Philosophy
Abstract Book
Edited by Gregory T. Papanikos
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Preface

This abstract book includes all the abstracts of the papers presented at the 6th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, 30 – 31 May 2011 and 1 – 2 June 2011 organized by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. In total there were 64 papers and 67 presenters, coming from 23 different countries (Australia, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America). The conference was organized into 21 sessions that included areas such as Metaphysics and Epistemology, Ethics and Value Theory, Philosophy of Religion e.t.c. As it is the publication policy of the Institute, the papers presented in this conference will be considered for publication in one of the books of ATINER.

The Institute was established in 1995 as an independent academic organization with the mission to become a forum where academics and researchers from all over the world could meet in Athens and exchange ideas on their research and consider the future developments of their fields of study. Our mission is to make ATHENS a place where academics and researchers from all over the world meet to discuss the developments of their discipline and present their work. To serve this purpose, conferences are organized along the lines of well established and well defined scientific disciplines. In addition, interdisciplinary conferences are also organized because they serve the mission statement of the Institute. Since 1995, ATINER has organized more than 100 international conferences and has published over 100 books. Academically, the Institute is organized into four research divisions and nineteen research units. Each research unit organizes at least one annual conference and undertakes various small and large research projects.

I would like to thank all the participants, the members of the organizing and academic committee and most importantly the administration staff of ATINER for putting this conference together.

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
FINAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Athens Institute for Education and Research

Arts & Sciences Research Division
Research Unit of Philosophy

6th Annual International Conference on Philosophy
30-31 May & 1-2 June 2011, Athens, Greece.

PROGRAM

Conference Venue: St George Lycabettus Boutique Hotel, 2 Kleomenous Street, Kolonaki, Athens

Organization and Scientific Committee

- Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, President, ATINER.
- Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President of Academics, ATINER & Professor, Sam Houston State University, USA.
- Dr. Patricia Hanna, Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.
- Dr. Donald V. Poochigian, Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.
- Dr. Michael Aristidou, Academic Member, ATINER & Adjunct Professor, Northwestern State University, USA.
- Dr. Chrysoula Gitsoulis, Academic Member, ATINER & Adjunct Assistant Professor, City University New York, USA.
- Dr. Panayotis Zamaros, Professor, ECMU, Switzerland.
- Dr. Yiorgo Maniatis, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Cyprus, Cyprus.
- Dr. Scott Nelson, Academic Member, ATINER & Assistant Professor, Virginia Tech, USA.
- Dr. Ioannis Stivachtis, Academic Member of ATINER & Director, International Studies Program Virginia Tech - Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, USA.
- Raymond Paul Petridis Tzombanos, Ph.D. Student, New School for Social Research, USA.
- Ms. Lila Skountridaki, Researcher, ATINER & Ph.D. Student, University of Strathclyde, U.K.
- Gina M. Bondi, Researcher, ATINER.
- Mr. Apostolos Kotsaspyrou, Researcher, ATINER.

Administration

Fani Balaska, Chantel Blanchette, Stavroula Kiritsi, Apostolos Kotsaspyrou, Eirini Lentzou, Konstantinos Manolidis, Katerina Maraki & Sylvia Sakka
CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Monday 30 May 2011
07:30-08:20 Registration
08:20-08:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks
• Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos, Director, ATINER.
• Dr. Nicholas Pappas, Vice-President of Academics, ATINER & Professor, Sam Houston State University, USA.
• Dr. Patricia Hanna, Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

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<td>Chair: Pappas, N., vice-President of Academics, ATINER &amp; Professor, Sam Houston State University, USA.</td>
<td>Chair: *Adamos, M., Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.</td>
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<td>Markhinin, V.V., Professor, Surgut State University, Russia. Philosophics Φιλοσοφία: On Substantiation of the Research Program.</td>
<td>1. Ward, A., Lecturer, University of York, UK. Hume Versus Kant on Causality and External Objects.</td>
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<td>Ebrey, D., Assistant Professor, Northwestern University, USA. Making Room for Matter.</td>
<td>3. *Adamos, M., Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA. Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.</td>
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<td>10:00-10:10</td>
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<th>Session IV: Ethics and Value Theory I</th>
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<td>Chair: Ward, A., Lecturer, University of York, UK.</td>
<td>Chair: *Naimo, J., Lecturer, University of Notre Dame, Australia.</td>
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<td>1. *Adamos, M., Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.</td>
<td>2. *Aminoff, B.Z., Researcher, Sheba Medical Center, Israel. Entropy Definition of Human Happiness and Suffering.</td>
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<td>2. Rellihan, M., Assistant Professor, Seattle University, USA. Information, Confirmation, and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception.</td>
<td>3. Correia, V., Ph.D. Student, New University of Lisbon, Portugal. The Ethics of Argumentation.</td>
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11:40-11:50 Coffee Break

11:50-13:20 (Room A) Session V: Ancient II  
**Chair:** *Gitsoulis, C., Adjunct Assistant Professor, City University New York, USA.*

1. O’Meara, W., Professor, James Madison University, USA. Truth is Subjectivity: Kierkegaard, Socrates, and Immortality.
3. Esfahani, M.N., Professor, The Imam Khomeini Education & Research Institute, Iran. The Part (role) of Religion in Human Life.

11:50-13:20 (Room B) Session VI: Philosophy of Religion I  
**Chair:** Hanna, P., Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, University of Utah, USA.

1. Nicholson, C., Professor, Rider University, USA. The Philosophy of Arthur Conan Doyle.
2. Mesbah, A., Associate Professor, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Iran. A Three-Dimensional Model for the Interrelation Between Religion and Human Knowledge.

13:20-14:00 Lunch

14:00-15:30 (Room A) Session VII: Philosophical Method  
**Chair:** *Margitay, T., Professor, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary.*

1. Goodman, W., Associate Professor, University of Ontario, Canada. What if Plato Took Surveys? Thoughts about Philosophy Experiments.
2. Heydari, F., Associate Professor, Islamic Azad University-Karaj Branch. Word and its Function in Naserkhosro’s Worldview.
3. Singleton, C., Associate Professor, Swinburne University of Technology, Australia. Preliminary Considerations to a Philosophy of Process.

14:00-15:30 (Room B) Session VIII: Ethics and Value Theory II  
**Chair:** *Sharpe, M., Lecturer, Deakin University, Australia.*

1. Dessberg, L., Lecturer, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. Can We Provide a Method of Inquiry for Promoting Multiculturalism?
2. Reuter, K., PhD Student, University of Goettingen, Germany. Biodiversity and the Fundamentals of Biology and Ethics.

15:30-15:40 Coffee Break

15:40-17:10 (Room A) Session IX: Philosophy of Mind II  
**Chair:** Poochigian, D.V., Academic Member, ATINER & Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.

1. *Hanna, P., Professor, University of Utah, USA. Is There a Room for Semantics in Bio-Linguistics?*

15:40-17:10 (Room B) Session X: Various Issues I  
**Chair:** *Skountridaki, L., PhD Student, Strathclyde University, U.K.*

2. Zeami, G., Contract Professor of Ethic, University of Palermo, Italy. The Conversion of Philosophy in the Young Heidegger.
3. *Huen, K.S.S., Senior Lecturer, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei. Integrity and Human Finitude as a Way of Life.*

17:10-17:20 Coffee Break
### Session XI: Metaphysics and Epistemology II

**Chair:** Cashell, K., Lecturer/Programme Leader, Limerick Institute of Technology, Ireland.

1. Poursina, M., Assistant Professor, University of Shahid Beheshti, Iran. The Supreme Way of Al-Ghazali in Attaining Intellectual Knowledge.
3. Taberi Khorramabadi, S.A., Assistant Professor, Imam Khomeini Educational & Research Institute, Iran. The Incorrigibility of Some of our Introspective Beliefs.
5. Shanbeh, R., Instructor, Islamic Azad University-Karaj Branch, Iran. Determinism & Free Will Form the Viewpoints of Plotinus & Saadi.

### Session XII: Philosophy of Religion II

**Chair:** O’Meara, W., Professor, James Madison University, USA.

1. Das, S.B., Assistant Professor, Delhi University, India. The Commandment of Love Messianicity and Exemplarity in Franz Rosenzweig.
2. Nazari, M., Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University-Karaj Branch, Iran. (Spirit) Soul in Mollasadra Idea.
3. Zabihi, M., Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University, Shahr-e-rey Branch, Iran. Philosophical Argumentation over “Unity of Being” in Mysticism.
5. Barroso, P., Researcher, University of Minho, Portugal. Mythic Meanings and Ideology for Beliefs in God: Is Religious Fear a Disease?

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### 21:00-23:00 Greek Night and Dinner

**Tuesday 31 May 2011**

### Session XIII: Ancient III

**Chair:** Gunes, I., Assistant Professor, Salisbury University, USA.

2. Metcalf, R., Associate Professor, University of Colorado, Denver, USA. Xenophanes and the Presocratic Study of Physis.
3. Sharpe, M., Lecturer, Deakin University, Australia. Therapy of the Psyche: Stoicism and Psychoanalysis.

### Session XIV: Ethics and Value Theory III

**Chair:** Aristidou, M., Adjunct Professor, Northwestern State University, USA.

2. Frogel, S., Teacher, Kibbutzim College of Education & Tel-Aviv University, Israel. Ethics without God: Spinoza, Nietzsche and Existentialism.
3. Lucca, E., Ph.D Student, State University of Milan, Italy. Longing for a New Identity Crisis and Encounter with Secularization in 20th Century German-Jewish Thought.

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### 09:00-09:30 Coffee Break
09:40-11:10 (Room A) Session XV: Ancient IV
Chair: Metcalf, R., Associate Professor, University of Colorado, Denver, USA.

1. Gunes, I., Assistant Professor, Salisbury University, USA. Heidegger’s rethinking of Theoria and Praxis in the Sophist Lecture Course.

11:10-11:20 Coffee Break

11:20-12:50 (Room A) Session XVII: Ancient V
Chair: Krusinski, L., Professor, University of Maria Curic Sklodowska in Lublin, Poland.

2. Danes, J., Assistant Professor, University of Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. Poets, Historians and Philosophers on Covetousness and Injustice.
3. Karkowski, J., Assistant Professor, University of Notre Dame, USA. Aristotle on the Political Nature of Human Beings.

09:40-11:10 (Room B) Session XVI: Ethics and Value Theory IV
Chair: *Biederman, K., Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellow, Cornell College, USA.

1. Aristidou, M., Adjunct Professor, Northwestern State University, USA & Basallo, B., Graduate, BS, DigiPen Institute of Technology, USA. Philosophical Themes in Mass Effect. (Tuesday, 31st of May, 2011)
2. Krusinski, L., Professor, University of Maria Curic Sklodowska in Lublin, Poland. Laurentius Grimaldius Goslicius (Wawrzyniec Grzymala Goslicki) and His Treatise "De optimo senatore" (The Accomplished Senator) - Mediterranean Roots of Polish Political Philosophy in the 16th Century.
3. Ravasio, E., Ph. D. Student, University of Pavia, Italy. Hannah in Plato’s Cave. Does Politics Need a Philosophical Method?

11:20-12:50 (Room B) Session XVIII: Ethics and Value Theory V
Chair: Shakunle, L.O., Editor, J. Transfigural Mathematics, Germany.

1. Kopanski, B.A., Professor, the International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia. How to philosophize with a sickle and hammer against the Zapad: Critical reading of Alexander Dugin’s Philosophy of War and Boris Kagarlitzky’s New Realism, New Barbarism in the Islamic academe.
3. Whiston, A., Ph.D. Student, University of Reading, UK. Rationality and Intentional Amoralism. (Tuesday, 31st of May, 2011)

12:50-13:30 Lunch
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Chair: Danes, J., Assistant Professor, University of Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. | Room B Session XX: Various Issues II  
Chair: Kopanski, B.A., Professor, the International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia. |
| 13:30-15:00  | *Poochigian, D., Professor, University of North Dakota, USA. Quantum Theory and the Humanities. | 1. Mahdavi, H.S., Islamic Azad University, Iran. A Theory on Existentialism. |
| 13:30-15:00  | Gitsoulis, C., Adjunct Assistant Professor, City University New York, USA. What Makes an Act Free? | 3. Kesgin, H, Ph.D. Student, Villanova University, USA. Diotima: La Pensée or Le Penseur? |
| 15:00-15:10  | Coffee Break   |                |
| 15:10-16:40  | Room A Session XXI: Various Issues III  
Chair: Whiston, A., Ph.D. Student, University of Reading, UK. Rationality and Intentional Amoralism. (Tuesday, 31st of May, 2011) |                |
| 15:10-16:40  | Kuan, T.F., Assistant Professor, Yuan Ze University, Taiwan. Understanding Without Perceiving and Conceiving? An Investigation into Buddhist Approaches to Truth. | 3. Kesgin, H, Ph.D. Student, Villanova University, USA. Diotima: La Pensée or Le Penseur? |
| 16:40-19:30  | Urban Walk     |                |
| 20:00-21:00  | Dinner         |                |

**Wednesday 1 June 2011**  
**Cruise:** Departure at 07:10 Estimated Return Time: 20:30

**Thursday 2 June 2011**  
**Delphi Visit:** Departure at 08:00. Estimated Return Time: 19:30
Maria Adamos  
Associate Professor, Georgia Southern University, USA.

**Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions**

Historically, the role of imagination in emotions has been ignored, or when it has been mentioned, has not been sufficiently explored. According to most scholars, emotions logically require evaluative propositional states such as beliefs, judgments or thoughts, which, on the one hand, are able to account for the intentionality or “aboutness” of the emotion, while on the other hand, are able to identify the emotion and distinguish it from other emotions and/or mental states. For instance, fear requires the evaluative belief that you are in a dangerous situation, anger requires the evaluative belief that you have been treated unjustly, humiliation requires the evaluative belief that your status has been degraded, etc.

In this essay I challenge the prevalent “cognitivist” view, and I argue that oftentimes imagination, through its medium of mental pictures, can better explain our emotional experiences. In particular, I examine a case of irrational fear and a case of humiliation where the requisite evaluative beliefs are missing, and I show that while mental pictures are non-propositional, as they don’t use concepts for their realization, they are in a better position to explain emotions that lack an evaluative propositional attitude such as belief or judgment. Given that mental pictures, like propositional attitudes, are intrinsically intentional and representational, they are also able to account for the intentionality of the emotion, and, as a result, they can identify it as the kind of emotion it is or distinguish it from other emotions and mental states.
Entropy Definition of Human Happiness and Suffering

The Almighty created man for contentment, and not for suffering. Creation of the universe was a leap from absolute entropy to substance and the vital world. The goal of creating the universe and humans was to create enjoyment and pleasure by depressing the level of entropy.

Current definitions do not adequately express the nature and origin of happiness or suffering, nor do they suggest how to treat, relieve and prevent the torment of a healthy or sick individual. We developed and proposed the entropy theory as a new definition for human happiness and suffering. Entropy is a state of a lack of order, a state of chaos.

Human happiness may be defined as the complexity of positive sensations, perceptions, emotions, or thoughts of a person. These arise due to the process, or state of depressive level of entropy of the individual’s organism, empathy for others, or germane surroundings in the past, present or that which will take place in the future.

Human suffering is the complexity of negative sensations, perceptions, emotions, or human thoughts that arise due to a process, or condition of an increasing level of entropy of a person’s organism, empathy for others, or germane surroundings in the past, present, or of a threat in the future.

A source of happiness and pleasure denotes depression of entropy in humans.

Therefore, in order to treat suffering, one should ensure that the entropy level is reduced by complementing it with that which is missing, disturbs, and has been lost.
Michael Aristidou  
Adjunct Professor, Northwestern State University, USA. 
Brian Basallo  
Graduate, BS, DigiPen Institute of Technology, USA. 

Philosophical Themes in *Mass Effect*

Many modern video games allow players to project their morals through the characters they control. In recent role-playing games, such as *Fallout 3*, players are often able to create characters that fit their image of themselves or their fantasies. They then use these characters to act out what they would do under specific, often dire situations. These actions are often tied directly to the player’s morality, whether they perceive it or not. In this paper we will be analyzing some decisions a player has to make as Commander Shepard, the main character from the popular video game *Mass Effect* for the Xbox 360 and the PC. Through Shepard, the player is given many options on how to handle situations that affect the in-game universe and how conversations flow based on the personality the player gives Shepard. These options are so specific and various that the player can project a substantial amount of their own self into Shepard. We will view those decisions through the lenses of two philosophical positions, utilitarianism and Nietzsche’s “will to power”, and connect those and other dilemmas to our own world today and how the player’s philosophies tie into the decisions they make. We will also be discussing ways how *Mass Effect* could be integrated into and be a useful aid for an introductory philosophy class.
Mythic Meanings and Ideology for Beliefs in God:
Is Religious Fear a Disease?

Every day we make use of a huge variety of signs. For the most times, we do it deliberately, creating a wide range of messages and meanings. However, sometimes we use signs unconsciously, since verbal language is not the only medium for human communication. The problem is: we still creating a wide range of messages and meanings using signs unconsciously? A sign can be used without any intention of the emitter to communicate anything?

Meanings are being made everywhere. So, the best way to analyze meanings is looking at the signs which communicate meanings. This way is based in semiotics methods, which efficiency lies partly in its applicability to the much wider fields of meaning-making. Religion is one of these fields. Can we imagine religious practices and rites without symbols, meanings, Gods or feelings represented in images?

My primary focus is on how semiotics can be used in the social study of religious symbolism. I assume that meanings are always communicated by signs and semiotics is concerned with the way of how signs work. Thus, my following focus is on the patterns and structures of signs used in religious practices, conditioning the meanings which can be communicated and understood. I will also focus on the relations between signs in a social and cultural context; the connections between signs, myths and ideology. In this perspective, I will consider Charles Sanders Peirce, Ferdinand de Saussure and Roland Barthes views to analyze the role of religious symbolism to the mental construction of reality through language and mythic meanings.

So, as I ask in the title of my abstract: Is religious fear a disease? Is it rational? If not, why God remains a “grammatical ghost”, according to George Steiner’s expression? If it is, what’s the role of semiotics to religious belief and practice? My purpose is to reflect if religious fear is a mental and mythic disease and if religion is deeply tied to mythic meanings forming ideologies for beliefs in God.

For James Lovelock the Earth is an organism, a living planet. This idea has been seen by the vast majority of scientists as too laden with moral values, which are foreign to scientific research. This is why they have urged Lovelock to purge his theory from undue moral considerations. In this paper I shall defend a different view. Sometimes in science we have theories which are intrinsically both descriptive and evaluative. This is the case of Lovelock’s Gaia. In the Gaia theory facts and values are logically interwoven in a way that has often been misunderstood. Indeed, in a sense to be carefully clarified, when recognising an entity as an organism we make a statement which is at the same time both descriptive and evaluative. Thus, if Lovelock had dropped the evaluative considerations characterising his theory we would not have had the same theory cleared of those evaluative considerations. We would rather have had a different theory. Following this line of reasoning I shall also argue that many advocates of the Gaia theory have unjustifiably dropped the notion of teleology from their explanations. They have been intimidated by neo-Darwinian orthodoxy, but I shall argue that teleological explanations play a role in their theory which is independent of evolutionary biology. In fact, without teleology their explanatory models become unintelligible.
Image as Experience, Transfiguration and Possibility

While interrogating the photographic images our hypothesis is that in the particular process of the image through which we provide something of meaning, there are discontinuities and decontextualizations that make it inherently a process of openings, challenging the perceptual principle of continuity of meanings.

There is an initial effect of the real on the image, but beyond that, the specific processes that constitute image, bind the subject and are felt as exterior.

Each of these moments are individual observations in which experience itself becomes actual. If experience is, for the subject, a dialectic of openness, the openings and densities of the process of the photographic image makes its experience an autonomous and specific process that compel the subject. It’s this process that is felt as exterior by the subject.

This motion triggers several fields of reference that throughout the process juxtapose and blend. The field of reference of the subject is one of them. There is an effect of the real in image, but in the construction of the real the subject is only a participant. Meaning is a construction by the subject, not of the subject.

Possibility is, in the photographic image, the coexistence of this fields of reference which do not limit to that of the subject.
Supervenience, Emergence, and Ontological Novelty

The paper argues for a “layered” view of the physical world: complex bodies and their properties do not supervene, but instead emerge, from the fundamental entities which constitute them. Firstly, I present two rival conceptions of “physicalism”, i.e., of the metaphysical doctrine which says that all the (real) entities which populate the world have a physical nature. On one side there is “microphysicalism”: every entity either is a fundamental physical entity, or supervenes over fundamental physical entities. In particular, complex bodies and their properties supervene over fundamental entities. On the other side there is “emergentism”: every entity is a physical entity or supervenes over physical entities, where complex bodies and their properties emerge from fundamental physical entities. Secondly, I discuss the difference between the supervenience relation and the emergence relation. Mainly, while supervenience holds with metaphysical necessity, emergence involves nomological necessity (which is metaphysically contingent). Thirdly, I favour emergentism and thereby reject microphysicalism. I argue, through some examples, that macroscopic entities and properties cannot be metaphysically reduced to fundamental physical entities. Accordingly, I claim that complex systems instantiate ontologically novel properties. Finally, I briefly revise the question of the nature of the mind and its causal powers from this layered ontology.
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Rationality, Irrationality, and the Excuse of Ignorance

In this paper, I construct a novel account of some of the main epistemic conditions that explain what is rationally required of moral agents. I offer five conditions that are minimal requirements for ascribing rationality or irrationality to an agent’s reasoning processes and explain how we ought to employ or apply reasoning processes. What I propose is a picture that shows how, through a reasoning process, we can ascribe rationality or irrationality. In so doing, this account aims to set clear limits on the excuse of ignorance and to show that ignorance is not always sufficient to mitigate one’s responsibility for acting.

The account of rationality I put forth suggests that moral agents who are in some way ignorant actually fail to act as rational agents. Illuminating the epistemological features of acting as an agent shows that a moral agent is subject to epistemic responsibilities that go with his moral responsibilities. I propose that epistemic conditions: (a) make sense of our intellectual endeavors and commitments in the moral domain by setting standards for how moral agents ought to be rational when engaging in belief-related activities that influence their action-guiding judgments and moral practices and (b) identify the limits of the excuse of ignorance.

I propose that epistemic conditions are more specific conditions for moral responsibility. These conditions recommend how we as moral agents ought to be rational. Thus, by defending these points, I develop a fuller account of what it means to be a responsible moral agent. I conclude by defending the claim that moral agency requires being rational and that the types of ignorance that result from epistemically irresponsible conduct, such as employing insufficient reasoning processes, procedural errors in belief-formation, inadequate evidence-gathering strategies, and the use of unreliable evidentiary sources, are beyond excuse.
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What Philosophy of Mind Can Learn From Cognitive Neuroscience?  
A Teleo-Semiotic Model of Pain

Since Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* the problem of sensation has become a key theoretical concern in the philosophy of mind. The difficulty of correctly thematizing so-called intransitive states is exemplified by the philosophical puzzle of pain. On the one hand, pain appears to be a visceral condition directly associated with physical damage at a specific bodily location. On the other hand, pain seems a completely phenomenological, emotional experience without reference to anything other than itself and lacking anything like a specific location. Are pains to be identified with (the site of) physical damage or are pains irreducibly psychological? Neuroscientific research has identified two dimensions of the pain experience: the immediate physical sensation (associated with intensity) and the emotional affect (its unpleasantness). These dimensions are vectored by different brain pathways. Physiological evidence thus suggests that there is a distinction to be drawn between *sensation* and *emotional affect*. In this paper, I refer to the evidence provided by cognitive neuroscience to critically assess the perceptual approach to pain as defended by many contemporary philosophers (Tye 1996; 2005) (Dretske 1995; 2005) (Hill 2005; 2009). Based on the evidence, I argue that representationalist theories fail to adequately account for certain non-trivial phenomena associated with pain (see Hill, 2005): they misconstrue for instance the commonsense phenomenology of pain in the attempt to construct a plausible explanatory theory that fits the facts emerging from scientific research (a consequence of this is what Hill has identified as the ‘paradox of pain’). In attempting to thematise pain as perceptual in nature, the representational theorists encounter several intractable problems some of which have been identified by Aydede (2005). Most obviously, the phenomenon of pain does not seem to represent anything: a particular pain does not have a definitive representational content. Pain is not *of* anything: ‘the only concept I need to have to be able to realise that I have a pain … is the concept of pain itself’ (Aydede 2005, 30).

In this paper I defend a teleosemantic hypothesis that seeks to thematise pain as a *sign* (or indicator). Yet this is defined as a presentation that in presenting as itself also represents something else. Although this suggests that pain possesses an “object” (in the semiotic sense) this object is not explained in terms of conceptual content. I
believe that this model can accommodate the commonsense understanding of pain, explain the phenomena of disassociation and phantom-pain (painfulness without pain), as well as accounting for the perplexing instances of functional pain that remain inadequately theorised by representational-perceptual paradigms.
The Ethics of Argumentation

Following Clifford’s famous lecture upon “The Ethics of Belief”, many contemporary authors put forth the idea that we bear an “epistemic responsibility” regarding the way we form our beliefs, just like we bear a “practical responsibility” regarding the way we act (Montmarquet, Audi, Haak, Engel, Zagzebski). Some authors (Engel 1997, 2001) even go as far as to suggest that, although our beliefs are often distorted by a variety of unconscious biases (Kahneman, Tversky, Gilovitch, Kunda), we remain nevertheless responsible for the rationality of our beliefs, insofar as we can (and therefore should) exert a certain control over the process of belief-formation. But could a similar claim be made with regard to the way we form our arguments in the context of a debate? Does it make sense, for example, to hold someone accountable for adhering credulously to a fallacious form of argument? And conversely, are we responsible for the irrational attitudes that might compromise the validity of our own argumentation schemes? To be sure, cognitive biases are typically unconscious mechanisms which arise without the subject’s intentional effort, and to that extent it would seem inappropriate to blame the arguer or the listener for being irrational, but on the other hand it remains possible for each participant in a dialogue to try to counteract the underlying mechanisms which generally prompt motivated irrationality, namely: selective evidence gathering, selective focusing and biased misinterpretation (Mele 2001). Much like the scrupulous judge who tries to reason and argue in full objectivity, leaving aside his personal views and prejudices, we have the possibility of developing what Ziva Kunda calls an “effort of objectivity” (Kunda 1990) in an attempt to reduce the impact of biases and heuristics both in the way we argue and in the way we process our opponents’ arguments. Conversely, Praktanis and Aronson (1992) suggest that we should adopt defensive strategies of critical thinking when exposed to manipulative forms of persuasion. In this paper I argue that it makes sense to speak of a deontology of persuasion (or an “ethics of rhetoric”), which would be the analogue, in the realm of argumentation theory, of the “ethics of belief.”
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Poets, Historians and Philosophers on Covetousness and Injustice

In my paper I will focus on the category of covetousness, which appears to be the key one to the classical ancient Athenian ethical, social and political thinkers. Their criticism of covetousness or greed took two basic directions: a) the criticism of individual corruption, which raised the question of how to prevent ourselves from the inborn greedy inclinations which disturb the harmony of our souls, and b) the condemnation of the covetousness either of the masses or of the oligarchs, which subverts political society by destroying the principle of fair distribution in civil society. I will scrutinise three different groups of thinkers – the poets (Euripides and Aristophanes), the historians (Herodotus and Thucydides), and the philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) – in order to illustrate how influential this kind of theorising was. Indeed, in some respects it is still alive, despite the fact that modern political and economic thought thinks of the egotistical and greedy individual as something natural and spontaneously creating the social and economic order.
The Commandment of Love Messianicity and Exemplarity in Franz Rosenzweig

What consists in the commandment of love: in the love for the wholly Other who is absolutely singular, and what this love transforms itself to, to the love for the others who are the placeholders of Not Yet, the neighbour who opens us to the radical futurity of a redemptive fulfilment? Irreducible to the order of law – both the law positing and law preserving order, the arrival of love is the event of time that opens the seal of immemorial promise given in the immemorial past to the absolute singularity of the event of love’s presentation and to the radicality of the incalculable futurity that is the coming of Messiah. In the name of Franz Rosenzweig, this article attempts to think an ethics of exemplarity which is love’s generosity, an exemplarity that consists of addressing to the singularity of the event of love and that of its immemorial promise on the one hand, and yet at the same time that affirms the necessity of translation of this singular language of love to the universality that is yet to come. What it thus demands is the re-thinking of the very sense of our ethico-political that must open itself to the thought of a promise beyond the violence of a historical Reason. This sense is the sense of exemplarity which is opened up in the generosity of love, beyond the dialectic of the autochthony of the particular and anonymity of the homogenous progress of universal history. If there remains for us any sense of the ethico-political, when wide spread horror at annihilation of sense is the prominent mood today, then this sense consists in this very exemplarity of love’s ethical commandment and in the irreducibility of the aporia of translation, which is the very aporia of our ethico-political today.
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Can We Provide a Method of Inquiry for Promoting Multiculturalism?  

By considering the plurality of goods which represents values that would not be the same for everyone, modern liberalism aspires to establish on institutional grounds the importance of multiculturalism. It is this position that Rawls’s concept of « justice as fairness » aims to present. Accordingly, he refers to the basic structure of the society and to the method of reflexive inquiry as means of evaluating principles of justice. Moral judgments about particular issues are to be made or revised until they become ultimately acceptable by looking for their coherence among more entrenched beliefs. People have to accept the deliberative process in which they may change their considered judgments of justice or some principles. Nevertheless, Rawls still considers the ways « free and rational persons » use the same cultural background instead of taking the full process into account. If such limits guarantee the stability of existing political institutions, they narrow down the perspectives of rational modifications offered by reflective equilibration.  

We would like, therefore, to insist on the possibilities given by Dewey’s pragmatic method of inquiry. In fact, Dewey was also interested by the conditions of reconstruction of the cognitive sets, but primarily in schools. He contends that education should promote the development of intelligence applied to democratic experience by enhancing epistemic virtues such as intellectual tenacity, attention to details and sense of fairness. For Dewey, only abstraction permits to say that each individual can use his intelligence apart from others. Deweyean democratic education aims at developing practical and situated intelligence that gives an alternative to universal reason and to reliance on ends-in-view embedded in ideological or communautarian habits. In his definition of valuation as inquiry, Dewey has in mind the continuity of the process that brings means and ends together. Such a relation may constitute an improvement of the reflexive equilibration methodology.
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*Ethos* and Demonstration.  
Persuasive Processes in Aristotle’s Rhetoric

This proposal concerns the field of studies on classical Greek rhetoric, in particular, on the Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In the first pages of this work, when Aristotle argues that the enthymeme is a particular type of demonstration, there is also an affirmation that seems to disclose something very interesting: "We *pisteuomen* (we believe, we trust), especially when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated" (1355th 5-6). Depending on how it is interpreted, this passage may influence the reading of Aristotelian thought on persuasion in different ways: far from saying that only the demonstrations persuade, Aristotle says that it is often what we consider to be a demonstration that produces *pistis*. In this way, according to Aristotle the "believing" holds a key position in comparison with the demonstration.

Then, this issue is part of the wider debate on how to understand the relationship between the three *entechnoi pisteis*, *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* and the role they play in the process of persuasion.

Starting from the passage above and others related to it (for example, the 1416th 27-28; or also 1356th 6-12), our proposal attempts to develop two points:

1. the role the demonstration (*apodeixis*) plays in the persuasive process, held in the persuasive process in relation with those elements usually connected to the personal dimension (the ethos of the speaker), elements traditionally excluded from the sphere of logical demonstration;

2. the opportunity to rethink the Aristotelian notion of *pistis* as wider, as a scientific-grounded belief, but also as a trust, or, sometimes, as a faith not always justified by the demonstrations.
Making Room for Matter

This paper explains how Aristotle’s theory can accommodate a material cause whereas Socrates (in the Phaedo) rejects such causes. The key difference is that Aristotle thinks that each change has four causes, whereas Socrates (I argue) thinks each change only has one. Plato and Aristotle think of causes in the same basic way: as what we must grasp to understand a change. I lay out evidence that in the Phaedo each change only has one cause; anything else is, at best, a mere necessary condition.

To see why having multiple causes allows matter be a cause, we need to appreciate why matter-like causes are dismissed in the Phaedo – in particular, why Socrates thinks that his flesh and bones cannot be the cause of his staying in jail. Contrary to what is often claimed, Socrates is not relying on the idea that causes must be rational or teleological. Instead, he is relying on the principle that the same thing cannot cause opposites. I argue that he is committed to this principle because of his commitment to one cause per change. Causes explain why changes happen. Something is not a good explanation of X if it works just as well to explain the opposite of X. Thus if you have only one cause, it cannot cause opposites.

Aristotelian matter can be involved in opposite changes, e.g., the same matter can become hot or cold. Because of this, on its own matter could not explain a change – it no more explains one change than its opposite. Nonetheless, Aristotle thinks that matter makes a fundamental contribution to why and how changes happen. By allowing for multiple causes, matter need not do its explanatory work on its own and so Aristotle can make it a cause.
The Part (role) of Religion in Human Life

One of the essential problems, which have an important role in man’s life, is the question of "the part of religion in human life." In fact the question is that, what is the role of religion in man’s life? How much do we need religion? What problems are going to be solved by religion? Does religion concerns only individual relation’s with Allah or it covers social relations as well. And the final question is that what will happen for someone who does not believe in any religion? Is it possible something substitute religion and function exactly like religion?

To know and to explain the part of religion in human life one should know definitions of two terms “religion” as well as “human.” If we have no clear understanding of these two terms our answer to these questions won’t be rational. What is religion and who is man? Sociologists have suggested different definitions regarding religion. Some of them are too wide, which, include even those religions who believe in no God and the others are too narrow and are so limited, which you may have difficulties to find even an example for them. Since to take all these definition in to consideration, analyze and criticize them, need a big paper, here; we only bring up our definition of religion. To our understanding, religion consists of collection of creeds, morals and behaviors (conducts), which effect eternal happiness and salvation of human beings and to miss them cause man’s adversity. In other words, religion constitute of three parts creeds, morals and commands (commandments).

There exist a debate that which one of these three factors is original and which one is of secondary importance? However between collections of these three factors is a kind of order, I mean, particular creeds cause particular virtues, and particular virtues, in its turn, cause particular behavior. In my paper I will deal with this problem and elaborate how worldview will affects and causes ideology and not the way around.
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Daemonic Being:
Politics and Human Life in Plutarch

In the last decades, two aspects in the philosophy of Plutarch have been underlined by the scholars: the political project and the metaphysical and cosmological interest.

It seems difficult to give a coherent image of this philosopher, but in the De Genio Socratis, through the discussion of the links among man, daimon and divinity, Plutarch seems to try to define the correct relationship between the world of thinking and the world of action.

In the dialogue, the concept of daimon plays a key role: living in the middle between god and man, the daimon interacts with both; in the world of man, its function is reflected by the true statesman (Epaminondas).

We can broaden this interpretation to the whole philosophy of Plutarch.

In this way we can correctly understand the politician's duty of taking care of his human fellows (philanthropia): acting like the demiurge with the cosmos, he fulfills his telos, the homoiosis to theo. But, if the demiurge is the archetype, the daimon is the true guide in the human world.

The struggle between the two metaphysical principles of good and evil creates the conflict that pervades the human world: it can be recomposed in politics by the harmonization of the individual lives, in order to create a community directed to the same end.

The politician, like the platonic god, takes care of what it is not self-sufficient, and can perform this task only because his nature is able to reflect the divine.

The politics is not only an activity, but a way of living, a double harmonization (of the self with god, of the community with the cosmos) that fulfills human nature.
The Role of Voltaire in the Representation of Chinese Philosophy in France

Chinese philosophy is little known in France and is not officially recognized by twenty-first century French philosophers as a philosophy. They regard its contributions as wisdoms, thoughts or spiritualities. This state of affairs has a historical origin linked to the introduction of Chinese culture and philosophy in France in the 16th century by the Jesuits missionaries. Philosophers of the Enlightenment like Voltaire have read and relayed the content of the Edifying and Curious Letters of some Missioners, of the Society of Jesus, from Foreign Missions.

This paper attempts to understand the role of Voltaire in the representation of Chinese philosophy in France, which has not yet been deeply studied. The aim is to provide some tentative explanations of Voltaire’s representations of Chinese philosophy and to seek what influence he had on the inherited imaginary in Chinese philosophy which is still in France today.

It will also be shown how Voltaire, a “sino-enthusiast” representative, will not follow the idea of China as the “Other” of the West (defended by Leibniz and by François Jullien nowadays for instance). He was attracted by cultural exchange. In spite of his positive view of China, he subscribed to the thesis of “backwardness” of China in Sciences. This thesis had a negative influence on the representation of China, and Chinese philosophy was blamed as outdated and not logical or rational. He also contributed to the “cliché” of the Chinese wise man, still in minds today.

One may find with Voltaire a desire to rehabilitate China against skeptics who disseminate negative information about it, as Montesquieu did. He gave a eulogy in which the recognition of the authority of men of letters, the meritocratic model, as well as religious and political tolerance are the main pillars. Finally, Voltaire has been an intermediary of certain images used by the Jesuits involved in the representation of French contemporary Chinese philosophy.
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**Ethics without God: Spinoza, Nietzsche and Existentialism**

Spinoza was the first to introduce the idea of ethics without God. After refuting the idea of the religious transcendent God he suggests a new approach to life in which human moral and happiness are no more a result of faith but of understanding. The intellect, the only active aspect of human soul, according to his view, should guide us in our ethical life by formulating universal laws of morality, which advance human happiness.

Nietzsche rejects Spinoza's idea of moral universalism but continues to develop the idea of ethics without God. He claims that it is unreasonable to argue for moral universalism after "the death of God", since this event, in his terms, should mark the end of our belief in cosmic and moral order. Nietzsche's new ethics argue for moral particularism, in which one's sensitivity to individuals replaces one's obedience to moral laws.

The atheistic existentialists could be perceived, from this perspective, as the followers of Spinoza and Nietzsche. They share with Spinoza the belief in the power of human understanding, but, like Nietzsche, emphasize the importance of individuals over universal laws. Their ethics is based on active engagement of individuals in human situations. Sartre formulates it in terms of the individual's freedom and responsibility and Camus, to give another example, by connecting human revolt with human solidarity.

My claim is that these three approaches could serve as good outlines for discussing the issue of ethics without God. This ethics is based on existential power of individuals instead of external authorities. Therefore, its main question is what improves the individual's existential power. The paper discusses the different answers of Spinoza, Nietzsche and the existentialist to this question.
What Makes an Act Free?

A historically popular account of freedom (defended by, e.g., David Human and Jonathan Edwards) defines it as the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling ones desires. In this paper I will highlight the deficiencies of this account, and argue that (a) freedom is a matter of degree, and (b) the degree is measured by how well one deliberates over alternative courses of action, and (c) this deliberative ability is a skill that can be done well or badly, depending on how informed it is by judgments by the agent about what is good for the agent. In sum, we act with free will when we act upon our considered judgments about what is good for us, whether or not our doing so conflicts with our desires.
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What if Plato Took Surveys? Thoughts about Philosophy Experiments

The recent movement called Experimental Philosophy (“x-phi”) has passed its tenth anniversary. This paper accepts x-phi’s program as credible, but as needing some maturing of its claims and methods. Its key insight is compelling: Whenever an argument hinges on someone accepting as obvious some “facts” about human thinking, perception, knowledge, or judging, the person’s intuitions may be mistaken. Thought experiments are supposed to make the facts appear obvious; but how good is an experiment with a sample size equal zero? X-phi purports to introduce real experiments, with real samples; but it does not always acknowledge that more, not less, may now need explaining. E.g.: Plato theorized why a slave boy (whom we imagine in a dialogue) could follow, though untutored, mathematical demonstrations. But what if Plato surveyed 100 slave boys—of whom 68% followed the demonstrations, and 32% could not? Now this difference would need explaining. Regardless, the reporting and experimental standards of early, ground-breaking x-Phi must now be updated. Two examples: (a) Early x-Phi papers accept (or even state outright) common misconceptions about the meaning of p-values for statistical significance; (b) to determine what “people”, in general, intuit (notwithstanding how much x-Phi’ers talk about cross-cultural differences), one writer samples, without concerns about representativeness, exclusively from one mall in one U.S. city. All experimenters must state and justify experimental assumptions, and explain how they will mitigate residual risks of error; philosophers who experiment should be exemplars of this care. A final point, ironically, reaffirms a need for thought experiments—precisely to help philosophy do “real” experiments as well as possible. It is impossible to recursively field-test, in advance, every assumption that a real experiment will need to get off the ground. Thought experiments can anticipate the limitations in one’s method, guiding considerations how to mitigate or account for them.
Heidegger’s Rethinking of Theōria and Praxis in the Sophist Lecture Course

Martin Heidegger’s early interpretations of Aristotle and his adoption of Aristotelian concepts into his philosophy have been a focus of interest in the last couple of decades. Although the role of Aristotle’s philosophy in the development of Heidegger’s thought is undeniable, the exact nature and significance of this role is subject to disagreement.

A major point of disagreement is about Heidegger’s adoption of the Aristotelian notion of the “virtues of intellect.” It is evident that his interest in this notion addresses the traditional question of the theory-practice divide and revives the possibility of defining practical knowledge separate from theoretical knowledge. However, the purpose of this revival has been a topic of arduous discussions. In recent literature, there have been claims (as voiced by scholars such as Jacques Taminiaux and Francisco Gonzalez) that although seemingly Heidegger tries to emancipate praxis (action) from the traditional domination of theōria (contemplation), he ends up praising theōria at the expense of praxis. That way, the claim goes, he simply entrenches the traditional domination of theōria over praxis.

The purpose of this paper is to show that these claims are not well-founded. Based on a detailed analysis of Heidegger’s major lecture course Plato’s Sophist (1924-25), I argue that Heidegger’s unorthodox interpretation of the concepts of theōria and praxis leads him to dissolve the traditional hierarchy between the theoretical and the practical spheres of human activity. I suggest that he does so by (1) pointing at the possibility of conceiving theōria as a kind of praxis, (2) redefining theōria as contemplation of being, (3) regarding theōria and praxis as complementary activities rather than mutual exclusives, and (4) highlighting the ultimate dependence of theōria and praxis. That way, I argue, he undermines the traditional view that takes theōria to be superior to praxis due to its supposed autonomy.
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Is There Room for Semantics in Bio-Linguistics?
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Time and Contradiction: Looking for Continuity in Aristotle’s Physics

In his work the Physics, Aristotle famously defined time as the “measure of motion.” On its own, however, this definition does not render an entirely clear picture of what time is. It leaves us wondering what ontological status, if any, time has and whether it exists independent or dependent of human experience. As the measure of “motion,” we are curious as to what “motion” refers—the movement of humans, the movement of any being, the movement of the heavens? So too, we wonder if “measurement” occurs only if there is a human mind to do the measuring, or if it exists in the world regardless of human presence. While at times what Aristotle tells us about time in the Physics is consistent with the idea that it exists independent of human experience, at other times he appears to claim that the existence of time is dependent on human experience. In this paper, I conduct a close reading of chapters 10-11 of the Physics Book IV, where Aristotle analyzes the “now” in support of his argument that time is the “measure of motion,” and of a portion of chapter 14 of the Physics Book IV, where he discusses directly the interdependence of the soul on time. This is all with an eye towards suggesting a valid way to understand time in Aristotle as that which can be described both as dependent and independent of human experience.
Word and its Function in Naserkhosro’s Worldview

Naserkhosro Ghobadiani Balkhi, the Iranian poet and philosopher, was born in 394 A.H.-After Hejara that is after Prophet’s migration from Mecca to Medina- and died in an unknown date after 465 A.H. He dreamt a dream in his youth, and after that he withdrew from the luxurious life in the court. Hence, he initiated a seven year journey and quest for truth. After many years of searching and acquiring different sciences, he became familiar with “the supporters of Ismaili sect”, and they made him familiar with Greek philosophers’ view. In his books Zadalmosaferin and Jameolhekmatayn he points out to his familiarity with the Greek philosophers and names Empedocles Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as theosophists, and elaborates on their views. Relying upon the Greek philosophy and religious teachings, Naserkhosro builds a meaningful pattern of ideas about Word, creation, and emanation. According to him world is the by product of God’s thinking, and human being is a by product of world’s thinking; consequently, intellect is the by product of man’s thinking. God through pure thinking in Himself creates Word, and Word is His manifestation so that there would be no Word without God and there would be no God without Word. Word as a being has two kinds of creation –creation from nothing and emanation- with which it reveals first intellect and then soul. In this article the function of Word versus Intellect and Soul, Table and Pen, and existence and man is going to be investigated.
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Integrity and Human Finitude as a Way of Life

This paper departs from a Heideggerian notion of death that Dreyfus describes as “a general structure of finitude which has both an individual and a cultural instantiation”. It is an insight, which, according to Hubert Dreyfus, is actually shared by John Haugeland and Carol White in their readings of Heidegger: Death is world-collapse, and authentic dying has to do with anticipating such a complete breakdown. My present tasks are not exegetical. First, I attempt to show that this interesting idea of human finitude as a way of life has its advantages in accounting for the personal and intellectual aspects of integrity, but disadvantages in accounting for the moral aspect. For, above all, moral norms and purposes that people are in general committed to are not grasped or intended in terms of “… until I die”. Second, I suggest replacing “my mortality” as an essential concern for a life of integrity by “my foundation”. The latter is a conception from Wittgenstein that I develop into a notion of deep integrity to be put forward here. A Tibetan Buddhist, Wittgenstein would contend, adopts a concept of (my) death, which functions as one of his foundations and which cannot be separated from other concepts that he lives with in his religious life. Through this case, which I contend to be an instance of authentic form of life, “my mortality” is decentered. Third, my finitude accounts for a crucial fact of my integrity: my basic visions, sensibilities, concepts and views are updated in the dynamic process of my life – including those concerning my mortality – especially at critical times of radical uncertainty. This notion of authenticity/integrity (better indicated by the word “life”) is to be contrasted with the above-mentioned Heideggerian notion.
Aristotle on the Political Nature of Human Beings

I argue that Aristotle’s conception of human nature is importantly similar to Plato’s in the *Republic*. The latter maintains that human beings have natural aptitudes that suit them for different political roles: some are rulers, others soldiers, and still others natural craftsmen. Similarly, I argue, an elaboration of Aristotle’s claim that man is naturally political suggests that he holds a similar view.

In HA I.1 Aristotle says that political animals have a certain way of negotiating the environment, viz., by collective and cooperative activity for the sake of a common end (HA I.1 488a7-8). The sort of cooperative venture undertaken by political animals requires a natural division of labor. Not every member of the relevant kind will be assigned the same task, but all of the tasks allocated to the members of the kind will contribute to the same end.

This description of the political way of life is satisfied by a number of zoological kinds: bees, wasps, and man (HA I.1 488a9). According to Aristotle, human beings are naturally equipped to negotiate the environment collectively and cooperatively, like bees. But while bees do so by forming hives humans do so by forming poleis. Aristotle thinks that the polis is the best means that humans have for surviving and flourishing in a given environment. Thus, since nature does nothing in vain, human beings must be naturally suited to live in poleis.

The satisfaction of this demand requires human nature to be complex. Since a polis is a complex community, nature will have to engender humans with different natural aptitudes for different political tasks. Aristotle recognizes more necessary political tasks than Plato, and so he ends up with more categories of human being. But they both employ a political framework in order to explain why different humans have different natural aptitudes.
Hande Kesgin
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**Diotima: La Pensée or Le Penseur?**

This paper seeks to understand the absence of any affirmation of female wisdom in Plato’s philosophical discourse. In this first part of the paper I will focus on *Symposium* and argue that Diotima’s speech is a recognition of philosophy as a male discourse from its very origin. Plato senses from the very beginning that philosophy is destined to be a phallic practice and the philosopher destined to be a male. Diotima’s speech shows us there is the potentiality of non-male thinking. This potential resides in the domain of negativity and illustrates itself in Eros’s maternal origin in his mother Penia and his grandmother Metis. I will discuss this claim in relation to two works of Rodin, namely *Le Penseur* (The Thinker-male-) and *La Pensée* (The Thought -female-). Through the former famous and the latter not so well known pieces by the world-famous sculptor, I will try to show how Diotima’s speech, and philosophy thereafter, has been highly influential in the formation of our contemporary ways of thinking about philosophy and the philosopher. Lastly, I will discuss why, although the problem of philosophy as being a male discourse is recognized, the potentiality of female thought cannot be realized in philosophy, at least in Diotima’s speech.

In the second part of the paper I will focus on *The Republic*. Plato’s position on women in *The Republic* is interesting not only because he offers something very unique in contrast to his contemporaries, but also he addresses a profound problem of political theory. I will analyze how Plato opens up the question of femininity, especially in Book V, and how he situates the feminine in the polis. I will question seriousness of Plato’s attempts to integrate and elevate women in the society and whether or not he succeeds.
Dohyoung Kim
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On the Limit of Aristotelian Deliberation

My claim is that deliberation is only of the means (to pros to telos). This should not be a contentious claim since Aristotle seems to indicate as much: ‘deliberation (bouleusis) is not concerned with the end (to telos), but only with the means’ (NE 1112b11-13). However, a noteworthy group of scholars, including John Cooper, Martha Nussbaum, David Wiggins etc, argue for what I will call the received view. On the received view, deliberation is of both the means and the end. They believe that the division between the means and the end is not very sharp. That is, there are so-called ‘constitutional means’, which could be means in one sense and ends in another. Furthermore, they think means are sometimes the part of the end. I see some tendency to agree with the received view. However, it is somewhat myopic as it neglects a full and rich understanding of Aristotle notion of ‘to telos’. The arguments of the received view seem to be based on the premise that ‘to telos’ is a conception on the form of happiness (eudaimonia), or moral principle, rather than a practice or the actualization of eudaimonia. I think that this is a misconception of Aristotle’s ‘to telos’. I argue that (1) what Aristotle means by ‘to telos’ is an actualization of ‘eudaimonic’ action (NE 1.7, 1098a5-7 and 1.8, 1098b31-1099a7); and, (2) an actualization of ‘eudaimonic’ action cannot be the object of moral deliberation because (2.1) the objects of deliberation are the things ‘not determined yet’ (1112b8-11) and (2.2) the actualization of ‘eudaimonic’ action is, at least, not the things ‘not determined yet’ (1098a5-7, 1098b31-1099a7 and 1113a3-9). Therefore, deliberation cannot have ‘to telos’ as an object, so deliberation is only concerned with the means. (1112b12-13) Consequently, my interpretation of Aristotle is more consistent with a more complete understanding of to telos, whereby deliberation cannot directly initiate any moral action.
Ataullah Bogdan Kopanski
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How to Philosophize with a Sickle and Hammer
Against the Zapad: Critical Reading of Alexander
Dugin’s Philosophy of War and Boris Kagarlitzky’s
New Realism, New Barbarism in the
Islamic Academe

Alexander Gelyevich Dugin [Александр Ге́льевич Ду́гин,] (b.1962) is one of the most prominent and most prolific political philosopher of Russo-Eurasianist polemology and co-founder of several extremely anti-western movements. Dugin propagates selected aspects of Jean-François Thiriart’s ideas and Hegelian synthesis of the Strasserist and Stalinist authoritarian concepts of existence as the theoretical foundation of geopolitical bi-civilizational ‘Eurasian Heartland Empire (Foundations of Geopolitics (1997). Julius Evola, Yahya Abd-al-Waheed (Rene Guenon), Oswald Spengler and Lev Gumilev are discussed as godfathers of his ‘Third Way Bolshevism’ proclaimed in his works like Konservativnaya revoliutsiia, (1994), Metafizika blagoi vesti: Pravoslavnyi ezoterizm, (1996) and Misterii Evrazii,(1996). Dugin’s Philosophy of War is a meta-historical and para-philosophical amalgamation of his neo-conservative thoughts which he preaches recently in the Faculty of Sociology at the Lomonosov University in Moscow.

Boris Yulyevich Kagarlitsky (Борис Ю. Кагарлицкий (b.1958), a coordinator of the Transnational Institute Global Crisis project and Director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements (IGSO) and editor-in-chief of Levaya Politika (Left Politics) quarterly in Moscow deconstructs the postmodernist newest ‘betrayal of the intellectuals’. His philosophical fundamentals base on the neo-Leninist historical materialism and his criticism resembles Julien Benda’s Betrayal of Intellectuals (Trahison des clercs). His Dialectic of Change (1989), The Mirage of Modernization (1995), New Realism, New Barbarism: Socialist Theory in the Era of Globalization (1999), The Return of Radicalism (2000), and The Revolt of the Middle Class (2006) are discussed in the paper.
Leszek Krusinski  
Professor, University of Maria Curic Sklodowski in Lublin, Poland.

Laurentius Grimaldiius Goslicius (Wawrzyniec Grzymała Goślicki) and His Treatise "De optimo senatore" (The Accomplished Senator) - Mediterranean Roots of Polish Political Philosophy in 16th Century

Laurentius Grimaldiius Goslicius (Wawrzyniec Grzymała Goślicki), political philosopher and catholic bishop was living in 16th century, in the golden age of Polish culture. Writing in Latin, educated in Poland (Kraków - Jagiellonian University) and in Italy (Universities in Bolonia and Padua, Ph.D.), Goślicki printed his treatise "De optimo senatore libri duo" in Venice in 1568. Following Aristotle, Cicero and Marsilius from Padua, Goślicki considers theory of the well-rulled state and tests its principles. He believes in "the inexistence of universal human values, acceptable for the majority of rational thinking, mentally non corrupted human beings regardless of culture and religion". Goślicki thinks that "the effects of man's activity are certification of his potential". In his opinion, "the highest office should go to the persons who can prove their capacities and qualities in public service". The tranquil and secure existence of the well-rulled state depends on respecting civil liberties, including the right to protest. Following Aristotle, Cicero and Marsilius from Padua, Goslicki stresses that the ruler and the ruled have to obey the law. Human nature, if not perverted or corrupted, accepts freedom, justice and democracy. Essential is the quality of man, especially the senator, who is living and taking part in the well-rulled state policy. There is the natural necessity to harmonize a political organism with man's essential needs and aspirations.
Tse-fu Kuan
Assistant Professor, Yuan Ze University, Taiwan.

Understanding Without Perceiving and Conceiving?
An Investigation into Buddhist Approaches to Truth

This paper aims to explore the issues regarding cognition in different spiritual levels as suggested in early Buddhist scriptures. It will discuss Buddhist evaluation of sources or instruments of knowledge and will clarify Buddhist concept of true knowledge and of ultimate truth against the broader background of epistemological and ontological debate in Indian philosophy. My concern will focus on early Buddhism, particularly (not exclusively) on a number of texts in the Ekottarika Āgama extant in Chinese translation and their parallels in other Chinese Āgama collections and the Theravada Canon in the Pali language. Since significant divergences are found between different versions of these texts, I will conduct a comparative study of these early Buddhist texts preserved in different traditions. In these texts, key words related to cognition in Pali such as sañjānāti (to perceive), maññati (to conceive) and abhijānāti (to fully understand) and their Chinese counterparts are to be examined in order to delineate their meanings and find out how they are differentiated in various canonical contexts, especially in contexts where the Buddha’s teaching is formulated in an apophatic manner. This research, with the aid of Western philosophy, seeks to elucidate Buddhist approaches to truth and what truth refers to in early Buddhism. In order to investigate these issues, this paper will take account of the well-known Diamond Sūtra, an early Mahayana text. This text is rich in apophatic expressions like “The Buddhas are dissociated from all perceptions (sa jnā, Sanskrit nominal form of sañjānāti in Pali mentioned above)” and “That which is true perception is non-perception”. A study of such concepts is expected to shed important light on the issues concerning those enigmatic passages on cognition in early Buddhist scriptures.
David Lee
Teaching Fellow, University of Oxford, UK.

Drama and Dogmatism in Plato’s *Phaedo*

It is widely thought that Plato’s Phaedo argues for the immortality of the soul on the assumption that a special realm of sense-transcendent metaphysical objects, the forms, exist. I do not think that this picture of the Phaedo is correct. I argue that the mainstream view arises from a neglect of the dramatic and argumentative structure of the dialogue, and a misreading of some key passages. I present a reading of the Phaedo in which Plato presents an argument for metaphysical conclusions which are, in important respects, more broad than the theory traditionally ascribed to him. I show that the presuppositions of this argument are limited to some particular claims about the nature of explanation, and give reasons for thinking that these claims are philosophically defensible. My reading develops the idea that the particular commitments of Socrates’ interlocutors set their reactions at a distance from the response Plato expected of his audience. I show that my reading allows us to give convincing solutions to some problems which beset mainstream interpretations. I also defend a new answer to an old puzzle about the relationship between Plato and the historical Socrates.
Enrico Lucca  
Ph.D Student, State University of Milan, Italy.

**Longing for a New Identity Crisis and Encounter with Secularization in 20th Century German-Jewish Thought**

My talk will be devoted to analyze some reactions to secularization developed in the first decades of XX century among the most important German-Jewish thinkers. Making reference to the writing of intellectuals, philosophers and historians (e.g. Scholem, Benjamin, Buber, Strauss, etc.), I will try to outline how the Jewish *intelligentsia* between two world-wars was forced to face the results achieved by former generations in terms of civil and political rights. As a consequence of the Weimar crisis, a heterogeneous group of thinkers felt the urgency to react to the paradigm of Emancipation, which had been seen starting from Moses Mendelssohn to Hermann Cohen as a necessary task for German Jewry’s way to modernity. Such a conviction clashed against the crash of XIX century conception of history and progress. Thus, a lot of Jewish thinkers once again had to deal with their belonging to a national and political community, asking reason of their considering themselves at the same time as Germans and Jews. Meanwhile, important philosophical and religious concepts were questioned too. In particular, fundamental notions such as messianism or revelation were explored in a totally different way with an attention unknown to prior reflection. The encounter with secularization seems to me the key that explains all those new and different approaches to Jewish tradition. Likewise, I will argue that the notion of crisis, which to a great extent informed all these authors’ thinking, highly contributed to shape the *Weltanschauung* that led them to formulate an original interpretation of Judaism. By struggling with politics and religion, though in many different ways and often with divergent outcomes, this generation of scholars and philosophers for the first time in history was taken to address the problem of defining Jewish identity in a secular and post-assimilatory time.
Frank Maet  
Lecturer, Sint-Lucas Visual Arts Ghent, Belgium & Erasmus University  
Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

**In Search for an Aesthetics of the 21st Century**

In this lecture I will discuss the theories of the Italian philosopher Mario Perniola in search for an aesthetics of the 21st century. Perniola states in *Aesthetics of the 20th Century* (1997) that the 20th century was a century (full) of aesthetics. During that century the aesthetic discipline was dominated by the legacy of Kant and Hegel. But, according to Perniola, at the end of our last century we get a shift towards an attention for ‘difference’. The roots for this change in sensibility can be found in Heidegger, Freud and well-known French theorists (Deleuze, Derrida,…). For Perniola it is clear that nowadays (since the 1960s), in order to define aesthetics, we can no longer go back to Kant and Hegel but we need to explore the feeling of difference instead.

The feeling of difference is central to Perniola’s own point of view, in which he tries to bring together philosophy and sexuality and to surpass the subject-object dichotomy. He describes his own theory with an expression borrowed from Walter Benjamin: “the sex-appeal of the inorganic.” Perniola writes about “the thing that feels” and claims that our condition of a neutral sexuality, situated between human and object, is the result of (the influence of) technology and is typical for our present-day culture.

In this lecture I will concentrate on Perniola’s view on the influence of technology and criticize the way he thinks we have to get rid of modern aesthetics. We need to find a new way of continuing modern aesthetics in the (highly technological) 21st century in which there is room for feeling and for reason – and this we cannot do without going back to the legacy of Kant and Hegel and reconcile this with 20th century philosophies of difference.
Heidegger and Quine on Experience

Traditionally, there is almost no dialogue between contemporary Anglo-Saxon empiricism and continental phenomenology. They are completely alien to each other—and this is also true of Heidegger’s and Quine’s philosophy that are prominent representatives of the two traditions. Though, as it will be argued, there are striking similarities in their notion of experience. It is one of the most fundamental concepts for both philosophers, thus their points of disagreement can also shed new light on their tenets.

First, Heidegger’s and Quine’s concept of experience will be reconstructed. (The reconstruction of Heidegger’s position will be based solely on Being and Time.) In order to analyze and compare them, Quine’s and Heidegger’s claims need to be represented in a common conceptual framework. It seems difficult—if not impossible—to find a common conceptual framework that is both precise and general, and such a conceptual structure would be rather clumsy to handle too. So I will stick to precision and make concession to generality.

Secondly, it will be argued that the two authors’ concept of experience prove to be structurally similar. Heidegger’s phenomenological experience can be translated into Quinean empiricist terms as experimental observation. The structural similarity also highlights the most illuminating points of disagreement.

Finally, I will briefly discuss one of these points, namely, that different sources of experience are acceptable for Heidegger and Quine. The latter admits only the five sense organs while Heidegger allows introspection as well. On the one hand, this disagreement springs from the difference of the two author’s conception of the objectivity of experience; on the other hand, it derives from their assumptions about what is the most direct way in which we can have access to the object of our experience.
Philosophics and Φιλοσοφία: On Substantiation of the Research Program

Philosophy remains philosophy, until it is loyal to the ancient Greek model. Modern age produced a tendency to subordinate philosophy to science and created conditions for the science – in the case in question, history of philosophy – to become an effective extra-philosophical cognitive means of philosophy self-awareness of its essence. Yet one should keep in mind that the reconstruction of the essence of philosophy sets a special goal and singles out a special object domain, which means that there must be a special historical and philosophical subdiscipline. We suggested naming this philosophical science philosophics.

In the subject sphere of philosophics the research hypothesis of what the essence of philosophy is, must allow the formation of empirical basis from the texts, identified as the archetypal philosophical texts. Firstly, it is the texts, where the meaning – the whole world of meaning – of the ancient Greek word-concept φιλοσοφία (the work, which was begun by M. Heidegger) is uncovered. Secondly, it is Plato’s works, in which he sums up all the previous thought, acquiring itself by means of φιλοσοφία concept, and where he creates philosophy teaching for the first time. In his teaching philosophy comes to self-awareness, thus concluding its formation and self-determination.

It has to be admitted, however, that from this point of view Plato’s heritage is still insufficiently explored. It seems that the problem here is that for Plato the meaning of the word φιλοσοφία appeared to be obviously clear. For us this meaning, throwing back to mythology and ‘wisdom’, is no longer clear. That is why, while solving our problem, we should read the corresponding groups of texts as mutually complementary.
H. S. Mahdavi
Islamic Azad University, Iran.

A Theory on Existentialism
Melisa McCormick  
Professor, Northwestern Michigan College, USA.
Christopher Kuchuris  
Instructor, Northwestern Michigan College, USA.

Aristotle’s Greatest Contribution to Science

It is a paradox that, of all Aristotle’s monumental efforts, what he thought was his greatest contribution to science, animating everything he wrote, is not only nothing for which he is especially known today, but nothing that is much understood or honored, either as his conception or as it still functions in science.

The causes of this dereliction are numerous, all ironically dependent on the very nature of what he discovered. For his greatest contribution was not some truth about the world, but an all-encompassing insight into the very nature of the attempt to know anything at all, the procedure used to know. And it was the employment of procedures less comprehensive than his that caused the obfuscation and misinterpretation of his insight.

Procedure is the manner in which man formulates his statements about the world, and Aristotle’s discovery concerns both the complete statement of that procedure and the variabilities to which man subjects it by his whimsy or myopia. Yet most commentaries focus mainly on his conclusions, whether the detailed sort of W.D. Ross, or the more sketchy ones by Tradennick, Rackham, Hett, etc., or the attempts like Werner Yeager’s to construct an imaginary chronology of his works, have treated every statement that he wrote as πίσισ, or belief, unrelated to any procedure by which it possesses either its significance or validity. But if conclusions, both their meaning and truth, are totally controlled by procedure, there can be no adequate statement about a man’s conclusions until one has first mastered that man’s procedure. Yet not a single one of the writers noted ever revealed the slightest notion of Aristotle’s sweeping and exhaustive insights into procedure. Hence this paper is committed to explicating one of the greatest, yet sorely neglected contributions to science; Aristotle’s procedure.
Ali Mesbah
Associate Professor, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Iran.

A Three-Dimensional Model for the Interrelation between Religion and Human Knowledge

For centuries, the issue of the relation between religion and human knowledge has been a topic of discussion in the philosophy of religion. Philosophers and theologians have come up with a variety of suggestions for answering the question, solving the problem, or resolving the conflict. This article will begin by an introduction on explaining the concept of knowledge and its various types. The concepts of knowledge by presence and knowledge by representation will be discussed and the three aspects of the latter reviewed. Then a three-dimensional model for the taxonomy of knowledge will be suggested, according to which all human knowledge and their relations can be classified in: a) latitudinal divisions, b) longitudinal hierarchy, and c) depth layers.

A discussion of the essence and aim of religion and the scope of its influence will follow, in which the relation between this world and the human destiny in the hereafter will be analyzed as well. In the next section, the roots of the question of the conflict between religion and human knowledge (including rational understanding and scientific explanation) will be briefly reviewed, and some of the most prominent and the most influential suggestions in this regard, both in the Western tradition and in the Muslim world will be compared and criticized.

On the basis of such an analysis of religion, its dimensions, and scope, and based on the given three-dimensional model of the classification of knowledge, the article will conclude by giving a model for explaining the areas that human knowledge can help religion and religious knowledge, and areas in which religion can influence human knowledge and understanding of the reality of the world as well as the human way of life.
Xenophanes and the Presocratic Study of Physis

Socrates, as portrayed in Plato’s *Apology*, denied being a philosopher who studies nature [*physis*] and denied, as well, that he possessed any wisdom beyond the human sort that is aware of its own limitations. By contrast with this distinctively “Socratic” approach to philosophy, Presocratic philosophy as a whole is often thought to be preoccupied with the study of *physis* and in such a way that fails to heed the proper limitations of human knowledge. Yet Socrates’ focus on the difference between the human and the divine is prefigured more than a century before him in the extant fragments of Xenophanes of Colophon—above all in Fragment 34, which explicitly denies that anyone will ever know the things that he addresses philosophically for one cannot know even what one chances to speak the truth about, “since seeming [*dokos*] is wrought over all things.” At the same time, Xenophanes’ recognition of human limitations does not lead him to abandon inquiry into nature since, elsewhere, he holds that we all came to be out of water and earth (Fragment 33), and still other fragments attempt to justify this view by arguing from physical evidence of various sorts.

The text that will serve as the focal point for interpreting Xenophanes’ peculiar brand of natural philosophy is Fragment 18: “It is not the case that the gods have revealed all things to mortals from the start, but over time, through seeking, [men] discover something better” [*outoi ap’ archês panta theoi thnêtois’ hypedeixan/ alla chronôi zêtountes epheuriskousin ameimon*]. Our reading of this fragment will situate Xenophanes between the tradition of epic poetry and the ambitions of Milesian natural philosophy. We will conclude with a defense of Xenophanes’ “clarity” as a philosopher, in response to Aristotle’s complaint that he made nothing clear (*Metaphysics* 989b18).
Diana Tietjens Meyers  
Professor, Loyola University, USA.

Embodied Empathy and Human Rights  
Epistemology

Empathy, in my view, enables you to glimpse values and disvalues as another person experiences them. This claim gains support while also facing a powerful challenge from Sonia Kruks’s account of sexed/gendered embodiment and visceral empathy. I argue, however, that well-wrought victims’ stories can mediate corporeal differences and enable differently embodied individuals to grasp alternative normative realities. To show how this works, I analyze passages from the anonymously published diary of the Red Army’s mass rape campaign at the end of World War II, *A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered City*. My aim is to explain how the anonymous author of this record discursively traverses the gaps between universal humanity, gendered subjectivity, and particular personhood. While I acknowledge that no victim’s story is guaranteed to engage everyone’s embodied empathetic capacities, I deny that people are inevitably alienated from one another by their biologically and socially conditioned bodies. Victims’ stories bring human rights down from the empyrean of statistical and moral abstraction. By taking their cues from what the other communicates about herself and her experience and viscerally imagining what she has been through, people can extend their understanding of the scope of human rights as well as their understanding of the urgency of protecting people from human rights abuse. What attuned empathetic engagement with a victim’s story can accomplish, then, is to bring a reader or auditor close enough to a victim for the addressee to grasp the monstrous disvalue of human rights abuse irrespective of who is undergoing it and to appreciate the paramount urgency of securing human rights.
Joseph Naimo  
Lecturer, University of Notre Dame, Australia.

**Triple-Aspect-Theory of Being**

The aim of this paper is to apply a process philosophy to which its subject of examination is conscious human being. There have been countless attempts to establish a theory of consciousness and one interesting approach emerges from David Bohm’s interpretation of quantum theory which brings to light certain fundamental assumptions about the nature of matter and mind. Bohm’s theory encompasses in its scope a new theory of mind and matter. Bohm presents a holistic view of two interwoven orders of existence defined as the Explicate material world and the Implicate enfolded world from which the former materialises. Incorporated in Bohm’s interpretation of quantum theory includes his account of the quantum potential and his theory of active information. The focus of this paper is to provide an adapted and adjunct conceptual schema in the form of a Triple-Aspect-Theory (TAT) of Being as a grounding ontology.

Consistent with Bohm’s idea that matter at a fundamental level consists of a kind of protointelligence, the TAT facilitates a perspective based on aspect conditions of the human organism intended to furnish an explanation of the constitutive mechanism (TAT) inherent in the evolving human being. The TAT operates as an organising principle by which it is suggested evolution inherently proceeds and maintains itself in an interactive relation between the Implicate and Explicate orders. The accumulated effect of natural selection is to produce adaptations, but without an organising principle: ‘Consciousness’, ‘Body-of-Experience’ and ‘Intellect-Reflective’ (the terms for the engaged coexistent aspects of being) it is argued could not occur. Consciousness as it is formed in the TAT is taken primarily as an activity, and though ordinarily we use the singular term for this natural kind of phenomenon it (consciousness) indeed displays distinct aspects (particular and universal).
Mah Nazari  
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(Sprit)Soul in Mollasadra Idea

Molasadra, unlike the opinion of Aflaton and his followers, dont consider the humans spirit as stagnant and unchangeable and dont accept the contradiction of Mashayin idea about spirit unity(abstract essence)with body(median) with body, which has not homogenity. He believe that spirit requires substance to incur and get help from the capability and talent which is hidden in body and make the form for yourself, like a member beside another, also contain a movement in essence and nature that can become more complete gradually and he has called its changes as spirit degrees that dont vanish with body annihilation but releases. Finally with a type of centre among Aflaton and Mashayin votes in the issue of accurance and spirit age, has made peace and has offered a third opinion against Aflaton and illuminati and believe three general stage for spirit.
Derrida in the Prison of Aristotelian Logic

Notwithstanding the fact that Derrida acquired a tremendous fame for his brilliant deconstruction of Aristotelian logics manifested in western metaphysics, it appears that he could not transcend Aristotelian logics. Aristotle emphasizes that opposing poles are mutually exclusive and can not enter each other’s realm. Derrida, following Nietzsche’s example, postulates that each apparently opposing pole depends on its “other” as “complementary supplement” and “guest”. It gains its identity in a negative form through its difference. Furthermore, this identity and the presence of its logos is deferred through this “other” in an “abysmal” vertigo. Nevertheless, according to Derrida, in western metaphysics one pole is always introduced as voice, God, logos, light, truth, episteme, center, presence, etc. to help us to escape from the anxiety of a never ending and absolutely uncertain play. At this point, it sounds that Derrida is trapped by metaphysical and Aristotelian absolutism. In fact, he forgets the Aporia and the “other” of his new centers, that is, difference, deferral, subjectivity, relativism, uncertainty and metaphor. He forgets that this is an ironic situation in which he escapes from the anxiety of the play through a firm grasping of one pole as a center or as a God. Deferral is treated as an independent “truth”. In the like manner, difference is viewed as an autonomous "fact" not relying on similarity. Subjectivity, relativism, certainty and metaphor also occupy the same status and obtain a god like and metaphysical status resembling an Aristotelian rigid pole. Ironically, all of these endeavors are in the service of escaping from the anxiety of the play and re-dominating an absolutist discourse.
Carol Nicholson  
Professor, Rider University, USA.

The Philosophy of Arthur Conan Doyle:  
An Illustration of Nietzsche’s Views on the  
Bicameral Brain

I examine the mysterious case of Arthur Conan Doyle in order to try to find out why a trained doctor in the empirically-minded intellectual climate of Edinburgh in the later Victorian Era could have become a fanatical advocate of spiritualism, a believer in fairies, and a self-described prophet of the “New Millennium.” I trace Conan Doyle’s intellectual and spiritual development and contrast his philosophy with the rigorously logical outlook on life of his famous character Sherlock Holmes. I interpret Conan Doyle’s philosophy in light of Nietzsche’s remarkably prescient insights in Human, All Too Human about the two-sided brain. I suggest that the enduring popularity of the Sherlock Holmes stories may be due to Conan Doyle’s brilliantly imagined personification of the two brain hemispheres in the characters of Holmes and Watson. In killing off Holmes, his creator symbolically rejected the left hemisphere of his brain and uncritically embraced spiritualism, which, as Nietzsche predicted, led to the decline of his creative genius as a storyteller as well as the loss of his intellectual sanity.
William O’Meara  
Professor, James Madison University, USA.

Truth is Subjectivity: Kierkegaard, Socrates, and Immortality

Socrates’ personal appropriation of immortality through the development of his moral character exemplifies for Kierkegaard the following “definition of truth: An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable by an existing individual.” In contrast with those who dabble in objective attempts to prove immortality of the soul but contradict that belief with their manner of life, Kierkegaard argues that Socrates puts the objective question as an uncertainty, “if there is an immortality. . . . On this ‘if’ he risks his entire life, he has the courage to meet death, and he has determined the pattern of his life that it must be found acceptable—if there is an immortality. Is any better proof capable of being given for the immortality of the soul?”

This paper shall argue that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates offers a significant reading of *The Phaedo*, especially when Socrates turned away from misology stirred by his disappointment with the investigations into the causes of physical things and turned towards the examination of human values and purposes. Trusting in Anaxagoras’s statement that the mind is the cause of all things, Socrates found that this belief was at least true in human life. Having discovered by his Socratic commitment to the examined life that it is the soul which directs the body, Socrates can reply to the objection that the soul as the harmony of the body cannot exist after death since the parts of the body will no longer be coordinated. For the harmony which comes from a musical instrument does not direct the instrument; however the soul does direct the body; hence the soul is in a way independent of the body and not necessarily destroyed when the body dies.
Marge Paas  
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Things Which Fill the Space of Perceived World

Sensuousness in aesthetic makes us believe that the object is aesthetic object or not. Perception gives us sense data, information, but we cannot know is it true or not. Par example, I do not have the real war experience, but I can expect it from fictional representation of war films, reading the book or looking the photos. I can imagine the rain drops and thunder storm in the music without having certain objects in music, but imitated by the orchestra. I read the poem and I perceive the unreality what is not completely unreal, but this sensuous being which present to me in virtue. This sensuous elements is expressed in visual object and narrative moments between world in the real and world in 'un-real'. Looking the fields of the contemporary culture, we even cannot believe the sense data, because usually it is simulated, manipulated or in other way given in our consciousness. In the following paper, I look the sensuous elements in aesthetic experience and how the signification of the sensuous characteristics is open in our perception. I try to evaluate several critical examples to show how do we really perceive the work of art aesthetically and how react the sensuous elements in aesthetic perception in contemporary culture. I use the theory of the Maurice Merleau-Ponty contemporary theory of sense experience and Edmund Husserls theory of phenomenology.
Donald Poochigian  
Professor, University of North Dakota, USA.

Quantum Theory and the Humanities

Challenged significance of the humanities in contrast to unchallenged significance of science descends from Logical Positivism which arose subsequent to the First World War. Reality is assumed to be what is observable. Science identifies objects and relations; humanities identify relations. Scientific objects and relations are observable; humanistic relations are unobservable. Scientific relations are numeric; humanistic relations are qualitative. Number is observable; quality is unobservable.

Science being a human social activity, though, an understanding of it is incomplete without an understanding of the human implementing it provided by the humanities. As a social activity, testimonial knowledge determines truth or falsity of scientific conclusions. Observation is determinate of science, when observation is intersubjectively unobservable. Only by testimony is observation knowable. Literature being a fundamental means of evaluating testimonial knowledge, it is essential to science.

History and philosophy determine science’s ontological content. Dependent on accidental participant values, there is no necessity in consensuses in different circumstances being consistent, inconsistencies accumulating. Science being incomplete, history and philosophy bring coherence to it by containing science within an encompassing domain. History contains it within an evolutionary domain, and philosophy contains it within an emergent domain. Thus, the humanities condition the content of science epistemologically and ontologically.
Mitra (Zahra) Poursina  
Assistant Professor, University of Shahid Beheshti, Iran.

The Supreme Way of Al-Ghazali in Attaining Intellectual Knowledge

Although the avoidance of sin for attaining mystical and intuitive knowledge has been an acceptable matter in mysticism from long ago, the noetic effect of sin as a moral-religious category in a general sense is a subject that has attained an appropriate ground to be presented after the recent developments in epistemology.

On the other hand, the idea of the great Muslim thinker, Imam Mohammad Ghazali, from the aspect of the acceptance of the relation between sin and the intuitive knowledge is a famous one among Muslims. But the effect of sin on the objective and intellectual knowledge in a general sense seems strange; especially if we consider that Al-Ghazali is known as an anti-rationalist who introduced the restrictions and disabilities of reason.

In this article the author is going to state that Al-Ghazali not only believed that sin is a barrier for mystical intuition, but also believed that sin is, in a greater extension, one of the most important barriers for arising and actualizing intellectuality in man; So that we can even say that analyzing the problem of the effect of sin on knowledge in Al-Ghazali’s thought is not only the studying of the effect of a non-noetic factor on knowledge but, in a deeper and wider sense, is the studying of the quality of the manifestation or non-manifestation of intellectuality in man.

This idea not only gives a more deep sense to intellectuality but represents a more strict explanation of the quality of its realization in man. So the explanation of the mechanism of the effect of sin on knowledge in Al-Ghazali’s system of thinking is proposing a supreme method in attaining intellectual, objective, and certain knowledge which reason (A’ql) attains in the moral training of the soul.
Hannah in Plato’s Cave.
Does Politics Need a Philosophical Method?

Arendt accuses Plato to have killed politics moving her critics from her interpretation of the *Republic* cave’s allegory. Who wants to rule must know his citizens’ issues, while the platonic philosopher stays out of the cave: in contemplation (*theorein*), he does not know what is better for politics.

On the contrary, in my view, Plato and Arendt converge as far as both believe that men have to consider their ethical values, in order to make better their political lives.

According to Arendt’s reflections who correctly thinks, justly judges and acts, as Socrates did. Generalizing this principle, we conform all the opinions to each other and we could fall in totalitarianism. This is opposed to Arendtian aim. My purpose is to show that Plato’s *dialegesthai* can avoid this apolitical result.

The ‘correctness’ Arendt deals with is not verifiable by a stable set of values, but only living in coherence with our consciousness, as Socrates proposes.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates works hard to refuse Callicles’ statements and cannot persuade him to live justly. Dialegesthai is the ‘weapon’ by which such a radical opposition can be faced.

Callicles can live with an unjust soul, nonetheless, he decides to continue conversing with Socrates. This is the most important ground for a good government of politics: despite the conflict of different points of view, people must continue talking to each other. For my proposal, the *Gorgias* is paradigmatic because is set during the Peloponnesian War, that will lead Athens to destruction. Plato wants to represent two different ways to fight and he implies which one, we should chose: if the war destroys *polis*’ life, the exchange of rational *doxai* should govern the political realm. Arendt would agree with this and with the philosopher she always condemned.
Matthew Rellihan  
Assistant Professor, Seattle University, USA.  

Information, Confirmation, and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception  

Ever since Kuhn’s publication of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, philosophers of science and epistemologists more generally have worried that the theory-ladenness of perception poses a serious threat to the objectivity of science. If, as Kuhn contends, what one observes is at least partially a function of the theories to which one is already committed, it’s difficult to see how observation can act as the neutral touchstone against which competing scientific theories are tested, and from here it is but a short step to Kuhn’s famous incommensurability thesis, according to which rational means of persuasion are closed off to practitioners of different scientific paradigms. In this paper, I argue that, despite appearances, the theory-ladenness of perception does not lend support to Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis or to any of a variety of weaker forms of scientific relativism. Appealing to Fred Dretske’s semantic theory of information, I argue that perception is epistemically significant only to the extent that it is the vehicle by means of which information is transmitted from the world to the mind. I then demonstrate that there are any number of ways of perceptually encoding the same bit of theory-relevant information—indeed, there are as many percepts carrying the information that x is F as there are perceptible events nomically dependent upon x’s being F. Theory-ladenness entails, at most, that some of these paths to theory confirmation and the establishment of scientific consensus will be closed off, but it gives us no reason to expect that all—or even very many—of them will be. Thus, different observers may experience the world differently without thereby being led to adopt different theories of the world, and science can be objective and unbiased even if perception often is not.
Katrin Reuter  
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**Biodiversity and the Fundamentals of Biology and Ethics**

The most cited definition of biodiversity is the one from the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), where it is understood as the ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources (…)’; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (CBD, Art. 2). Furthermore, the preamble states that biodiversity has to be protected ‘conscious of [its] intrinsic value’ (CBD preamble), amongst others.

Hence, the term has a descriptive and a normative dimension and questions the distinction between facts and values, which is one of the premises of modern moral philosophy. The specialty in the history of the term ‘biodiversity’ is that the aim to protect something, and also the conviction that it inheres intrinsic value, occurred before the definition of that something was established (see Takacs 1996). But what is that something respectively what does the term ‘biodiversity’ exactly refer to? Is biodiversity everything that has to do with life? Then we need an explication of what it means for an entity ‘to have something to do with life’. This cannot be the same as what biology tells us what life is, because biology only mentions attributes of living things without telling us what precisely makes them attributes of living things. In addition to these ontological questions the term raises questions regarding meta-ethical as well as ethical aspects, e.g.: What does it mean to say that an entity inheres intrinsic value? And how to deal with biodiversity in the ‘right’ way?

These are only a few issues that arise in the wide scope of the concept of biodiversity. As they aim at the fundamentals of biology as well as ethics, answers to them may provide the basis for a better understanding of the term, and thus better research and protection.

**Literature**
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (CBD):  
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml
Amir Sadeghi  
Researcher, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Iran.

Vision of God:  
A Study on Relation between Philosophy and Religious Experience in Islamic Tradition

The "Vision of God", as the significant manifestation of "Religious Experience" in Islamic tradition, finds its roots in Quran and at the moment of Islam’s appearance. However, it were actually Sufis and Mystics considering that gave a more serious aspect to the "Vision of God" from ninth and tenth centuries C.E. Challenging with this issue, Muslim Theologians occupied in a debate, which have emerged and sometimes hostile theological sects in Islamic theology (Kālam).

This paper is presented in two main parts. In the first part the history and background of religious and mystical experience in Islamic tradition will be presented. In the second, I will present an elaborative argument about the reasons of Muslim philosophers’ (such as Avicenna and ḥārābī) inattention to Religious Experience. In my opinion, this inattention raised from the nature of categorizing of this issue in the realm of theoretical discourse of that time. In despite of that historical system of categorizing, we could suggest a philosophical interpretation of this issue.

The paper tries to respond this question:
"Can we philosophically describe religious and mystical experience in Islamic Tradition? If such a description is possible, what is the reason of neglecting that?"
Max Schaefer  
PhD Student, National University of Ireland, Ireland.  

**An Unrecognized Gift: Accessing Being and Generosity through Forgetfulness**

With this work I will argue that auto-affectivity, as conceived by Michel Henry, cannot, if it is to retain its role as the condition of all ontological affection in the world and its beings, be taken as a gift which calls for the renewal of the bond it inaugurates between itself and each individual, as donor and collector, through the latter's recognition of the former's role in relation to it.

For inasmuch as self-affectivity occurs without the mediation of any sense, wholly in itself as the essence of all phenomenological realization, of which the living individual is but an imminent modality, then, I argue, contra Henry, that this obliged recognition tears self-affectivity from itself by inscribing it in a narrative of a first principle whose final signified is mutual understanding. By tempering the forgetfulness inherent in auto-affectivity with an ethical intrigue in the form of recognition, I contend that Henry situates affectivity as a final moment in a narrative of meaning as salvation, as goal and fulfillment, the attainment of which leads man to disassemble his own physiology.

To pass beyond this apogee of meaning, I propose that another history, community and individuality needs to be established in and through the certain immediacy of affectivity that, by virtue of its own radical immediacy, cannot offer a face to face, so that by necessity one partakes and furthers life's ability to feel in an exposure wrought by a forgetfulness outside certainty and uncertainty, knowing and non-knowing. In being delivered over to forgetfulness, I will argue that we by pass beyond our essences, places and Gods, and, in an affectivity that comes from and goes nowhere, attains to its intrinsic ability to come forward on its own as an un-savable yet unbounded growth and generosity of self in self.
Mathematics - Whatever Can Be Wrong With the Foundations?

If you ask mathematicians about the world, it would say, well, everything is fine. If you shake your head in doubt because of what you see around, it would ask you to go to the natural science and the technologies that spin off from it. Yes, whatever can be wrong with the foundations of what produces, through the natural sciences and technology things that work and through the social sciences quantities that stand up to say they represent the results of social research on which social policy could be based? Indeed whatever can be wrong where the computer, the acme of the attainment of mathematics makes the internet, the facebook, google and others create a virtual environment in which handshake no longer determines friendship but a smiling teddy. All this is good and fine, we must admit. And praiseworthy too, we hasten to add. And it did take hundreds of years of building on the foundations of classical mathematics to modern mathematics to intuitionistic mathematics to reach this far. But wait, what about reality? Since nothing stands still, it is not possible to pin the reality of a thing on the ruler, the measurable. And since reality is based on existence which is based on truth none of whose nature and condition is accommodated in our mathematics and sciences, how should the foundations of a mathematics in which everything flows and so changes beyond the dream of Heraclitus look like? And how does the permanent on which eternal values and virtues are anchored relate to the changing? This paper presents new foundations of a mathematics in which these issues are addressed and introduces new perspectives on the fundamental entities of mathematics.
Roghayeh Shanbeh  
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Determinism & Free Will from the Viewpoints of Plotinus & Saadi

Affinities and common themes in human thought bespeak of interactions among opinions of the thinkers throughout the world and over the span of time.

In this respect, contribution of Greek thinkers and philosophers to the world especially Iran is undeniable.

Philosophical and literary thoughts of great Greek philosophers, including: Plato and Aristotle, especially, the Neo-Platonic school of Plotinus have overshadowed the philosophical, mystical and literary thought of Iran, so strongly that we not only witness their direct influence on the opinions and ideas of Iranian scholars, but also trace their philosophical thoughts among poets and writers who are not philosophers.

Among these common ideas is the philosophical issue of "determinism and free will" from the viewpoint of the great third century AD Greek philosopher "Plotinus" and "Sadi" the celebrated poet and writer of the seventh century of Hegira (thirteenth century AD) who regardless of the historical, geographical and intellectual differences which exist between these two great men of philosophy and letters, share some commonalities.

The equivocal view of "Plotinus" on "determinism and free will" where it refers to his belief in predestination and its effects on human life to where it reminds man of his roles and responsibilities, bespeak of his rejection of rejected "pure determinism" and "absolute free will" because he sees man as complicated entity who has a free quintessence, although this free quintessence cannot exist beyond the realm of predestination and cosmic plot.

He believes if human actions were pre-ordained, volition, free will and freedom made no sense. But although he believed in volition and free will in human nature, he never deemed this free will as total.

Such an approach to "determinism and free will" which is in fact the belief in both "determinism and free will" is also significant in the view of "Sadi" on this philosophical issue.

Using his usual technique in Gulistan tales, that is; establishing binary oppositions in creating characters and themes with a dialectic and conflict between two of his characters one of which is in favor of determinism and the other advocates free will, he actually discusses this issue in its various aspects including: aliment, death, effort and the effects of heredity and environment on education so that through
strong arguments of characters in “Gulistan” tales we realize his belief in both determinism and free will in human life.
Matthew Sharpe
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**Therapy of the Psyche: Stoicism and Psychoanalysis**

In this paper, I will consider the distances and proximities between Stoicism, conceived as an ancient therapeutic philosophy in the wake of Pierre Hadot's work, with Lacanian psychoanalysis, the most philosophically sophisticated school of the latter endeavor. Lacan maintained that philosophy wanted to know nothing of the unconscious, separating analytic ethics in *SEMINAR VII: THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS* from Aristotelian thought. For Lacan, psychoanalysis is predicated on the Keplarian break with ancient cosmology, and the Kantian break from any notion of an accessible sumum bonum (highest good)—indeed, for him, the place of this highest good is occupied in the psyche by the primordially repressed Freudian nebenmensch or Das Ding. And of course, differences could be multiplied. Psychoanalysis sides with the poets, and takes its shape from Freud's rereading of the Oedipus and Narcissus myths; philosophy is predicated on the critique of the poets and the mythic world of the presocratic Greeks. Psychoanalysis inherits a modern interest in phylogenesis and ontogenesis which is not central for the Greek philosophic episteme. Nevertheless, there is an orienting proximity between ancient philosophy, conceived as a care of the psyche, with modern psychoanalysis: a body of knowledge which originates in, and always returns to, an intersubjective practice predicated on the liberating power of truth. In psychoanalysis, we will furthermore recall, the patient is invited to encounter the way that her suffering is predicated largely on her judgments concerning things, structured by fantasies originating in a time when the I-other, internal-external distinctions between subject and world have not been stabilised. In this fundamental way, we will suggest, psychoanalysis can be seen as a modern legatee to the founding Epictetan, and earlier Stoic concern, to distinguish those things which depend on us, and the neutral or indifferent externals, which cannot deliver on the eudaimonic promise we insist on seeing in them.
Preliminary Considerations to a Philosophy of Process

This paper introduces the thesis that process metaphysics is an advanced, complete and infinite metaphysic which accommodates an open ontology while conceiving lived reality as emerging process. Referring to Arran Gare’s 1996 study of process metaphysics, I draw on Levinas, Wittgenstein and Heidegger to demonstrate that process philosophy reaches beyond traditional metaphysics in its ontological, moral, aesthetic and metaphysical reach to structure a possible future metaphysical outlook.

The paper speculates that process philosophy is not an extension of traditional western metaphysics but has its own ontologically disparate etiology and character, the main focus of the paper being the elucidation of the parameters of that discussion. I ask what do we mean by thinking metaphysically given metaphysics impacts on its own description, as the precondition for considering process philosophy as a metaphysical view which transcends the interwoven strands of traditional metaphysics.

Metaphysics considered as the configuring principle governing both the history of ontology, that is, the history of the things commonsense quantifies over, and the changing nature of lived reality, explicates the question of Being, that is, why anything exists at all? In order to identify the substantive difference between both material object and idealist metaphysics and process metaphysics it is helpful to distinguish metaphysics from philosophy in general. Ontic difference, the gap between ontology and Being, and the generation of ontology enables the possibility of radical plurality to be explained and hence the change from material object to a process view of nature. Onticity allows Being’s metaphysical articulation to be thought manifesting as Being’s amenability to differing ontological configurations.
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The Incorrigibility of Some of our Introspective Beliefs

Armstrong argues that introspective knowledge cannot be incorrigible. Firstly, because to know something introspectively is to classify an inner state as belonging to a certain concept. But if that classification were immune to error then it cannot be characterized as right classification. His second argument is based on the distinction between the one's inner states and his/her awareness of it. This distinction implies the possibility of there being an awareness of that inner state without there being that state itself.

I think none of these two arguments is sound. The possibility of error is different from the probability of it. The incorrigibility of a belief implies that its falsity is improbable and then it is immune to revision. But even that incorrigible belief by its nature could be false. So his first argument fails to show that introspective knowledge cannot be incorrigible. Moreover, this argument targets the incorrigible knowledge in general and there is nothing specific to introspective knowledge in this argument.

Regarding his second argument I will show that there is no objective distinction between one's inner state and his/her awareness of it. Therefore, whenever a person is aware of his/her inner state then some state is within that person.

But I do not think that all our introspective beliefs are incorrigible. So I will continue to show that how some of our introspective beliefs and therefore our knowledge are incorrigible.
Andrew Ward
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Hume versus Kant on Causality and External Objects

Do Hume and Kant really hold divergent views about the law of cause and effect, viz. the law that every event, or change of state, in nature must have a cause? It has traditionally been held that they do on the ground that Hume holds that there is no rational justification for the law’s acceptance, while Kant claims that the law can be shown to be necessary for the possibility of our perceiving objects. However, if we examine the account Hume gives of why we believe in external objects, the alleged difference between the two philosophers is thrown into question. On Hume’s account, there can be no question of our perceiving external objects changing their states randomly or acausally. There cannot since, on this account, it is only insofar as the impressions of the senses are found to unfold in such a regular way as to allow us to preserve our causal beliefs that we can come to believe, and continue to believe, in external objects changing their states at all. In other words, on Hume’s account, it is a condition of our perceiving the impressions of the senses as the changing states of objects that these objects must be experienced to change in accordance with the law of cause and effect. Consequently, Hume is not in a position to deny that the law has a rational justification given he accepts, like Kant, that we are conscious of perceiving events, or changes of state, in nature.
Rationality and Intentional Amoralism

The bare idea of irrationality\(^1\), the idea that there can be something self-contradictory about the way a person reasons, bears directly on the question as to whether someone who genuinely believes that an action is morally demanded of him whilst ignoring that belief, can be described as rational. Moral indifference of this kind includes cases where a person intentionally ignores his moral judgement about what he believes he ought to do in order to (1) prevent the possibility of being motivationally affected by it, so that he can (2) pursue his personal goals such that are incompatible with that judgement. In this paper I consider the possibility of what I call intentional amoralism\(^2\) in relation to the basic idea of irrationality. I argue that my account of intentional amoralism as a counterexample to the judgement internalist claim that moral judgements must motivate rational agents \(^3\) has several advantages. Firstly, this instance of the indifference phenomenon seen as an agent’s awareness of the fact that his moral judgement has the potential to motivate him to act accordingly, accommodates the common intuition that rational agents are naturally affected by moral concerns. Secondly, being a counterexample to judgement internalism, the argument from intentional amoralism, whilst supporting the externalist thesis\(^4\) – motivation is not essential to moral judgements – does not depend on the Humean constraint on action; the claim that belief can motivate us only in conjunction with an independent desire. Thirdly, and most crucially, intentional amoralism...

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\(^1\) See D. Davidson, (2004). T. M. Scanlon (2007) describes this basic idea of irrationality as ‘structural irrationality’, to be distinguished from claims about what is a reason for what. In his earlier work (1998), Scanlon restricted the term ‘irrational’ to instances of structural irrationality. In this paper I rely on this restriction although I do not provide an argument to support this claim.

\(^2\) Contrast this with certain psychological states such as depression and weakness of the will, i.e. Aristotle’s example of Medea who begs her own hand not to murder her children, her hand being an alien force which overwhelms her or her will.


can explain why motivational failure is not necessarily a rational failure, at least as far as the basic idea of irrationality\textsuperscript{5} is concerned. Finally, this paper aims to expose one of the difficulties with the current state of the motivational debate – an insufficient treatment of intentionality in examining the link between an agent’s theoretical and practical reasoning.
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Philosophical Argumentation over “Unity of Being” in Mysticism

“Unity of Being” is one of the most common topics in philosophy and mysticism. “Being” in philosophy is in essence “existence”. Thus if it is to be “non-existent”, it needs to be “non-existentable”. Since “Being” in essence cannot be “non-existence” then “existence” is quintessential for “Being”. On the other hand, if the necessity of “Being” as equal to “existence” in essence is proved, then “Unity of Being”, its Oneness and Unity will be proved through the Necessary Being Argument. This article aims at presenting intellectual arguments over the concept of “Unity of Being”, as a fundamental issue in theoretical mysticism, in order to prove it in Philosophy. The stated arguments are developed based on and with reference to philosophers’ (e.g. Molla Sadra) approaches and perspectives concerning “Unity of Being”. Moreover, The present paper explores the other philosophers’ perspectives and approaches in accordance with those of mystics like Ibn Arabi. According to him the reality of “Being” is principle, origin of all the manifestations, pure goodness and one in essence. In addition, as “Being” is “One”, then the existent which is One in essence will be One as well. He further asserts that the truth of “Being” is God Almighty who is pure “Being”, pure goodness, origin and source of all the manifestations. Therefore, not only it is true that there is no true “Being” except the “Truth” but also this “Truth” entails manifestations which are manifested and appears in outward levels, in outer existents’ appearances as a result of which Multiplicity appears and the universe merges. In philosophy, as well as Mysticism, the concept of Tashkeek or gradation in hierarchical chain of Being bears the same meaning as it is elaborated on in this article.
On various occasions, Wittgenstein turns to Plato’s dialogues and comments critically on the way that Socrates poses the question about the essence of something. When Socrates asks the question «what is ....?» (what is courage? what is knowledge? etc.), he only accepts a certain type of answer and he is particularly insistent on rejecting any kind of enumeration of examples. According to Socrates, giving an enumeration as an answer implies a vicious circle: one must already know what a thing is to be able to know what counts as an example of that thing. A proper response to the question requires providing the constitutive traits or characteristics of the thing, something that he often calls the δέα or ε δος. Wittgenstein takes issue with Socrates’ questioning, pointing out that it reflects a deeply problematic «craving for generality». He thereby takes issue with the very question to which the notion of essence has usually been the answer. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein considers the problem exhaustively and provides his most forceful reflections on the notion of essence. He seeks to show that the questioning that such a notion is usually a response to - a questioning that he simply calls the philosopher’s effort to seize the essence of a thing (Philosophical Investigations, §116) - is deeply problematic. Our problem will be to grasp what exactly is problematic about this questioning and why Wittgenstein insists on having to return to their «home» (Heimat) the terms of the things whose essences we try to capture.
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The Conversion of Philosophy in the Young Heidegger

In some Heidegger’s fascinating texts – *Phänomenologie des religiösen Leben* (*Vorlesungen* 1919-1922) – the Christian religious experience (particularly into speculative tissue of Paul of Tarsus and Augustine) appears as the paradigm of effective life. In fact, in Freiburger lectures, religious experience is interpreted as a particular form of knowledge that, exceeding the content and the ambition of natural reason, coincides with belief without however stopping it. This reveals that at the founding of life there is not a determinate *datum* (the Being), or a determinate *substance* (the God at creator), but the effective dynamism of same life. This imposes the necessity of a new method of research: the phenomenology.

The issue show that the phenomenology in young Heidegger’s speculation is more than a method, but it is the same philosophy in her original articulation. If philosophy is the original experience that is called into question the obviousness and givenness (*Vorgegebenheit*) Being, phenomenology, as a matter of how and what's not, is the only way to follow it at the founding. Phenomenology is short for Heidegger the same philosophy.

The circuit rises, however, because underlying intuition that life is dynamic is his analysis of religious experience and not philosophical. In an attempt to overcome such difficulties, Heidegger tends to neutralize the religious references present in the readings Freiburg, until ontology, first, content, and impoverish the other hand, the same term phenomenology. Open, short, in a few years, an essential transformation in the understanding of the term phenomenology and therefore the same philosophy.