marginal, slight modifications of purely random quantum processes as proposed by Stapp, we consider here quantum biological processes preceding their quantum physical manifestations, so they can occur regularly and add up to large, biological amplitudes. In the newly emerging picture, biological autonomy shows up as a new, fundamental and inevitable element in our scientific world picture. It offers new perspectives for solving problems regarding the origin and nature of life, connecting ancient Greek philosophy with modern science.
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Cicero’s Timaeus Scepticus

Cicero’s affiliation with Philo’s sceptical Academy is well documented. A particular attraction, Cicero frequently informs us, was the school’s dialectic practice of arguing on either side of a given philosophical viewpoint, the *disputatio in utramque partem*, which aimed at evaluating the credibility of the contending positions that were being advanced. Cicero recognized within this concept of sceptic dialectical argumentation numerous parallels, both in its structure and its function, to the rhetorical methodology in which he himself excelled.

Having been cast off the political stage, Cicero set out on a new project of ‘exporting’ rhetoric from the law courts and public arenas in order to apply it to sceptic philosophical debate, thus promoting rhetorical argument as a device that proved most useful in the dialectical discussions that formed the core of contemporary sceptic epistemology. I shall retrace Cicero’s conflation of rhetorical and epistemological concepts by examining his use of technical vocabulary characteristic of these disciplines as we encounter it in his much-neglected partial translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*. By identifying in his translation a number of key terms and expressions associated with this newly devised rhetorical-dialectical methodology, I shall argue, moreover, that Cicero integrated this argumentative approach into his Latin version of the dialogue in such a manner as to represent the fundamental epistemological theme at the center of the *Timaeus* in a contemporary light: the Timaean creation account, famously described by Plato as an εἰκώς λόγος, a ‘likely story’, is reinterpreted by Cicero in terms which correspond to the sceptic epistemological outlook with which he affiliated himself.

The Ciceronian *Timaeus*, I shall conclude, claims Plato’s allegiance for Cicero’s contemporary sceptical Academy whilst serving as a showcase for Cicero’s own agenda of promoting the rhetorical-dialectical method of argument as an essential tool for the sceptic philosopher.
Ciprian Jeler  
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**What Does Multi-level Selection Tell us about the Causal Nature of Natural Selection?**

A recent debate in philosophy of biology has addressed the problem of the causal nature of natural selection, giving way to the formulation of a number of separate interpretations which could be named, following the classification of Stuart Glennan, the individualistic, the dynamical, the statistical and, finally, the counterfactual interpretations of the causal statute of natural selection. Starting from an analysis of the classic trait-group model for the evolution of altruism developed by D.S. Wilson, this paper shows that all these four interpretations neglect the very element they all have in common and they all presuppose: the fact that natural selection, if it is to be admitted as a cause, is a cause that acts not on elements, but on differences between elements. Trivial as this may seem at first glance, the failure to give its proper importance to this differential nature of natural selection makes it impossible for these four positions to give a satisfactory causal account of natural selection. Furthermore, this particular status of natural selection as cause acting on a difference between elements reveals, as a pursued analysis of the trait-group model shows, another peculiarity of natural selection, namely that it also constitutes a type of cause that cannot be – even ideally or theoretically – separated from its effect. In other words, it is a cause that, in its very causal nature, partially depends on its own effect. Finally, corroborating the analysis of the trait-group model with other cases of higher-level selection lead to the third and final objective of this paper, that of showing that multi-level selection theories are not just an extension of the theory of natural selection to other domains than those of classical Darwinism, but may be a privileged way towards the clarification of the nature of natural selection in general.
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**Bare Life: Biopolitics of Foucault and Agamben**

This paper aims to examine intersections between the biopolitics of Foucault and Agamben, and seeks the possibilities of political struggle that might be derived from these crossings. It offers us the possibility to how to get rid of the founding dichotomies of both human and animal. By addressing questions concerned with the ethical implications of the political and physical construction of bodies, as well as the erasure of traditional categories that separate the human from technology and the animal as seen in the works of Giorgio Agamben, this paper will offer alternative reflections of the role and position of ‘bare life’ today.

I will focus on Agamben’s interpretation of Foucault’s concept of biopolitics. I will critically discuss his analysis of power and show how he rejects Foucault’s theory of power. I will compare and contrast Agamben’s theory of sovereign power with Foucault’s theory of power and I will conclude that Agamben’s political ontology fails to give account of the mechanisms of power and that Agamben’s theory cannot explain how gendered and raced bodies are constructed throughout history. However, then I will present a different reading of Agamben. I will argue that Agamben’s latest work *The Open*, offers us a new political imaginary. I will illuminate how Agamben uses Foucault’s genealogical method and how he problematizes the human and animal dichotomy. It will be the crossroad of two theories.

In *The Open*, Agamben does a Foucauldian analysis. He questions the conditions of existence of certain discourses. Agamben asks how humans are animalized and how animals are humanized. How did some humans begin to being treated as animals? More importantly, how does animality become a means for biopolitics to kill in such a violent way? How does it become possible to divide humanity and animality within the concept of the human being? Is it possible to think about animality and humanity beyond this binary structure? My paper aims at answering these questions.
The Identity, the Integration in the our Global era.
Education by the Intercultural Communication

Identity, integration, Globalization and intercultural communication are four topics of this philosophical present paper.

The scope of this philosophical reflection is human society and the approach is the Albanian society in European processing of integration. I have given a new "definition" of the identity. This category is variable. Identity is a functional aggregate of natural human values-oriented as and not oriented values. And in the Albanian case, the oriented values are the freedom and the justice.

The identity is the core of the human Being and by it can realize the integration of Being itself in every progress evolution stages (phases)

Identity is a process or a motion in which functioning this vectors: the identity, the human Being, the time and the space.

The Integration is analyzed as a category that function in correlation with the identity. It is the realizing or the production of integrate identity. In this relation, the identity is compulsory to open (to be the open module). Between its changes some values and some functions and in time, both they can realize the integration process.

The Globalization is conceived by us as a central category of human thought in post-modern century. This category is the area which has created opportunities for all kinds of other philosophical to have a new form a new essence.

In the space of Globalization all the thought categories are qualitatively different. The space of Globalization is a multidimensional space of vectors of movement of human thought towards the Global philosophical truth.

The human Being as well as the philosophical truth identifying with the Globalization itself. It, therefore, done a Global Being. Time and the space reach a new level of relationship that its appear as a single philosophical category.

Intercultural communication is an effective vehicle for educating and integrating of identities in the Global era.

In our case, this topical research argue with the experience of migration of Albanians into Greece, Italy and other countries after the collapse of totalitarianism (the transition time).

All my research in this area is built on the my credo reflective philosophy, which is:
"I am, therefore you think"..
Barbara Lekatsas
Professor, Hofstra University, USA

The Infinite in the Real: Plato’s Influence on Surrealism

This paper examines the influence of Plato on founder of Surrealism, André Breton. In *The Phaedrus*, the “blessings of madness” are viewed as superior to reason and manifest themselves via “release from customary habit.” In the *Second Manifesto* (1929), Breton recovers Plato’s theory of the four ‘divine’ manias via Agrippa and the Neo-Platonic tradition and repeats the pre-requisite of “detaching one’s mind from common place things”: “All I do know is that man's sorrow is far from over, and all I hail is the return of this furor, four kinds of which Agrippa perceived, fruitlessly or not.”

“The ‘esoteric tradition, Breton writes, “originated with the Gnostics…those poets who have had the greatest impact on the modern sensibility (Hugo, Nerval, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Lautréamont, Mallarmé, Jarry) were inspired to a greater or lesser degree by this tradition.”

Breton refused to visit Greece or Italy, “We have been occupied by the Graeco-Latins far too long,” he complained. A poem of his begins, “How beautiful the world, Greece never existed,” and the Surrealists redrafted the map of Europe minus Greece. Breton was accused of being a crypto-Platonist nonetheless by the Left.

Alquié in his *Philosophy of Surrealism* (1955) celebrates Breton’s relationship to Plato, Bonnet in the Pleiade edition of Breton’s collected works writes, “The question of a relationship between the beyond [au-delà] and life doesn’t imply a transcendental position.” In *Hermeticism and poésie dans Arcane 17*, Lamy disagrees, “Breton’s insistence on materialism creates an impasse.” Maurice Mourier in Breton/Berkeley: *de l'idéalisme comme tentation et comme Terreur.* goes further, “Breton is the greatest the only metaphysician… in that his essential preoccupations always lead him beyond nature toward ‘the true life,’ which is always ‘absent.”

The new is always a revival. This paper examines the importance of Plato’s ideas in the framing of Surrealism.
Informed Consent: Reasons to Prefer Consent-as-Relational-Autonomy to Consent-as-Grant-of-Authority

Respect for autonomy is the common philosophical foundation for informed consent in international research on human subjects. As the foundation, it serves two purposes; it justifies why we should obtain informed consent and it guides policy makers in how to structure informed consent so as to ensure that subjects make self-governed choices regarding research participation.

Although most people agree that we should ensure that subjects’ choices are self-governed, they disagree on how we should structure informed consent in order to accomplish this goal. One of the strongest objections comes from Joan Tronto. In “Consent as a Grant of Authority: A Care Ethics Reading of Informed Consent” (2009), Tronto refers to the common informed consent model as consent-as-autonomy. According to Tronto, we should reject consent-as-autonomy because it neglects concerns of beneficence and justice that relate to informed consent. As an alternative, she proposes an informed consent model she calls consent-as-grant-of-authority.

In addressing Tronto’s arguments, I explain how her proposed solution fails to adequately attend to beneficence and justice as these relate to informed consent. In addition, I argue that the primary reasons for rejecting autonomy as the philosophical foundation for informed consent fail once we consider that we can revise this account to reflect a relational account of autonomy. In presenting my proposal for consent-as-relational-autonomy, I explain how this informed consent model attends to beneficence and justice, thereby providing a better informed consent model for ensuring subjects’ autonomy in the medical context. This paper provides an interesting analysis of autonomy, informed consent, and the ways in which philosophical foundations inform public policy.
Whither Kuhn’s Evolutionary Philosophy of Science?

In his 1991 Rothschild lecture, ‘The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science’, Kuhn discusses what he thinks went wrong with the 1960s historical philosophy of science revolution. He claims that two chief pillars of traditional philosophy of science—the priority of facts to theoretical beliefs and the mind-independent nature of truth—were demolished without replacing them. In the revolution’s aftermath, according to Kuhn, philosophers of science have either attempted to erase all vestiges of the two pillars or to introduce chastened versions of them. However, Kuhn offers a tertium quid in which scientific change is likened to biological evolution. In this paper, I discuss the problems associated with Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science. Specifically, Kuhn relies only on the tempo of scientific revolution predicated on a particular historical approach to scientific change, but he fails to examine critically the mode of change. He assumes the mode is gradual, as Darwin did for biological evolution; however, another predominant mode also accounts for evolutionary change—saltation. Saltatory biological evolution involves dramatic and sudden speciation. My proposal is that the mode of change for scientific revolution is comparable to biological evolution in terms of being either salutatory or gradual. Saltatory scientific revolutions reflect dramatic paradigm transformations that often result in a sudden paradigm shift, while gradual scientific revolutions pertain to cumulative paradigm adjustments that eventually result in a paradigm shift. I illustrate my proposal with a historical case study involving Howard Temin’s DNA provirus hypothesis and the discovery of reverse transcriptase. For the community of virologists the discovery was revolutionary, and led to a dramatic change in the central dogma of molecular biology and to the sudden appearance of a new subfield of virology—retrovirology. However, the community of practicing molecular biologists incorporated the discovery into the central dogma, so change appeared not saltatory but gradual. This example from virology not only illustrates but also supports my proposal for revising Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science to include the mode of change associated with scientific revolutions.
Per-Erik Milam  
PhD Student, University of California, USA  

Self-Forgiveness and Quality of Will  

An adequate account of self-forgiveness must be broad enough to cover the different forms of self-forgiveness—for harming others and for harming oneself. However, it must also be narrow enough to distinguish self-forgiving from distinct processes that yield similar outcomes—processes like excusing, condoning, and letting go. While many philosophical accounts have made important contributions to understanding self-forgiveness, none has met both of the above challenges. In this paper, I suggest that popular attempts to understand self-forgiveness in terms of outcomes like self-reconciliation are misguided. However, while self-forgiveness does not yield a unique outcome, it can be distinguished by the reasons that motivate it. I offer an account of self-forgiveness that treats the offender’s quality of will as central. I claim that self-forgiveness occurs if and only if a moral agent, in response to an offense she has committed, meets each of the following conditions.  

First, she must believe herself both to be responsible and to have acted with ill will or objectionable indifference. Second, having recognized her offense, she must experience a negative self-directed emotion like guilt, shame, or regret. Third, having recognized that she no longer possesses the objectionable quality of will that was behind her initial offense, she must forego this negative emotion. I then draw out some of the consequences of and respond to potential objections to my quality of will account. I suggest that the conditions on self-forgiveness apply, with minor modification, to interpersonal and third party forgiveness. I argue that to forgive or not to forgive oneself is a free choice insofar as the forgiver is responsive to the fact that her change in quality of will gives her reason to forgive herself. Finally, I argue that, while overcoming survivor guilt appears to involve self-forgiveness, it is actually best understood, both phenomenologically and psychiatrically, as a form of condoning.
Philosophers have come belatedly to the prison or penal debate, a concern of reform-minded U.S. citizens, policy makers, criminologists and certainly the millions of people mired in the carceral complex. It was only when it hit a crisis point with mass incarceration in the last twenty years that a few started to pay closer attention. The profession’s silence is quite odd given that our first philosopher, Socrates, was jailed before taking the poisonous drink. The Apology presages famous and controversial modern defenses in the court room (e.g., from Fidel Castro, to Nelson Mandela, Steve Biko and John Africa). Socrates dared the jury to give him a pension rather than punishment for being a gadfly in the marketplace.

Philosophers today have taken stock of theories of punishment, i.e., retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, (Honderich, 1970) and of the repressive prison apparatus (Foucault, 1975). However, how successful have we, as public intellectuals, been in addressing our concerns to a general public? I link political analysis with questions about human values by engaging with contemporary ethical theories. I focus on a Southern African version of virtue ethics (Ubuntu ethics; cf. Metz, 2010) and contrast it with communitarianism (Sandel), and an ethic of care (Nodding); elsewhere I argued that neither communitarianism nor an ethic of care can account for a differentiated, heterogeneous public (Nagel, 1997; Nagel, 1993). Engaged Quakers and criminologists have used a pragmatist approach of “what works” rather than thinking through an ethical paradigm. I don’t know of any sustained philosophical analyses of these alternative penal models. Taking my cue from Angela Davis’s concept of abolitionism, I argue for a transformative model of justice rather than a restorative model within the context of the U.S. mass incarceration.
Achim Oberst  
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Antichristian Christlichkeit and Athleticism in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Life

In this paper I will examine a tension that has marked the Western tradition of Christianity. A deep suspicion toward the human body with its extensions into the mind has plagued Christian thinkers and believers. Much of the critique galvanized against the practice and philosophy of Christianity get their incentive from this resentment. Friedrich Nietzsche, a self-proclaimed “Antichristian”, epitomizes the critique. Before examining his scathing criticism, it is important to gather a concrete picture of the Christian self-conception as it presents itself in the biblical accounts, notably in the words of Nietzsche’s antipode, the apostle Paul. The task is necessary, since, even according to itself, the Christian position is never self-evident. An assessment is best done with the degree of authenticity available to us through the original texts. The language of the New Testament speaks its philosophy through a terminology specifically coined by the lived experience of faith for the purposes of expressing the ethical reality of its truth. Reliance on the original Greek is important, because, as Martin Heidegger recognized, “an actual understanding [of primordial Christianity] presupposes a penetration into the spirit (Geist) of New Testament Greek.” Once we see the truth of faith at work in the lifelong everyday struggle for redemption, we may be able to witness in the practice of faith itself an “athletic struggle” (ἄθλησις παθημάτων) that needs the body as the condition for the possibility of the execution of this struggle (ἀγών). The historicality of intensified (Christian) living transforms the human being. The endpoint of transformation is salvation. When Nietzsche’s critique is measured against this lived experience of Christianity, we may discover that despite his total condemnation Nietzsche shares much of the original Christian message that motivated his resentment of it.
William O’Meara  
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Kant and the Categorical Imperative

Kant’s application of his first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-Itself (FH), to his famous set of four moral problems reveals the weaknesses of his defense of these formulae.

Korsgaard correctly analyzes Kant’s application of the FUL to the first two problems. However, Korsgaard fails to consider, for example, that an agent could generalize to a unique class which has only one possible member in the following way without any contradiction in concept, “All who are uniquely Joe Jones with my unique genome and phenome may commit suicide or make a false promise. Of course, that maxim is immoral, but not because it violates any law of logic. What it does violate is universal respect for humanity as an end, and so the FUL must rely upon the FH. Kant’s defense of the FH will be evaluated as inadequate also.

Korsgaard correctly analyzes Kant’s application of the FUL to the last two problems. However, Kant’s attempt fails because there is again no logical contradiction in one’s willing if one generalizes to a unique class with only one member who resolves never to accept help from any other person. So again, Kant’s argument here must be that the FUL needs the FH. But Kant himself violates his rule that humanity must be conceived as an independently existing end whose value ought not be harmed. Kant’s FH, for its best understanding, is dependent upon belief in freedom of the will, which cannot be rationally proven, as Kant himself admits and Korsgaard emphasizes, and hence FH must be conceived as fundamentally dependent upon one’s own deep existential choice of human freedom and to value one’s humanity as the supreme value, both not be harmed and also to be advanced.
Embodiment, Lived Body and Empathy. Crossover for the Aesthetic Experience

Empathy has been in focus of considerable research field in 20th century. Today, the theory of empathy, not belong just to the field of psychology and phenomenology, but sharpens in the field of neuroscience, theology, visual art theory and also in philosophy of art.

In this paper, I investigate the connections with empathy and 21st century work of art. My key question and challenge is how is the lived body, empathy and embodiment in relation with aesthetic experience. Lived body and experience itself, is not nothing new, but the focus in this paper goes to the aesthetic experience. Especially, in the contemporary art perspectives.

The relation between work of art and spectator is most significant questions of the historical developments in aesthetics, but how relevant is the empathy in aesthetic experience. Aristotle described the spectators ability to identify themselves with different tragic events; Husserl recognized the experience of Otherness, Stein's lived body and Dufrenn's symbolic sympathy with empathic relations in work of art; Nussbaum's 'narrative empathy', these are just some of the characteristics in relation between empathy and aesthetic experience. The traditional questions concerning the philosophy of art have taken new directions partly because there are new art forms, like interactive art, new media art, digital photography, contemporary choreography and etc. The discussion today between empathy and aesthetics basically base in the embodiment as a one of the key terminology of contemporary art. Embodiment makes aesthetic experience measurable and significant. Empathy as the experience of experiencing something from the other's viewpoint, have been placed in the role of specific aesthetic responses.

The first, I give some of the historical issues of empathy to understand more the deepness of the philosophical problem, and the second part of the paper, I consider the questions of empathy from contemporary perspectives. This paper require also some investigations of the giveness of the living body, causality, and the phenomenon of expression. I evaluate thought examples from art to solve the rised question of empathy, embodiment and aesthetic experience.
Donald V. Poochigian  
Professor, University of North Dakota, USA

**Axiomatic and Correspondence Truth as Mutually Verifying**

Traditionally assumed is there are, “two main approaches to truth: axiomatic and semantic.” Often portrayed as emblematic of axiomatic truth is mathematics, and as emblematic of semantic truth is science. Supposing mathematics is the derivation of theorems from postulates, then mathematics is axiomatic. Supposing the proper business of the pure scientist is to derive correspondence of postulated propositions to reality, and that it is her or his concern as a scientist to decide whether the propositions she or he assumes are actually true, then science is semantic.

Consistency of mathematical postulates is shown by converting each postulate into a true statement about a model. Now mathematics concerns correspondence of postulated propositions to model. As to how validity of scientific propositions is to be shown, this too concerns derivation of theorems from postulated assumptions.

Thus, mathematics and science both employ axiomatic and semantic conceptions of truth. Being so, a question arises whether the mathematical and scientific conceptions of truth are internally consistent. If not, then mathematics and science contain a concealed contradiction.

Axiomatic and semantic conceptions of truth represent reciprocal progression from wholly diffused limit to wholly fused limit of the universe. Being linear, progression from limit to limit is well-formed. Consistency of each progression is proven by modeling an archetype.

Model for any progression is reverse progression from limit to limit. Hereby, conjunctively joined in a mutually verifying ill-formed circle are axiomatic deduction from wholly fused limit, and semantic induction from wholly diffused limit. Every argument ultimately terminating in the universe, however, when the universe necessarily contains its own criterion of identity, every argument is ill-formed. Failure to recognize this engenders the Cantor and Russell paradoxes.
Elisa Ravasio  
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Retrieving Plato: the Dialogical Method in Nussbaum and Williams' Readings

Nussbaum harshly criticizes Plato's philosophy, because it erases vulnerability and fragility from human life: only philosophers are *eudaimones*, since they devote their lives to rationality and they can reach a stable truth with such a peculiar device, namely the *dialegesthai*. By contrast, Aristotle's philosophy develops some implicit features of Greek tragedies showing the incommensurability of different desires and demands: it highlights the importance of several goods in achieving a proper happiness actually tied to human beings. Thus, according to Nussbaum's reading, Aristotle's philosophy can be defined as *democratic*, unlike the overbearing Plato's dialogical method that aims at reaching a single and immutable good able to make people forever fulfilled.

By contrast in Williams view, Aristotle is a *reductionist*, because he establishes what the human good is starting from defining a man as a *zoon echon logon*; and Plato's dialogical method is helpful to grasp how the true philosopher, namely a person who takes care of individual and public good, should think and act to enrich his own and his interlocutors' view about what a virtuous and just life is. Thus, thanks to Williams' reading, we could define Plato's method as *democratic*, since it aims at providing the reader with an enlarged mentality about ethical and political matters.

In conclusion, I will argue that through Contemporary readings of Ancients philosophical reflections, we could broaden our own conceptions of what a democratic interplay and the human good are, enhancing, in turn, our overview about ethics and politics.
Rossana Raviola  
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On Identity and Indiscernibility: Against any Ontological Reduction

The identity of indiscernibles is the principle which states that two or more entities are identical if they have all their properties in common, and vice versa. Formally, we have that, for any x and y, if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y, and vice versa:
\[ \forall x \forall y (x = y \leftrightarrow \forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy)) \]

In spite of its apparent trivial truth, it is famous the argument by Max Black against its validity. I intend to admit his claim in order to analyse the matter, following two connected ways. Unlike Peter Geach, who reasoned in favour of a relativistic conception, I uphold that the identity, as the primitive relation of the numerical identity, is an absolute concept, because the universal quantification of the F’s, which is responsible, according to Geach, for difficulties, really concerns only the indiscernibility. In fact, the principle is formulated as a double implication, so – I shall argue – the “\( \leftrightarrow \)” symbol connects two atomic statements, i.e. “\( x = y \)” and “\( \forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \)”.

The statement “\( x = y \)" represents the formal definition of the numerical identity, whereas the statement “\( \forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \)” expresses the formal definition of the indiscernibility. Well, are these relations ontologically equivalent?

On the other hand, the principle, as a biconditional, consists of the conjunction of two material implications, i.e. “\( \forall x \forall y (x = y \rightarrow \forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy)) \)” and “\( \forall x \forall y (\forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x = y) \)”.

Then, I shall show which direction of the material implication incurs the objections, supporting the idea according to which any form of dependence cannot interpose between the (numerical) identity and the indiscernibility.
Ilaria Resto  
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Experience and Expression: A Phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy of Mind and Intersubjectivity

Wittgenstein's thought about subjectivity has been widely considered (both by the continental and the analytical tradition) as the origin of the contemporary tendency of considering the mind from an abstract and third-personal point of view, avoiding the importance of the experiential dimension.

I think that Wittgenstein's insights on subjectivity has been too deeply influenced by an univocal line of interpretation (started from Peter Hacker) and that it can be read in a fruitful comparison with the phenomenological tradition, focusing not so much on the private language argument as on the positive idea of inwardness developed in the last phase of his work (from the Philosophical Investigations to the volumes on the Philosophy of Psychology).

First of all, his famous critic of Cartesianism, underlying the irreducibility of the mind to a self-enclosed realm of private objects can converge with (and be integrated by) Dan Zahavi's phenomenological investigation of the First Person Perspective, in particular the notion of Pre-reflective Self-awareness as a non-thematic and non objectifying form of Consciousness, contrasting the higher-order theories of Consciousness.

Secondly, Wittgenstein's positive idea of subjectivity is based on the concept of Expression, presenting interesting similarities with the Merleau-Pontian analysis of the expressive body and of Intercorporeity, but also with recent perspectives emphasising the expressive character of the Mind (Mitchell Green).

Furthermore, Wittgenstein's observations on Intersubjectivity have not only a critical potential against the Theory of Mind's proposals about the Nature of Social Cognition, based on what Anita Avramides calls “Conceptual Skepticism”, but can also integrate a phenomenological account of the relation with the other with the compelling theoretical instruments of the philosophy of language, stressing the crucial role of language and of narrativity for the constitution and the articulation of social experience (Daniel Hutto, Peter Goldie).
Peirce’s Theory of Continuity and the Vindication of Universals against Nominalism

Peirce’s analysis of Continuity seems to be a keystone for his advocating for universals as real, he sees continuity in nature as a vindication of his method. In his recent book Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism, Paul Forster (2011) presented how Peirce understood the nominalist scruple to individualise concepts for collections at the cost of denying properties of true continua. In that process Peirce showed some vibrant problems, as for example, the classic one of universals. Nonetheless that work is still incomplete, as long as that should be adequately related with what Peirce called his ‘scholastic realism’.

Continuity is started by the theory of multitude and frees his analysis from any constraints of the nominalist theories of reality as integrated by incognizable things in themselves. His theory of multitude, instead, can be derived with mathematics: By drawing in the work of the ways of abstraction in diagrammatic reasoning made by Sun Jo Shin (2010) and in continuum theories by Cathy Legg (2010) I will show the device of diagrammatic reasoning as a plausible pragmatic tool to represent those continua and make sense of his scholastic realism. The analysis of continuity is a perfect example of how the method of diagrammatic reasoning helps unblock the road of philosophical inquiry and also helps to clarify other problems as, for example, the applicability of Mathematics. General concepts define continua, and, while the properties of true continua are not reducible to properties of the individuals they comprise, they are still intelligible and necessary to ground any science of inquiry.
Thomas Robert  
PhD Student, University of Geneva, Switzerland

The Darwinian Theories of Instinct: From Lamarckism to Selection

Darwin’s thinking on instinct stigmatises the relation between two different sides of his theory, i.e. a diachronic orientation and a synchronic orientation. The diachronic side of Darwin’s theory corresponds to the principle of descent with modification. The synchronic side is illustrated by the theory of natural selection. Although it is necessary to clearly state the independence of descent with modification from natural selection, a caricatural reading of Darwin, reducing his theory to natural selection, has prevailed since the publication of On the Origin of Species (1859). This caricatural reading is certainly due to the fact that, in the Origin of Species, Darwin tries to unify his theory around natural selection.

In the Origin of Species, the problem of instinct is treated with respect to natural selection, firstly as an objection and finally as one of the best arguments in favour of natural selection. This synchronic theory of instinct, based on the selection of spontaneous variations, is opposed to Lamarckism, i.e. the heredity of characters acquired by habits. However, before being confronted to very specific problems, such as the instincts of neuter insects, Darwin had supported the diachronic theory of instinct represented by Lamarckism. It is important to note that after the Origin of Species, Darwin will still rely on the heredity of acquired habits to explain non-selective phenomena, such as the expression of emotions, and selective phenomena from a panchronic point of view, which is developed in The Descent of Man.

Since the concept of instinct is important for a lot of domains (philosophy, ethology, biology, sociology...), as is the Darwinian theory, I think that it is the role of a philosophical history of science to explain Darwin’s conversion from Lamarckism to selection and to underline the return to the theory of use-inheritance.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel

Recently the problem of time travel has been seriously dealt by philosophers as well as physicists. According to Lewis’ definition, time travel will occur if the traveler’s personal time differs from the external time in magnitude. Some philosophers have found the idea of time travelling as impossible on the basis of some alleged paradoxes. In the contrast, some others have tried to solve these proposed paradoxes and endorse the possibility of such a travel. In this paper I examine a group of the most well-known paradoxes and their proposed solution. These paradoxes include the “nowhere paradox”, “the paradox of discrepancy”, “the paradox of backward causation”, “the paradox of changing the past” and so on. I conclude that in spite of some excellent theoretical efforts in order to sole the paradoxes, philosophers have much to do to show the possibility of time travel.
Eric Silverman
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How to Resolve the Partiality-Impartiality Puzzle Using a Love-Centered Account of Virtue Ethics

Some ethicists argue that modern ethical theories do not allow an adequate role for intimate relationships. Nowhere has this problem been illustrated as well as Bernard Williams’s example of the husband who encounters two drowning people one of whom is his wife. According to Williams if the husband even seeks a justification for rescuing his wife first he has ‘one thought too many’ and commits an offense against the relationship. He goes onto conclude that partial relationships are necessary for life itself and that, “... unless such things exist, there will not be enough substance or conviction in a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life itself.” Therefore, any moral system that undermines such relationships is problematic.

However, most traditional ethical theories value a kind of moral impartiality. According to these theories all persons must be granted some sort of equal consideration. The kind of impartiality required differs from theory to theory, whether it is equal weight in the utilitarian calculus, or impartial consideration required by obedience to the moral law expressed within the categorical imperative, or some other type of impartiality.

I argue that a love-centered account of virtue ethics provides an attractive solution to this puzzle. It will portray the ideal agent as one who has loving desires towards all persons, thus fulfilling the intuition that an adequate moral theory requires impartiality. Yet, the type of relationship the agent has with others will also be portrayed as a morally relevant consideration that shapes how loving desires ought to be expressed. I proceed by describing a love centered account of virtue ethics inspired by Thomas Aquinas and go on to show how this account can resolve the partiality-impartiality puzzle while doing justice to both moral intuitions.
Chandra Prakash Trivedi  
Former Principal and Professor, MJS College, India  
&Sengar Manisha  
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Science of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

The form less God and Soul are subject of philosophical discussion. The history goes back to the six system of philosophy. It starts from the worship of natural deities, and leads to monism. The concept of Adi Shankar ‘Eko Brahma; the Brahma, God is one has a prominent place. The transmigration of Soul has given it a unique place. The conflict has started with literary discussion on the theories of formless God and Soul on physical plane, and transmigration of Soul. The Brahma, God is the cosmic principle, and the Soul is life principle, both are same, and beyond perception of human senses. Hence it is the matter of self realization, just like magnetism induces magnetism in iron, in the same way the cosmic principle induces its replicates. The life on the earth is its higher form with evolution and complexity in nature. Hence it has been said that God and Soul are one and the same without attribute and character. The creation has evolved from a single ancestor. With combination of fundamental energy and nature. It is the combination of fundamental energy and primeval matter- micro-nature. It has generated the biodiversity with evolution. The fundamental energy and nature are infinite and eternal. Transmigration The immortal DNA is the part of nature, and is blue chip of life. It has been described as bio-Soul. The life on the earth is hereditary life principle. It appears with union of fertilized DNA, eternal cosmic energy and chemical energy of food metabolism in the womb of mother. The immortal sound of words is the stimulator of language on the DNA. The metabolism is the source of consciousness. They appear with birth in the womb as hereditary life principle, and disappear with death. Even the time twins have different DNA and fate.
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**Hume’s Bundle Theory of the Self**

In seeking to defend his bundle theory of the self - in the section ‘Of Personal Identity’ in Book I of the Treatise - it is generally agreed that Hume is expressing scepticism about personal identity. But it is also standardly taken that having originally put forward a sceptical account, Hume later came to realize - in his ‘Appendix’ to Book III of the Treatise - that this account had been unsuccessful and he could see no way of improving upon it.

I outline the key elements of Hume’s bundle theory of the self and explore the main reasons that have been offered for supposing that he became dissatisfied with it. I contend that far from expressing reservations about the theory’s adequacy in the Appendix, he should be seen as further attempting to defend it against the view that there is more to the self’s identity than a mere succession of disconnected experiences. Hume’s bundle theory of the self is not only an attempt to defend scepticism about personal identity but, I argue, an entirely successful one within his own system.
The Wisdom of the Many and Fichte’s “We”

In his Philosophy of Law, Hegel states that “the personality does only begin there insofar the subject has not a mere self-consciousness of itself as the concrete, in any way determined, but rather as a self-consciousness of itself as completely abstract I in which any concrete restrictedness and validity is negated and cancelled (§35).” Due to this presupposition, the individual and the people do not have a personality.

Otherwise, Aristotle makes a well-known statement in book three of his Politeia (1281a43-b9) that, when several people come together who all differ in their personality and their special skills, experience and knowledge, they will at the end make up the better opinion in comparison to the sole judgment of a single one, it may even be the best one or an expert.

This confrontation cannot count as a simple opposition. Apart from idealism which could render the base of it, the subject, self-consciousness, the I and the personality are all concepts which have to be derived from the historical turning point separating modernity from antiquity (§124). Nevertheless, and even if Hegel openly denounces the Aristotelian theorem in connection with Fries in the preface as shallow and against science, there are others who either defend Aristotle within an scholarly exegesis (p.e. Jeremy Waldron 1995) or who come near to it due to their methodical basis – Emile Durkheim in his lecture upon truth against pragmatism.

Aforehand, it makes good sense that an author like Durkheim who tried to spell out the forces of collectivity within his own science, sociology, believed in a collective judgment or a judgment whose basis is a plurality of people or subjects. Contrary to his proper endeavor, yet philosophy needs its own access and justification. And instead of taking in the point of view of the observer who opposes the sole subject against the many or plural subject, one has very good reason to imply the investigating person herself among the many. The result is to relate conclusive judgment and its special basis to the many instantiated and stated as the We.

[3] Still in the framework of idealism, there is one source which can help to outline the very concept of this conclusion: the 1804 lecture of Fichte's Philosophy of Science (i.e. Wissenschaftslehre. Gesamtausgabe vol. 8). In several instances in order be able to follow his explanations one has to include oneself among an audience which, by far, is not the rhetorical one, but someone who neatly is capable of understanding his
arguments. This We is immediately an analogon of the I now constitutively – or on transcendental thinking and method – a plural, centered subject. The contribution/paper will further trace this line in order to look for and compare special instances of propositions where a philosopher makes reference to a We statement apart from the rhetorical one. The final conclusion is that, beginning with Fichte, this reference has to do (i) with a special focus; (ii) with the capability of the human mind to not only concentrate within its own individual sphere as the subjective one, but also in an essential sphere where others included instantiate themselves and concentrate in a common consciousness, its peculiar focus.
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The Segregation of Applied Arts from Fine Arts and the Status of Fashion

In this paper, I argue that segregating applied arts from fine arts is superficial since all applied arts are fine as art cannot be applied in the first place. Hence, this paper attempts to determine the status of fashion qua art form as it has been labeled for a long time as "applied". To be sure, there was no such distinction between 'fine' and 'applied arts' in the history of art until the rise of Kant's theory of 'disinterestedness' and 'purposelessness' of art in The Critique of Judgment, the implications of which have led to what is called 'the autonomy argument,' as it were. 'The autonomy argument' has been one of the strongest and most influential arguments in the modern and (to a great extent) in the postmodern and contemporary art theory. It briefly implies that producing a useful/useable object, or an object that appeals to the mass audience, necessarily requires the producer to take into consideration commercial, economic, social, and many other factors while producing such an object, a process that results in a non-autonomous art, if art at all.

In this paper, I shall argue that art is autonomous by its very nature, not only when producing disinterested or non-useful/useable objects; and therefore all art forms are autonomous, which means that there cannot be a non-autonomous art since art for an artistic object is like the DNA for cells of a body. Hence, the aim of this paper is to refute the undermining view to some art forms such as fashion design; a view that deprives the literature of fashion from many contributions which may come from philosophers who can enrich such literature in very new and creative ways.
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A Concept of Images of Man

There is widespread consensus that conceptions of human nature or, as I would call it, images of man ("Menschenbild" in German) are fundamental to human self-understanding and the organisation of society. "Ideas of human nature are the most potent ideas there are." (Trigg 1988, 169) However, despite this fact there are hardly any publications offering general, theoretical examinations about images of man, their functions and effects.

The aim of this paper is to present such a general concept of images of man. Its four main points are:

(a) Images of man are historically and culturally determined systems of beliefs about fundamental attributes of being human. They define what the central human qualities are, which needs and inclinations to act humans have, where the goals of human life lie, which values should be respected, and how humans differentiate from plants, animals and machines. These systems can either be given explicit in theoretical or programmatic texts or implicit in narratives, social practices and institutions.

(b) Images of man are central elements of cognitive or moral maps, that is, the epistemic and moral order by which humans conceive and sort the world: they form a central part of a society’s social imaginaries. According to Charles Taylor (2004), social imaginaries are the vague, partly inarticulate complex of notions that form people’s common frame of reference, from which they imagine, understand and conceive their societies or their social situation.

(c) Images of man are descriptive and normative. They orientate and guide human action. By providing a basis for mutual expectations and for what is being considered as normal, they determine the way humans see and treat themselves and each other. Being normative, images of man have a constituting effect or a tendency to self-realisation. They shape man’s self-perception and regulate her/his behaviour, and consequently help to insure that s/he increasingly becomes what her/his self-images tell her/him what s/he is (Taylor 1985). In doing so, it is not so important whether the image of man is true, but rather, whether it is accepted as true and believed in (which implies that it has been forgotten that it is an image).

(d) Because they have this constitutive effect, images of man play a fundamental role, not only for human identity, but also for the organisation of society, which is dependent on what humans think of themselves and of each other.